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Abstract
Since John Locke repeatedly insists that his theory of bodies, endorsed in the Essay
concerning Human Understanding (1690), is a genuinely philosophical assessment of
bodies, the topic of his account adds up to a philosophical reflection on the so-called
scientific revolution in the seventeenth century. In this work, I will develop a line of
interpretation that undertakes to settle the issue what the genuinely philosophical issue
of Locke’s analysis of bodies consists in. This leads to a thorough re-examination of
Locke’s account, since the differences to other interpretations concern most prominent
issues on bodies and, correspondingly, many of their crucial concepts: the substratum of
bodies, primary and secondary qualities, resemblance, the role of corpuscularian theory,
archetypes, real and nominal essences, the argument on species and classification, the
significance of the analysis of language, the concept of knowledge, the ideal of scientific
understanding, and the account of the scope of contemporary knowledge. As will be
argued, Locke consciously assesses contemporary knowledge in the perspective of an ideal
scientific grasp of bodies and thus unfolds a philosophical framework for natural science
which: (1) specifies what a science of bodies ideally consists in, (2) assesses contemporary
knowledge in this perspective, (3) advances an own conception of a contemporary science
of bodies that proposes means to enhance contemporary knowledge, and (4) refutes
alternative ideas of a science of bodies.
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Abstract
Da John Locke wiederholt betont, dass seine Theorie von materiellen Körpern,
vorgebracht im Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690), eine genuin
philosophische Darstellung von Körpern sei, summiert sich das Thema seiner
Ausführungen zu einer philosophischen Reflektion der sogenannten wissenschaftlichen
Revolution im siebzehnten Jahrhundert auf. In dieser Arbeit werde ich eine
Interpretationslinie entwickeln, welche zu bestimmen versucht, worin das genuin
philosophische Anliegen von Lockes Analyse von Körpern besteht. Sie führt zu einer
umfassenden Neubetrachtung von Lockes Ausführungen, da Unterschiede zu anderen
Interpretationen gerade bei den zentralen Fragestellungen und der ihnen entsprechenden
Begriffen bestehen, namentlich von: dem Substratum von Körpern, primären und
sekundären Qualitäten, Ähnlichkeit, der Rolle der Korpuskulartheorie, Archetypen,
realen und nominalen Essenzen, dem Argument zu Spezien und Klassifikation, die
Bedeutung von Lockes Sprachanalyse, dem Wissensbegriff, dem Ideal wissenschaftlichem
Verstehens und der Bestimmung der Reichweite zeitgenössischen Wissens. Es wird
argumentiert, dass er bewusst zeitgenössisches Wissen von Körpern in der Perspektive
eines idealen, wissenschaftlichen Verstehens von ihnen bestimmt und dass er so einen
philosophischen Rahmen für die Naturwissenschaften entwirft, der: (1) spezifiziert,
worin eine Wissenschaft von Körpern idealerweise besteht, (2) zeitgenössisches Wissen
in dieser Perspektive bestimmt, (3) eine eigene Konzeption für eine zeitgenössische
Wissenschaft beinhaltet, welche Mittel zur Verfügung stellt, dieses Wissen zu erweitern
und (4) alternative Ideen von einer Wissenschaft von Körpern zurückweist.
Schlagwörter
John Locke, Substanzen, Ideal der Wissenschaft, Reichweite von Wissen
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General Introduction
Given the structure of the Essay concerning Human Understanding, John Locke’s theory
of bodies is clearly embedded in the overall argument. The account is evidently intended
to spell out the general programme of the Essay with respect to bodies, namely “to enquire
into the Original, Certainty, and Extent of humane Knowledge; together, with the
Grounds and Degrees of Belief, Opinion, and Assent”.1 Locke moreover executes his
overarching project as to bodies in connection with contemporary natural philosophy.
This becomes manifest when he uses key terms of mechanists to express arguments, e. g.
Galileo Galilei’s and Robert Boyle’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities.
Similarly, Locke extensively discusses Boyle’s corpuscularian hypothesis and often adopts
it in his reasonings. And, moreover, he attempts to refute Cartesian and especially
Aristotelian views on bodies. In fact, in virtually all passages on bodies, Locke debates or
alludes to scientific accounts. Since he likewise repeatedly insists that this assessment of
bodies is genuinely philosophical,2 the topic of his account adds up to a philosophical
reflection on the so-called scientific revolution, i. e. on the rise of the new, empirical
sciences in the seventeenth century.
This can be further specified. In the light of Locke’s various programmatic statements it
becomes plain that the analysis of the Essay leads up to its fourth and last book being
explicit on knowledge and opinion. The first book on innate notions forms the backdrop
of Locke’s own positive account and directly motivates the second book on ideas;3  and
the third book on words is justified by its contribution to the fourth one.4 Since,
moreover, the argument on knowledge first assesses contemporary knowledge to
                                                
1 43, I.i.2. Cp. 44, I.i.3. Quotations from the Essay refer to the Nidditch edition. I abbreviate them as follows:
page, book.chapter.paragraph. Citations from other works by Locke refer to the edition of his collected works
from 1823 and are identified by the short title ‘Works’. Other references are by page number to the editions
listed under ‘Bibliography’.
2 Cp. 43, I.i.2; 140, II.viii.22; 287, II.xxi.73; 376, II.xxxi.2;548, IV.iii.16.
3 102f, I.iv.25; 104, II.i.1.
4 401, II.xxxiii.19; 579, IV.vi.1.
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terminate then in a conception of a science of bodies, Locke’s comments apparently
evolve to a philosophical account of natural science. This corresponds to the final chapter
of the Essay where Locke classifies “All that can fall within the compass of Humane
Understanding” into three sciences of which one concerns bodies and spirits, namely
natural philosophy.5 Locke therefore understands his clarification of knowledge as to its
origin, certainty, and extent in the context of bodies as a philosophical argument on
natural science.
However, despite Locke’s recurrent effort to make plain the relationship between natural
philosophy and his epistemology, there is an on-going debate on what the genuinely
philosophical issue of Locke’s analysis of bodies consists in. In this work, I will develop a
line of interpretation that undertakes to settle the issue. As will be argued, Locke
consciously assesses contemporary knowledge in the perspective of an ideal scientific
grasp of bodies and thus unfolds a philosophical framework for natural science.
This approach leads to a thorough re-examination of Locke’s account, since the differences
to other interpretations concern most prominent issues on bodies and, correspondingly,
many of their crucial concepts. To indicate the chief distinctions, the characteristics of this
reading will now be outlined by comparing it with competing interpretations as to central
issues comprising the programme of Locke’s theory of bodies. One can naturally
differentiate between five interrelated aspects. First, I turn to Locke’s analysis of ideas
regarding substratum, qualities, and resemblance and its relationship to corpuscularian
theory, the probably most hotly discussed topic.
According to Peter Alexander, for example, Locke’s philosophical reasoning on bodies
aims at establishing Boyle’s corpuscularian theory by demonstrating that it is an adequate
and plausible account of our everday experience and description of the world. Locke is
conceived as an advocat of the most convincing contemporary hypothesis on bodies who
not only additionally justifies, but also explains and popularizes the theory.6 This
effectively means, Locke’s analysis is a philosophical foundation of Boyle’s scientific
hypothesis, significantly complementing Boyle’s own experimentally based reasonings. By
                                                
5 720, IV.xxi.1f.
6 Alexander (1985), 6f.
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comparison, Edwin McCann maintains that Locke genuinely analyses our everyday
notion of body. But McCann similarly takes Locke to found philosophically the
corpuscularian hypothesis in so far as that it is the sole explanatory account which is i n
accordance with our ordinary conceptual understanding of bodies and our commonsense
views on them and their qualities.7
One aim of the here expounded reading is to demonstrate that Alexander and McCann
misconceive the thrust of Locke’s explanations in connection with Boyle’s hypothesis (cp.
ch. 5 on Locke’s theory of qualities). Of course, Locke does regard corpuscularianism as the
best available scientific account being in line with our everyday concepion and experience
of bodies. Yet, generally speaking, Atherton rightly points out that the genuine issue is
not to establish corpuscularian theory, since even in the comments on qualities, where
Locke is most favourable to the theory, his is concerned with the epistemological topic of
resemblance.8 Following this approach, I intend to show that Locke rather presupposes
than argues for corpuscularian theory. Locke does intend to establish the corpuscularian
account as, at his time, the only intelligible conception of bodies, but he does so only
because he needs the hypothesis as a premise in the argument on the epistemological
issue of resemblance. Crucially, the analysis makes likewise plain that Locke’s central
claims on qualities and resemblance assess our ordinary conceptual understanding of
bodies not in corpuscularian terms, but in concepts of an ideal scientific account.
Not less importantly, Locke’s conception of this ideal scientific viewpoint will be further
specified by an unorthodox analysis of what the issue of resemblance and its relationship
to corpuscularian theory are (cp. ch. 3 on Lockean resemblance). This view leads to an
enhanced reading of what it means that primary qualities are “in the things themselves”,
whereas secondary qualities are “nothing in the things themselves, but powers” (cp. ch. 4
on the reality of primary and secondary qualities). One substantial upshot is that Locke
describes bodies from a particular epistemological perspective which coincides with an
ideal scientific grasp. From this standpoint, bodies are understood in terms of being not
specific for our epistemic access to the world, i. e. for the human senses or our epistemic
                                                
7 McCann (1994), 58ff.
8 Atherton (1992), 122.
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apparatus respectively. This perception-neutral viewpoint is crucial to understand Locke
aright, since it relates to the substratum and real essences of bodies as well. To assess
bodies in this ideal scientific perspective, thus seems to me Locke’s stake i n
corpuscularian theory, resemblance, and the distinction between primary and secondary
qualities.
This account, I contend, is in effect additionally supplemented by Locke’s assessment of
substratum (cp. ch. 2 on the substratum of bodies). The key to this reading is a detailed
analysis of Locke’s conception of substratum in the light of his corpuscularian
comprehension of bodies. As will be argued, commentators do not elucidate convincingly
the depiction of substratum as what gives rise to the “union of properties”, although they
usually acknowledge its importance. According to the here advanced view, Locke
conceives the substratum of bodies in explanatory terms which are neither confined to
corpuscularian nor to any other theory. Correspondingly, one has to read Locke’s
prominent claim that one’s idea of substratum is confused which thus turns out as an
assessment of the contemporary understanding of substratum from the standpoint of an
ideal scientific grasp.
Second, Locke’s theory of bodies includes a theory of classification. Commentators
typically conceive Locke’s comments on species and essences in the light of his criticism of
Aristotelian views on this subject matter.9 Usually, one likewise takes Locke to
distinguish between contemporary classifications sorting bodies in the light of rather
superficial resemblances existing on the macrophysical stage and an ideal scheme sorting
bodies in accordance to their similarities on the explanatory, microphysical level. By
contrast, I will argue that this latter topic is the leading issue of the comments on species,
on essences, as well as on archetypes. To start with archetypes, on first thought Locke’s
claim that ideas are inadequate appears to be an emphasis that contemporary ideas do not
depict bodies by their real essences.10 The explanations of archetypes however add rather
up to a complex account of how our ideas are connected with the epistemic project of an
ideal scientific sorting of bodies regarding their similarities on the explanatory stage (cp.
                                                
9 Cp. Ayers (1991), II, 65-77; Mackie (1975), 85-88; Woolhouse (1971), 99-105; Yolton (1970), 28-34.
10 Cp. Ayers (1991), II, 76.
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ch. 1 on ideas and archetypes). A detailed analysis of the comments on names of bodies
will moreover reveal that Locke uses the distinction between nominal and real essences
to express the profound difference between ordinary species and classifications, on the one
hand, and an ideal scientific sorting in terms of real essences, on the other hand (cp. ch. 6
on species and essences). Both points thus establish that the aim of the argument on
species is not chiefly the refutation and substitution of Aristotelian views, but rather the
assessment of contemporary classifications by comparing it with an ideal scientific sorting.
This issue of ideal classification is furthermore interwoven with Locke’s notion of real
essences, I contend. In the light of his comments on archteypes, species and other topics,
an unorthodox reading of real essences emerges (cp. ch. 7 on real essences). A real essence,
I claim, is ascribed to a specimen as the set of features according to which the body is
sorted in an ideal scientific classification. This view profoundly diverges from the
prevailing one(s), but purports to show that many of Locke’s chief arguments on bodies
afford and imply the advanced understanding of real essences.11 It thus turns out that
Locke’s assessment of contemporary classification in the perspective of an ideal sorting is
essentially linked to his conceptions of archetypes and essences. And since ‘real essence’ is
almost omnipresent in his account of bodies, the issue of an ideal classification is one of
Locke’s primary themes and present in many parts of his theory.
Third, there is Locke’s language critic. Locke puts much weight onto this analysis and
emphasizes its aim to refute competing views.12 In my eyes, however, his reasoning has
not yet been fully apprehended (cp. ch. 8 on imperfection and abuses). One aim of the
advanced reading therefore is to highlight Locke’s account and to make plain its
significance. This leads to a substantial re-interpretation of the argument, since the
proposed reading of real essences is decisive for a correct understanding. It thus becomes
plain how Locke’s language critic attempts to reject for once and for all Cartesian and
                                                
11 In other words: if the real essence of a specimen were traditionally conceived, namely as comprising the
microphysical properties corresponding to the nominal essence of its sort (or, alternatively, as comprising a l l
the microphysical features a body possesses), many of Locke’s prominent reasonings would be incoherent,
conceptually confused, or would in some passages openly contradict his use of ‘real essence’.
12 As Locke emphasizes when introducing the Essay to the reader, he attempts to “[remove] some of the
Rubbish, that lies in the way to Knowledge” by displaying “frivolous use of uncouth, affected, or
unintelligible Terms”. Cp.Epistle, 10.
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Aristotelian conceptions of a science of bodies on purely semantic grounds, paving the
way for his own conception of a science of bodies.
Fourth, in his comments on knowledge Locke advances an assessment of contemporary
knowledge (cp. ch. 10 on the scope and advancement of knowledge). I will argue for two
claims in particular. First, to understand aright Locke’s analysis of the scope of
contemporary knowledge, one has to take into account the developed view on real
essences. Both aspects are part and parcel of Locke’s argument to determine the extent of
contemporary knowledge and to propose an experimental conception for a contemporary
science of bodies that enhances human knowledge.
Importantly, this assessment of contemporary knowledge is advanced on the backdrop of
a conception of an ideal natural science. According to the orthodox view, Locke maintains
a mathematical-like, conception of an ideal science of bodies.13 Roughly speaking, Locke is
taken to claim that one can deduce properties on the basis of knowledge of microphysical
structures by discovering conceptual-like relationships holding between these
microphysical features and the properties. By contrast, I will argue for the contention that
Locke is committed to an axiomatic, empirical theory that allows for mathematical-like
deductions of properties. The decisive difference is that in the latter case one affords
comprehensive knowledge of matter and causal interactions in the first place to develop
this axiomatic, empirical theory. An axiomatic theory of this kind simply represents a
thorough grasp of body. Given this kind of knowledge, Locke contends, one can then
deduce which specific features are possessed by bodies having a particular microphysical
structure. This conception of an ideal science of bodies thus complements the account of
an ideal scientific grasp of bodies from a perception-neutral, classificatory viewpoint.
The upshot is a partial re-positioning of Locke’s place in the history of philosophy. In
rough and ready terms, Locke’s conception of an ideal account of bodies is substantially
farer away from Descartes’s rationalism and closer to Hume’s empiricism than is usually
thought. The problem with Locke’s conception is not that it has a Cartesian,
mathematical-like a priori character, but that Locke is rather naive on the question of its
                                                
13 Cp. Ayers (1970), 39; Ayers (1991), I, 102, and II, 147; Krüger (1973), 243-46; Mackie (1975), 100-103; Wilson
(1979), 143 and 147; Wilson (1982), 249; Woolhouse (1971), 19, 25, and 136.
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material adequacy.
Finally, there is Locke’s comprehension of knowledge as to its certainty (cp. ch. 9 on
knowledge and its degrees). Commonly, Locke is perceived to advance an incoherent
account, namely that his definition of knowledge does not fit with the depiction of
sensitive, i. e. perceptual, knowledge.14 By contrast, a re-interpretation of both the
definition of knowledge and the portrayal of its so-called degrees show that Locke
proposes a coherent view. Accordingly, in both contexts the certainty of knowledge relates
to one’s grasp of the reasons in virtue of which one recognizes the obtaining of a fact.
Since the certainty of knowledge concerns Locke’s generic portrayal of knowledge, the
issue of certainty does not however specifically bear on Locke’s theory of bodies, but
pertains exclusively to the overall programme of the Essay.
The outline has made plain that the controversy concerns virtually all substantial topics
regarding bodies. It has also indicated that according to the here suggested reading Locke
develops a philosophical framework for natural science which: (1) specifies what a science
of bodies ideally consists in, (2) assesses contemporary knowledge in this perspective, (3)
advances an own conception of a contemporary science of bodies that proposes means to
enhance contemporary knowledge, and (4) refutes alternative ideas of a science of bodies. I
rather speak of a “philosophical framework” than of a “philosophical foundation” since
Locke does neither attempt to establish a particular theory, e. g. the corpuscularian
hypothesis, nor any fundamental laws, as Descartes respectively Kant do. Instead, Locke
solely wants to provide a philosophically clarified conception of a science of bodies, the
most that he believes one is able to achieve. In this sense, his theory of bodies intends to
set human knowledge of bodies on the right track: by pointing out which track the right
one is, that one is still at the beginning of the journey, and what the final destination of
the exploration is. He thus determines with epistemological and semantic arguments: the
ultimate goal of scientific knowledge and research, the actual limits of contemporary
knowledge and the probable limits of knowledge in the future, as well as the objectives
and means to enhance contemporary knowledge. Since the following interpretation of
                                                
14 Cp. Alexander (1985), 282f; Ayers (1991), I, 103 and 126; Jenkins (1983), 196ff; Lowe (1995), 174; Specht
(1989), 129f.
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Locke’s account of bodies is structured along the lines of his own discussion, I will come
back to these issues in the final chapter and delineate how in the case of bodies the general
programme of the Essay evolves into a philosophical framework for a science of bodies
(cp. conclusion).
A Note on Locke’s Works on Bodies
The Essay is not only Locke’s major work on theoretical philosophy in general, but on
bodies in particular. To understand therefore aim and force of Locke’s philosophical
programme on bodies, one has to focus on the Essay even though some of its issues are
likewise discussed in his correspondence with Stillingfleet or touched on in The Elements
of Natural Philosophy and in Of the Conduct of the Understanding, which was originally
planned to supplement the Essay. Thus, except for few places, an interpretation of Locke’s
account of bodies is chiefly concerned with the Essay. Since there are only few important
differences amongst the various editions, I will generally quote the fourth one, i. e. the
last one published at Locke’s life time, if not otherwise pointed out.
A Note on Terminology
Locke himself does of course use the word ‘body’, but it is not his preferred term to denote
bodies in the sense I do. He rather uses ‘natural substance’ or even the more general term
‘substance’ to refer to bodies qua natural substances. These two words, however, signify
strictly speaking, not only bodies. Substances are bodies, spirits, and God; natural
substances are bodies and spirits. Natural substances are furthermore contrasted with
artificial substances. Natural substances are bodies qua members of a natural kind, e. g.
men and gold, artificial substances are artefacts like pistols. To further complicate the
matter, bodies can also be characterized as relations, e. g. men as children. The difference
in this case is that only bodies qua natural substances are substances; in other words,
entities being grasped as relations are not conceived as being, or respectively as possessing,
a substratum. In the light of these considerations, it may not seem to be amiss to call
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
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bodies qua natural substances simply bodies.
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Part I
IDEAS: THEIR CONTENT AND ARCHETYPES
Introduction
In the first book of the Essay Locke begins the execution of his overall programme by a
thorough dismissal of a conception of knowledge based on innate ideas or propositions.15
For Locke, the proposal of innate ideas and propositions is the result of a misconception
of what our immediate assent to true propositions consists in.16 He thus rejects both that
there is knowledge adding up to innate ideas or propositions and that knowledge can be
justified by innate ideas or propositions serving as principles to enlarge human
knowledge.17 On this backdrop, Locke motivates the analysis of the second book on ideas.
He intends to show that ideas are not innate, but acquired in the light of experience, e. g.
the idea of substance.18 For this purpose, he inquires into the origin and content of our
                                                
15 104, II.i.1.
16 99, I.iv.22; 101, I.iv.24.
17 Cp. 55, I.ii.15; 58, I.ii.19. Cp. ch. 8b and 10d.
18 48, I.ii.1; 104, II.i.1f; 95, I.iv.18.
PARTI: INTRODUCTION
20
ideas, examines the faculties being involved in their genesis, and assesses their content i n
different epistemological perspectives. This approach, Locke indicates, eventually leads to
an alternative explanation of knowledge and of what immediate assent consists in.19 The
general aim of the account thus is to pave the way for a correct assessment of human
knowledge by determining its foundation.20  
In the comments specifically concerning ideas of bodies, Locke primarily aims at
establishing one’s limited grasp of bodies. The point of his reasoning is however not to
give simply an account of the content of our ideas, since he apparently has a specific
epistemological issue in mind. This becomes plain, when Locke insists that his
assessment is to be distinguished from a scientific, explanatory account of bodies, of their
properties, and of the physical processes that cause ideas in the human mind.21 However,
as indicated in the introduction, despite his repeated efforts to differentiate his own
programme from that of a natural philosopher, it is hotly disputed what the
epistemological topic is.
The aim of this part is to make plain that Locke’s major contentions on ideas of bodies
determine their content from a specific, ideal scientific viewpoint. Locke thus intends to
show, I argue, that one’s conceptual understanding of bodies is far from being an ideal
scientific grasp. This account comprises several aspects specifying by which properties
bodies are ideally to be depicted and in which kind of concepts these properties are to be
understood.
In the first chapter, I will argue for two points. First, Locke’s analysis of ideas of bodies is
an assessment of one’s conceptual understanding of bodies, i. e. of the depiction of bodies
as it is entailed in our concepts of them, e. g. ‘gold’ and ‘man’. Second, in the comments
on archetypes Locke conceives ideas of bodies in the perspective of a specific epistemic
project, namely of an ideal scientific classification. The next chapter delineates Locke’s
characterization of the substratum of bodies and its identification with matter i n
explanatory terms which are neither confined to corpuscularian nor to any other theory.
Chapters three, four, and five reconstruct successively: Locke’s notion of resemblance,
                                                
19 Cp. 55, I.ii.15.
20 102, II.iv.25.
21 Cp. 43, I.i.2; 140, II.viii.22; 287, II.xxi.73; 376, II.xxxi.2; 548, IV.iii.16.
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what it means for qualities (not) to be real, and the argument establishing the account of
qualities as a whole. As will be contended, crucially for all three aspects, ideas and
properties of bodies are discussed in an ideal scientific perspective depicting bodies and
their properties from a perception-neutral viewpoint.
Locke’s comments on ideas thus assess the contemporary conceptual comprehension of
bodies from a twofold epistemic viewpoint. It specifies both in virtue of which properties
and in terms of which concepts bodies are ideally grasped, depicted and classified. For this
purpose, Locke relies partly on corpuscularian theory and partly goes beyond it. In fact, the
result is an intriguing and complex relationship between Locke’s ideal epistemological
viewpoint and Boyle’s physical theory, since the intelligibility of Locke’s arguments draws
in part on Boyle’s model of body. But though Locke’s views on an ideal grasp are
decidedly inspired by Boyle’s hypothesis, it likewise becomes plain that he pursuits a
genuine philosophical project. The programme of Locke’s analysis is to determine one’s
conceptual grasp of bodies in the perspective of what he regards a scientific understanding
ideally to be.
22
1. Ideas and Archetypes
At the end of the second book of the Essay Locke compares the content of an ordinary idea
of bodies with its archetype. He conceives an archetype as what an idea is intended to
represent and identifies the archetype with a real essence. More specifically, some people
refer their ideas to Aristotelian real essences whereas others relate them to corpuscularian
real essences. Yet, despite this difference, all speakers understand the archetypes to be the
real essences of bodies experienced in nature. Locke’s primary claim is that our ideas of
bodies represent only inadequately their archetypes or real essences respectively. In
addition, the ideas are said to be inadequate representations as to the substratum of bodies.
Generally speaking, commentators do not pay much attention to the topic of archetypes i n
the first place,22  but if they do so, they tend to focus on corpuscularian real essences since
they apparently regard corpuscularian real essences as the true archetypes of ideas of
bodies and Aristotelian real essences as only alleged archetypes.23 But this picture does not
fit with Locke’s comments, as a closer examination will reveal. The upshot is a far more
complex account, namely that according to Locke a subject conceives an idea as standing
in the perspective of a certain epistemic project, which goes beyond the idea’s content,
when relating ideas to archetypes. An idea is formed to serve a specific classificatory end
that is not part of the idea. This epistemic intention varies among subjects in so far as they
have different ideas of what the real essences of bodies are, but they share the basic
conception to depict species experienced in nature and that real essences are the
archetypes of ideas of bodies. These insights will prove to be important in chapter seven
on real essences, but there is an immediate implication as well: Locke’s account that our
ideas of bodies are inadequate both as to corpuscularian real essences and as to their
substratum adds up to an assessment of our conceptual grasp of bodies from an ideal
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viewpoint of scientific classification.
The first step is to clarify what an idea is. Giving the gist of Yolton’s interpretation and of
Ayers’s supplemental account and acknowledging both views in principal, I argue in later
chapters that, pace Ayers, Yolton’s reading applies thoroughly to the context of bodies. The
punchline is to give the reader the established interpretation of Lockean ideas at hand as
well as to delineate Ayers’s account against which the argument is directed in the
following chapters. Then, an analysis of Locke’s comments on archetypes contends that
there he links ideas to the classificatory venture a subject has in mind. Both the
differences and the common ground of the Aristotelian and corpuscularian epistemic
project will be highlighted which, according to Locke, speakers pursue with their ideas.
Subsequently, I will make plain Locke’s assessment of our ideas from an ideal scientific
viewpoint. This latter result will be reconfirmed in the chapters on substratum, the
theory of qualities, and real essences.
a. The Notion of Idea
Locke’s central characterizations of ideas highlight them as “the immediate object of
Perception, Thought, or Understanding”.24 Reading this portrayal on the philosophical
backdrop of Locke’s time, Yolton in particular has developed an interpretation which
comprehends Lockean ideas as intentional objects.25 The point is to explain how thought
can be concerned with entities which are “outside” the mind. Conceiving entities, the
claim is, is to grasp them by a mental representation. For example, one can think of tigers
by having a conception of tigers. In this explanation, tigers “appear” in two ways; namely,
firstly, tigers as the (material or physical) entities being referred to by one’s thinking of
tigers, and, secondly, tigers as the (intentional) entities being the content of one’s
conception of tigers, i. e. as the entities being referred to in so far as they are thought of. In
the second sense, tigers are the intentional object or the object of thought respectively,
namely the entities being conceived of in so far as they are conceived of. The difference
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between the two “ontological modes” becomes apparent with respect to their existence
conditions as to non-existant entities. When thinking of centaurs, there are centaurs as
the object of this thought of centaurs even though there are no centaurs in the world to
which the thought refers; while, on the other hand, when no one thinks of gold, there
would be gold in nature to which a thought refers even though there were no gold as the
object of a thought.
Interpreting Locke’s notion of the immediate objects of the understanding as intentional
objects, to say for Locke, ideas are the immediate objects of the understanding, is to
emphasize that one conceives entities only by thinking of them. One conceives entities i n
terms of ideas, i. e. one grasps entities by them being the intentional object of one’s
thought. ‘Thought’ is taken here in a very general sense which signifies all kinds of
intentional states whether they are, for example, sensations or memories. For instance,
the thought of an particular apple might be one’s sensation or one’s memory of the apple.
Moreover, Locke speaks of ideas not only in the sense of them being the content or object
of intentional states, but also in the sense of them being an intentional state. For example,
with ‘idea of gold’ Locke could mean either gold in so far as it is a thought of gold or gold
in so far as it is the object of thoughts of gold.
I prefer to speak of ideas in terms of mental representations.26 That is, Locke’s ideas are
either mental representations, i. e. intentional states representing entities, or the content
of representations, i. e. the object of thought. For example, in the first sense the idea of
centaurs is the mental representation of a sort of entities, namely of centaurs. In this sense
of idea, an idea is specified by its content. An idea is the mental depiction or portrayal of
specific entities, an idea is a mental state which represents entities. One can speak of
course not only of particular mental representations, but also of a type of mental
representations which is individuated by a common content. Two persons have the same
idea of gold, if the two mental representations have the same content, i. e. if they depict
the same entities. And Locke calls both types of mental representations and their token
idea. Moreover, whether ideas are understood as types or tokens of representations, to
highlight ideas as mental representations explains why in some contexts ideas are
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identified with mental states being characterized by having a specific content and a causal
history, e. g. the sensation of yellow. On the other hand, in most contexts and especially i n
connection with his comments we are concerned with, Locke means by idea the content
of mental representations, i. e. the object of thought. He examines our mental
representations with respect to the sort of entities they represent. For example, the
discussion of our ideas of bodies is an analysis of the kind of features by which bodies are
conceived as bodies. Since ideas in the sense of representations are genuinely
characterized by their content, there is a floating transition from ideas understood as
representations to ideas understood as the content of representations. Yet, one should
keep in mind that for Locke ‘idea’ can denote both the content of mental representations
as well as these mental representation themselves.
By and large, in some cases a Lockean idea might be regarded as making up the whole
content of a thought. For example, if one thinks of tigers simply in the sense that one
conceives of tigers as they are depicted by one’s idea, one could regard the whole cognitive
content of the thought as solely consisting of the idea of tigers. More precisely, however,
for Locke ideas serve as aspects of intentional content. This becomes evident in his theory
of knowledge where a “combination” of ideas represents a state of affairs. As will be
developed more in detail,27 to know that a state of affairs holds is to perceive the holding
of that state of affairs, e. g. that gold is yellow. States of affairs are therefore likewise
content of intentional states where a single idea serves to represent an aspect of a state of
affairs, e. g. the idea of gold stands for gold. Moreover, given Locke’s emphasis that not
ideas but only propositions can be true or false,28 if pressed, Locke should concede that
one’s thought of tigers is not simply aquivalent to the idea of tigers, but to a proposition
representing a state of affairs expressing or spelling out the depiction of tigers as it is
entailed in the idea, e. g. ‘Tigers are predatory cats with yellow and brown stripes’. Thus,
strictly speaking, Lockean ideas are aspects of thoughts.
There is a close connection between ideas and concepts. Words are regarded as signs
which acquire semantic content only when they are used to signify ideas.29 Categorematic
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terms like substantives, predicates, adjectives, and adverbs signify ideas whereas so-called
particles, i. e. syncategorematic terms, like ‘but’ refer to relations between ideas.30 This
shows, since ‘idea’ is the central notion of Locke’s theory, that from his perspective
concepts or the meaning of words have to be explained in terms of ideas, namely as the
content of ideas. Concepts, meaning, words, etc. are entities which have to be related to
intentional states of an epistemological subject, i. e. they terminate ultimately in the
content of mental representations. On the other hand, at central places Locke explains
ideas by referring to words. An idea represents what a word stands for:
“§1. EVERY Man being conscious to himself, That he thinks, and that which his
Mind is employ’d about whilst thinking, being the Ideas, ’tis past doubt, that Men
have in their Minds several Ideas, such as are those expressed by the words,
Whiteness, Hardness, Sweetness, Thinking, Motion, Man, Elephant, Army,
Drunkenness, and others: [...]”.31
Given this nexus between ideas and the meaning of words, an idea can be conceived of
characterizing entities in the way concepts do. An idea entails the kind of portrayal of
entities as it is entailed in concepts. In modern terms, the content of an idea amounts to
the meaning, or intension, of a concept.32 In this sense, one’s idea of entities represents
one’s conceptual understanding of these entities. In the contexts, where Locke focuses on
the content of ideas, ideas add up to what one usually calls concepts. For instance, Locke’s
analysis of the content of our ideas of bodies is effectively an account of our concepts of
bodies. More precisely, to discuss “our” or “the” ideas of bodies, means for Locke to
examine the kind of ideas which are commonly signified by our names of bodies. As his
repeated criticism of Descartes’s notion of bodies shows,33 Locke is only interested in our
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usual concepts of bodies, namely in those ideas which are given by experience and which
therefore represent entities in the world. Having said that, one should keep in mind
however that in connection with other issues it is relevant that ideas are menta l
representations.
Ayers has complemented Yolton’s account of Lockean ideas by adding another
understanding of ideas which is present in some of Locke’s comments on simple ideas.
An idea is understood as a mental state in the sense of a “blank effect” of an external
cause.34 A blank effect is a mental state characterized by phenomenological features and
caused by an external power or property. The idea of yellow is, for instance, the kind of
effect which is caused by yellow objects. The phenomenological feature of the idea of
yellow is thereby contrasted by the phenomenological features of other sorts of sensations,
e. g. the phenomenological feature of sensations of green. As Ayers has convincingly
shown, this understanding of ideas is indeed present in Locke’s arguments.35
Now, matters become complicated if one asks what is the content of a simple idea. In
many contexts, a simple idea is said to be about the property that causes the simple idea i n
ordinary sensation. For example, the idea of yellow is about the feature of material objects
which causes the sensation of yellow when one visually perceives yellow. Given this
“causal understanding” of the content of simple ideas, there is a seemingly innocuous
connection between ideas as blank effects and ideas as intentional objects. Simple ideas of
sensible qualities, e. g. colours, tastes and sounds, are individuated by phenomenological
features. Yellow is the property of bodies that causes sensations of yellow, whereas green
is the feature producing sensations of green. But this kind of characterization does not
apply to all simple ideas. For example, the idea of the form of globes is the mental
representation of the form of globes whether one has a visual or tactual idea of the
shape.36 In other words, for Locke there is no difference between a visual and a tactual
idea of the form of globes as there is a difference between the idea of yellow and the idea
of green. On first thought, one might want to explain this difference by pointing out that
it is justified for Locke to take the visual and the tactual idea of a shape to be the same
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ideas, since they represent the same property. These two ideas, one might add, are only
different in the sense that they have been received by different senses. And indeed Locke
does hold that experience has to show that the tactual and the visual idea of globes have
the same content.37 Lockean simple ideas, one could move on, are mental representations
that are prima facie individuated by their specific phenomenological features, but which
are identified by their content, namely by the kind of property causing this sort of mental
representations in sensation. Simple ideas are portrayed as mental representations having
both a property as their content and phenomenological features by which one specifies the
content.
However, Locke’s position is not that straight forward, since there are other passages i n
which a simple idea is depicted as an intentional state whose content consists in the
phenomenological features of a mental state. Sensations are the paradigm again. For
example, in some passages the idea of pain is understood as a mental state being
characterized by phenomenological features which differ from sensations of colour.38 In
this sense, one can move on to distinguish between pondering and stinging pain, i. e.
between ideas representing various sorts of pains. Here, simple ideas do not represent
their cause, but their phenomenological features. In sensations, such a simple idea is
effectively a self-representing mental state; but since there are also other intentional states
than sensations, e. g. memories of one’s having been in pain, simple ideas in this sense
need not to be self-representing states. Rather, more generally, simple ideas of this kind
represent mental states being characterized by phenomenological features. Ayers’s speaks
therefore rightly of two different models of ideas which are partly interrelated and partly
excluding each other. On the one hand, by characterizing simple ideas as blank effects one
can explain how they represent their cause, namely by asserting that a simple idea
represents the property which causes a certain kind of blank effect. On the other hand, i n
other contexts simple ideas are said to represent a blank effect.
Ayers shows convincingly both that Locke’s understanding of simple ideas as blank effects
is part and parcel of his conception of ideas as being mental representations of their cause
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and that the blank-effect model is employed in some places to specify the content of a
simple idea as a blank effect. But I disagree with Ayers with respect to the range of contexts
in which the content of a simple idea is identified with a blank effect. In particular, I will
argue that in Locke’s theory of qualities and resemblance the content of ideas of secondary
qualities is identified with their cause.39 For example, the idea of pain is conceived there
as representing the property of bodies which causes the idea of pain, i. e. as standing for
the disposition of bodies to produce pain. This interpretation of ideas of secondary
qualities implies that Locke only uses rarely the blank effect model to determine a simple
idea as a blank effect representing a mental state being characterized by phenomenological
features. Pace Ayers, there is no clash between the two models, but rather a peaceful
coexistence.40 On the other hand, as we have seen, Ayers correctly points to unclarified
parts of Locke’s theory. Some simple ideas, e. g. the idea of pain, are in some contexts
portrayed as representing blank effects, but in other ones as representing its cause; some
simple ideas, e. g. the visual and the tactual ideas of the shape of a globe, are said to be o n e
idea conveyed by different senses, whereas other simple ideas being likewise conveyed by
different senses, e. g. ideas of colours and of smells, are said to be different. These are no
contradictions but represent either ambiguities or the lack to clarify exactly what mental
representations should have in common to be signified by the same name, e. g. by ‘pain’
or ‘globe’.
b. Ideas of Bodies and their Archetypes
Ideas, we have seen, are mental representations of entities. This means for ideas of bodies
more specifically that they each stand for a species of bodies having a distinct set of
properties. For example, a particular idea of bodies might depict the class of bodies being
yellow and having a metallic shine. Bodies are thereby understood as entities having a
substratum, consisting of coherent solid parts as well as being extended and capable of
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communicating motion by impulse.41 As will be delineated in the next chapter, the
substratum of bodies is the kind of stuff they consist of, namely matter.42 Thus, an idea of
bodies comprises the idea of substratum, the ideas of extension, solidity and motion as
well as a set of other ideas of properties which specify the depicted class of bodies as a
particular species, e. g. as gold.43 Now, Locke assesses our ideas of bodies in comparison
with the epistemic project a subject pursues with his or her ideas. As will now be argued,
Locke’s comments entail that his account on ideas being inadequate as to corpuscularian
real essences and substratum is an examination of our conceptual grasp of bodies from an
ideal scientific viewpoint.
At various places, Locke comprehends ideas of bodies to depict a class of bodies which one
has regularly experienced. For example, in the chapter on the ideas of substances, Locke
asserts that one forms an idea of substances in the light of the repeated experience of
substances having a particular set of properties.44 To experience recurrently various bodies
being yellow and fixed, leads to the genesis of an idea of bodies being yellow and fixed. In
other passages, an idea of substances is said to copy an existing pattern, e. g. bodies being
yellow and fixed. An idea of bodies depicts therefore an existing class of bodies, since the
idea has been formed in the light of bodies displaying a common set of features. In this
sense, substances are said to be the “standard” of an idea, namely the entities according to
which one generates the idea. The idea has its standard in nature.45 Similarly, one puts
together properties in an idea because there are bodies in nature which show a
corresponding union of these properties: “the Union in Nature of these Qualities” is “the
true Ground of their Union in one complex Idea”.46
This account is developed further in his theory of real and fantastical ideas. An idea of
substance is real if it depicts existing substances: if there “are such Combinations of simple
Ideas, as are really united, and coexist in Things without us”.47 By contrast, fantastical idea
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of substances “are made up of such Collections of simple Ideas, as were really never
united, never were found together in any Substance.”48 A fantastical idea is not a copy of
an existing pattern or standard. For example, the idea of a centaur or the idea of a body
possessing the colour of gold and the weight of iron are fantastical, since one has not
experienced bodies of this kind. Yet, Locke insists, a fantastical idea might represent
substances existing in the world even though one does not know whether this is
possible.49 One is ignorant of whether these bodies could exist because one’s idea is not a
copy. Locke speaks at some places of real ideas as if specimens must actually exist so that
the idea is real. However, the characterization of fantastical ideas and their opposition to
real ones as well as passages on real knowledge show that an idea is real even if no
specimens exist presently. Real ideas of substances ”[have to] be taken from something
that does or has existed”.50  Once the idea is made, there need not to be members of the
depicted sort. Locke’s point is that a real idea must be a copy and thus guaranteeing the
possibility that specimens exist.
Locke’s distinction of real and fantastical ideas makes plain that ideas of bodies
corresponding to our everyday concepts of natural kinds serve as copies for species
existing in nature. The epistemic purpose of real ideas of bodies is to portray classes of
bodies which do exist or at least have existed in the world. This becomes evident by the
contrast between substances and mixed modes or relations.51 Ideas of mixed modes or of
relations might have been made in accordance with features of an existing entity, but this
need not to be the case: they are “not always copied from Nature”.52 Correspondingly, an
idea of mixed modes is real even if it is not a copy and is fantastical only if it depicts
entities by properties which exclude each other logically.53
Locke’s account of fantastical ideas likewise makes clear that an idea of bodies represents
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entities in the world even if the idea is not a copy. In this sense, the representative
content of ideas is independent of its epistemic purpose for which it has been introduced.
Whatever epistemic function a subject attaches to its ideas, they represent the kind of
bodies which they depict. A fantastical idea portrays, in principle, bodies in the world
even if it is not truly a copy of some specimens of the sort. This independence of an idea’s
content from the opinions and intentions of a speaker is affirmed rigorously by Locke i n
his theory of true and false ideas. According to Locke, a truth value can be ascribed only to
propositions because only they express a state of affairs.54 Properly speaking, he maintains,
an idea cannot be judged to be true or false, since ideas, if taken by themselves, represent
simply the kind of entities they do. For this reason it does not make sense to call them
either true or false.55 Only ideas which include properties logically contradicting each
other may be termed false as to their content56 - since such ideas do not really portray any
kind of entity. Usually, however, one asserts an idea to be true or false in reference to
another entity.57 As to substances, this means, an idea is related to another entity in the
sense that the idea depicts this entity.58 For example, our common ideas of bodies are false
in the way that they do not depict bodies by microphysical properties, namely by their
corpuscularian real essences.
We have seen, ideas of bodies are designed to copy real existing patterns, i. e. classes of
bodies possessing a common set of properties. But besides this epistemic function, a
speaker has further epistemic intentions with regard to his ideas. One does not only aim
at portraying an existing class of bodies by the set of properties one has experienced.
Rather, one intends to depict these bodies also by properties which exceed the set of
features one has experienced and which go thus beyond the content of the idea. This
means, one has a conception of the bodies that are represented by one’s idea which goes
beyond the depiction of the idea.
Aristotelians, for example, grasp the species being portrayed by their ideas of bodies as
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classes which are characterized by an Aristotelian real essence. By contrast, other speakers
understand the bodies being depicted by their ideas to possess corpuscularian real
essences. Epistemic subjects therefore comprehend the specimens of a sort by properties
which are not included in their ideas. In other words, they conceive the members of a sort
as being a particular kind of entities, e. g. as entities having an Aristotelian real essence i n
common. This account of Locke becomes obvious in his theory of (in-) adequate ideas.
Ideas of bodies, he explains, are used in two ways. Either one refers them to a class of
bodies sharing an Aristotelian real essence, or to a class of bodies possessing
corpuscularian real essences.59 Either way, ideas of bodies are inadequate, since they do
not include either type of real essences.60
This means, a subject comprehends the specimens of a sort as of a particular kind of
entities. Speakers conceive of bodies as being of a certain type of entities what is not
entailed in their ideas. Importantly, one does not only grasp bodies being depicted by an
idea to be such entities; one also intends to represent bodies as such entities, e. g. as bodies
having the same Aristotelian real essence. If one knew real essences, one would form
ideas including these real essences and thus representing bodies as the entities as one
conceives them. In this case, one’s ideas of bodies were adequate since they would
represent the bodies they depict by the features one intends to portray the bodies. More
precisely, according to Locke subjects intend to portray bodies not only by their real
essence, but by their substratum as well. An idea is therefore adequate if it depicts the
represented bodies by their real essence and substratum. One’s intentions as to
representing bodies involves therefore a conception of the properties by which one ideally
wants to portray bodies by one’s ideas.
This comprehension of the specimens of a sort of bodies is entailed in Locke’s notion of
archetype. Archetypes are the entities one regards to be the originals or standards of one’s
ideas. The archetype of an idea is the entity “which the Mind supposes [to have] taken [the
idea] from”.61 One conceives of the standard of an idea to be the archetype of the idea; the
archetype is the entity which one takes the standard to be. In the case of bodies, speakers
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thus conceive of their ideas as copies of their archetype. The archetype is the entity which
one believes the standard to be and according to which one has formed the idea. A subject
grasps the standard as the idea’s archetype, and comprehends the idea as a copy of the
features the archetype has displayed. The archetype of an idea is therefore a conception of
the standard of the idea - a conception portraying the standard beyond the experienced
properties and serving as the ideal as what kind of entity one wants to depict the standard.
Given this notion of archetype and Locke’s corpuscularian belief that bodies possess
corpuscularian real essences, it is legitimate for Locke to apprehend the standard of an
idea as a corpuscularian archetype and to signify the standard with ‘archtetype’ when
discussing the corpuscularian use of ideas.62 This identification of standards and
corpuscularian archetypes is natural for Locke, but one has to keep in mind that an
archetype is not defined as the kind of entity which actually serves as the original of our
ideas. Only if one has an understanding of archetypes which discerns correctly the
(unknown) features of one’s standards, standards can be conceived as instantiations of
one’s archetypes. The case of Aristotelian archetypes exemplifies this. Since speakers
intend their ideas to represent the archetype which they have in mind and since speakers
take their archetypes to be the originals of their ideas, Aristotelians conceive the standards
of their ideas as having an Aristotelian real essence. But according to Locke, bodies do not
have Aristotelian real essences; the conception of Aristotelian real essences is for h im
even incomprehensible.63 The Aristotelian case shows, the archetype of an idea need not
to be also the idea’s standard. An archetype is only the kind of entity which one conceives
the original of our ideas to be.
 Furthermore, an archetype is not only a speaker’s comprehension of his standard. More
specifically, a subject intends his idea to represent its archetype, i. e. one refers the idea to
its archetype. Locke therefore calls ideas inadequate because they are “a partial, or
incomplete representation of those Archetypes to which they are referred”, because they
do not “perfectly represent those Archetypes ... which it [scil. the mind] intends them [scil.
the ideas] to stand for, and to which it [scil. the mind] refers them”.64 The kind of
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archetype, which an idea has, depends on the way it is used by a speaker. An Aristotelian
use of ideas ascribes Aristotelian-real-essence archetypes to ideas, a corpuscularian use
refers ideas to corpuscularian real essences. Locke calls therefore ideas inadequate because
they do not portray the archetype as one uses one’s ideas: “[with respect to both ways i n
which ideas of bodies can be used] these Copies of those Originals, and Archetypes, are
imperfect and inadequate”.65 In other words, ideas of bodies are inadequate depictions of
their archetypes - whether one wants to represent bodies by Aristotelian or by
corpuscularian real essences - since either kind of real essences is not contained in our
ideas. This entails, the archetype of an idea represents the kind of entity as which one
would like ideally to portray its standard. More generally, one’s comprehension of
archetypes embodies a conception of the features by which one would ideally represent a
body.
We have seen, the notion of archetype relates directly to one’s grasp of standards, but it
entails indirectly a corresponding understanding which one has of bodies, species and
ideas. For example, due to their comprehension of real essences, Aristotelians grasp every
body to possess an Aristotelian real essence and to be classified by it into a species. The
members of each species are regarded to share the same Aristotelian real essence.
Consequently, they believe that the inclusion of further properties of the macrophysical
level, which are displayed by several specimens, is a perfection of the idea they already
have of that species. The possession of the same Aristotelian real essence is seen to
guarantee that all members of a species have in common the same features of the
macrophysical level. Locke brands this understanding of one’s ideas (and words) as an
abuse of language which according to him leads to false knowledge claims raised by the
Aristotelians.66 Moreover, due to their comprehension of species, real essences and
archetypes, Aristotelians conceive their ideas as part of a scientific project to classifiy
bodies ideally according to their respective Aristotelian real essence. Corpuscularians, by
contrast, see themselves to sort bodies ultimately as to corpuscularian real essences. In the
chapter on language and species, I will highlight this latter claim. Thus, from their own
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perspective speakers pursue a certain epistemic project of classification; and depending on
their understanding of bodies, species and real essences, subjects might have a different
outlook on their depiction of bodies by their ideas.
Yet, despite the differences, both Aristotelians and corpuscularians recognize that their
ideas are copies of standards in nature. Ideas are not only partial representations of their
archetypes, but foremost copies of an experienced set of properties. Aristotelians and
corpuscularians disagree over the epistemic purpose of their ideas only as to what goes
beyond experience or respectively beyond the content of their ideas. Their respective
beliefs in archetypes affect solely the broader outlook of the classification represented by
their ideas. This corresponds to Locke’s stance that the representative content of an idea is
independent of the opinions and intentions one has. Thus for Locke, Aristotelians still
have ideas of bodies which relate to bodies in the world regardless of their thoroughly
false conception of bodies, species and real essences. The common ground of Aristotelians
and corpuscularians is their use of ideas to copy and represent existing sorts of bodies.
Importantly, since Locke regards the corpuscularian understanding of archetypes as
correct, his more specific comments on the corpuscularian use of ideas are effectively an
assessment of one’s ideas and classification of bodies from an ideal scientific viewpoint.
As we have seen, for Locke ideas ideally depict bodies by their corpuscularian real
essences. Consequently, Locke regards our ordinary ideas as provisional. According to
him, one makes use of features of the macrophyiscal level only because of our ignorance
of corpuscularian real essences and as a substitution for real essences.67 Properties of the
macrophysical level serve as a substitution of unknown real essences because one takes
only those properties into one’s ideas which one believes to be identical with parts of the
real essence of the standard. Here the corpuscularian understanding of the reduction or
identification of properties comes into play. For example, the colour of a body is
comprehended as being identical to parts of the microphysical surface of the body.
Features of the macrophyiscal level are thus identified with microphysical properties.
Rough and ready in Lockean terms, features of the macrophysical level depend on  the
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real essence of the body.68 Therefore, due to this correspondence or identity relationship
between properties of the macrophysical level with features of the microphysical stage,
the former can be taken as placeholders and substitutions for the latter. All properties of a
standard which depend on its real essence, or microphysical internal constitution
respectively, have a right to be included.69 Correspondingly, according to Locke one does
not include features in an idea which one regards as not depending on the real essence of
its standard. For example, if one generates an idea of gold, one does not take the form of
its standard into the idea because one cannot conceive its form to depend on its real
essence.70 The precedence of real essences over properties of the macrophysical level finds
also expression when Locke judges our ideas still as inadequate even if they contained all
the features of the macrophysical level which depend on the real essences of their
standards.71 Thus, the inclusion of properties in an idea is understood in the perspective
of representing the corpuscularian real essence of the standard.
On the other hand, when portraying ideas of bodies in general, Locke puts forward
another conception of ideas, namely that ideas serve to copy sets of features experienced
recurrently. Consequently, this means for him, every property or set of properties may be
taken into an idea which has been experienced repeatedly. As he puts it, every property,
which has been found together with other features, has the right to be included in an idea:
“For the complex Ideas of Substances, being made up of such simple ones as are supposed
to coexist in Nature, every one has a right to put into his complex Idea, those Qualities he
has found to be united together.”72 In other words, properties making up an idea have
“no more original precedency, or right to put it, and make the specifick Idea, more than
others that are left out”.73 Since this is a general conception as to ideas of substances in so
far as they are (real) ideas of substances, an ideal idea is a copy of a recurrently experienced
set of features.
The present point is that at first sight Locke gives two different conceptions of the
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properties which are included and which are ideally to be included in ideas. On the one
hand, ideas include only properties depending on the real essence of their standard as a
substitution for the standard’s unknown, corpuscularian real essence which ideas ideally
contain. On the other hand, ideas comprise and ideally comprise features that are found
repeatedly together in various bodies. Crucially, these two conceptions of ideas are not
detached from one another. They apparently go hand in hand, since Locke mentions
them in the same contexts: properties of an idea’s standard which are regarded as being
left out are features that both depend on the real essence and go together regularly.74
How can these two conceptions of ideas of bodies be squared with one another? The usual
readings of corpuscularian real essences cannot accomplish this, as we will see in chapter
seven.75 And as will be argued there as well, in the light of a different understanding of
what Locke’s corpuscularian real essences are, both conceptions turn out to be effectively
aquivalent.76 By and large, a classification as to real essences, is the sorting of bodies
according to their microphysical similarities. And since similarities are sets of features
which can be experienced repeatedly, the recurrent experience of microphysical properties
that coexist in bodies, is the experience of microphysical similarities among bodies. To
represent bodies by their real essence, is thus effectively the depiction of bodies by the
largest set of microphyiscal features which recurrently coexists, namely by their
microphysical similarities. If real essences are thus understood, it likewise becomes plain
how features of the macrophysical level serve as substitutions for real essences. Due to the
correspondence relationship, similarities on the macrophysical stage correspond to
similarities on the microphysical level. A sorting of bodies in accordance with repeatedly
experienced similarities on the macrophysical level approximates a classification of bodies
in accordance with their microphysical similarities. By contrast, the traditional
comprehension of Lockean real essences fails to deliver a satisfying answer as to the role
properties of the macrophyiscal level play as substitutions for corpuscularian real
essences.
As argued, ideas are said to be inadequate as to Aristotelian and corpuscularian
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archetypes. That is, ideas of bodies are inadequate as to the features by which a speaker
ideally wants to portray bodies. Ideas are therefore inadequate as to Aristotelian and
corpuscularian real essences as well as to the substratum of bodies. However, in his
comments Locke evidently focuses on corpuscularian real essences. In the summary of
II.xxxi, the inadequacy as to Aristolian real essences is not mentioned any longer and the
one as to substratum is briefly acknowledged for the first time. Moreover, in subsequent
discussions ideas of bodies are said to be (in-) adequate, more or less, only with respect to
corpuscularian real essences.77 In addition, Locke’s comments on our general epistemic
venture and on the specific corpuscularian project naturally relate to his theory of an
ideal classification since ideas of bodies represent species. To say that bodies are to be
depicted by sets of features which have been experienced repeatedly, is to maintain that
bodies are to be sorted according to their similarities. To assert that bodies are ideally
portrayed by their corpuscularian real essence, is to contend that one ideally classifies
bodies into species by their corpuscularian real essence. Thus, taking everything into
account, in his comments on inadequacy Locke effectively assesses our ideas of bodies i n
the perspective of an ideal classification. That is, when claiming that ideas of bodies are
inadequate as to corpuscularian real essences, Locke determines our conceptual
understanding of bodies in the perspective of an ideal classification.
Importantly, the proposed ideal of ideas portraying bodies by their corpuscularian real
essences applies to our ideas solely from a scientific viewpoint. Locke concedes that i n
everyday life one would still make use of our ordinary ideas, even if we knew real
essences, since with our senses one can recognize and determine substances of a particular
sort only by features of the macrophysical level.78 After all, we do not have microscopical
eyes to discover handily the real essence of a substance.79 This acknowledgement of the
need of ideas for our everyday use implies a devision between two sorts of ideas and,
correspondingly, two sorts of language, namely one for everyday life and one for scientific
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investigations. This ties in with Locke’s remark to Stillingfleet that he does not claim that
ideas of bodies are necessarily inadequate because not all speakers refer them to real
essences as the archetypes of their ideas.80 It depends on the speaker and his epistemic
interests. Yet, this does not imply a principal devision between, on the one hand, laymen
and, on the other hand, corpuscularians and Aristotelians, since for Locke both laymen
and Aristotelians abuse their names of bodies by referring them to unknown real
essences. In this latter case, there is only the difference that Aristotelians further obscure
their use of words by an unintelligible theory of real essences.81 This indicates that,
according to Locke, speakers do generally refer their ideas of bodies to real essences qua
archetypes.
Locke’s focus is, however, on adequate ideas serving our scientific purposes and interests.
It is his epistemological backdrop why in his account adequate ideas take precedence over
our everyday, inadequate ideas. He is interested in determining the correct understanding
of the classificatory quest which looms in the content and formation of our everyday ideas
of bodies, and in assessing the content of our ideas from this ideal scientific viewpoint.
From the scientific perspective, Locke contends, one should comprehend our ideas in the
perspective of corpuscularian real essences.
This account is enhanced by the results of chapter five. For real essences are understood i n
terms of microphysical primary qualities which, as will be argued, are features in terms of
which bodies are conceived from an ideal scientific viewpoint. The same applies to the
substratum of bodies, since it is likwise elucidated in terms of microphysical primary
qualities as will be delineated in the next section. This scientific standpoint is generally
speaking the physical one, but more specifically a particular epistemological one as well.
Locke’s focus on a corpuscularian understanding of archetypes thus means that his
argument on inadequacy determines our everyday comprehension of bodies from an
ideal scientific standpoint: our everyday ideas do neither characterize bodies by
corpuscularian real essences nor by their substratum. And, as has been shown, this
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assessment stands in the perspective of an ideal classification.
This account becomes more clear in the following chapters. Having said that, we can turn
to the next section where Locke’s notion of substratum will be reconstructed and his
account that our comprehension of the substratum of bodies is confused.
42
2. The Substratum of Bodies
Locke develops his theory of the substratum of bodies as part of his account of our
common ideas of substances. Every idea of substances, Locke asserts, contains the idea of
substratum. The inclusion of this idea, which is also called the general idea of substance,
is precisely what makes an idea of substances to an idea portraying (a class of) substances.
In other words, to have or be a substratum is to be a substance. A substratum is thereby
understood to be the “cause of the union” of all the other properties unified in an idea of
substances.82 Moreover, Locke presupposes general agreement rather than demonstrates
that our common ideas of bodies, finite spirits, e. g. human minds, and God include the
idea of substratum.83 But this idea of substratum, Locke argues, is confused. The stress of
Locke’s chief contention that our ordinary ideas of bodies and of spirits contain a confused
idea of substratum, therefore does not lie on our possession of an idea of substratum, but
on the fact that we just have a confused one. Now, as to bodies, Locke’s explanations on
substratum add up to this general claim.84 This means in the light of Locke’s notion of
idea that his chief reasoning is an argument for the thesis that our conceptual
comprehension of the substratum of bodies is in some sense confused.
This “knowledge thesis” comprises two aspects, namely what a substratum is and what it
means that the idea is confused. I will agree on the latter issue with what has been
suggested by other commentators, e. g. Ayers, even though I am going to disagree with
their interpretations of what a substratum consists in. One can hold on to the suggested
notion of confusion, but replace the understanding of substratum. With respect to
substratum, however, an alternative reading will be developed. There are two diverse,
common lines of interpretation. One is Bennett’s view that a substratum is a featureless,
pure logical subject, the other one highlights the substratum of bodies as a specific set of
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(micro-) physical properties which has been differently determined by different
commentators. Generally speaking, I agree with those proponents of the latter line of
interpretation who identify the substratum of bodies as matter. But there is largely
disagreement with respect to the details of the argument. In my eyes, one commonly
misses the point of Locke’s formula that a substratum is the cause of the union of
coexisting properties. What he means by this depiction is usually not elucidated, but it
reveals both that his comments are more coherent and that he advances a more subtle
account than current readings suggest.
To come to grips with Locke’s reasoning for the knowledge thesis, his notion of the
substratum of bodies will first be discussed and subsequently the assertion that the idea of
substratum is confused. Then, Locke’s justification will be analysed that our ordinary
ideas of bodies contain a confused idea of their substratum. Finally, the conclusion will be
drawn that Locke conceives the substratum of bodies in the perspective of an ideal
scientific comprehension of bodies. This account will be confirmed in chapter five on the
theory of qualities which re-establishes that Locke’s analysis of the ideas of bodies assesses
our conceptual grasp of bodies from an ideal scientific viewpoint.85
a. The Notion of the Substratum of Bodies
At the beginning of the chapter on the ideas of substances, Locke officially introduces the
notion of substratum. The advanced characterization is repeated in the course of the
explanations and also in other passages.86 Moreover, since ‘to inhere in’ and ‘to support’
are aquivalent to ‘to subsist in’, as will be explained below, the same use of ‘substratum’
appears at further places as well.87 Locke introduces ‘substratum’ as follows:
“§1. THE Mind, being, as I have declared, furnished with a great number of the
simple Ideas, conveyed in by the Senses, as they are found in exteriour things, or by
Reflection on its own Operations, takes notice also, that a certain number of these
simple Ideas go constantly together; which being presumed to belong to one thing,
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and Words being suited to common apprehensions, and made use for quick
dispatch, are called so united in one subject, by one name; which by inadvertency
we are apt afterward to talk of and consider as one simple Idea, which indeed is a
complication of many Ideas together; Because, as I have said, not imagining how
these simple Ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom our selves, to suppose
some Substratum, wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result, which
therefore we call Substance. ”88
In the first part of §1 Locke describes the process of acquiring the idea of substratum as part
of our forming ideas of substances. After having repeatedly experienced the same set of
properties in several particulars or in one’s own mind (“that a certain number of these
simple Ideas go constantly together”),  these properties are regarded to belong to the same
subject: “which (i. e. properties) being presumed to belong to one thing,  ..., are called s o
united in one subject”. That is, the regularly experienced bond of properties results in our
assumption that these properties are features of the same entity. In the same light one has
to read the last part of §1 and in particular the notion of ‘to subsist’, since Locke refers back
to what he has said before (“as I have said”): the repeated experience of the same
properties being together leads to our assumption of a substratum, i. e. we suppose that
these entities have a substratum (“not imagining how these simple Ideas can subsist by
themselves, we accustom ourselves, to suppose some Substratum, wherein they do
subsist”). This means, Locke specifies our supposition that properties belong to the same
entity as the assumption of a substratum, namely as the supposition of a substratum being
understood as what explains the experienced union of properties. To say that the same
properties are found together because they are properties of the same entity, is for Locke to
say that the bond of the properties is due to a substratum. A substratum is therefore what
explains the bond of properties by elucidating how these features are properties of the
same entity.
In other words, ‘substratum’ is an explanatory notion introduced to designate that feature
of substances which accounts for the experienced union of the same properties.
Correspondingly, by ‘some x subsist in y’ Locke means roughly ‘the bond of some x is due
to y’. And likewise one has to understand similar expressions being used in subsequent
paragraphs and elsewhere; i. e. ‘to support’ and ‘to inhere in’ denote the same relationship
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between a set of properties and a substratum, namely, as Locke puts it, that the substratum
is the cause of the union of coexisting properties.89 Furthermore, Locke’s reference to
regularity means that the assumption of a substratum is caused by the recurring
experience of the same set of properties. This does not mean, however, that Lockean
substratum is defined by explaining this recurrence. One does not suppose a substratum to
explain the fact that one has repeatedly experienced a set of properties. This can be taken
from other passages where Locke uses similar phrases to depict substratum, but without
relating this to regularity.90 Rather, as Ayers has pointed out, the supposition of a
substratum is a specific response of the mind to the (repeated) experience of the union  of
properties to explain the union of the features, but not the regularity of the experience.91   
The point seems to be that the experience of a set of properties cries for an explanation of
how these properties are interrelated, and our epistemic response is to assume that a real
or ontological bond exists between the features.92 The general character of this kind of
experience, namely that it is not confined to any particular properties, explains why
Locke’s conception of substratum applies to all kinds of features, i. e. to simple ideas of
sensation and of reflection. This is the reason why a substratum is purely functionally
understood as what accounts for the union of properties and as applying to all kinds of
substances. Locke expresses the functional conception of substratum by saying that “we
have no Idea of what it is, but only a confused obscure one of what it does.”93 It is
important to note that ‘substratum’ is defined as a general conception which applies
uniformly to all kinds of substances, namely to bodies, finite spirits like human minds,
and God. For if one overlooks the uniformity of Locke’s conception, one is easily driven
into the direction Alexander goes, namely to understand ‘substratum’ as denoting a
mixed bag of different stuffs which do not have a generic conception of a substratum is
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common.94  
As we have just seen, according to Locke the experience of the same set of properties leads
to one’s supposition of “some substratum” to explain the union of the features found
together. A substratum is thus functionally characterized as what explains the bond of
properties which one encounters. In this sense, a substratum is characterized by a causal
relationship: a substratum causes the union of features. To put it in slightly paradoxical
terms, a substratum is the bond of properties qua being the cause of their bond. This
causal understanding of Lockean substrata suggests, of course, that a substratum is to be
identified with a set of other properties which substances have, e. g. microphysical ones. A
substratum is the set of those properties of substances which explain the bond of the
experienced features of an entity. In what follows the leading question will be to assess
more precisely which properties of bodies comprise their substratum.
But before turning to the matter, a radically different line of interpretation should be
discussed first. For, according to Bennett, the advanced approach is already on the wrong
track and sets a completely false perspective in which to interpret Locke’s further
explanations. Bennett maintains what he calls the “Leibnizian interpretation”,95 since he
believes that Leibinz has already interpreted Locke correctly: for Locke a substratum is a
“pure logical subject”. ‘Substratum’ is like the dummy concept ‘thing’ which can be used,
even if one gives an exhaustive description of an entity’s features: ‘This thing has the
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properties A, B, C, etc.’96 In this sense a substratum is a featureless subject to which one
predicates properties only to make explicit that these properties belong to the same entity.
And a substratum is pure logical in so far as it is stripped off any features. This means, if
one equates a substratum with a set of explanatory basic properties, one is on the wrong
track. According to this reading, Locke puts forward an argument which explains the
substratum of a substance as a featureless something which serves as a subject i n
predications to depict a substance.
However, this view faces three difficulties at least. Firstly, given Locke’s notion of obscure
and confused ideas, as understood below, the idea of substratum would be neither obscure
nor confused. Locke’s knowledge thesis would become obscure itself. Secondly, to
elucidate a substratum as a pure logical subject, would introduce incoherences in other
parts of his explanations. Given Bennett’s view, there would be no point for Locke to
discuss whether the substance of finite spirits could exist or not. If the substratum of finite
spirits were a pure logical subject, it would not make sense for Locke to argue that it
exists.97 Thirdly, in the very same context, Locke also suggests that there are two different
kinds of substrata, namely one for bodies and one for spirits. This becomes evident in the
Stillingfleet correspondence where Locke clarifies his explanations by asserting that the
substance of finite spirits need not to be necessarily immaterial, but could also be
material.98 But a distinction between two kinds of substrata would be implausible, if
substrata were pure logical subjects. The alternative line of interpretation faces certainly
its own difficulties, in the way it has been developed by Alexander or Ayers.99 Yet, despite
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Bennett’s rebuttal of criticism, the objections to the former views are not as big as the
incoherences implied by his own one.100
In §2 Locke moves on to argue that we have zero or only limited knowledge of substrata.
He claims subsequently that corpuscularians, children or the laymen do not really know
what the substratum of bodies is. In particular, the knowledge thesis is expressed in idea-
theoretic terms, namely that one does not have a clear and distinct, but only a confused
and obscure idea of substratum.101 We will come back to what this claim exactly means.
More importantly, when exemplifying one’s limited knowledge of substrata, Locke
delivers a corpuscularian conception for the substratum of bodies. This account will help
to examine what Locke means by substrata. The crucial question of interpretation is how
to understand the corpuscularian model:
“§2. So that if any one will examine himself concerning his Notion of pure
Substance in general, he will find he has no other Idea of it at all, but only a
Supposition of he knows not what support of such Qualities, which are capable of
producing simple Ideas in us; which Qualities are commonly called Accidents. If
any one should be asked, what is the subject wherein Colour or Weight inheres, he
would have nothing to say, but the solid extended parts: And if he were demanded,
what is it, that that Solidity and Extension inhere in, he would not be in a much
better case, than the Indian before mentioned; who, saying that the World was
supported by a great Elephant, was asked, what the Elephant rested on; to which his
answer was, a great Tortoise: But being again pressed to know what gave support to
the broad-back’d Tortoise, replied, something, he knew not what. And thus here, as
in all other cases, where we use Words without having clear and distinct Ideas, we
talk like Children; who, being questioned, what such thing is, which they know
not, readily give this satisfactory answer, That is it something; which in truth
signifies no more, when so used, either by Children or Men, but that they know not
what; and that the thing they pretend to know, and talk of, is what they have no
distinct Idea of at all, and so are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark. The Idea
then we have, to which we give the general name Substance, being nothing, but
the supposed, but unknown support of those Qualities, we find existing, which we
imagine cannot subsist, sine re substante, without something to support them, we
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call that Support Substantia; which, according to the true import of the Word, is in
plain English, standing under, or upholding.”102
Locke argues that even corpuscularians and their sophisticated understanding of bodies
fall short in giving an adequate explanation of substratum. According to Locke, all of us, i.
e. including the corpuscularians, talk like children when speaking of the substratum of
bodies, since we do not know what it is. On the other hand, since Locke evidently believes
corpuscularian theory to be true, the corpuscularian model of bodies certainly embodies
the most intelligible conception of what one does not know, namely the most qualified
account of what explains the experienced bond of properties. To point out the ignorance
of corpuscularians, Locke draws the picture of three successive stages of explaining the
union of properties. He does this in analogy to the way an Indian philosopher makes
plain the “upholding of the world”. First there is the world being upholded, i. e. what has
to be explained; then there is an elephant holding up the world; then a tortoise holding
up the elephant; and then a one-knows-not-what holding up the tortoise. That is, the
Indian does not know what truly explains the upholding of the world. Likewise, Locke
expounds a corpuscularian-theory inspired model of three different levels of explanatory
properties. First there is the union of properties, i. e. what has to be explained; then
extension and solidity; and then a one-knows-not-what. Now, the decisive question is
how to understand this model and its implications for Locke’s conception of the
substratum of bodies.
Mandelbaum has suggested to identify the substratum of a body with its real essence.103
He maintains the common view, criticized in part two, that the real essence is a
microphysical structure which is specific for the specimens of a sort. The basic argument
for this interpretation is that corpuscularian theory conceives the union of experienced
properties in terms of real essences. That is, the model Locke proposes in §2 is taken to
imply that the substrata (of sorts) of bodies are their real essences. If the argument were
true, it would be a strong one, since Locke’s affiliation to corpuscularian theory indicates
indeed that he comprehends the union of properties along corpuscularian lines. I will
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contend, however, that a corpuscularian understanding of the bond of properties consists
in fact in a different view. But before delineating the alternative account it is worth
noting that Mandelbaum’s reading has difficulties to square Locke’s explanations.
First of all, Mandelbaum’s interpretation and similar ones hinge decisively on their
reading of Locke’s corpuscularian model, since there is virtually no additional textual
evidence supporting their reconstruction. Only §3 of the chapter on the ideas of
substances suggests prima facie that for Locke the substratum of a body is its real essence,
since he uses there an expression to denote the substratum of a sort which he otherwise
applies to its real essence, namely ‘the particular internal Constitution, or unknown
Essence of that Substance’. On the other hand, given strong evidence for an alternative
interpretation of ‘substratum’, one can also read Locke as being only (verbally) imprecise
in not distinguishing here properly between substratum and real essence. In any case, i n
§3 Locke does not clearly equate ‘substratum’ with ‘real essence’, so that this passage alone
does not support sufficiently Mandelbaum’s reading if he is mistaken about the
corpuscularian understanding of bodies. To turn the tables, given the importance of both
notions, one would expect Locke to make plain such a significant identification, e. g.
when introducing ‘real essence’ officially.104 But at no place Locke asserts explicitly that
‘real essence’ denotes substrata.105
More importantly, whether his view of corpuscularian theory is correct or not, critics
have shown that Mandelbaum interprets effectively Locke’s explanation in §2 as
incoherent.106 The objection runs as follows. If one identifies the substratum of a body
with its real essence, the real essence appears as the one-knows-not-what on the third
level. In addition, according to corpuscularian theory the real essence of a body is
explained from a microphysical viewpoint in terms of the extension of cohering solid
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elementary particles, i. e. corpuscles. This means, if the substratum were a real essence,
microphysical solidity and extension would be assumed to be explanatory basic, i. e. to be
on the third stage. Consequently, as Yolton and Ayers have indeed maintained,107 when
Locke says in §2 that a corpuscularian cannot explain solidity and extension, he must be
read as referring to macrophysical solidity and extension of bodies. But if this were so, the
critic now urges, Locke would not draw in §2 a picture of successive stages of explanation,
as he apparently intends to do. For macrophysical solidity and extension does neither
elucidate the experienced set of properties nor their bond. Macrophysical solidity and
extension are features of the same level as the experienced properties are. Even worse, for
Locke macrophysical extension and solidity are characteristics of bodies and therefore part
of the set of features whose bond is to be specified. In short, if Locke intended to elucidate
the substratum as the real essence by its explanatory role with respect to other properties,
he would have failed bluntly.
A closer analysis of what a corpuscularian account of the bond of experienced properties
consists in will reveal, however, that Locke does expound a corpuscularian model of the
substratum of bodies in terms of three different explanatory levels. The first stage, i. e. the
one of the experienced features, is of properties of the “macrophysical level”, e. g. colours
and macrophysical figure. According to corpuscularian theory every property of the
macrophysical level can be reduced to or explained by specific microphysical properties.
For example, a colour is identified with a minute particles being in motion on the surface
of coloured bodies and passing on motion by impulse to other tiny particles which finally
affect our senses.108 These microphysical properties are described in terms of
microphysical solidity, extension, and mobility. Features of the macrophysical level are
“the various modifications of the Extension, of cohering solid Parts, and their motion”.109
Thus, from an explanatory viewpoint a macrophysical body is conceived, by and large, as a
compound of cohering solid corpuscles which has a particular extension. (Motion will be
discussed below.) In this sense, properties of the macrophysical level can be re-identified
with microphysical features in terms of microphysical solidity and extension. Even
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macrophysical solidity and extension are comprehended in this way. From this
microphysical standpoint every body is understood as being solely solid and extended.
Consequently, the second stage should be read as comprising microphysical extension and
solidity.
To re-describe the experienced features of the macrophysical level as microphysical
properties of an extended, solid substance is indeed to give an account of their union,
namely that they are bound up by being interrelated features of a solid and extended entity
from the microphysical perspective. Yet, this cannot be the whole story, since
corpuscularian theory does not conceive a macrophysical body as an indivisible entity, but
as a constitution of elementary bodies or atomic corpuscles. As indicated, a macrophysical
body consists of cohering solid parts. Explaining the interrelationships between the
properties of the macrophysical stage therefore leads to the question how the parts cohere
which the body comprises of. As Locke puts it, there is a need to elucidate the extension of
a macrophysical body, namely how its solid parts cohere.110 Thus, if an explanation of the
union of experienced properties is asked for, describing them in terms of microphysical
solidity and extension simply passes on the bucket, namely to the interrelationship
between microphysical extension and solidity. The identity relationship between the
features of the first two stages illustrates this well. To explain the bond of properties of the
macrophysical level is simply the same as to elucidate the union of corresponding
microphysical features. Explaining the bond of properties of the macrophysical level i n
terms of microphysical extension and solidity, thus results in elucidating the union of
microphysical extension and solidity. Corpuscularian theory requires a third stage of
explanation.
To delineate the union of microphysical features, being conceived of as modifications of
the extension of cohering solid parts, is to elucidate how the elementary corpuscles are
united to one entity, i. e. to explain the coherence of corpuscles or the entity’s extension
respectively - in terms of other microphysical properties. However, as Locke painstakingly
points out in the same chapter, neither corpuscularian theory nor any other hypothesis
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can make intelligible how corpuscles cohere.111 That is, for corpuscularians the bond of
experienced properties, the substratum of bodies, is in fact a one-knows-not-what.
Thus in §2 Locke effectively employs a model of three stages of explanatory properties.
The first one is about properties of the macrophysical level which serve as the defining
features of sorts of bodies in our everyday ideas of them. The second one comprises
properties of the microphysical level which correspond to properties of the first one. The
third stage is of other microphysical properties, namely the substratum, which explains
ultimately the union of all the other properties. In this sense, a substratum comprises the
explanatory fundamental properties.
A comparison between real essence and substratum illustrates the differences. The real
essence of a body comprises properties of the second level and represents an explanatory
comprehension of features of the first one. That is to say, the real essence elucidates i n
microphysical terms properties being ordinarily known by our senses. By contrast, the
substratum of a body consists of those microphysical properties which make plain the
interrelationship of properties of the second stage. The substratum of a body accounts for
the union of the features of which the body’s real essence consists. A description of bodies
as to the second level involves general features, e. g. being solid and extended, but it does
not delineate how these properties are interrelated.
More precisely, on the second stage a body is conceived as an extended, solid entity which
is being moved by impulse. For, according to Locke, features of the macrophysical level
are explained as “the various modifications of the Extension, of cohering solid Parts, and
their motion”.112 Thus, mobility and its interrelationship to solidity and extension is
likewise to be made intelligible on the most basic level as part of a theory of substratum.
This means, an account of the union of a body’s properties consists of an explanation of
the interrelationships between microphysical solidity, extension and mobility. And, as
with extension or cohesion respectively, we do not comprehend mobility. For in arguing
that our understanding of finite spirits is equally in the dark as the one of bodies, Locke
does not only point out that we, i. e. corpuscularians, have no clue of how corpuscles
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cohere, but also none of how they pass on impulse.113 Mobility therefore needs to be
explained as well - in terms of other microphysical features. The substratum of bodies
comprises the properties which elucidate the union of microphysical solidity, extension
and mobility.114
As the discussion of Locke’s view shows, he comprehends all bodies and all their features
in the same, corpuscularian perspective. This suggests that he also conceives the union of
properties for all bodies in the same terms. For example, he apparently assumes that
corpuscles comprising bodies cohere in the same way. That is, he has a portrayal of the
interrelationship of microphysical solidity and extension in mind which applies to every
body. This understanding of the substratum of bodies is present when in the course of his
explanations and at other places Locke identifies the substratum of bodies with a general
stuff bodies are made of, namely with matter.115 In other words, Locke conceives bodies as
modifications of the same kind of material.116 Thus the substratum of bodies comprises
solely properties being common to all bodies, i. e. being specific for them qua bodies. A
theory of the substratum of bodies consists in a general theory of what bodies are, namely
in a depiction of the interrelationships of their properties in general terms.    
This interpretation has advantages. It interprets satisfactorily Locke’s corpuscularian
model of the substratum of bodies in §2. Furthermore, a coherent or unambiguous
conception of substratum is ascribed to him which squares his definition of substratum
with its identification with matter. In addition, another problem of reading Locke as being
coherent can be solved. As has been pointed out above, in §1 Locke clearly intended to
introduce a notion of ‘substratum’ which applies to the substrata of all substances.
Moreover, the model of §2 relates to all kinds of substrata, since it serves not only to
illustrate one’s ignorance of the substratum of bodies, but of substrata in general. Thus the
substratum of human minds comprises of analogous properties explaining the union of
the defining features of these substances. And, corresponding to the equation of the
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substratum of bodies with matter, Locke speaks also of the substrata of human minds and
of God as of general stuffs. The substratum of God is thereby portrayed as immaterial and
the substratum of human minds as either material or immaterial.117 The question arises,
however, whether Locke truly has a uniform notion of substratum. It has to be a generic
conception for different substrata which leaves open the ontological issue of human
consciousness and which covers both matter and the immaterial stuff of God. If Locke’s
concept of substratum does not comply with this, one would effectively be thrown back
on Alexander’s two-substances-in-general view that ‘substratum’ is not a generic term for
substrata, but denotes a ragbag which includes two distinct stuffs. To see that there is no
such incoherence, a comparison with the concept of the melting point of a sort of bodies
might help.
The point of Locke’s uniform concept of substratum is that it serves as a generic place-
holder for different, unknown substrata. ‘Substratum’ may denote various substrata, but
different substrata have genuinely in common that they fulfill the same explanatory role.
In short, Locke’s concept of substratum signifies sets of properties which ultimately
account for the union of properties of substances - whatever these sets of properties may
(turn out to) be. His concept ‘the substratum of a sort of substances’ is thus of the same
kind as ‘the melting point of a sort of bodies’. Melting points differ among classes of
bodies, but the abstract concept ‘the melting point of a sort of bodies’ is the same in each
case. We can refer to the unknown melting points of various classes by using in each case
the same concept ‘the melting point of a sort of bodies’. The general concept of melting
points denotes a particular (and perhaps unknown) melting point, if used for a specific
class of bodies. Likewise, there is the generic notion of substratum. It is considered as part
of the concept of a particular sort of substances, signifying a specific (and unknown)
substratum. The dissimilarity is only in number, namely that there are many different
melting points compared to two different substrata. Thus, it is indeed intelligible and
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coherent for Locke to assert, on the one hand, that there is always one and the same idea
of substratum in every idea of substances and, on the other hand, that there are two
different substrata and that consciousness might be material or immaterial.
b. The Confused Idea of Substratum
The advanced account of ‘substratum’ discloses in fact what Locke means by our
ignorance of the substratum of bodies. Given our everyday ideas or comprehension of
bodies, one does not know what a substratum consists in. Yet, one does know the
existence of substrata. For ‘substratum’ denotes the unknown properties which “cause” or
explain that the same set of properties go together. Crudely speaking, the experience of the
union of properties is the experience of a substratum. Thus, the idea of substratum as
being part of ideas of substances represents knowledge  of the existence of a substratum.118
One knows the existence of a set of explanatory properties, but not what these properties
are.  
Locke expresses this peculiar cognitive content of the idea of substratum in characterizing
it as relative, obscure, and confused.119 As other commentators have rightly said, Locke’s
portrayal of the idea of substratum as confused (or respectively as being not distinct) is
decisive.120 His other characterizations should be seen as an effort to convey the same.121
An idea is confused or not distinct if it is “not sufficiently distinguishable from
another”122 idea. More precisely, two ideas are confused if two ideas have the same
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content, even though there is a name for each idea which is taken to signify a different
idea. This means, two names are intended to signify two different classes of entities, but
they denote the same entities because they are related to the same idea.123 Given Locke’s
technical notion of a confused idea, the question should be with respect to which other
idea the idea of substratum is called confused.124
However, in this context Locke does not stick to his official notion of confused ideas. As it
has convincingly been shown,125 Locke’s argument in II.xiii.18 entails an elucidation i n
which sense he understands the idea of substance, i. e. the idea of substratum, to be
confused.126 He criticizes those people who think that the term ‘substance’ stands for three
different significations, namely three distinct (unconfused) ideas when used for God,
finite spirits and bodies. And, given these intentions of those speakers, he recommends
them to use three distinct names to indicate those three different ideas to avoid confusion
in conversation, i. e. names aquivalent to ‘substratum of bodies’, ‘substratum of finite
spirits’, and ‘substratum of God’. But this advice is not really meant to be a
recommendation, since Locke argues subsequently that the term has only one  non-
distinct signification, namely that ‘substance’ stands for a confused idea. Thus Locke does
not maintain what one would expect, given his technical term of confused idea. He does
not claim that one uses three distinct terms with the intention to denote three different
substrata, but fails to do so because one uses the three terms for one and the same idea of
substratum. Instead, Locke speaks of one idea which is confused.
Yet, it becomes clear what he means. He criticizes those who think that their term
‘substratum’ stands for different substrata when referred to God, finite spirits and bodies.
Thus Locke implies that the idea of substratum is confused in the sense that it does not
distinguish the alleged differences between the substratum of God, finite spirits and
bodies. One has only one  idea which cannot be used to discriminate between various
substrata. This usage of ‘confused idea’ is similar to his official notion. In both cases
various classes of entities are not distinguished as intended. The dissimilarity is however
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that according to the official notion various names do not discriminate between different
entities and that in the case of the idea of substratum an idea does not distinguish
between different entities. This account implies that the confusion of the idea of
substratum expresses one’s ignorance of substrata: one does not know what substrata
consist in, but one does know that they exist.
c. Locke’s Argument
So far only Locke’s knowledge thesis has been analysed, but not his argument that our
ordinary ideas of bodies contain a confused idea of substratum. Once he has established
that ideas of substances include the idea of substratum, his argument takes off that this
idea is only confused, namely that a portrayal of matter is not part of our everyday ideas of
bodies. Crucially, however, for Locke there is no question that we have an idea of
substratum, i. e. that we have knowledge of the existence of the substratum of bodies and
spirits. This shows up in the case of bodies when he asserts without an explicit argument
that even children acquire the general notion of substance and ascribe it to bodies.127
Likewise, though he does discuss whether finite spirits have a substratum, Locke is
prepared to regard denials of the existence of their substratum as confusion about one’s
ordinary conception of the human mind and not as really arguable.128 For him everyday
experience entails knowledge of the existence of the substratum of bodies and human
minds. Similary, Locke argues for the idea of substratum being confused: everybody who
makes plain to oneself the content of one’s own idea, will agree that it is confused and
obscure.129 In other words, the “epistemic status” or content of the idea of substratum is
quite evident, once one becomes aware of the fact. Thus, when rejecting knowledge
claims raised by the laymen or corpuscularians to have a clear idea or understanding of
the substratum of substances, Locke sees himself as referring to the kind of understanding
of matter which is contained in our concepts or ideas of bodies. To conceive that our ideas
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of subtances include an idea of substratum and that this idea is confused, is simply to
become aware of the content of the ideas.
Yet, there is another argument present in Locke’s account. He maintains that the regular
experience of the same set of properties leads to the assumption of a substratum. For
Locke this account serves certainly not so much as a psychological explanation of a mental
operation, but rather as a justification of our supposition of a substratum and the
inclusion of a confused idea of it in our ideas of substances. One has to assume unknown
features of bodies which explain how the experienced properties are interrelated, i. e.
which causes the experienced bond of the properties.  
Two objections illuminate the argument. True, one may say that properties making up a
set have a bond in a logical sense, namely that they comprise the set. But why has one to
ascribe a real or ontological bond to the properties in the sense that other features have to
account for the fact that one experiences them as being together? For example, given a
universe in which only elementary particles exist, a comprehensive understanding of
“ordinary” bodies would simply consist in a list of all their properties. In other words,
given everyday experience of our universe, how does one know that the properties of
bodies are complex interrelated and not explanatory basic? Our ordinary experience of a
set of features alone does not convey the existence of unknown interrelationships
between these properties. Experience of this kind does not entail the need to account for
such interrelationships. There is a second problem. As we have seen, Locke drives at a
notion of stuff. Imagine, however, a universe in which bodies have features in common
only on higher explanatory levels, but not on the explanatory basic stage. For example, the
mechanism or cause how their elementary corpuscles cohere might vary from species to
species. Bodies were then not made of the same stuff, since there were no generic features
of bodies. And if even specimens of the same sort, e. g. gold, do not share features on
which the bond of their common properties depend, the notion of stuff evaporates
completely. If the bond of properties differs from body to body, one could not even speak
of a “stuff” being specific for a sort. It shows up that the force of Locke’s argument rests on
the attractiveness and intelligibility of a corpuscularian-theory inspired understanding of
bodies.
With respect to both problems, one might be tempted to reply that Locke has the recourse
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to appeal to a wider range of experience. The defence runs as follows. Locke maintains
that ordinary experience of bodies suggests the notion of matter.130 In other words,
everyday experience of bodies interacting, dissembling and unifying affords the
assumption that bodies are of the same stuff, namely the supposition of a substratum
which explains the bond of properties as to every body. This might solve the difficulty for
bodies, but it is far from clear whether it does so likewise for substances like human
minds. We do not have analogous experience of consciousnesses interacting, dissembling
and unifying - at least not in the required sense.
d. Conclusion
The most pressing difficulties of Locke’s theory of substratum do not relate to alleged
incoherences or ambiguities of his conception of substratum, but to his justification of it,
namely by his appeal to everyday experience. Yet, despite this predicament, one can agree
with Locke’s epistemological argument: to reject advanced accounts of the substratum of
bodies as insufficient and to point out one’s ordinary ignorance about their explanatory
basic features, and to insist on the need of an account of matter as part of a
comprehensive, scientific understanding of bodies.
As we have seen, for Locke ‘substratum’ is an explanatory concept. In this sense,
‘substratum’ is certainly not a pre-theoretic notion. On the other hand, according to Locke
the assumption of a substratum is a simple or basic epistemic response of the human
mind, since even children obtain the concept. This means, ‘substratum’ is directly linked
to experience and has thus an extension independent of the truth of any theory which
allegedly delineates the details. Whether Aristotelians, corpuscularians, Indian
philosophers, laymen or children, we all have the same idea of substratum and apply it to
the substrata of substances, whatever beliefs or opinions each of us has as to what a
substratum consists in. In this sense, the conception of a substratum is primitive enough
to serve as a placeholder for what an ideal theory identifies as the substratum of bodies.
Thus, despite his corpuscularian model of the substratum of bodies, Locke’s notion goes
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beyond it. Its application is not confined to the truth of corspuscularian theory. This
conception of substratum is more manifest with respect to finite spirits, since Locke does
not even present a convincing or well justified hypothesis on their substratum.131 For
him one’s everyday experience of the multiplicity of properties of bodies and of one’s own
mind entails a primitive conception of matter and consciousness. A specification of
substratum is therefore part of an ideal, or true and comprehenisive, scientific
understanding of species, since ideal, i. e. adequate or perfect, ideas of substances include a
clear and distinct idea of their substratum.132 Summing up, in connection with its
functional conception to explain elementary experience, the substratum of bodies
comprises features which are ascribed to bodies in an ideal scientific account of them.
This account will be confirmed by the theory of qualities. As will be argued in chapter
five,133 the notion of ‘primary quality’ serves to comprehend bodies from an ideal
scientific viewpoint and in a specific epistemological perspective. And since the
substratum of bodies is understood in the corpuscularian model as what explains the
interrelationship between the three corpuscularian primary qualities solidity, extension
and mobility, the substratum is understood in the same perspective as well.
This has a substantial implication as to Locke’s philosophical programme. His discussion
of substratum shows that there he is not concerned with pointing out the merits, but
rather the limits of corpuscularian theory. Locke emphazises the ignorance of
corpuscularians about the substratum of bodies, and equates it with the ignorance of
children, laymen and Aristotelians. Likewise, when delineating that our idea of the
substratum of finite spirits is not more obscure or confused than our idea of the
substratum of bodies, he heightens our limited, corpuscularian understanding of bodies,
namely as to the cohesion of atoms and as to the mechanism by which impulse is
transmitted from body to body. In both reasonings, Locke does not justify, but only
assumes and criticizes a corpuscularian account of bodies. Pace Alexander’s view that the
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Essay is intended to establish corpuscularian theory,134 the thrust of Locke’s argument is
not to justify a corpuscularian account of matter and bodies. Rather, given his notion of
substratum and its connection to ‘primary quality’, Locke assesses our everyday
understanding of matter and bodies from an ideal scientific viewpoint. In this perspective
one has to read the knowledge thesis that we possess only a confused idea of substratum,
i. e. that we do know the existence of substratum, but not what it consists in. The
epistemological aspect of this standpoint will be highlighted in the following section on
resemblance.
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3. Lockean Resemblance
Locke introduces his notion of resemblance as part of some further considerations
concerning simple ideas in II.viii. Evidently, however, as his examples show, Locke is
interested in our ideas of bodies and in simple ideas only in so far as they make up ideas
of bodies. His resemblance theory concerns therefore the simple ideas of our everyday
ideas of bodies. Distinguishing the properties of bodies in primary and secondary qualities,
Locke argues that ideas of primary qualities are resemblances whereas ideas of secondary
qualities are not. He contends more specifically that contrary to popular belief our ideas of
sensible qualities, e. g. of colours, tastes, etc., are not resemblances.
As the discussion of recent years and the variety of suggested interpretations prove,
Locke’s doctrine of resemblance is not easy assessable. First of all, one has to distinguish
between two notions of resemblance. As Yolton has persuasively shown, at Locke’s time
the relationship between ideas qua intentional objects representing entities has been
explained by saying that ideas resemble the entities they represent, e. g. by Cartesians.135
That is: an idea represents the entities which it depicts because the idea resembles the
entities, i. e. because the idea portrays the entities by properties which they possess.136 And
since the content of ideas determines which entities are represented, ideas have to
resemble the entities they represent.  If an idea represents its cause, it does so precisely -
otherwise it would not represent its cause.137 In turn, in this context ‘resemblance’ is on
par with ‘representation’: an idea resembles the depicted entities in the sense that it
represents the entities by an accurate depiction of them. However, this conception of
resemblance is evidently not present in Locke’s context of qualities, since ideas of
secondary qualities are said not to resemble the properties which they represent; which
would be a contradiction in terms, if the former understanding of resemblance were
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manifest here.
More importantly, Locke’s comments on resemblance are  on the face of it only to a degree
illuminating. It is therefore not surprising that a variety of interpretations has been
suggested.138 E. M. Curley suggests a “causal reading” of resemblance which I will support
and substantially supplement. According to Curley, in the case of resemblance the same
concept denoting the idea also signifies the represented property in a scientific account of
this feature as the cause of its idea.139 In this sense, which will be delineated in what
follows, I will speak of “conceptual resemblance”. Curley does however concede that i n
these passages Locke speaks of secondary qualities in connection with the reality status of
qualities when really meaning ideas of secondary qualities.140 The problem now arises for
Curley’s line of interpretation that these comments are linked with the topic of
resemblance. This, it seems to me, leads Alexander to the conclusion that there must be
more to Lockean resemblance than Curley contends.141  Probably for the same reason,
Ayers differently reconstructs the resemblance doctrine as a whole, dropping Curley’s
approach of a causal reading.142  I will argue in this and the next chapter that Curley is
                                                
138 I will not go into details with a line of interpretation which understands Locke’s resemblance doctrine as
the claim that ideas of primary qualities necessarily depict bodies as to properties which they possess,
whereas ideas of secondary qualities might fail to do so. Cp. Aaron (1937), 126 and O’Connor (1952), 67. As
other commentators have rightly and thoroughly argued, Lockean resemblance has nothing to do with
mistakes in perceptual judgements. Cp. Curley (1972), 152-55; Mackie (1975), 13ff. - Generally speaking, many
interpretations will be refuted simply by re-interpreting their textual evidence. For instance, Jackson’s
interpretation of resemblance is based on the assumption that primary qualities add up to indeterminate
macrophysical properties: “The ideas of the secondary qualities are, therefore, probably held to be produced
by microscopic qualities, while the ideas of primary qualities are probably held to be produced ny macroscopic
qualities. Locke’s doctrine then will be that macroscopic qualities produce resembling ideas, while microscopic
qualities produce non-resembling ideas.” Cp. Jackson (1929), 68.  Since I will argue that primary qualities are
neither determinable nor, crucially, macrophysical, there is no basis for Jackson’s thesis that Locke does only
identify secondary qualities, but not primary qualities with microphysical primary qualities when they are
conceived as powers to produce ideas. Cp. 5a.
139 Curley (1972), 150f.
140 Curley (1972), 141.
141 Alexander (1985), 198.
142 According to Ayers, Locke conflates Yolton’s kind of resemblance with another one. Yolton’s notion of
resemblance is present when ideas of primary qualities are said to be resemblances. But Locke is conceived as
making use of ‘resemblance’ in a second sense in connection with ideas of secondary qualities. Here, resemblance
is taken to hold between ideas of secondary qualities qua blank effects and secondary qualities qua being the
cause of the blank effects, i. e. between mental states characterized by phenomenological features and
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basically right as to remblance, but, as most interpretators, he is wrong about the reality of
qualities. Curley’s reading neglects however substantial aspects and thus does not
apprehend the genuine topic of Locke’s resemblance theory. The issue of resemblance, I
will contend, is to determine how far our ideas portray bodies from a perception-neutral
viewpoint that is identified with the scientific, causal standpoint.
As just alluded to, this account will be further deepened in the next chapter, since
contrary to prevailing interpretations Locke’s view of the reality of qualities is an
ontological claim that is linked to the same perception-neutral viewpoint specific for
Lockean resemblance.143  In fact, this nexus between the two topics makes first and
foremost intelligible why there is a correspondence between Locke’s major contentions on
the resemblance of ideas and his contentions on the reality of qualities. It likewise
explains why, curiously, after having gone on stage the notion of resemblance virtually
disappears again. For, even though the resemblance theory sets the stage for the theory of
qualities, in later parts of the Essay Locke’s claims on resemblance reappear in the guise of
assertions about qualities and their reality status.
In this chapter, first, the relata will be clarified and, subsequently, Lockean resemblance as
a whole, including his chief contentions on resemblance. Due to the close ties between
Locke’s explanations on qualities and resemblance, the reconstruction is however
completed in the following two chapters in three ways. First, further textual evidence will
be presented that in this context ideas and secondary qualities are to be understood as
suggested.144 Second, as part and parcel of the theory of qualities, Locke’s reasoning is
highlighted for his principal claims on resemblance and qualities.145 Third, the analysis of
the argument establishes furthermore that pace Alexander Lockean resemblance and its
perception-neutral viewpoint are not bound up with corpuscularian theory, but are rather
                                                                                                                                                                       
physical properties. Cp. Ayers (1998), II, 1064 , 1091, and 1092. Cp. also Ayers (1991), I, 63ff.
143 McCann likewise highlights resemblance in the light of the corpuscularian criticism of Aristotelian “real
qualities”. However, McCann’s approach does not lead to an elucidation of Lockean resemblance. He explains
an idea, that is a resemblance, as being “qualitatively similar” to the property it represents, without
clarifying what he means by this expression. Cp. McCann (1994), 64.
144 Cp. 4c.
145 Cp. 5b.
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theory-neutral.146 On the other hand, this chapter also pertains to the other two, since it
does not only delineate the perception-neutral perspective, but also sets out a line of
interpretation what (ideas of) secondary qualities are which is equally decisive for a correct
grasp of Locke’s comments on qualities.
a. The Relata of the Resemblance Relationship
Locke expresses his notion of resemblance rather methaphorically and vaguely. Taken by
themselves, they open the gates for a variety of different interpretations. For example,
Locke introduces ‘resemblance’ as follows:
“§7. To discover the nature of our Ideas the better, and to discourse of them
intelligibly, it will be convenient to distinguish them, as they are Ideas or
Perceptions in our Minds; and as they are modifications of matter in the Bodies
that cause such Perceptions in us: that so we maynot think (as perhaps usually is
done) that they are exactly the Images and Resemblances of something inherent in
the subject; most of those of Sensation being in the Mind no more the likeness of
something existing without us, than the Names, that stand for them, are the
likeness of our Ideas, which yet upon hearing, they are apt to excite in us.”147
In this context Locke distinguishes between two meanings or conceptions of ideas. In a
first sense, ideas are mental states, namely perceptions or sensations. In a second sense, an
idea is the cause of such mental states, i. e. of an idea in the first sense. The two
conceptions of ideas are linked by a causal theory of perception. An idea of the second
sense causes an idea of the first one: the property of a body causes one’s perception of this
feature. As we will soon see, Locke uses ‘idea’ primarily with the first meaning to denote
perceptions and less frequently with the second one to signify the properties of bodies
which cause these mental states.148
Locke draws the distinction as a means to prevent the common mistake of regarding
perceptions as exact images or resemblances of the corresponding properties causing the
perception. But if one differentiates between the two kinds of ideas, the possibility
                                                
146 Cp. 5b.
147 134, II.viii.7. Cp. 137, II.viii.15f for further vague depictions of resemblance.
148 Cp. 376, II.xxxi.2. Cp. my interpretation of this passage in 4c.
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becomes plain not to understand every idea of the first sense as a resemblance of an idea
of the second one. This intention of Locke becomes clear in §7 by his comparison between
ideas (in the first sense) and words: most of our sensations do not have any likeness of
something existing outside of us, just as there is no likeness between a name and the idea
being signified by the name. The resemblance relationship holds between an idea taken as
a mental state and an idea taken as the property causing this sensation. An idea resembles
its cause, if it is like  its cause. However, ‘likeness’ is left unexplained. The depiction of
ideas resembling their cause as “exact images” certainly does not help either. And the
comparison of the dissimilarity between an idea and its cause with the dissimilarity
between the idea and its name does not tell us in which respect there is a lack of
resemblance. The same goes for the deep metaphorical characterization of ideas being
resemblances as mirrors in §16. My point here simply is, as the diversity of interpretations
of Locke’s theory of resemblance (and qualities) indicates, that Lockean resemblance
remains unclear if these explanations are taken only by themselves. What are ideas qua
mental states precisely and in which respect are they compared to the property causing
them?
As it became common to read Locke, at the beginning of the comments on qualities and
resemblance, Locke introduces the following two notions of ideas and qualities that each
other correspond: an idea is a mental representation of the property which causes this
representation in sensation; and a quality is the power, i. e. property, which causes a
mental representation in sensation.149 The point however is, I contend, that Locke sticks
to this conception of ideas and qualities throughout the argument in the required sense.
“In the required sense” means that Locke’s use of ‘idea’ to denote also qualities is not
decisive for his doctrines of resemblance and the reality of qualities. By contrast, according
to one line of interpretation, in the context of resemblance ideas of secondary qualities are
mental states characterized by a specific phenomenological content.150 And since i n
connection with the topic of reality secondary qualities are moreover conceived as mental
                                                
149 Cp. Alexander (1985), 114ff; Ayers (1991), I, 58; Curley (1972), 141-45; Mackie (1975), 15.
150 Ayers (1991), I, 63ff. According to Ayers, in this context resemblance is taken to hold between the idea of a
secondary quality qua blank effect and the secondary quality qua cause of the blank effect, i. e. between a
mental state characterized by phenomenological features and a physical property. Cp. Ayers (1998), II, 1092.
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states being characterized by a specific phenomenological content, secondary qualities are
thus equated with ideas of secondary qualities in the latter sense.151 This implies in turn
that ideas of secondary qualities are regarded as self-representing, namely as representing
secondary quality which is a mental state characterized by phenomenological features.
Two (ideas of) secondary qualities would then be distinguished in the way the sensation
of yellow varies from the impression of blue, or a poundering headache differs from a
dull one. Given the nexus between the issues of resemblance and the reality of qualities,
the here developed reading will be further established in the following chapter which
entails a thorough rejection of comprehending in this context (ideas of) secondary
qualities as self-representing mental states.
In §8 Locke moves on to distinguish between ‘idea’ and ‘quality’. The explanations of §8
show that ideas are conceived here as the content of intentional states or respectively as
the intentional states themselves:
“§8. Whatsoever the Mind perceives in it self, or is the immediate object of
Perception, Thought, or Understanding, that I call Idea; and the Power to produce
any Idea in our mind, I call Quality of the Subject wherein that power is. Thus a
Snow-ball having the power to produce any Idea of White, Cold, and Round, the
Powers to produce those Ideas in us, as they are in the Snow-ball, I call Qualities;
and as they are Sensations, or Perceptions, in our Understandings, I call them Ideas:
which Ideas, if I speak of sometimes, as in the things themselves, I would be
understood to mean those Qualities in the Objects which produce them in us.”152
Ideas, Locke explains in the first sentence using traditional philosophical terminology,153
are the “immediate object of Perception, Thought, or Understanding”.154 This means,
ideas are the content of intentional states. Since in §7 ideas are said to be perceptions or
sensations, Locke apparently does not differentiate between an intentional state and its
content, putting thus the stress solely on intentionality. This implies, in §8 he uses ‘idea’
with the first meaning of §7, declaring this signification as his official use of the concept.
Furthermore, a quality is explained as the power or propensity of bodies to produce an
                                                
151 Ayers (1991), I, 63.
152 134, II.viii.8.
153 Cp. Yolton (1984), 88-104.
154 134, II.viii.8. Cp. 47, I.i.8. Cp. likewise 104, II.i.1 where Locke expands his phrase of ideas being the
immediate object of the understanding.
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idea, i. e. to cause intentional content or an intentional state having intentional content
respectively.155 This peace of §8 is clear, independently of the other parts. Thus, on the face
of it ‘idea’ denotes primarily the intentional content of mental states caused by qualities.
The distinction of §7 between two meanings of ‘idea’ corresponds to the one between
‘idea’ and ‘quality’ advanced in §8. What is called ‘idea’ with its second meaning in §7, is
signified as a quality in §8. Consequently, since §8 is linked to §7, the resemblance
relationship should hold between ideas as intentional objects and qualities as the cause of
them! True, Locke’s paradigm are sensations, since with respect to this type of intentional
states the intentional object can be straight forwardly identified as its cause. But since
Locke evidently regards his theory of qualities and resemblance to apply to all kinds of
intentional states and not only to sensations, one should not misunderstand his
explanations too narrowly to confine them only to sensations, as Alexander does.156 In
other words, ‘idea of x’ refers to x as the intentional object of any type of intentional state.
The second part of §8 is, no doubt, a linguistic muddle. The problem is to interpret the
two occurrences of ‘as they’. I prefer to read them to refer to ‘powers’ because this would
consider the semicolon to separate two different explications of powers in terms of ,as
they’. Given this interpretation, qualities are first explained as powers producing ideas (i.
e. intentional objects) in us; ideas are then elucidated as powers in a sense in which
powers can be said to be perceptions, namely as powers conceived as intentional objects.
This implies, Locke uses ‘power’ with two significations corresponding both to the sense
of ‘idea’ and of ‘quality’ in the first sentence of §8, and to the two meanings of ‘idea’ in §7.
In the last part of §8 Locke, however, warns the reader that despite these conceptual
clarifications he sometimes uses ‘idea’ to denote qualities as well. He thus reintroduces
the ambiguity of ‘idea’ which has been explained in §7 and substituted by the distinction
                                                
155 Jackson contends that one should strictly distinguish between powers and qualities, since only primary
qualities are genuinely qualities and that secondary qualities are in fact powers. Cp. Jackson (1929), 55 and 59.
Jackson is right in reading some passages in this light, cp. 135, II.viii.9 and 375f, II.xxxi.2. Here Locke
indicates that according to his “taste” one should call only primary qualities qualities, but not likewise
secondary qualities. Calling secondary qualities ‘qualities’ is for him only to comply with an established way
of speaking (135, II.viii.9). However, after all, he does name secondary qualities ‘secondary qualities’. And in
this sense he apparently highlights qualities in terms of powers in §8 what subsequently serves him as the
basis for distinguishing between two types of qualities, calling the latter ones secondary qualities.
156 Alexander (1985), 199.
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between ‘idea’ and ‘quality’ in the first part of §8. There is in fact no need to read Locke’s
attempt to illuminate his key concepts as confused - but one might become thoughtful
about its true impact on the innocent reader.
More importantly, it becomes evident what Locke is aiming at. He distinguishes between
two ways to comprehend the same properties: to regard them as the objects of our
intentional states and to conceive them as the causes of these intentional objects or states.
This is expressed by his elucidation of ideas both as powers in our minds and as qualities
of bodies. One even arrives at the same interpretation, even if, contrary to the above
assumption, one reads the first occurrence of ‘as they’ to refer to ideas and the second one
to qualities: qualities are then said to be ideas in the sense in which an idea can be
comprehended as being in a body, and an idea is said to be a quality in the sense in which
a quality can be conceived of being in the mind. Thus in either case Locke is struggling to
distinguish between two different conceptions of the same property, namely between a
feature as an intentional object and the feature as the cause of an intentional object. The
topic of §§7-8 is to make plain the difference between properties of bodies as they are
represented in our minds and as they are understood in a causal account of perception.
Now, the crucial consequence is that, if Locke’s account is coherent, the resemblance
relationship holds between two conceptions of the same property. And since Locke
introduces this understanding of ideas and qualities immediately before he differentiates
between primary and secondary qualities, ideas of both primary and secondary qualities
are prima facie to be comprehended in this sense, namely as properties of bodies
conceived as the content of intentional states which are caused by this quality.
By contrast, to comprehend ideas as self-representing mental states characterized by
phenomenological characteristics would introduce in Locke’s argument unnecessary
incoherences, if not confusion, since contenders of this line of interpretation understand
only ideas of secondary qualities as representing mental states, but not likewise ideas of
primary qualities. Only the latter ideas are conceived in the proposed way as intentional
states or objects representing the property causing these ideas in sensation. In addition,
this approach can easily lead to the view that, in the context of resemblance, secondary
qualities are not properties of bodies, but of a perceiver, since a secondary quality is taken
as the content of its idea, namely as the mental state being represented by the idea. But,
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again, §§7-8 are placed immdiately before the distinction between primary and secondary
qualities and thus treat them on par. One principal claim of the interpretation proposed
in this and the next two chapters is that in connection with the resemblance theory and
the reality doctrine there is no need to read Locke to deviate from his official
understanding of ideas and qualities which he delineates in §§7-8. Quite the contrary, one
can highlight Locke’s explanations as conceptually coherent. For, as we will see, even
those passages can be interpreted in the light of the here advanced view which on first
thought seems to imply the rival reading that (ideas of) secondary qualities are self-
representing mental states.157 The thrust of Locke’s distinction between ideas and their
causes, i. e. between ideas as powers (or qualities) in the mind and powers (or qualities) as
ideas in bodies, is not to differentiate between phenomenological features of a mental
state and the property causing it, but to separate two conceptions of the same property.
The epistemological significance which Locke attaches to this will be addressed below.
First, however, Lockean resemblance will be reconstructed on the basis of our results.
b. Lockean Resemblance
The point of the preceding section is to demonstrate by a careful analysis of §§7-8 that, on
the face of it, the resemblance relationship holds between ideas qua intentional object and
qualities qua properties being represented by ideas and causing these ideas in sensation.
The relationship thus compares two conceptions of the same properties. As we will
shortly see, this naturally paves the way for Curley’s interpretation of Lockean
resemblance which will be significantly enhanced in the subsequent section. As indicated
above, the problem of Curley’s reading is that he maintains the orthodox view on the
reality of qualities as well. According to him, Locke contends that secondary qualities are
only real qua being properties of a perceiver, namely mental states characterized by
phenomenological features, whereas primary qualities are real qua being physical
properties of bodies. This implies, secondary qualities are taken, on the one hand, as
properties of bodies in connection with resemblance and, on the other hand, as mental
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states in the context of their reality status. In the light of this consequence, however,
Curley’s reading is hardly tenable. The reason is that Locke’s comments on resemblance
and on the reality of qualities are closely intertwined. Both claims are the two sides of the
same coin. Alexander, who basically agrees with Curley on resemblance and reality,
avoids this problem by interpreting terms like ‘yellow’ not as denoting secondary
qualities, but ideas of secondary qualities.158 Resemblance could thus be understood to
relate to secondary qualities (in the sense of properties of bodies) and the reality status to
ideas of secondary qualities (in the sense of sensations of secondary qualities, or properties
of bodies respectively). In my eyes, this reading of Locke’s terms like ‘yellow’ is straight
forward contra-intuitive, given the nexus between them and Locke’s comprehension of
secondary qualities as properties of bodies in terms of microphysical primary qualities.159
Any alternative reading which ascribes to Locke as advancing more or less coherently a
different account should be preferred.
On the supposition of the orthodox view of the reality doctrine, I believe, the only
convincing way out is Ayers’s reading.160 The price to pay is however that in the case of
secondary qualities the notion of resemblance does not relate any more to two different
conceptions of the same properties. According to Ayers, resemblance holds between ideas
of primary qualities and primary qualities in Yolton’s innocuous sense, namely that the
former represent the latter. But ideas of secondary qualities are regarded to dissemble
secondary qualities in the sense in which a mental state dissembles its cause. In which
sense? Well, as Ayers himself alludes to, it is unintelligible what kind of dissemblance
this should be. Moreover, in the context of resemblance and reality secondary qualities are
conceived as mental states characterized by phenomenological features, whereas in other
contexts secondary qualities are properties of bodies. And since both kinds of contexts are
present in the comments on resemblance and qualities, this line of interpretation
                                                
158 Cp. Alexander (1985). Alexander maintains, on the one hand, that secondary qualities are properties of
bodies (118). But since he claims that colours (etc.) are truly ideas of secondary qualities (118) - and not
secondary qualities, as I contend -,  he takes the issue of colours (etc.) being real as a question of locating them
correctly. Colours (etc.) are genuine properties of a perceiver, i. e. ideas, and not properties of objects causing
ideas (125f). As to resemblance, cp. 198.
159 For instance, in Locke’s definition of ‘secondary quality’. Cp. 135, II.viii.10.
160 Cp. Ayers (1998), II, 1064 , 1091, and 1092. Cp. also Ayers (1991), I, 63ff.
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understands Locke as employing ambiguously his central terms: ‘idea of secondary
quality’ denotes either self-representing mental states characterized by phenomenological
features or mental states representing properties of bodies; ‘secondary quality’ and ‘yellow’
(etc.) signify either self-representing mental states or properties of bodies.161
But there is no need to read Locke in this way, namely as talking of two kinds of
resemblance relationships, of which one is unintelligible, and of using ambiguous terms.
This will be argued in the next chapter on the reality doctrine. The point I wish here to
make simply is that Curley’s approach to read Lockean resemblance is natural in the light
of §§7-8, but has to be secured and supplemented by an alternative interpretation of the
reality status of qualities. Otherwise, Ayers’s reconstruction is the better alternative.
Curley’s approach will now be unfolded and further deepened in the next section.
Curley elucidates the resemblance relationship in conceptual terms. According to him, i n
the case of resemblance the same concept denoting the idea also signifies the represented
property in a scientific account of this feature as the cause of its idea.162 As we have seen,
in §§7-8 Locke is concerned with clarifying his vocabulary in order to distinguish between
a property being the content of an idea and the property being the cause of the idea. On the
one hand, there is the depiction of a property as it is represented by an idea. On the other
hand, there is one’s grasp of the same feature as the cause of the idea representing the
feature. This suggests, to read the resemblance relationship as  “conceptual resemblance”
holding between two different conceptions of the same property.
One can easily advance this line of interpretation. Thereby, it comes into play that a
primary quality consists in a conceptual type comprising properties of both the macro- and
the microphysical level. Like Locke, one can illustrate this in corpuscularian terms. For
example, the primary quality form, i. e. figure, includes macro- as well as microphysical
                                                
161 This is not exactly what Ayers says, but it is implied by his position. See above.
162 Curley (1972), 150f. In principle, Alexander maintains the same approach. Cp. Alexander (1974), 458f.
However, he decisively obscures his account because he believes that there has to be a stronger conception of
resemblance. For him, one has to explain in which sense one can intelligibly say that the idea of the property
X has the property X, e. g. that the idea of extension is extended. One result of his effort is that the notion of
resemblance is narrowed down to sensations so that other types of intentional states are excluded. I am affraid,
I do not see Alexander’s problem in the first place, namely why Locke is allegedly confined to the claim that
an idea is extended in any stronger sense than that the represented entities are extended. Cp. Alexander
(1985), 198-203.
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figure. Both features are of the same conceptual type in the sense that ‘form’ denotes them
both. This means, in an explanatory account of bodies a macrophysical primary quality is
conceived in terms of its microphysical counter-part. For example, macrophysical form
and solidity are understood in terms of the corresponding microphysical properties, e. g.
microphysical form respectively solidity. By contrast, secondary qualities like colours do
not reappear conceptually on the microphysical level. Conceived from an explanatory
perspective, bodies do not have colours or any other secondary qualities, since secondary
qualities are identified with microphysical primary qualities. For instance, yellow is
equated with minute particles being in motion on the microphysical surface structure of
bodies.163 In this sense, a secondary quality is identified with a “combination” of
microphysical primary qualities, but not with microphysical secondary qualities. Primary
and secondary qualities differ crucially in this aspect.
Now, to comprehend a property as the cause of a mental representation, is to grasp the
feature in scientific terms. This holds, of course, whether properties are depicted by ideas
of primary qualities or by ideas of secondary qualities. Our ordinary ideas of
(macrophysical) corpuscularian properties therefore represent a (macrophysical) primary
quality which is scientifically conceived as a (microphysical) primary quality. Ideas of
secondary qualities, however, portray properties which are not highlighted again in terms
of secondary qualities, but in terms of (microphysical) primary qualities. Thus, due to the
conception of primary qualities as conceptual types, in the case of ideas of primary
qualities there is conceptual resemblance holding between the term denoting the property
as the content of the idea and the concept signifying the feature as the idea’s cause: they
both denote the same primary quality. The mental representation of solidity resembles
the causal understanding of solidity since the former depicts solidity by the same term as
the latter does, namely by ‘solidity’. By contrast, the idea of yellow dissembles the scientific
comprehension of yellow because the former does not depict yellow by the same concept
as the latter.
But is there not a stronger notion of resemblance present in Locke’s explanations? Take,
for example, hair, i. e. our sensation or ordinary conception of hair and our scientific
                                                
163 545, IV.iii.13; 589, IV.vi.14.
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understanding of hair. Assume further that the view or comprehension of hair which we
derive from looking through a microscope adds up to a scientific understanding of hair.
True, the view through a microscope does not give an adequate explanatory account of
the constitution of hair, but for the sake of the argument let the microscope serve here as
a model. Given all this: does not our perception of hair through a microscope resemble
our ordinary sensation of hair more specifically than just in the ascription of primary
qualities? For instance, do both depictions not have more in common than that they both
attribute any kind of figure to hair? Do they not both ascribe also a similar figure to hair?
Is long and curly hair not likewise long and curly if perceived through a microscope?
However, Locke does not give prominence to this kind of resemblances. He rather
emphasizes that one has very different ideas of bodies if one looks at them through a
microscope.164 For Locke there is no similaritiy which goes beyond conceptual
resemblance. This point becomes more obvious with regard to the corpuscularian
comprehension of bodies. For example, the surface structure of a dice might be smooth i n
macrophysical terms. But the surface is not only “very rough” from a microphysical
perspective. It is also described profoundly different, since in corpuscularian theory a body
is regarded as a compound of corpuscles on whose surface minute particles are i n
motion.165 In a macrophysical description, however, there are no tiny bodies buzzing on
rough surfaces. Locke, criticizing corpuscularian theory with subtlety,166 must have been
well aware of this at first very astonishing insight about the “falsity” of our everyday
physical picture of bodies. One should therefore abandon the idea to read Locke in a more
figurative way. According to him, in principle, the macrophysical description of a primary
quality dissembles the corresponding microphysical portrayal in every aspect a part from
having in common to depict the primary quality as the same primary quality, e. g. as
form.
To conclude, Lockean resemblance is conceptual resemblance. The resemblance
                                                
164 301f, II.xxiii.11. In this context Locke focuses on our ideas of sensible qualities and compares them to ideas of
the microphysical structures with which one would identify a sensible quality in an explanatory account of
bodies. Yet, his comments make plain that ideas of macrophysical primary qualities vary also greatly from
ideas of microphysical primary qualities.
165 Cp. 545, IV.iii.13; 589, IV.vi.14.
166 295f, II.xxiii.2; 308-12, II.xxiii.23-28.
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relationship holds between the concept signifying a property conceived as the intentional
object of a mental state and the concept denoting the same property comprehended as the
cause of that mental state. Both concepts are of the same type; but there is no further
similarity, since they each stand for an otherwise differently conceived feature. To pick up
again the example, both concepts denote figure, but one stands for a smooth surface
whereas the other one signifies a rough surface with minute particles being in motion. In
this sense, it is intelligible to speak of conceptual resemblance between an idea and its
cause. The same concept denotes both the idea and its cause, e. g. form. Consequently, on
the backdrop of Locke’s corpuscularian list of primary qualities, our ordinary ideas of
macrophysical primary qualities resemble their cause only because they have counter-
parts on the microphysical level. The concept signifying the idea of a primary quality of
the macrophysical stage is of the same type as the concept denoting the idea’s cause i n
terms of microphysical primary qualities. The same does not hold for ideas of secondary
qualities because, as Locke argues, from the microphysical standpoint one does not
conceive their cause in terms of secondary qualities.
This understanding of Lockean resemblance explains why according to his notions of
ideas, qualities, and resemblance it is possible that only one of two ideas resembles its
cause although both have the same cause, e. g. the idea of yellow and the idea of the
respective microphysical features.167 For, although the two ideas have the same
intentional object, only the latter idea is signified by the type of concept by which the cause
is denoted. The interpretation also fits with Locke’s usage of ‘resemblance’ in II.viii, for
example in §13:
“It being no more impossible, to conceive, that God should annex such Ideas [e. g.
of colours] to such Motions, with which they have no similitude; than that he
should annex the Idea of Pain to the motion of a piece of Steel deviding our Flesh,
with which that Idea hath no resemblance.”168
After having advanced an explanatory, corpuscularian account of human sense
perception and after having presupposed its truth as a hypothesis, Locke explains here
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why ideas of colours are like the idea of pain which does not resemble its cause: in an
explanatory account of bodies the idea of pain does not resemble its cause (i. e. the
sharpness of the knife’s shape) because one uses concepts of a different type to denote the
idea of pain and its cause respectively.
We have seen what it means that ideas of primary qualities resemble primary qualities,
whereas ideas of secondary qualities dissemble secondary qualities. But one can dig
deeper. There is a particular epistemological thrust attached to Locke’s theory of
resemblance. To see this, one has to spell out the implications of the already indicated
explanatory role which primary and secondary qualities play as to ideas.
c. The Perception-neutral Viewpoint
As argued, the resemblance relationship contrasts our conceptual understanding of
properties in so far as they are conceived as being mentally represented with our
comprehension of the properties in so far as they are conceived as the cause of their
mental representation. This means, to grasp a feature in causal terms is to conceive it
independently of the mental representation of the property. More precisely, a feature is
comprehended not in terms of the way it is represented, if it is understood in terms of
microphysical primary qualities. And since this accounts for all properties and for all our
mental representations of them, the grasp of a property in terms of primary qualities is to
understand the feature independently of the way it is mentally represented. To say
therefore that ideas of primary qualities are resemblances, is to claim that ideas of primary
qualities depict primary qualities in the same terms in which one would conceive them
independently of the way they are mentally represented by the ideas. The punchline of
Locke’s resemblance theory is to determine which ideas portray the properties of bodies
from an idea- or perception-neutral conceptual viewpoint.
 All this becomes manifest when one realizes that Locke does not discuss any explanatory
or causal account of bodies and their properties, but more specifically a theory of qualities
in conjunction with an account of our perception of them. As will be highlighted in the
chapter on the theory of qualities, the assumption of a corpuscularian theory of sense
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perception is the cardinal step in Locke’s main argument for his contentions of
resemblance and qualities in §§11-14. On the basis of a corpuscularian theory of sense
perception, Locke demonstrates that ideas of primary qualities are resemblances whereas
ideas of secondary qualities are not. Furthermore, as Thomas Heyd has forcefully
argued,169 in §16 and §§19-21 Locke presents additional empirical support by pointing out
that the alternative, Aristotelian theory of sense perception and qualities cannot
convincingly explain the results of certain experiments or everyday experience
respectively. In §22 Locke even clearly asserts with reference to the preceding paragraphs
that an account of qualities and our perception of them is at issue.170 This likewise
becomes plain at the end of II.viii in §25. And since in this context Lockean ideas are
regarded as intentional objects, which will be underscored in the next chapter, and since
sensations serve as paradigms for intentional states, Locke’s theory of sense perception is
in fact a theory of mental representation and intentional states. Primary qualities are
those properties whose concepts are designed to be the vocabulary with which one
comprehends properties without reference to a mental representation of these properties.
If therefore a body is understood in terms of primary qualities, the body is grasped
independently of the way it is represented in the human mind.
In connection with the resemblance theory, bodies are grasped from a specific
epistemological perspective, namely from a perception-neutral, conceptual viewpoint:
bodies and their properties are conceptually conceived independently of the particular
way we represent them. The reason is that bodies are understood in terms of primary
qualities if they are conceived as the cause of our mental representations of their
properties: in a theory of mental representation, primary qualities serve as the kind of
properties in terms of which bodies are comprehended as the objects of every mental
representation. An idea resembling its cause is thus an idea representing its cause in those
terms in which this property is grasped if conceived without any reference to the specific
                                                
169 Heyd (1994), 19-27.
170 140, II.viii.22: “§22. I have in what just goes before, been engaged in Physical Enquiries a little further
than, perhaps, I intended. But it being necessary, to make the Nature of Sensation a little understood, and to
make the difference between the Qualities in Bodies, and the Ideas produced by them in the Mind, to be
distinctly conceived, without which it were impossible to discourse intelligibly of them; [...].”
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way the property is mentally represented. A resemblance is a mental representation
depicting its property in terms of the same concepts in which the property is understood
from a causal or perception-neutral viewpoint. Thus, Locke’s chief contention of his
explanations that only ideas of primary qualities are resemblances and that ideas of
sensible qualities are truly not resemblances, is an account of how one has to conceive
bodies from a scientific, conceptual viewpoint. In the light of Locke’s reasoning that the
known corpuscularian properties are primary qualities, the point of his argument on
resemblance apparently is to insist that, in principle, we do have a conceptually adequate
comprehension of bodies even though we are ignorant of their microphysical features. In
other terms, from the epistemological viewpoint of resemblance our everyday ideas
depicting bodies in terms of macrophysical corpuscularian properties represent a
conceptually adequate scientific grasp of bodies and their properties.
Given the presence of corpuscularian theory in the argument of resemblance and
qualities, namely the assumption of a corpuscularian theory of sense perception and the
use of the quality distinction, the question arises whether this epistemological perspective
is meant to be a specific corpuscularian one or a general, theory-neutral viewpoint
applying prima facie to all kinds of theories of perceptions. In other words: is the issue of
resemblance confined to the truth of corpuscularian theory, as Alexander’s reading
implies?171
First of all, supposing Boyle’s hypothesis as a premise to establish which ideas are
resemblances does certainly not mean that Locke’s notion of resemblance is part and
parcel of corpuscularian theory. The assumption does not imply that the question which
ideas are resemblances is specifically linked to the hypothesis, but only that the answer is
premissed on corpuscularian theory. Moreover, the simple fact that Locke uses the quality
distinction does likewise not imply that he does so with the Boylean meaning, since other
natural philosophers like Galileo have used these terms before and there was no defined
                                                
171 Alexander holds, first, that Locke’s quality distinction is Boyle’s one and, second, that, the Essay is aimed
at establishing that corpuscularian theory can best explain our everyday experience and at spelling out its
implications for philosophy. And since in the comments on resemblance and qualities, Locke discusses
everyday experience and even experiments, it follows for Alexander’s line of interpretation that the notion of
resemblance is a corpuscularian term. Cp. Alexander (1985), 7 and 118.
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or fixed signification for them.172 Of course, what has just been said does neither indicate
the opposite. But, on the face of it, the topic of resemblance seems not to be confined to
Boyle’s explanatory account. First, contrary to Boyle Locke develops a concept of
resemblance which he introduces before, immediately before, the notion of quality and
the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. This indicates that resemblance
is not meant to be an “addition” to corpuscularian theory.  Second and more important,
the resemblance relationship is conceived as one between an idea and its cause. This cause
is what Locke then calls a quality. That is, the relationship does not make use of any
characteristics which specifically apply to primary or secondary qualities.
On the other hand, a defender of Alexander’s line of interpretation can reply that the talk
of ideas resembling its cause already implies a more specific characterization of causes
than just simply being causes since otherwise there would be no distinction between ideas
resembling their cause and ideas which do not. And these entailed characteristics, one can
add, are spelled out by Locke in terms of the quality distinction. This means, Locke’s
notion of resemblance presupposes the quality distinction so that the former would be
confined to corpuscularian theory if the latter is. In my eyes, however, the topic of
resemblance with its reference to properties qua causes is clearly too general to be bounded
up with any particular theory of bodies and sense perception. Thus, even if Locke’s quality
distinction were meant to be specifically corpuscularian, his notion of resemblance should
not be taken to be so as well.
Fortunately, we need not to content ourselves with these considerations. There is
conclusive evidence that the quality distinction is not understood as part and parcel of the
corpuscularian viewpoint. But before arguing this point in chapter five, the next section
on the reality of qualities will first highlight that the advanced interpretation of
resemblance can be squared with other passages on resemblance that are connected with
Locke’s reality doctrine. The reality doctrine and the resemblance theory turn out to be the
two sides of the same coin.
                                                
172 Galileo introduced the distinction in modern philosophy in Il Saggiatore. Cp. Galileo (1968), VI, 213-372.
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4. The Reality of Primary and Secondary Qualities
Locke’s two chief contentions as to qualities are that primary qualities are “in the things
themselves” or respectively “real”, and that secondary qualities are “nothing in the
objects themselves but powers” or respectively not in the same way real than primary
qualities are. I will call these claims the reality doctrine of qualities. The reality doctrine is
an integral part of Locke’s prominent explanations on resemblance and qualities in II.viii
and is intimately connected with Locke’s chief assertions on resemblance. Obviously, the
reality status of qualities matches the resemblance status of their ideas: ideas of qualities,
which are real, are resemblances; ideas of qualities, which are nothing in the objects
themselves but powers, are dissemblances.173 And as with resemblance, Locke is not
primarily concerned with the reality status of primary and secondary qualities in general,
but rather with the “non-reality” of sensible qualities.174  
Yet, despite the frequency and evident importance of these depictions of qualities, Locke
himself never really introduces or explains the notions of being in the things themselves,
being real or being nothing in the objects themselves but powers. Apparently, for him it is
a clear-cut and natural way to characterize qualities. The prevailing view is that primary
qualities are conceived as real in the way properties exist in bodies and that secondary
qualities are not real in this sense, since in this context they are understood as mental
states or respectively properties of a perceiver. Commentators however disagree i n
important details, especially whether secondary qualities are the entities which Locke
officially designates as secondary qualities or whether they are truly identified with the
entities which he usually calls ideas of secondary qualities.175 On the contrary, I will argue
that, in principal, Locke uses his notions of ideas and qualities unequivocally and
consistantly with his official declarations as they were reconstructed in the foregoing
chapter. Moreover, taking into account Boyle’s views on qualities, a historically plausible
                                                
173 Cp. 137, II.viii.14f.
174 137, II.viii.13-16; 142, II.viii.25.
175 Cp. 4c.
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alternative interpretation becomes attractive which reads Locke’s explanations as being i n
line with our reconstruction of Lockean resemblance and which comprehends reality
doctrine and resemblance theory as two sides of the same coin. The upshot is that the
ontological issue of the reality doctrine is not whether qualities exist in bodies or i n
sensible beings, but whether bodies genuinely possess them if they are understood in an
ideal scientific perspective, namely from a perception-neutral standpoint.
In this chapter, only the reality doctrine will be highlighted, whereas both Locke’s
reasoning for the contentions and his definitions of primary and secondary qualities will
be discussed in the next one. The first step is to show that key passages link the reality
status of qualities with the role they play in an explanatory account of bodies and
properties. Crucially, this demonstrates that secondary qualities are conceived as features
of bodies and thus refutes common lines of interpretations which take the reality doctrine
to relate to mental states with respect to secondary qualities. Then an alternative view
will be developed by reading Locke’s comments in the light of Boyle’s corpuscularian
theory and his argument on real qualities. The analysis discloses that the reality doctrine
conceives qualities from the same perception-neutral perspective from which the
resemblance theory depicts ideas of qualities. The final part discusses passages which are
often understood to substantiate the usual views. It will be argued that Locke should
rather be read on the backdrop of the advanced interpretation to understand his
explanations as coherent.
a. The Reality of Qualities and the Resemblance of Ideas
In many passages, Locke portrays secondary qualities as powers, i. e. properties being
dispositions to cause ideas, which are to be identified with microphysical primary
qualities. In Locke’s corpuscularian terms, a secondary quality is a disposition understood
in terms of primary qualities of the “insensible parts” of bodies.176 Since according to
corpuscularian theory these dispositions, or insensible parts respectively, are minute
particles on the surface of bodies, the secondary quality of being yellow is conceived as
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being identical with specific microphysical minute particles which pass on motions to
other microphysical particles which eventually affect our senses.177 This understanding of
qualities is significantly present when Locke makes use of corpuscularian theory in his
reasoning about qualities, namely in his accounts about: the perception of a body’s
properties (§§12-13), the changing of a body’s secondary qualities (§20), and the multiplicity
of effects a body has on a perceiver (§§19 and 21). The same relationship is expressed by
Locke’s phrase that secondary qualities depend on  or are reduced to primary qualities.178
In an explanatory account of bodies, secondary qualities are dispositional properties and to
be elucidated in terms of microphysical primary qualities. Note that for Locke
macrophysical primary qualities can likewise be conceived as dispositions being
comprehended in terms of microphysical primary qualities. Hence, the punchline of the
portrayal of secondary qualities as powers or dispositions is that they are features which
are highlighted by properties of a different conceptual type, namely by primary qualities.
In this sense, one has to understand my way of speaking that secondary qualities are
dispositions, namely that, more specifically, they are dispositions which are elucidated i n
terms of a different conceptual type. This depiction is likewise present in Locke’s
definition of secondary qualities:
“§10. 2dly, Such Qualities, which in truth are nothing in the Objects themselves,
but Powers to produce various Sensations in us by their primary Qualities, i. e. by
the Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of their insensible parts, as Colours, Sounds,
Tasts, etc. These I call secondary Qualities.”179
The first step is to realize that the characterization of secondary qualities as powers is part
of a more complex depiction: secondary qualities are nothing else “in the Objects
themselves” than powers that are comprehended in terms of microphysical primary
qualities. In other words, a secondary quality is a property which is in no other way “in
the things themselves” than in form of a disposition. In a later passage it becomes evident
that Locke equates this way of being in the things themselves with the reality status of
secondary qualities:
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178 138, II.viii.17.
179 135, II.viii.10.
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“[...] whatever reality we, by mistake, attribute to them [scil. secondary qualities],
[secondary qualities] are in truth nothing in the Objects themselves, but Powers to
produce various Sensations in us, and depend on those primary Qualities, viz.
Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of parts; as I have said”.180
This means, secondary qualities are only in that sense real, or “non-real” in which they
are qua dispositions in the things themselves. The apparent similarity between the latter
quoted passage and the definition of ‘secondary quality’ suggests that Locke means the
same when defining secondary qualities as properties being nothing else in the objects
themselves than a disposition. Importantly, this implies that secondary qualities are
comprehended as properties of bodies when characterized as being non-real. Having said
that, it becomes plain that, in fact, this is likewise entailed in the definition of secondary
qualities:
“To these [scil. primary and sensible qualities] might be added a third sort which are
allowed to be barely Powers though they are as much real Qualities in the Subject,
as those which I to comply with the common way of speaking call Qualities, but for
distinction secondary Qualities. For the power in Fire to produce a new Colour, or
consistency in Wax or Clay by its primary Qualities, is as much a quality in Fire, as
the power it has to produce in me a new Idea or Sensation of warmth or burning,
which I felt not before, by the same primary Qualities, viz. The Bulk, Texture, and
Motion of its insensible parts.”181
Locke points out that non-sensible secondary qualities, e. g. the propensity of fire to
change the consistency of wax, are as much “real Qualities” of bodies, e. g. a “real Quality”
of fire, as sensible qualities are. Since, usually, only primary but not secondary qualities
are said to be “real Qualities”, Locke evidently does not use ‘real Quality’ in the same
sense when calling primary qualities real, but with a different one which applies to
secondary qualities, namely to assert that secondary qualities are real qualities in the sense
of being powers. Again, it shows up: secondary qualities in general and thus sensible
qualities in particular are real qua being dispositional properties of bodies which are
highlighted in terms of microphysical primary qualities.
This understanding of ‘real’, and ‘in the things themselves’ respectively, corresponds to
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the way Locke uses these concepts in connection with primary qualities.182 The argument
in §§11-15, which establishes that sensible qualities are secondary qualities, suggests that
primary qualities are understood as being real in so far as intrinsic or explanatory
properties are real. Here Locke first expounds a corpuscularian hypothesis of sense
perception according to which primary qualities are explanatory basic, i. e. according to
which bodies are understood from the explanatory perspective in terms of microphysical
primary qualities. And he then concludes that only the “patterns” of ideas of primary
qualities “do really exist in the Bodies themselves”.183 Now, whatever Locke means
exactly when recognizing that the patterns of ideas of primary qualities are in the bodies
themselves, on the face of it, primary qualities are conceived here as properties being i n
the things themselves in virtue of their explanatory function. However, it would be
imprecise to identify primary qualities with features being intrinsic or explanatory basic i n
an account of bodies and their properties. For primary qualities, as explained above, are
conceptual types of features which comprise micro- as well as macrophysical properties.
The primary quality figure is instantiated by both micro- and macrophysical figure. Thus,
more specifically, primary qualities are real in virtue of being the conceptual type of
features serving as intrinsic or explanatory basic properties in a theory of bodies.
We have seen, ‘to be real’ and ‘to be in the things themselves’ characterize the reality
status of both primary and secondary qualities with respect to their role in an explanatory
or scientific account of bodies. Secondary qualities are non-real or nothing in the things
themselves than powers in virtue of being dispositions that are identified with primary
qualities. Primary qualities are real or in the things themselves in virtue of being the
features in terms of which one conceives bodies and their properties in a theory of bodies.
The analysis so far has made plain that at least in some passages the reality doctrine is
about qualities conceived as properties of bodies. The reality status has something to do
with their role in a scientific account of bodies and their properties, namely with them
serving as intrinsic or respectively dispositional properties. The immediate impact is that
these important paragraphs cannot be understood in accordance with common lines of
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interpretation. For example, Locke is often understood to ascribe reality to primary
qualities in the sense that they are properties of bodies, and to deprive reality of secondary
qualities in the sense that they are not properties of bodies, but rather mental states of a
perceiver.184 These commentators regard secondary qualities in the context of the reality
doctrine not to be dispositions, but to be sensations, i. e. as being identical with ideas of
secondary qualities. Other readings do conceive Locke’s secondary qualities as properties
of bodies, but they also assert that the reality doctrine relates truly to ideas of secondary
qualities.185 Ideas of secondary qualities are thus said to be not real in the sense that they
are mental states and not properties of bodies. Both lines of interpretation view Locke’s
notions of being real and non-real alike and attribute them to the same type of entities,
namely to properties respectively to mental states. Not surprisingly, among the two
readings there is a corresponding similarity as to the conceptual level. In connection with
the reality doctrine, predicates like ‘yellow’ are said to denote mental states: according to
one reading Locke calls these mental states ‘secondary qualities’, according to the other
one ‘ideas of secondary qualities’.186  
However, in the quoted passages Locke speaks neither of (ideas of) secondary qualities
being non-real in virtue of being sensations, nor of primary qualities which are real solely
in virtue of being properties. Quite the contrary, secondary qualities are real qua
dispositions and primary qualities are real qua intrinsic features.
Yet, it remains so far unclear how the reality status of qualities can be spelled out in the
light of their explanatory role. In what follows next, I will argue that this can be done by
ascribing to Locke an intelligible and historically plausible view. The key is the
corpuscularian backdrop of Locke’s quality discussion.
                                                
184 Cp. Ayers (1991), I, 63. Ayers insists here that, in this context, secondary qualities are blank effects, i. e.
mental states. And he depicts secondary qualities not to be real in objects in the sense that they are mental
states and not properties of bodies. Cp. Krüger (1981), 80ff.
185 Cp. Alexander (1985). Alexander maintains, on the one hand, that secondary qualities are properties of
bodies (118). And since he claims that colours (etc.) are truly ideas of secondary qualities (118) - and not
secondary qualities, as I contend -,  he takes the issue of colours (etc.) being real as a question of locating them
correctly. Colours (etc.) are genuine properties of a perceiver, i. e. ideas, and not properties of objects causing
ideas (125f).
186 Cp. again Ayers (1991), I, 63; Alexander (1985), 118. See notes above.
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b. The Reality Doctrine in the Light of Boyle’s Criticism of Real Qualities
Natural philosophers before Locke have already distinguished between primary and
secondary,187 in particular Boyle who had developed the corpuscularian hypothesis.188
There is no need to expound Boyle’s concept of primary and secondary qualities and his
corpuscularian account in detail, but some input of Locke’s corpuscularian background is
needed to recognize the thrust of his reality doctrine.
Boyle’s quality distinction is part of his corpuscularian theory which is a mechanical
account of the properties of bodies, namely of how their properties change and how their
properties are perceived. He contends that bodies are to be comprehended as a compound
of smaller bodies, the corpuscles,189 and that corpuscles have certain physical properties, e.
g. shape, size and mobility.190 These “corpuscularian” properties are often, but not
consistently called primary qualities.191 From this explanatory perspective bodies are
understood solely in terms of microphysical, corpuscularian qualities. This implies that
the multiplicity of properties, which bodies have on the macrophysical level, is reduced to
their microphysical, corpuscularian properties.192 Every property of the macrophysical
level is explained in terms of corpuscularian properties of the microphysical level. Since
macrophysical bodies have corpuscularian properties not only if understood from the
micro- but also from the macrophysical viewpoint, corpuscularian properties occur on
both levels. There are both macro- and microphysical corpuscularian properties. In other
words, a corpuscularian feature is conceived as a conceptual type of properties, namely as
a conceptual type of the features being intrinsic according to corpuscularian theory. On the
other hand, all other properties, e. g. colours, are understood as dispositional properties
                                                
187  In Il Saggiatore, Galileo introduced the distinction in modern philosophy. Cp. Galileo (1968), VI, 213-372.
188 Boyle developed his corpuscularian theory especially in the so-called theoretical part of The Origin o f
Forms and Qualities. Cp. Boyle (1772), III, 14-27.
189 Boyle (1772), III, 16 and 22. However, Boyle uses his terminology not always consistently and also refers to
unobservable compounds of corpuscles as corpuscles, 29f.
190 Boyle (1772), III, 16. However, it is a matter of interpretation whether Boyle’s primary qualities comprise
only shape, size, and mobility, since he also speaks of other properties, e. g. bulk. Cp. Boyle (1772), III, 16.
There is no need for my argument on Locke to go into these details.
191 For instance, Boyle refers to primary qualities also as “essential properties”. Cp. Boyle (1772), III, 20f.
192 This is well illustrated by Boyle’s famous example of a key fitting a lock. Cp. Boyle (1772), III, 18.
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and do not have a microphysical aquivalent.193 These features are often, but again not
consistently named secondary qualities.194
The implications are of two kinds. First, a single corpuscle does not have secondary
qualities, e. g. it is not coloured.195 Second, even macrophysical compounds of corpuscles
are conceived not to have secondary qualities in addition to their corpuscularian features.
Boyle illustrates this with respect to non-sensible secondary qualities. A key fitting a lock
has the power to turn the the lock and the lock has the power to be turned by the key. But,
Boyle insists, “by these new attributes there was not added any real or physical entity
either to the lock or to the key”.196
Boyle’s substantial argument to decline Aristotelian real qualities is directly connected
with his account of qualities, as the last quote already indicated. A quality is real if it is
literally ascribed to bodies on the microphysical level although bodies do not have the
quality from the explanatory standpoint.197 In other words, real qualities are secondary
qualities which are treated analogous to primary ones in being likewise present on the
microphysical level. For example, sensible qualities like colour and taste are real qualities,
if they are attributed to bodies as features being ontologically or numerically distinct from
corpuscularian properties; but Boyle insists:
“there is in the body, to which these sensible qualities are attributed, nothing of real
and physical but the size, shape, and motion or rest, of its component particles,
together with that texture of the whole, which results from their being so contrived
as they are; [...]”.198
To say in the Aristotelian sense that bodies are coloured, is to assign to them a real quality
                                                
193 Boyle (1772), III, 18 and 25.
194 For instance, Boyle calls also sensations secondary qualities. Cp. Boyle (1772), III, 23.
195 Boyle (1772), III, 22: “[...] if we should conceive that all the rest of the universe were annihilated, except
any [scil. any one] of these intire and undivided corpuscles ... it is hard to say what could be attributed to i t ,
besides matter, motion (or rest), bulk, and shape. Whence by the way you may take notice that bulk, though
usually taken in a comparative sense, is in our sense an absolute thing, since a body would have it, though
there were no other in the world.”
196 Boyle (1772), IV, 18.
197 I do not claim that this is Boyle’s definition of ‘ realqualities’, but that, as a matter of fact, they have this
characteristic according to Boyle’s explanations.
198 Boyle (1772), IV, 23.
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which they do not possess from the scientific viewpoint. This becomes evident in respect
of single corpuscles: corpuscles are not coloured - neither from the microphysical
perspective nor even from the macrophysical stage since they do not have the power to
cause visual sensations. Similarly, compounds of corpuscles are not coloured, if
understood from the microphysical perspective. In an explanatory account, bodies are not
described in terms of secondary qualities. Of course, according to corpuscularian theory,
macrophysical bodies still have secondary qualities, but only on the macro- and not on the
microphysical level. The disclaimer of real qualities is not a denial of macrophysical
bodies having secondary qualities, but of the existence of microphysical secondary
qualities. It is an ontological thesis. This ontological contention is derived from an
account that the real qualities are truly dispositions and that they therefore do not exist
numerically distinct in addition to their corpuscularian properties. In Boyle’s own words:
“And proportionably hereunto, I do not see why we may not conceive, that as to
those qualities (for instance) which we call sensible, though by virtue of a certain
congruity or incongruity in point of figure (or texture or other mechanical
attributes) to our sensories, the portions of matter they modify are enabled to
produce various effects, upon whose account we make bodies to be endowed with
qualities; yet they are not in the bodies that are endowed with them any real or
distinct entities or differing from the matter itself furnished with such a
determinate bigness, shape, or other such modifications.”199
Locke’s corpuscularian account of perceiving properties of bodies which he gives in §§12-
13 goes along the lines of Boyle’s corpuscularian theory.200 As alluded to above,201 i n
Locke’s outline of an explanatory account, bodies are described solely in terms of primary
qualities, and secondary qualities are conceived as “combinations” of microphysical
primary qualities. Now, if one reads Locke in the light of Boyle’s discussion of real
qualities, the depriving of secondary qualities of being real simply means that there are n o
secondary qualities on the microphysical level. In this sense it is perfectly intelligible to
say: secondary qualities are not real - while maintaining that they are properties in the
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Cp. Rogers (1966), 210f.
200 Cp. Boyle’s account of the perception of colours in The Experimental History of Colours. Cp. Boyle (1772), I ,
671.
201 Cp. 4b.
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sense of dispositions. In an explanatory, microphysical description secondary qualities do
not exist separately side by side with primary qualities. To the contrary, secondary qualities
are to be identified with microphysical primary qualities. The former are not numerically
distinct from the latter. This reading of the reality status of qualities and of Locke’s use of
“real” complies with Boyle’s use of ‘real’ when saying that a non-sensible quality is not
“any real or physical entity” or that sensible qualities are not “any real or distinct entities
or differing from the matter itself.” By contrast, primary qualities of the macrophysical
level are real in the sense that they re-appear on the microphysical level. To be more
precise, since a primary quality comprises both micro- and macrophysical features,
primary qualities are real because bodies possess them from the scientific standpoint.
Thus, what Locke is up to is to decline the popular belief amongst laymen,202 Aristotelians
and alchemists that sensible qualities are in the same way irreducible as corpuscularian
properties are.203 Primary qualities do appear on the microphysical level, but secondary
qualities disappear. Not to make this distinction is to give a false, very misleading account
of how things are. Locke’s claim of the non-reality of secondary qualities can be made
intelligible on the background of contemporary scientific discussions. Macrophysical
primary qualities are real because from the explanatory perspective they are conceived i n
terms of the same conceptual type, whereas secondary qualities are non-real because they
are explained in terms of a different type of properties.
This way to comprehend Locke illuminates both why the reality status of qualities is
linked with their explanatory role as intrinsic or respectively as dispositional features and
why qualities are understood in terms of “conceptual types”. The nexus between the
reality status of qualities and their explanatory role makes likewise plain why in these
passages Locke is concerned with an explanatory account of bodies, namely with
corpuscularian theory: the reality status of properties relates to the way bodies are
conceived in a scientific description of them.
Crucially, on the face of it, other passages have to be understood in the same light. In his
discussion of qualities, Locke’s main objective is to show that contrary to popular opinion
                                                
202 141f, II.viii.24f.
203 It is not clear whether Locke has Aristotelians and alchemists in mind, but certainly Boyle has. Boyle
argues against both of them especially in The Sceptical Chymist. Cp. Boyle (1772), I.
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sensible qualities are not real, i. e. that they are only as much real as other secondary
qualities are. To underpin his contention, he draws an analogy between sensible qualities
and other secondary ones, namely mediately perceivable features like the propensity of
the sun to melt wax. To come to grips with the analogy, Locke’s distinction between
immediately and mediately perceivable secondary qualities has to be introduced first.
The sub-division of secondary qualities between immediately and mediately perceivable
secondary qualities is implicitly introduced in the definition of secondary qualities, but
stated explicitly at the end of the chapter.204 The secondary quality of a body is mediately
perceivable if it is understood as the property which causes a sensation of a change of
features which another body possesses. Mediately perceivable secondary qualities are
therefore propensities of bodies to cause property changes in other bodies; and they are
identified by the corresponding change of sensation which goes hand in hand with the
property change. For example, the capacity of the sun to melt wax is grasped as the
property of the sun which causes the change of perceiving wax first to be hard and then to
be fluid. Similarly, the power of wax to be melted by the sun is that feature of wax which
is causally involved in the change of perceiving wax first to be hard and then to be fluid.
On the contrary, a secondary quality is immediately perceivable if it is identified or
ascribed to a body directly by a sensation of the secondary quality. For example, sensible
qualities like colours are properties causing a visual perception by which a particular
colour is specified.
Coming back to the comparison of the reality status between sensible qualities and
mediately perceivable secondary qualities, §24 for example, entails the proposed reading of
the reality doctrine. According to Locke, one commonly regards sensible qualities as real
qualities in the things themselves, but mediately perceivable qualities as nothing but
powers:
“For the Second sort [scil. immediately perceivable qualities], viz. The Powers to
produce several Ideas in us by our Senses, are looked upon as real Qualities, in the
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things thus affecting us: But the Third sort [scil. mediately perceivable qualities] are
call’d, and esteemed barely Powers.”205
Rejecting the belief that sensible qualities are real, Locke points then out that one has to
conceive them like mediately perceivable features, namely as powers and not as real
qualities. In both cases one has to comprehend secondary qualities in terms of
(microphysical) primary qualities: “ [...] these two later sorts of Qualities are Powers barely,
and nothing but Powers, relating to several other Bodies, and resulting from the different
Modifications of the Original Qualities”.206 Locke illustrates his point by qualities of the
sun. The sun’s power to melt wax is a mediately perceivable property which is regarded
solely as a power or disposition of the sun:
“But when we consider the Sun, in reference to Wax, which it melts or blanches,
we look upon the Whiteness and Softness produced in the Wax, not as Qualities in
the Sun, but Effects produced by Powers in it”.207
In other words: when conceiving the power of the sun to melt wax with reference to the
effect caused in the wax, we do not understand the sun to be soft; rather the softness is
seen as an effect produced in the wax by the sun’s power. In short, softness is not
attributed to the sun, but to the wax. That is, one does not elucidate a mediately
perceivable property in terms of its effect by which one identifies the property. Instead,
one comprehends the sun’s power to melt wax in terms of microphysical primary
qualities. Locke moves then on to assert that sensible qualities have to be understood i n
the same way. This means, not only mediately but also immediately perceivable
properties are dispositions which are to be conceived in terms of primary qualities. The
comparison between mediately and immediately perceivable features thus establishes that
for Locke sensible qualities are not real qualities in virtue of being dispositions.208  
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This means, Locke links again the reality status of secondary qualities with them being
dispositions: they are not real qualities because they are to be identified with primary
qualities. And Locke charges his opponents to make the mistake to ascribe a secondary
quality to bodies from an explanatory standpoint. But a secondary quality, he maintains, is
of a conceptual type in terms of which one only grasps the secondary quality, but in terms
of which one does not elucidate the secondary quality in a scientific account of bodies.
Concepts of secondary qualities denote properties in virtue of the sensations they produce,
concepts of primary qualities depict properties in virtue of their existence from the causal
standpoint. To confuse this, is to take sensible qualities as real qualities or respectively to
attribute sensible qualities to bodies on the microphysical level.
To sum up, Locke’s analogy serves to establish that sensible qualities are like other
secondary qualities with regard to a scientific understanding of them. There is nothing
soft in the sun which causes the softness of wax. Correspondingly, there is nothing hot i n
the sun which causes the sensation of heat. Of course, in the sun there is the disposition
to melt wax and to warm, but these properties should not be understood in terms of
softness or warmth. Secondary qualities are features of bodies which are to be elucidated
in terms of primary qualities; from the explanatory standpoint one should not conceive
secondary qualities in terms of the conceptual type in terms of which one depicts them as
secondary qualities. As to secondary qualities, one can grasp a feature either with reference
to our mental representation of them as produced in sensation, i. e. in terms of a
secondary quality or with reference to our scientific understanding of them, i. e. in terms
of primary qualities. By contrast, primary qualities - whether micro- or macrophysical
                                                                                                                                                                       
qualities being sensations as portraying sensible qualities as powers of bodies. For, if one does not
read him in this way, he would contradict himself in the very same sentence by calling at once sensible
qualities both powers as well as sensations or respectively ideas: “v.g. the Idea of Heat, or Light,
which we receive by our Eyes, or touch from the Sun, are commonly thought real Qualities, existing in
the Sun, and something more than mere Powers in it.” Now, as ‘v.g.’ indicates clearly in this context,
the “Idea of Heat, or Light” exemplifies that sensible qualities are powers: ‘idea’ signifies here powers
or dispositions of bodies. More straight forwardly, one can read the occurrence of ‘perception’.
Sensible qualities of the sun are identified as powers or properties of the sun “which are Perceptions
in me when I am [effected by these powers]”. That is, given this time Locke’s primary meaning of
‘idea’, a sensible quality is a power which is in so far a perception as it is the intentional content of a
perception.
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ones - are properties which are understood in the same terms whether with respect to our
sensations or to our explanatory account of them.
 Importantly, the analogy between mediately and immediately perceivable features
moreover makes plain that the reality status of qualities is not related to their explanatory
role in any account of bodies and their properties. Rather, the reality status of a quality is
linked with its role in an account of bodies with respect to our mental representations of
them. To say that secondary qualities do not exist on a microphysical level is not simply to
claim that they are omitted in a description of bodies in some scientific explanation of
their properties or that secondary qualities do not perform the role of being explanatory
basic in some kind of theory. Instead, Locke prefers to conceive bodies in the language of
microphysics rather than in our everyday language of secondary qualities, because to
portray bodies in terms of primary qualities is to comprehend them independently of any
particular way we represent them mentally. One can illustrate this again i n
corpuscularian terms.
According to the corpuscularian picture, a body has a multiplicity of ways to affect a
perceiver, namely to cause a multiplicity of mental representations of the properties of
the body. And since one grasps the features of bodies by one’s mental representations, one
depicts bodies by a multiplicity of mental representations. In other words, there is a
multiplicity of concepts each of which denotes a type of property being conceptually
distinct. However, for corpuscularians like Locke, an explanatory account of our mental
representations makes intelligible that only a smaller set of conceptually distinct types of
properties are truly numerically distinct. The multiplicity of conceptually distinct types of
features are ontologically reduced to the small set of primary qualities. In a theory of
perception, bodies are grasped from a causal perspective, namely as the cause of all our
mental representations. To depict bodies in terms of primary qualities is thus to conceive
them as independent of the way they are mentally represented. Concepts of primary
qualities are therefore designed to be the vocabulary with which one comprehends bodies
as not being related to our mental representations. In Lockean words: describing bodies
with primary qualities is to conceive them how bodies are in themselves,  and not how
they are in relationship to the way they affect the perceiver, i. e. to the particular way
bodies are mentally represented.
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We now see: in connection with the reality doctrine Locke discusses qualities from the
same epistemological perspective as he does with ideas in connection with the
resemblance theory, namely from a perception-neutral viewpoint. This is not surprising,
given the prominence of the corpuscularian theory of perception in Locke’s chief
argument in §§11-15 and the close ties between reality doctrine and resemblance theory.
With regard to this epistemological perspective Locke depicts qualities as real or non-real.
A property is real if a feature of the same conceptual type is ascribed to bodies from the
perception-neutral standpoint; otherwise it is non-real.
c. Objections against Alleged Textual Evidence for Alternative Readings
If one keeps the perception-neutral perspective of the reality doctrine in mind, one can
elucidate passages in accordance to the developed reading which are usually seen to
establish common lines of interpretation. For most commentators, there are passages
showing that Locke comprehends secondary qualities as being not real in the sense that
they are sensations and not properties of bodies. At the root of this predicament Locke is
viewed to mean in fact ideas or perceptions of secondary qualities when literally speaking
of secondary qualities or when using words like ‘yellow’. Locke is taken to mean ideas of
secondary qualities when speaking of entities which he signifies by concepts like
‘yellow’.209 Ayers does not certify confusion, but he takes Locke to make use of an
ambiguity of ‘idea of secondary qualities’ and of a corresponding ambiguity of ‘secondary
qualities’. Ayers understands Locke to use ‘secondary qualities’ not only for properties but
also for our ideas or sensations of them, since Locke, allegedly, declares in one passage
that ‘ideas of secondary qualities’ signifies primarily perceptions of secondary qualities and
secondarily secondary qualities. In particular, Ayers regards Locke’s analogy between pain
and sensible qualities to show that secondary qualities are said to be not real in the way
Ayers views Locke.210
But the advanced interpretation can be squared with these passages. On first thought
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Locke there seems to speak of secondary qualities as if they were effects or sensations.
Secondary qualities appear to be portrayed as being real only in the sense that they exist as
sensations of bodies only in the mind of a perceiver. In these paragraphs Locke pursuits
again his main objective, namely to show that sensible qualities have the same reality
status as all other secondary qualities have. To show that the common interpretation of
these passages is unnecessary and unhelpful in order to read Locke as arguing coherently,
one has to keep in mind Locke’s use of ‘quality’, namely that qualities are understood as
intentional objects if qualities are said to be ideas.211 On this backdrop the comments
having typically led to the usual view can be understood in the light of the reconstructed
position. Likewise, Ayers textual evidence for the alleged official ambiguity of Locke’s
notions dissolves and it becomes clear that Locke’s pain analogy does not display that
secondary qualities are mental states. Instead, the pain analogy should be read along the
lines of his analogy of sensible qualities with mediately perceivable secondary qualities. I
begin with II.viii.16:
“§16. Flame is denominated Hot and Light; Snow White and Cold; and Manna
White and Sweet, from the Ideas they produce in us. Which Qualities are
commonly thought to be the same in those Bodies, that those Ideas are in us, the
one the perfect resemblance of the other, as they are in a Mirror; and it would by
most Men be judged very extravagant, if one should say otherwise. And yet he, that
will consider, that the same Fire, that at one distance produces in us the Sensation
of Warmth, does at a nearer approach, produce in us the far different Sensation of
Pain, ought to bethink himself, what Reason he has to say, That his Idea of
Warmth, which was produced in him by the Fire, is actually in the Fire; and his
Idea of Pain, which the same Fire produced in him the same way, is not in the Fire.
Why is Whiteness and Coldness in Snow, and Pain not, when it produces the one
and the other Idea in us; and can do neither, but by the Bulk, Figure, Number, and
Motion of its solid Parts?”212
As the beginning of §16 indicates, the subsequent fire example is supposed to highlight
the denial that ideas of sensible qualities like hot, white, cold and sweet are “the perfect
resemblance[s]” of these qualities.213 Thus, given our reading of ‘resemblance’, if Locke
asks whether those ideas are in the bodies which cause these ideas, he asks whether the
                                                
211 Cp. 3a.
212 137; II.viii.16.
213 137, II.viii.16.
4. THE REALITY OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES
97
type of property which is ascribed to the body as the idea’s content is also ascribed to the
body on the microphysical level in an explanatory account. Locke insists in the fire-
example that warmth, coldness, and other sensible qualities are not to be ascribed to fire
on the microphysical level just as one does not do it in the case of pain, since in both cases
one conceives the property as dispositions in terms of primary qualities. Conceptually
speaking, there is nothing “like” the idea of a secondary quality in the fire. Locke moves
then on in §17 to restate his point:
“§17. The particular Bulk, Number, Figure, and Motion of the parts of Fire, or
Snow, are really in them, whether any ones Senses perceive them or no: and
therefore they may be called real Qualities, because they really exist in those Bodies.
But Light, Heat, Whiteness, or Coldness, are no more really in them, than Sickness
or Pain is in Manna. Take away the Sensation of them; let no the Eyes see Light,
nor the Nose Smell, and all Colours, Tastes, Odors, and Sounds, as they are such
particular Ideas, vanish and cease, and are reduced to their Causes, i. e. Bulk,
Figure, and Motion of Parts.”214
Let us first become aware of the different aspects which are clearly mentioned. First, he
identifies secondary qualities with primary ones of the microphysical level: “[Secondary
qualities] are reduced to their Causes, i. e. Bulk, Figure, and Motion of Parts.” Second,
Locke compares the reality status of sensible qualities with that of other secondary
qualities which both are opposed to the reality status of microphysical primary qualities
(cp. the first two sentences). All the ingredients of Locke’s reality doctrine are present.
Now, the alleged problem of interpretation arises with respect to the first part of the
second sentence. There, Locke seems to ascribe to secondary qualities the existence
conditions of ideas of secondary qualities and thus to equate the former with the latter.
Does he not assert that there are no secondary qualities, if one does not perceive them,
and that they are thus reduced to primary qualities? Does he not identify secondary
qualities with what he calls at other places ideas of secondary qualities?215
However, Locke speaks very carefully of secondary qualities vanishing only in so far “as
they are such particular Ideas”. Thus he does not simply equate secondary qualities with
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our ideas of them. He does talk about the reduction of secondary qualities and of their
non-existence if they are not perceived, but only with respect to secondary qualities in so
far as they are ideas: “Take away the Sensation of them; ... and all [secondary qualities], as
they are such particular Ideas, vanish and cease, and are reduced to their Causes, i. e .
[primary qualities].” That is, if one does not perceive secondary qualities, they vanish in so
far as they are ideas. We can elucidate this on the backdrop of the advanced reading.
Certainly, Locke is pressing his point, and confuses the reader by pushing his rhetoric
over the edge of immediate comprehensibility. But he does so only to stress the issue of
the reality of microphysical primary properties and the non-reality status of secondary
qualities: bodies have a figure, but not a colour - if they are conceived as being
independent from the way we represent them. Locke maintains: if one understands
secondary qualities of bodies independently of the ideas they cause (“Take away the
Sensation of them”), one comprehends secondary qualities in terms of primary qualities
(“[secondary qualities], as they are such particular Ideas, are reduced to their Causes, i. e .
[primary qualities].”) so that in this sense bodies do not have secondary qualities
(“[secondary qualities], as they are such particular Ideas, vanish and cease”). Locke thus
insists that sensible qualities are in the same way real in bodies as other secondary
qualities are real in bodies: “But Light, Heat, Whiteness , or Coldness, are no more really
in them, than Sickness or Pain is in Manna.” The reality status of secondary qualities is
not related to their existence in human minds, but to their existence in bodies. Secondary
qualities are not said to cease to exist if they are not perceived, but that they have to be
identified with primary qualities, if they are conceived not in relation to our sensations
but as the causes of sensations. In the same light one has to read §18:
“§18. A piece of Manna of a sensible Bulk, is able to produce in us the Idea of a
round or square Figure; and, by being removed from one place to another, the Idea
of Motion. This Idea of Motion represents it, as it really is in the Manna moving: A
Circle or Square are the same, whether in Idea or Existence; in the Mind, or in the
Manna: And this, both Motion and Figure are really in the Manna, whether we
take notice of them or no: This every Body is ready to agree to. Besides, Manna by
the Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of its Parts, ahs a Power to produce the
Sensations of Sickness, and sometimes of acute Pains, or Grippings in us. That
these Ideas of Sickness and Pain are not in the Manna, but Effects of its Oprations
on us, and are no where when we fell them not: This also every one readily agrees
to. And yet Men are hardly to be brought to think, that Sweetness and Whiteness
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are not really in Manna; which are but the effects of the operations of Manna, by
the motion, size, and figure of its Particles on the Eyes and Palate; as Pain and
Sickness caused by Manna, are confessedly nothing, but the effects of its operations
on the Stomach and Guts, by the size, motion, and figure of its insensible parts;
[....].”216
At first, one might be tempted to read Locke again, as commentators usually do, to insist
that: bodies have primary qualities independently of whether we perceive them, whereas
bodies have secondary qualities only if one perceives them. But bearing in mind what
Locke means by the reality of microphysical primary properties, he rather makes the
following claims:
• our mental representation of motion depicts motion in the same terms as one would
conceive motion independently of any of our mental representations of motion (“The
Idea of Motion represents it, as it really is in the Manna moving”)
• the property to have the form of a circle or of a square is conceived in the same terms,
whether with regard to our mental representation of them or with regard to the way
manna has them from a perception-neutral viewpoint (“A Circle or Square are the same,
whether in Idea or Existence; in the Mind, or in the Manna”)
• manna is conceived to have both motion and form independently of whether we
attribute motion and form to manna in virtue of a mental representation of motion and
form, since manna has motion and form from a perception-neutral viewpoint (“And
this, both Motion and Figure are really in the Manna, whether we take notice of them or
no”).
Likewise one has to read Locke when he subsequently insists: sweetness and whiteness
are effects like sickness and pain and are therefore not really in the manna, since all four
qualities are to be understood as effects of microphysical primary qualities of the manna.
Again, one has to remember that Locke speaks here of secondary qualities in so far as they
are ideas or mental representations which are indeed effects caused by the manna: qua
mental representations, secondary qualities disappear if bodies are grasped from a causal
perspective.
True, in this paragraph there is no straight forward reference to secondary qualities being
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dispositions as there is in the other passages where secondary qualities are qualified as
ideas and as being not really in bodies. This has certainly led many readers to the view
that in this context secondary qualities are mental states, namely ideas of secondary
qualities. However, as we have seen at the beginning, this interpretation of the reality
status of qualities does not work out for key passages. But since it is possible, one should
therefore read §18 along the lines of the advanced reading of the reality doctrine. One
should rather understand Locke to put his point in a confusing way, instead of being
deeply confused or ambiguous about the reality status of qualities. Moreover, one should
not be too strict with Locke, since §18 does not serve as his first attempt to make his point
intelligible. It seems to me, in §18 Locke wants to stress the analogy of sensible qualities to
pain, since he believes that the reader will concede him the non-reality status of pain.
From a scientific perspective, there is literally speaking no pain in the manna - and so is
no sweetness.
A similar passage can be highlighted in the same way, namely Locke’s thought
experiment of a world without perceptions in II.xxxi.2. To see this, we have to take into
account the context as well, especially because it includes both the comments which Ayers
reads in favour of his view as well as the utterance showing that the pain analogy has to
be understood along the lines suggested here.
“’Tis true, the Things producing in us these simple Ideas, are but few of them
denominated by us, as if they were only the causes of them; but as if those Ideas
were real Beings in them. For though Fire be call’d painful to the Touch, whereby is
signified the power of producing in us the Idea of Pain; yet it is denominated also
Light, and Hot; as if Light and Heat, were really something in the Fire, more than a
power to excite these Ideas in us; and therefore are called Qualities in, or of the Fire.
But these being nothing, in truth, but powers to excite such Ideas in us, I must, in
that sense, be understood, when I speak of secondary Qualities, as being in Things;
or of their Ideas, as being in the Objects, that excite them in us. Such ways of
speaking, [...] truly signify nothing, but those Powers, which are in Things, to excite
certain Sensations or Ideas in us.”217
The argument begins with Locke’s delineation of the popular belief that bodies are not
only the cause of simple ideas, but that these ideas are also “real Beings” in bodies. The
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subsequent sentences to the end of the paragraph make plain that the topic is again the
reality of qualities. This indicates, at the opening of the argument Locke rejects the
widespread opinion that sensible qualities are not understood as being only powers - as
one should in the case of secondary qualities - but as “real Beings” or real qualities
respectively. Importantly, Locke does not critizise that secondary qualities are portrayed as
features, namely as powers or dispositions, but that they are regarded as real. It thus shows
up again: to be real is not a question about being a property or not, but about being what
kind of property.
In the subsequent sentence Locke illustrates his claim by a comparison between pain and
sensible qualities which entails the same result. The alleged difference between pain and
sensible qualities like light and heat consists for Locke in the false assumption that
sensible qualities “were really something in the Fire, more than a power to excite these
Ideas in us”. One conceives mistakingly sensible qualities, but not pain, as real. Secondary
qualities are portrayed as powers of bodies which are not real.
In the next sentence Locke reasserts that secondary qualities are only powers. The
punchline is to warn the reader not to mistake his talk of “qualities” in connection with
secondary qualities as a depiction of these properties as being real qualities. This has
already been indicated in the preceding sentence where Locke states that ‘quality’ is
commonly applied to sensible qualities because of the belief that they are real. More
importantly, at the end of the then following sentence Locke emphasizes: when saying
that secondary qualities are in bodies or that ideas of secondary qualities are in bodies, he
means that (ideas of) secondary qualities are nothing but powers. Given our
interpretation of ‘being nothing but powers’, Locke asserts: (an idea of) a secondary quality
is in a body in the way a disposition is, but not in the way a real quality is.
Having reconstructed the background, we can now turn to the thought experiment itself.
Locke invites us to imagine a world without perceptions and sensible beings:
“Since were there no fit Organs to receive the impressions from the Fire, or the
Sun, there would yet be no more Light, or Heat in the World, than there would be
no Pain if there were no sensible Creature to fell it, though the Sun should
continue just as it is now, and Mount Ætna flame higher than ever it did. Solidity,
and Extension, and the termination of it, Figure, with Motion and Rest, whereof
we have the Ideas, would be really in the World as they are, whether there were
4. THE REALITY OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES
102
any sensible Being to perceive them, or no: And therefore those we have reason to
look on as the real modifications of Matter; and such as are the exciting Causes of
all our various Sensations from Bodies.”218
At first glance it seems again as if Locke maintained that secondary qualities are
sensations of secondary qualities and that secondary qualities would not exist if there were
no sensations or ideas of them. Does Locke not assert that light and heat are only in so far
in a world without perception as pain is? And is pain not a mental state, i. e. an idea? If
this were correct, Locke would present a thoroughly confused argument since the thought
experiment is apparently introduced to establish what has been said before, namely that
secondary qualities are not real in virtue of them being just powers. However, there is no
need to interpret him in this way, since his comparison of pain has to be understood
differently. We have just seen that in this context Locke comprehends pain as a power to
cause ideas, i. e. as a feature of bodies and not of minds. Crucially, Locke says: “For though
Fire be call’d painful to the Touch, whereby is signified the power of producing in us the
Idea of Pain; [...]”. Thus, when Locke imagines the reality status of sensible qualities in a
world without perceptions by analogy to pain, he portrays sensible qualities as powers.
Moreover, one can easily read the thought experiment in the light of the advanced
interpretation. This is indicated at the end of his reasoning where Locke draws the
conclusion that primary qualities are the only types of properties in terms of which one
has to describe bodies if understood as the causes of sensations: “And therefore those [scil.
primary qualities] we have reason to look on [...] as are the exciting Causes of all our
various Sensations from Bodies.” That is, from the viewpoint explaining only primary,
but no secondary qualities are ascribed to bodies. Correspondingly, one can understand the
thought experiment as an attempt to convey the reality status of secondary qualities.
Given a world without perceptions, there is no basis to conceive properties of bodies i n
relation to mental representations, since there are no sensible beings to have ideas. By
contrast, it does make sense to describe bodies in terms of primary qualities, since they
depict bodies from a perception-neutral viewpoint. The same thought is evidently
entailed in Boyle’s argument against real qualities:
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“[...] if there were no sensitive beings those bodies that are now the objects of our
senses would be but dispositively [scil. dispositionally], if I may so speak, endowed
with colours, tastes, and the like; and actually but only with those more catholick
affections of bodies, figure, motion, texture, etc.”219
The point is that in a world without sensitive beings, e. g. when only one complex body
like a metal or stone exists, “it would be hard to shew that there is physically any thing
more in it than matter and the accidents we have already named”220 This becomes plain
in another passage as well:
“I do not deny but that bodies may be said in a very favourable sense to have those
qualities we call sensible, though there were no animals in the world: for a body in
that case may differ from those bodies which now are quite devoid of quality, in its
having such a disposition of its constituent corpuscles, that in case it were duly
applied to the sensory of an animal, it would produce such a sensible quality which
a body another texture would not: as though if there were no animals there would
be no such thing as pain, yet a pin may, upon the account of its figure, be fitted to
cause pain, in case it were moved against a man’s figure.”221
Boyle’s punchline is that in a world without sensitive beings one may speak of sensible
qualities in terms of dispositions, but there is no real basis to characterize them qua
sensible qualities. In the light of this parallel, the suggested reading of Locke’s comments
appears natural.
Perhaps more importantly, the interpretation has shown that Locke’s comparison
between pain and sensible qualities does not imply that secondary qualities are
comprehended as ideas in connection with the reality doctrine. Quite the contrary, the
pain analogy establishes that secondary qualities are truly properties of bodies. The pain
analogy serves as an argument for the claim that sensible qualities are only dispositions
but no real qualities. For Locke the reader is ready to concede that pain is non-real.
Pointing out the similarities between sensible qualities and pain, Locke intends to
convince him or her that sensible qualities are secondary qualities and not real ones.
The analysis made plain, moreover, that Ayers is wrong in reading the passage as Locke’s
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declaration of an ambiguous use of ‘secondary quality’.222 According to Ayers, Locke
delineates in II.xxxi.2 that ideas of secondary qualities stand primarily for perceptions i n
the sense of blank effects and secondarily for the powers to cause these perceptions.
Correspondingly ‘secondary quality’ is taken to denote either properties or sensations i n
the sense of blank effects. However, this is simply not what Locke says. He conceives
secondary qualities as dispositional properties and not as (simple) ideas; and simple ideas
are not understood as sensations in the sense of self-representing blank effects but as
representations of the property causing them in sensation.
To conclude, given a precise analysis of the nexus between the reality status of qualities
and their role in a theory of mental representations on the backdrop of contemporary
corpuscularian theory, one can read Locke’s various explanations as presenting a coherent
view on the reality of qualities. The reality doctrine assesses which conceptual type of
properties bodies have from a perception-neutral standpoint. The reality status of a
quality thus corresponds to the ressemblance status of its idea.
In the light of the parallels between Boyle’s and Locke’s position, the question naturally
arises whether the latter simply re-states the former. Three differences indicate that Locke
transcends Boyle. First, Locke has positive concept of real qualities. Whereas Boyle uses
‘real quality’ to denote unintelligible properties which are not corpuscularian, Locke refers
with this term to features that exist from a perception-neutral perspective. Second, Locke
develops the notion of resemblance which characterizes the relationship between two
conceptions of the same properties, namely as they are conceived in mental
representations and as they are conceived from a perception-neutral perspective. The
third distinction relates to the topic which has already been alluded to at the end of the
last chapter. The presence of corpuscularian theory in Locke’s explanations of resemblance
and qualities leads to the question whether this epistemological perspective is meant to be
a specific corpuscularian one or a general, theory-neutral viewpoint applying prima facie
to all kinds of theories of perceptions. I have argued that the topic of resemblance, and
therefore of the reality of qualities as well, is apparantly too general to be bounded up with
a particular scientific account. But the issue will finally be settled in the next chapter.
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Another still open issue is Locke’s argument for the reality doctrine in general and for the
thesis that sensible qualities are non-real in particular. All this will be taken on in the
next section as part of Locke’s theory of primary and secondary qualities.
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5. Locke’s Theory of Qualities
In the chapter on ideas of substances, one of Locke’s chief contentions is that our everyday
ideas of bodies include mainly secondary qualities, which are non-real or nothing but
powers, and only few primary qualities, which are real or in the things themselves.223
This account is based on previous results, namely on the analysis of resemblance and
qualities in II.viii. Locke defines here primary and secondary qualities and advances an
argument to establish both that sensible qualities are non-real, or respectively that our
ideas of them are not resemblances, and that corpuscularian properties are primary
qualities and real, or respectively that our ideas of corpuscularian features are
resemblances. In addition, as the comments in the chapter on ideas of substances display,
Locke takes it for granted that everyone who reflects on his or her ideas will concede that
our ideas of bodies include only few corpuscularian, primary qualities and for the most
part secondary qualities, especially sensible qualities. Likewise, he assumes consent that
the features he regards as non-sensible, secondary qualities are genuinely non-real. Thus,
though Locke does present an argument that corpuscularian properties are primary
qualities, i. e. that we do partly depict bodies by real properties, the focus is clearly on the
non-reality of sensible qualities. More importantly, given these presumptions and his
argument in II.viii, Locke can justify his chief contention that our everyday ideas of
bodies inlcude only few real, primary qualities and mostly non-real, secondary qualities. I
will call this whole account Locke’s theory of qualities.
In the light of the so far developed reading of the reality status of qualities, the theory of
qualities is an assessment of our everyday grasp of bodies from a perception-neutral
perspective. That is: Locke’s claims on which type of qualities are included in our
common ideas of bodies specify the cognitive content of the ideas with respect to a
scientific understanding of the represented properties. In principle, this account of our
everyday knowledge of bodies can still be reconciled with Alexander’s general view that
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the comments on qualities relate to corpuscularian theory.224 For, given Alexander were
right, the causal perspective would be bounded up with corpuscularian theory and would
therefore have to be conceived as a specific corpuscularian standpoint. On the contrary,
according to the here advanced interpretation, the perception-neutral perspective is
theory-neutral, i. e. it is not confined to or bounded up with a specific account of mental
representation. One leading question therefore is whether Locke examines our common
ideas of bodies from a specific, corpuscularian viewpoint or from an ideal scientific one.
Since the theory of qualities includes the reality doctrine and since the doctrine
corresponds to the chief assertions on resemblance, the difference between these topics is,
by and large, that the focus is either on features qua primary or secondary qualities, or on
features qua real or non-real qualities, or on ideas being resemblances or dissemblances.
The theory of qualities, the reality doctrine and the resemblance theory concern assertions
corresponding to each other: for instance, that sensible qualities are secondary qualities,
that sensible qualities are non-real, and that their ideas are not resemblances. Thus,
Locke’s argument on qualities establishes all three accounts.
An interpretation of Locke’s reasoning on qualities first affords a clarification of the
definition of primary and secondary qualities. it will become plain that the distinction is
not confined to corpuscularian theory, but is rather related to an account of bodies from
an ideal perception-neutral viewpoint. Subsequently, the full argument will be
reconstructed in the context of resemblance theory and reality doctrine. Here the issue
will finally be settled whether Locke’s reasoning intends to establish corpuscularian
theory or a theory-neutral assessment of our ideas of bodies from an ideal perception-
neutral viewpoint.
a. Locke’s Definition of Primary and Secondary Qualities
We begin with Locke’s notion of secondary qualities. In the discussion of the reality
doctrine we have seen that the striking similarity between Locke’s wording in §10 and §14
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of II.viii indicates that secondary qualities are defined as non-real properties, namely as
features being nothing but dispositions which are to be explained in terms of primary
qualities in a perception-neutral account of bodies and their properties.225 More precisely,
in §10 secondary qualities are not identified with primary qualities, but with
corpuscularian properties, i. e. with features in terms of which dispositions like secondary
qualities are elucidated in corpuscularian theory, e. g. form and solidity. On the face of it,
this suggests that secondary qualities are not defined as the properties which are reducible
according to a correct or ideal theory, but as the properties which are reducible according
to corpuscularian theory. This would mean, first, ‘secondary quality’ is a technical term of
corpuscularian theory and, second, there would be in fact no secondary qualities if
corpuscularian theory were false. If in a true, comprehensive or ideal theory of bodies,
their dispositions were not to be identified with corpuscularian qualities, there would be
no secondary qualities since no dispositions would fulfill the definition of secondary
qualities. But there is one passage which displays that, if pressed, Locke understands
secondary qualities solely by being non-real and not necessarily as reducible to primary
qualities.
Locke asserts that (ideas of) secondary qualities might be in fact to be explained by features
which are not primary qualities or corpuscularian properties respectively and of which
one does not have yet any comprehension: (ideas of) secondary qualities “[depend] all (as
has been shewn) upon the primary Qualities of their minute and insensible parts; or if
not upon them, upon something yet more remote from our Comprehension”.226 What
Locke evidently wants to express is that the features he has determined as secondary
qualities are truly secondary qualities whether they are to be elucidated in terms of
corpuscularian properties or other features. In either case, he insists, the so-called
secondary qualities are reducible, i. e. they have to be explained in terms of properties
which are of a different conceptual type. This shows that, if pressed, Locke portrays
secondary qualities not as features which are to be identified with corpuscularian
properties, but as features which are dispositions in an ideal theory. ‘Secondary quality’ is
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not a technical term of corpuscularian theory which has an extension only if
corpuscularian theory is largely right. To the contrary, a secondary quality is understood as
a feature that is reduced to other features in an ideal scientific account of bodies.
Consequently, one has to read §10 as defining secondary qualities as being non-real
features, i. e. as being of a conceptual type in terms of which bodies are not conceived
from an ideal perception-neutral viewpoint.
We now turn to primary qualities. In his definition of primary qualities Locke first gives
three abstract characterizations (which are syntactically seperated by semicolons) and then
makes a thought experiment which identifies corpuscularian properties as primary
qualities, e. g. bulk and form. In his abstract portrayals Locke defines primary qualities as
those properties no body can do without: in whatever state a body is, whatever changes it
suffers, whether a body is perceivable or not, these features are inseparable from the body.
Primary qualities are the properties every body has:
“§9. Qualities thus considered in Bodies are, First such as are utterly inseparable
from the Body, in what estate soever it be; such as in all the alterations and changes
it suffers, all the forces can be used upon it, it constantly keeps; and such as Sense
constantly finds in every particle of Matter, which has bulk enough to be perceived,
and the Mind finds inseparable from every particle of Matter, though less than to
make it self singly be perceived by our Senses. v.g. Take a grain of Wheat, divide it
into two parts, each part has still the same qualities; and so divide it on, till the
parts become insensible, they must retain still each of them all those qualities. For
devision (which is all that a Mill, or Pestel, or any other Body, does upon another,
in reducing it to insensible parts) can never take away either Solidity, Extension,
Figure, or Mobility from any Body, but only makes two, or more distinct separate
masses of Matter, of that which has but one before, all which distinct masses,
reckon’d as so many distinct Bodies, after division make a certain Number. These I
call original or primary Qualities of Body, which I think we may observe to produce
simple Ideas in us, viz. Solidity, Extension, Figure, Motion, or Rest, and
Number.”227
One should not understand Lockean primary qualities to be determinable properties, as
some commentators do.228 The notion of shape, for example, is a determinable property
in the sense that the feature of having a shape has to be determined or specified with
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respect to each body, since bodies have always a determined or specific shape. ‘Shape’ does
not denote to every body the same particular shape, but only some particular shape which
varies amongst bodies. However, this interpretation does not work out, because solidity is
not a determinable property. According to Locke’s technical term of ‘solidity’, which is
roughly aquivalent to ‘impenetrability’,229 there are not various kinds of solidity as there
are different kinds of shape. There is simply solidity. Every body, whether it is water, a
diamond or a single corpuscle, is called in the same sense solid. The example of solidity
shows that primary qualities are not determinable properties. Primary qualities are simply
features being general enough to be properties of all bodies.230 The feature of having the
shape of a globe, by contrast, is too specific, i. e. not every body has it.
After having advanced the three abstract portrayals of primary qualities, Locke expounds a
thought experiment in the course of which he identifies primary qualities with
corpuscularian properties. Given this structure of the reasoning, it is natural to read the
thought experiment as an argument for specifying which features are primary qualities, i.
e. which properties fulfill the previously given definition. This “grain-of-wheat
argument” determines with which features a body cannot do without: even if a body is
devided in unperceivable parts, each resulting body has still solidity, form, etc. In the last
sentence of §9 Locke then sums up that primary qualities are the properties mentioned i n
the grain-of-wheat argument. The thought experiment is a reasoning validating by
analogy that the mentioned corpuscularian properties are primary. The analogy is
between perceivable and unperceivable bodies, arguing that the latter always retain
solidity, extension, form and mobility despite any possible kind of alteration just as the
former do. The analogy thus implies that all bodies, whether perceivable or not, have
corpuscularian properties.
In the light of Locke’s use of the thought experiment to establish that corpuscularian
properties are primary qualities, ‘primary quality’ seems like ‘secondary quality’ not to be a
technical term confined to corpuscularian theory in the sense that it has extension only if
corpuscularian theory is largely correct. Primary qualities are not defined as being
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corpuscularian properties; rather, a reasoning is presented to identify the former with the
latter. This shows, both concepts can have extension even if Boyle’s theory is
fundamentally flawed. This strongly suggests that the quality distinction is meant to relate
to an ideal account of bodies.
 This conclusion is confirmed, even if §10 is differently interpreted in order to justify a
“corpuscularian reading” of Locke’s notion of primary qualities. Alternatively, one could
insist that the thought experiment does not determine which properties fulfill a
previously given definition, but is rather part of this foregoing portrayal. Furthermore, i n
the last sentence Locke is conceived to finally define primary qualities as being
corpuscularian properties fulfilling the preceding depiction. However, since ‚secondary
quality‘ is not regarded as a specifically corpuscularian term, as argued above,
corpuscularian theory would effectively be reduced to the assumption that every body has
corpuscularian features if primary qualities were understood to be defined as features
which are possessed by every body according to corpuscularian theory. But this conception
of primary qualities would certainly not do justice to Boyle’s hypothesis. And this last
consequence is rather implausible since Locke is so well acquainted with the theory.
Correspondingly, the distinction between being real and being non-real relates to an ideal
theory of mental representation as well. Locke’s epistemological perspective is an ideal
one being not confined to corpuscularian theory. Locke believes of course in the
corpuscularian claim that the properties he calls secondary qualities are truly to be
explained by corpuscularian properties, i. e. by features which corpuscularian theory has
determined as real qualities. This is the reason why Locke usually portrays secondary
qualities as reducible to corpuscularian, real properties, e. g. in his definition of secondary
qualities in §10. Yet, when engaged in scientific speculation, as we have just seen, Locke is
prepared to concede that corpuscularian theory might be false and that secondary qualities
are then not to be identified with corpuscularian, real qualities.
One can enhance the analysis. On the backdrop of §§7-8,231 Locke introduces the quality
distinction in §§9-10 in order to clarify the relationship between an idea, i. e. an
intentional state representing a property, and the property causing the mental
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representation and being the content of an idea. In other words, Locke draws the
distinction in order to specify which simple idea resembles the property it is about,
namely that only ideas of corpuscularian properties are resemblances but not ideas of
sensible qualities. Moreover, the reasoning in the chapter on ideas of substances shows
that Locke is interested in resemblance and qualities to determine the cognitive content of
our ideas of bodies: which of the features included in our ideas are real. Given this
backdrop, the thrust of the quality distinction is clearly an epistemological one. The
distinction serves to determine which of the properties, by which we depict bodies, are of
the same conceptual type in terms of which one conceives bodies as independent of how
they are mentally represented. Locke’s understanding of qualities thus relates to an ideal
account of bodies from a perception-neutral viewpoint. In this sense, the conception of
primary and secondary qualities is intended to be theory neutral, i. e. to be appropriate for
an ideal account and not to be confined in its employment to the truth of any particular
theory.
Correspondingly, if the quality distinction is not confined to Boyle’s hypothesis, then
certainly is so the notion of resemblance either. This implies, the viewpoint of
resemblance is an ideal scientific one. Locke therefore does not aim at establishing
corpuscularian theory, as Alexanders contends. Rather, he transforms Boyle’s scientific
issue of explaining human sense perception of bodies in the genuinely epistemological
issue of assessing our conceptions of bodies from an ideal scientific, perception-neutral
standpoint.
Coming back to the topic of qualities, at first sight, there are two curious aspects about
Locke’s quality distinction. Locke treats the quality distinction as if it were complete, i. e. as
if it classified all the properties bodies have in being either primary or secondary.
However, given his definitions, there might be properties being neither primary nor
secondary. For, if there were explanatory basic or real qualities which are not shared by all
bodies, these real qualities would neither be primary nor secondary since they are neither
common to every body nor non-real. In other words, there is a “conceptual gap” between
primary and secondary qualities. It seems to me, Locke has not recognized this due to his
belief in corpuscularian theory. According to the theory, on the one hand, corpuscularian
properties are primary and real, since all bodies are supposed to have them and since all
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features of bodies are assumed to be reducible by corpuscularian properties. And, on the
other hand, corpuscularian properties are regarded as the sole features in terms of which
bodies have to be understood from a scientific viewpoint. If one therefore identifies
primary qualities with corpuscularian properties in the light of corpuscularian theory,
primary qualities are the only real qualities bodies have. On this background, it becomes
plain why Locke conceives the quality distinction as complete. Corpuscularian theory
bridges the conceptual gap: primary qualities add up to real qualities so that primary
qualities are opposed to secondary qualities which are defined as non-real properties.
Features of bodies are seen as being either real or non-real, namely as being either primary
or secondary.
Another reason why Locke does not draw a complete distinction of qualities might be his
objective. After all, he wants to examine our ideas of bodies as to which of the entailed
features are real. He is thus concerned with corpuscularian properties, sensible qualities
and other (secondary) qualities. In addition, Locke apparently believes that corpuscularian
properties are real. This matches his grain-of-wheat argument which despite its simplicity
is taken to indicate strongly that corpuscularian properties are primary and thus real.
Moreover, according to Locke there is no question that all the other, known qualities,
which are not corpuscularian features or sensible qualities, are secondary. And with
respect to sensible qualities Locke clearly holds, as the quotation above shows, that they
are secondary in any case whether they are to be reduced to corpuscularian properties or to
other ones of which we do not even have a conception. Thus, the range of features Locke
has in mind when discussing qualities are properties of whose quality status he has strong
convictions. Corpuscularian properties are primary, all the other features are secondary.
Locke holds this belief of course in the light of corpuscularian theory. Given therefore
corpuscularian theory, the quality distinction files, despite its “incompleteness”, all the
properties being contained in our ideas of bodies.
There is another striking aspect of the quality distinction. After having defined ‘primary
quality’, this depiction of primary qualities virtually disappears in his further comments.
Instead, primary qualities are portrayed as being real, as being in the things themselves
and by their explanatory role in a theory about human mental representations of bodies.
And these characterizations have turned out to be aquivalent. It seems to me, the reason
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for the disappearance of the defining portrayal of primary qualities is again Locke’s
leaning towards corpuscularian theory. According to this account, the only qualities
which are real are primary, namely corpuscularian properties. Identifying primary
qualities with corpuscularian features, it is natural for Locke to equate primary qualities
with real qualities.
But having said all that, should one not expect Locke to define primary qualities as real
properties in the first place instead of determining them as features all bodies have? This
would indeed be the conceptually straight forward way, since in the subsequent passages
Locke is interested in properties which are real, but not in features which are possessed by
every body. However, Locke’s train of argument affords first the notion of primary quality
as he defines it and then the notion of real quality. On the basis of his definition Locke
specifies first the set of primary qualities by his grain-of-wheat argument in §9. He then
outlines a corpuscularian theory of sense perception which entails the assumption that
corpuscularian properties are primary. Locke’s depiction of corpuscularian properties as
primary serves here as a premise to make intelligible a corpuscularian theory of
perception. And it is thereby where corpuscularian properties acquire the feature of being
real, since ideas of primary qualities and ideas of secondary qualities are said to be
produced by bodies that are understood in terms of corpuscularian properties.
Of course, Locke could have disentangled his concepts by defining first primary and
secondary qualities as real respectively non-real and by introducing subsequently the
notion of a property being shared by all bodies to get his argument off the ground.
However, Locke does not present his theory in this conceptually more matured form
because he has corpuscularian theory before his eyes according to which real qualities are
aquivalent to the properties being possessed by every body. Yet, as the discussion of
secondary qualites has revealed above, if pressed, Locke is prepared to concede that there
might be other, yet unknown features which are real and in terms of which one has to
explain secondary qualities.
One can add a further, critical remark in this context. Given Locke’s definition of primary
qualities, there might be none. For it is possible that smaller bodies have properties of a
conceptual type which is not also instantiated by bigger bodies. In the extreme case, atoms
might be conceptually conceived radically different than macrophysical objects. Again,
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one sees that despite its theory neutrality the quality distinction is designed in the light of
corpuscularian theory in the very end.
b. The Argument
Having clarified the quality distinction, we can move on to assess the argument. It has
already been indicated, Locke develops the quality distinction in the context of his
resemblance theory.232 His topic is the assessment of which idea resembles the property
that causes the idea (§7). As the reality doctrine has shown, the notion of being a real
quality corresponds to his conception of an idea being a resemblance. A property is real if
it is of the same conceptual type in terms of which bodies are depicted as being
independently understood of the way the feature is mentally represented. An idea is a
resemblance if the idea represents the property in the same terms in which the feature is
portrayed as being independently grasped of the manner the idea represents the property.
To come to grips with resemblance, Locke first clarifies his general use of ‘idea’ and
‘quality’ and then introduces ‘primary quality’ and ‘secondary quality’ (§§8-10). As we have
seen, the quality distinction is drawn in the light of corpuscularian theory. Yet, the pair of
concepts is neutral to or not part of the corpuscularian hypothesis. It is an epistemological
distinction going along the lines of the resemblance status of ideas and the reality status of
qualities. Moreover, while defining primary qualities, Locke presents the grain-of-wheat
argument to establish corpuscularian properties as primary.
In §11 Locke maintains that we have to conceive bodies to interact by impulse when
producing ideas in us: “§11. The next thing to be consider’d, is how Bodies produces Ideas
in us, and that is manifestly by impulse , the only way which we can conceive Bodies
operate in.”233 Locke states thus a requirement for every plausible hypothesis of sense
perception, namely that causal interaction between bodies and human minds has to be
explained in terms of impulse. Of course, corpuscularian theory fulfills this requirement.
As Rogers has pointed out, in the face of Newton’s theory of gravitational forces, Locke
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softened the original version (in the first three editions of the Essay) of this paragraph
which had excluded the possibility that bodies could operate upon each in another way
than by impulse.234 But although Locke allows implicitly from the fourth edition onwards
(as just quoted) the existence of gravitation, the way gravitation works is for him still
inconceivable.235 For him only the conception of impulse and motion makes
comprehensible how bodies act upon each other. §11 sets thus the stage for the
introduction of a corpuscularian theory of perception in §§12-13.
In §§12-13 a corpuscularian theory of the genesis of mental representations is outlined.
Locke does not go into details just as he does not do in other passages as well.236
Apparently, for him it is sufficient to make intelligible the kind of explanation
corpuscularians give. More specifically, Locke is interested in making plain that in a
theory of perception features causing ideas of primary and of secondary qualities have to
be understood in terms of (microphysical) primary qualities. In §§12-13 Locke focuses on
primary qualities and on some sensible qualities, namely on colours and smells. §13 ends
with the conclusion that ideas of colours and smells are in the same way not a
resemblance as the idea of pain is.237 Given the advanced interpretation of resemblance
and of the pain analogy, in §13 Locke simply concludes the dissemblance status of ideas of
colours and smells from the non-reality status of colours and smells which they have
according to the scetched corpuscularian theory of perception. Colours and smells are
understood from the causal viewpoint in terms of primary qualities, i. e. in terms of other
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concepts as the ones by which they are grasped as being represented by our ideas of colours
and smells.
In §§14-15 Locke moves on to generalize his point. §14 contends that not only colours and
smells but also other sensible qualities like tastes and sounds are non-real and have to be
identified in terms of primary qualities from the explanatory perspective. In §15 Locke
then concludes from the non-reality status of sensible qualities the dissemblance status of
their ideas. Likewise, he deduces that ideas of primary qualities are resemblances. The
subsequent paragraphs of II.viii highlight the principal claim that only ideas of primary
qualities are resemblances and that ideas of sensible qualities - like the ideas of other
secondary qualities - are dissemblances. As will be delineated, he thereby appeals to
experiments, or everyday experience respectively, to undermine an Aristotelian theory of
sense perception and of real qualities which thus serve as additional support for the
corpuscularian account. And since Locke assumes consent that non-sensible secondary
qualities are not real, in II.viii Locke’s reasoning focuses clearly on sensible qualities. The
aim of the argument is to refute the popular belief that sensible qualities are real and that
our ideas of them are resemblances.238   
On the basis of this argument in II.viii, Locke can easily assess our ideas of bodies i n
II.xxiii. Our ordinary ideas, Locke maintains, portray bodies mainly only by non-real
features or respectively secondary qualities. Bodies, he contends, are primarily depicted by
powers, namely by mediately perceivable secondary qualities or by sensible qualities.239
And since according to the argument not only mediately perceivable but also immediately
perceivable or sensible qualities are non-real, we grasp bodies notably in terms of non-real
properties. As Locke’s remarks show, this is most obvious as to chemical substances
where even form and bulk are disregarded for characterizing bodies.240 In other words,
our everyday knowledge does not conceive bodies chiefly from the ideal epistemological-
perspective, i. e. from the perception-neutral standpoint. This account of our knowledge
is even more disillusioning if one considers that for Locke ideal knowledge of bodies
would depict them not by macrophysical, but by microphysical primary qualities, i. e. by
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real essences.241
Evidently, Locke’s claims as to qualities and his corresponding contentions of
resemblances are related to a corpuscularian-mechanical theory of bodies, their qualities,
and our perception of them. But how is his reasoning exactly to be understood?
Importantly, one should distinguish between arguments relating to a general mechanical
understanding of bodies and specific claims relating to corpuscularian theory. In §11 Locke
asserts that a mechanical understanding of perception is the only kind of explanation at
hand which makes the process of generating ideas or mental representations intelligible.
One can conceive interaction between bodies and human minds only in terms of
impulse. Moreover, this mechanical conception of perception can be spelled out
differently, i. e. not only by corpuscularian theory. Similarly, given the simplicity of the
grain-of-wheat argument, it effectively asserts that bodies can be comprehended only i n
terms of the mentioned corpuscularian properties, e. g. solidity. Every body, whether
perceivable or not, has to be understood as having these features. And, again, the
conception of bodies represents only a framework for a mechanical account of bodies
which can be spelled out differently, since it leaves open how to comprehend the
relationship between properties, the inner structure of bodies, etc. The thought
experiment establishes effectively that in any mechanical account of bodies the
mentioned properties are primary qualities. Thus, in §§9 and 11 Locke does not
demonstrate Boyle’s hypothesis. Instead, characterizing bodies in the only way we can
conceive of them, the two arguments represent a general mechanical account of bodies
and their relation to ideas. Locke’s contentions about impulse as well as about
corpuscularian features being primary qualities make up the only conceivable conception
to grasp bodies in relation to our ideas of them, namely a general mechanical one.
 Up to this point, it has only been asserted that as a matter of fact in §§9 and 11 Locke
argues for a general mechanical account, not specifically for Boyle’s hypothesis. But does
Locke also view his claims in this way? Given the evident generality of the contention
that bodies interact by impulse, Locke cannot believe that the claim establishes
corpuscularian theory. As to the grain-of-wheat argument, Locke certainly echoes Boyle
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who has previously used a similar reasoning in his corpuscularian theory to establish that
bodies have to be conceived in terms of corpuscularian properties.242 At first sight, one
could therefore take the thought experiment to demonstrate Boyle’s hypothesis. On the
other hand, since for Locke the only conceivable conception of bodies is a mechanical one
and since the thought experiment evidently determines only which features are primary,
Locke need not to regard the argument as establishing corpuscularian theory in particular.
Moreover, corpuscularian features coincide by and large with the set of physical properties
which have generally been regarded as primary or explanatory basic in the mechanical
tradition going back to Galileo.243 Thus, an argument that establishes corpuscularian
features as primary qualities can likewise be seen as determining generally which
properties have to be primary according to a mechanical account. More importantly and
decisively, Locke seems to identify corpuscularian theory with more specific claims than
that bodies interact by impulse or that corpuscularian properties are primary. He refers
explicitly to corpuscularian theory more or less only when he outlines more specific
theses of the hypothesis, e. g. that animal spirits transfer motion from the senses to the
brain. Locke apparently identifies corpuscularian theory with its particular claims as to the
details of the constitution of bodies and their causal interaction on the human senses. In
this light, the grain-of-wheat argument serves to establish for any kind of mechanical
account which features are primary.
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materia o sostanza corporea, a concepire insieme ch’ ella è terminata e figurata di questa o di quella figura, ch’
ella in relazione ad altre è grande o piccola, ch’ ella è in questo o quel luogo, in questo o quel tempo, ch’ ella si
muove o sta ferma, ch’ ella tocca o non tocca un altro corpo, ch’ ella è una, poche o molte, nè per veruna
imaginazione posso separarla da queste condizioni; [...]“. That is: „Whenever I conceive any material or
corporeal substance, I immediately feel the need to think of it as bounded, and as having this or that shape; as
being large or small inrelation to other things, and in some specific place at any given time; as being in motion
or at rest; as touching or not touching some other body; and as being one in number, or few, or many. From these
conditions I cannot separate such a substance by any stretch of my imagination.“ Cp. Drake (1957), 274
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Locke argues for a minimal account of bodies which represents the only way we can
conceive of them, and signifies explicitly further claims as more doubtful hypotheses. But,
as his identification of primary qualities with corpuscularian features shows, he tends to
view a general mechanical account already in the perspective of Boyle’s theory. If pressed,
Locke would certainly maintain that the grain-of-wheat argument applies to any
mechanical account. Yet, on the other hand, the thought experiment effectively
determines primary qualities as those features which, in Locke’s terms, Boyle has specified
as real qualities. Thus, in Locke’s comments there is a distinction between a general
mechanical account, on the one hand, and corpuscularian theory which spells out this
conception, on the other hand, but this distinction is not clear-cut. The reason apparently
is that for him Boyle’s hypothesis is unmatched. Corpuscularian theory is for Locke the
most convincing, unrivaled mechanical theory. Speaking of a mechanical account of
bodies, their qualities and their relation to ideas, is conceiving bodies in corpuscularian
terms and properties. It is therefore natural for Locke to regard corpuscularian theory as
the only conceivable account at hand and thus to treat qualities in accordance with Boyle’s
hypothesis.
 In short, the two arguments in §§9 and 11 respectively establish a general framework for a
mechanical theory of bodies and their relation to perception. He then fills out this account
by the assumption of corpuscularian theory in §§12-13. For Locke a mechanical account is
the only one providing us with a scientific conception of bodies which is best spelled out
by the unmatched corpuscularian theory. This corresponds to the structure of the
argument. After having advanced the grain-of-wheat argument and his claim as to
impulse, Locke assumes explicitly the corpuscularian hypothesis to make intelligible how
one has to understand perception in mechanical terms. Crucially, it shows up that there is
no particular reasoning for corpuscularian theory itself.
In the same light, one has to read Locke’s declarations that the programme of the Essay
does not consist in scientific investigations, e. g. in developing a theory of sense
perception. At various places, he distinguishes his epistemological project to determine
the extent and origin of knowledge from natural philosophy. These remarks stand
usually in connection with excursions into natural philosophy to ensure the reader that
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his reasoning does not require a discussion of scientific questions.244 Given the use of
corpuscularian theory in his argument, the punchline apparently is that Locke regards his
analysis as not requiring a debate whether corpuscularian theory is really true. For Locke
it is sufficient to argue for an outline of the only satisfying model making sense
perception conceivable, namely a corpuscularian-mechanical one. This aim of the
argument fits with Locke’s contention that we can imagine secondary qualities to be
explained in terms other than corpuscularian qualities, but that we do not have any
conception of these other, unknown features. Since Locke does not present any argument
why in any case the so-called secondary qualities are truly secondary, one might, however,
regard Locke to be a bit dogmatic on this subject matter. Here Locke adheres to a
characteristic claim of Boyle’s corpuscularian theory, namely that sensible qualities and
other dispositional properties are reducible. To sum up, Locke argues for his contentions
about qualities by outlining a corpuscularian-mechanical account making plausible that
his claims hold.
Moreover, Locke’s comments on a corpuscularian-mechanical theory cannot mean to
prove its truth. First, the grain-of-wheat argument serves only as a good reason for
believing an hypothesis to be true, but not as a proof yielding knowledge. This becomes
manifest in Locke’s account of hypotheses. Analogies can only make plausible, but do not
demonstrate the truth of hypotheses.245 This means, for Locke his analogy serves as strong
evidence for the hypothesis that corpuscularian properties are primary. One should
therefore not mistake Locke’s thought experiment as a proof for the existence of
corpuscularian properties and, eventually, of primary qualities. The aim of the grain-of-
wheat argument is to make plausible that corpuscularian properties are features every
body has.
Second, when saying that we cannot conceive bodies acting on our senses otherwise than
by impulse, Locke just points out that we do not have any other conception of interaction
and does not attempt to prove that bodies have to act on us by impulse. He should be
understood in this way, since he concedes as to secondary qualities that they might have
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to be identified with properties other than corpuscularian features, namely with
properties of which we do not have a conception.
Third, though corpuscularian theory provides the most convincing explanation, Locke
calls in these and other passages the corpuscularian theory explicitly a hypothesis.246
Again, this is confirmed by and is in accordance with his theory of knowledge and
hypotheses. Corpuscularian theory is a hypothesis whose truth is uncertain. This
epistemic status of corpuscularian theory is not surprising, however, given Locke’s
manysided criticism of the theory. He points to the limitations of the explanatory power
of corpuscularian theory with respect to: the cohesion of corpuscles which make up a
compound, the acting of bodies on one another by impulse (not to speak of gravitational
forces),247 and the causal interaction between mind and body.248 - All this indicates, when
advancing corpuscularian theory, Locke assumes the most reasonable and available
account of bodies to assess the reality status of qualities and the resemblance status of our
ideas.
It becomes manifest why Locke presents only a sketch of corpuscularian theory. For, if a
corpuscularian theory of perception is more or less the unrivaled hypothesis and if the
reasoning cannot yield knowledge in the first place, one needs to delineate corpuscularian
theory only to the extent that it becomes sufficiently conspicuous how the argument runs
in principal, namely an argument establishing the reality doctrine and the resemblance
theory on the basis of assuming corpuscularian theory. Given the alternatives, Locke has
neither to delineate Boyle’s hypothesis nor to justify it in detail.249   
This leaves us with the two arguments which are supposed to demonstrate a mechanical
framework for any account of bodies. Are they good? First, the grain-of-wheat argument is
certainly far from being convincing even though Locke is in distinguished company,
namely with Boyle.250 All bodies we perceive do not only have the corpuscularian
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247 For Locke, Newton’s gravitational force is like a mystery for which one cannot even can propose a
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248 Cp. 10e.
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properties Locke mentions but also sensible qualities, e. g. colours. If the analogy were
sound, it would prove as well, for example, that colours are primary: since all perceivable
bodies retain colour whatever change they undergo, every unperceivable body is
coloured. Second, given Locke’s belief that gravitation is inconceivable, it is natural for
him to assume as a mechanist that impulse is the only conceivable manner in which
bodies interact with human senses. Given Locke’s historic context, his arguments and
assumptions are certainly not inappropriate, but they are not satisfying either.
As indicated, Locke adds further reasonings to his main argument which, pace McCann,
render implausible an alternative, Aristotelian account of perception and real qualities.251
One can distinguish between four experiments, or types of everyday experience
respectively, that are directed against Aristotelian theory and that thus supercede those
passages in which Locke insists emphatically on sensible qualities being on par with non-
sensible secondary qualities.252 According to Aritsotelian theory, at least as Locke
conceives it,253  the perception of sensible qualities involves the communication of a
substantial form, or a real quality respectively. As we have seen, a real quality is conceived
as a property which bodies have from an explanatory viewpoint. Change in the
perception of the features of a body indicates change of its constitution, i. e. of its
properties, and change of the latter causes a corresponding change in perception. On this
backdrop, one can naturally highlight §16, and §§19-21, as Heyd has shown.254
First, in §16 Locke argues that, depending on the distance, the same fire causes the idea of
warmth and the idea of pain. This contradicts Aristotelian theory which implies that the
                                                                                                                                                                       
conceive that all the rest of the universe were annihilated, except any [scil. any one] of these intire and
undivided corpuscles ... it is hard to say what could be attributed to it, besides matter, motion (or rest), bulk,
and shape. Whence by the way you may take notice that bulk, though usually taken in a comparative sense, is
in our sense an absolute thing, since a body would have it, though there were no other in the world.” Boyle
(1772), III, 22. Locke’s deviding of a grain of wheat, if continued, would eventually yield the same result,
namely the set of properties which are ascribed to a single corpuscle.
251 McCann downplays the impact of Locke’s considerations on the intelligibility of Aristotelian theory
because he believes that the quality distinction is entailed in our notion or common sense understanding of
bodies and their causality. Cp. McCann (1994), 65ff. According to McCann, the mentioned experiments “are not
supposed to be decisive counterexamples to the Aristotelian theory of qualities”. Cp. McCann (1994), 66.
252 137ff, II.viii.17f; 141f, II.viii.24f.
253 Cp. Works, IX, 215.
254 Heyd (1994), 19-27.
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change of the idea of warmth to the idea of pain represents an alteration in the
constitution of the fire. But the fire is the same, only our sensation of it changed because
the perceptual conditions are different. Second, in §19 porphyry is said to cause sensations
of colour when striking by light, but not to do so in darkness. Locke similarly presumes
here that turning on or off the light does not alter the constitution of porphyry. Hence,
this contradicts Aristotelian theory which implies that “real alterations are made in the
Porphyre”255 because the change of perception is not explained by light, but by the
transmission of real qualities. Third, in §20 Locke refers to the change of the sensible
qualities of almonds when they are pounded. Here it is presupposed that poundering can
only alter the physical structure of bodies, but not any Aristotelian real qualities. This
contradicts Aristotelian theory which implies that the change in sensible qualities goes
hand in hand with an exchange of sensible qualities qua real qualities, e. g. that there is
privation of sweetness and acquisition of oiliness. By contrast, according to the
corpuscularian story, there is only a change in texture, i. e. in the arrangement of
corpuscles, but no process of privation and acquisition of real qualities. Fourth, in §21 the
same water is described to cause different sensations of temperature (when one hand has
been previously cooled), i. e. one hand feels warmth, the other one coldness. Given
however Aristotelian theory, this implies that the same water has contrary properties
which is impossible. From an explanatory perspective, water cannot be both cold and
warm, if both properties are taken as real qualities.
In turn, the experiments represent empirical support for a corpuscularian account of
sense perception and real qualities since it can convincingly explain the phenomena, as
Locke makes plain. On the other hand, the appeal to everyday experience is of course no
conclusive evidence for the truth of corpuscularian theory. But given the alternatives, the
corpuscularian account is clearly established as the only conceivable explanation.
To conclude, the issue of Locke’s theory of qualities is to assess qualities contained in our
ideas of bodies from a perception-neutral perspective. This is his philosophical
programme. The quality distinction is designed as part of a conceptual framework for an
ultimate, scientific account of bodies and their properties. Locke’s notions of qualites are
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not part of corpuscularian theory. Yet, Boyle’s hypothesis illustrates the quality distinction
and, more importantly, makes it intelligible, as the conceptual gap between primary and
secondary qualities has revealed. McCann is therefore wrong to take Locke to advance a
distinction that simply reflects our common sense conception of bodies and their
causality.256 In fact, McCann’s view introduces incoherences into Locke’s argument since,
according to him, the common sense view of sensible qualities is that they are real. On the
contrary, the topic of resemblance and of real qualities, and thus of the quality distinction,
relates to an explanatory account of bodies, their properties, and our perception of them.
Moreover, it becomes manifest that Locke does not genuinely intend to develop an
argument for corpuscularian theory. Pace Alexander, the Essay is not a grand
epistemological argument for Boyle’s theory by showing that the assumption of the
hypothesis leads to an adequate and plausible account of our everyday experience.257 True,
Locke does claim that corpuscularian theory coheres with or, perhaps, even naturally
grows out of everyday experience, and that it is intelligible on a general mechanical
backdrop which is argued for. But notwithstanding the corpuscularian hypothesis is
assumed as a premisse to establish epistemological claims as to the reality status of
qualities and corresponding contentions of the resemblance status of ideas. And for this
reason only Boyle’s hypothesis is justified in the light of a general mechanical conception
of bodies and everyday experience. The issue of Locke’s analysis that our ideas portray
bodies mainly by non-real features is an epistemological claim which is rendered
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plausible by corpuscularian theory.
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Part II
NAMES, SPECIES,  AND ESSENCES
Introduction
As Locke declares, he had to discover in the course of writing the Essay that an assessment
of human knowledge affords a systematic, separate analysis of the role which words
play.258 Locke therefore conceives the third book of the Essay on language as an important
part of his overall epistemological programme. This epistemological outlook manifests i n
Locke’s focus on general terms and universal propositions, since for him knowledge of
the latter is the kind of knowledge which, in principle, enlarges our understanding at
most since it relates to many particulars at once.259 On first sight, however, one cannot
discern an epistemological issue. The first step of Locke’s argument is the development of
a positive account of general terms which determines their signification and the nature of
the species they denote. On this backdrop, he subsequently assesses the so-called
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imperfections and abuses of words. Finally, Locke proposes a use of general terms which
takes into account their imperfection and abuses. But what is the epistemological issue
underlying the comments on names of bodies?
Generally speaking, I will argue that Locke advances his account to establish partly, or at
least to pave the way for, his contemporary conception of a science of bodies. As will first
be contended, the aim of the account of species and their essences is not simply to
substitute his own views for Aristotelian ones. Rather, Locke primarily intends to make
plain that contemporary classifications of bodies are far from being an ideal scientific
sorting (cp. chapter 6), irrespective of whether they are Aristotelian or Lockean schemes.
This argument will be underscored by a radical re-interpretation of Locke’s notion of real
essence (cp. chapter. 7). In the light of previous results as well as  of further aspects, ‘real
essence’ is understood to be part and parcel of an ideal scientific classification. Given the
“omipresence” of the concept, this reconstruction has considerable impact on Locke’s
overall argument, especially on his theory of knowledge as we will see in part three.
This classificatory issue is further deepened and complemented by Locke’s disclosure of
the imperfection and abuses of names of bodies (cp. chapter 8). Locke attempts here to
reveal important Cartesian and Aristotelian notions and connected knowledge claims as
being based on an improper use of terms. These concepts are central for a Cartesian and
Aristotelian science of bodies so that Locke’s analysis adds up to a refutation of their
conceptions of a science of bodies. Considering the influence which Cartesian and
Aristotelian views enjoyed in Locke’s time, his rejection is a remarkable attempt to
annihilate these competing theories at once and all together on purely linguistic grounds.
This is also the aspect of the epistemological programme which Locke most strongly
emphasizes. As he declares in the Epistle to the Reader, he attempts to expose alleged
“deep Learning, and heighth of Speculation” as the “frivolous use of uncouth, affected, or
unintelligible Terms” and as “[v]ague and insignificant Forms of Speech, and Abuse of
Language”.260 Locke likewise intends to highlight that language leads naturally to false
knowledge claims and fruitless debates: “[t]he greatest part of the Questions and
Controversies that perplex Mankind [depend] on the doubtful and uncertain use of
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Words”.261 In this sense, the language critic is supposed “[to remove] some of the Rubbish,
that lies in the way to Knowledge”.262 That is, Locke attempts to open the path for true
knowledge by destructing wrong theories in the light of his analysis of language. And as
we will see, Locke is indeed interested in the defects of language use virtually only in so
far as they obstruct the enhancement of our scientific grasp of bodies.
On the backdrop of this dismissal of abuses, obscure notions, and untenable knowledge
claims, Locke recommends a use of words in connection with his own theory of names,
species, and essences. In fact, this account already establishes essential aspects of the kind
of science of bodies which Locke approves. That is, the analysis of language paves the way
for a conception of science which is developed and justified in the fourth book on
knowledge. It thus becomes plain that the programme of Locke’s argument on names of
bodies is an analysis of their signification and usage in order to establish a specific
conception of a science of bodies and to bury alternative ideas. The issue is what a science
of bodies can and should consist in.
But desipite Locke’s rhetorical stress on the “ill use of words”, one should not
misconceive his account in two ways. First, the core of the argument is accomplished i n
the positive account of names, species, and essences. For Locke characterizes here the
signification of names of bodies which will then serve in later parts as the basis of the
reasoning. Locke’s criticism of alternative theories as being rooted in abuses of words
therefore explains, strictly speaking, only the source of what goes wrong in the opponent’s
reasoning. Second, for Locke language is not only a natural source for obstructions of
knowledge, but also an indispensable means to establish comprehensive knowledge.
Language is conceived as essential for the progress of knowledge because it is a crucial
instrument for thinking and for the communication of thought.263 The use of words thus
makes it possible to enlarge human knowledge in the first place. Accordingly, one has to
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conceive Locke’s pronunciated language critic and his suggestions of how to use words i n
scientific discourse: the use of words is necessary for the systematic advancement of
knowledge - but to achieve progress one has to use them in the right way.
131
6. Species and Essences
In his comments on general terms, Locke proposes a theory of classification, namely an
account of what species are. He raises two chief claims with respect to sorts of bodies. First,
species are determined by nominal essences and not by real essences. Second, nominal
essences are made by men, not by nature. Locke thus puts forward a theory of, first, the
criteria by which species are determined and, second, how in turn these criteria are
determined. Moreover, the account is levelled at sorts to which speakers referred at his
time by either scientific or common terms. This becomes plain partly by his examples and
partly by remarks indicating that the sorts he speaks of are neither identical with nor
aquivalent to species representing an ideal scientific classification of bodies.
In this way, the topic that the classification scheme being entailed in “our” concepts is not
an ideal scientific one is evidently present in his comments on species and their essences
like in many other parts of the Essay. This is also the dominant view amongst
commentators, since one usually agrees that for Locke one ideally sorts bodies i n
accordance to properties of the explanatory, microphysical stage.264 My point will however
be that this topic is not more or less loosely linked to the reasoning on species and
essences as it seems to be on the face of Locke’s remarks. Rather, his comments are
manifestations of an issue overarching the two main arguments: in his chapter on the
names of substances, Locke aims at demonstrating that prevailing classification schemes
principally differ from an ideal scientific scheme. That is, contemporary classifications are
neither identical with nor even aquivalent or analoguous to an ideal scheme. This is a
crucial step forward for Locke’s programme, since the assessment of our everyday species
implies the refutation of the Aristotelian science of bodies and the foundation or
conception of an alternative corpuscularian one. As will become plain in chapter eight,
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on the backdrop of his theory of species and their essences, Locke can reveal Aristotelian
knowledge claims as unintelligible and being based on an untenable abuse of words.265
To recontruct content and force of Locke’s own view on species, it is sufficient to focus on
those parts of his reasoning which directly argue for his two chief contentions. We will
therefore set aside the various other strands, e. g. objections raised against alternative
accounts of species like Aristotelian theory which attempt to show its unintelligibility as
an explanatory account,266 although we will touch on some of them in the present and
the following chapters as well.267 The key will be an adequate comprehension of what real
essences are in this context. The interpretation thus proceeds as follows. The backdrop of
both arguments is Locke’s view on the signification of general terms which will therefore
be highlighted first and what can be done straight forwardly since they are well known.
Subsequently, the first argument will be assessed and then the second one, since the latter
is based on the result of the former. On this backdrop, I will argue that Locke’s grasp of his
two key concepts, namely the distinction between nominal and real essences, shows that
his theory of the species of bodies assesses our ordinary species in the perspective of ideal
scientific sorts. An appropiate understanding of Locke’s claim that species are made by
man and not by nature will thereby serve as the key to disclose his account.
a. Locke’s General Semantic Views
Norman Kretzmann268 has rightly identified the main thesis of Locke’s semantic theory
as the claim that, by and large,269 a general term stands immediately for an abstract idea:
“The use then, of words, is to be sensible marks of ideas; and the ideas they stand for are
their proper and immediate signification”.270 Moreover, since an abstract idea represents
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the entities being depicted by the idea, a general term is likewise conceived to signify the
entities being represented by the idea for which the word stands.271 As Locke explains,
since an abstract idea can portray various entities due to its abstractness or generality, a
general term signifies a class of entities: “That then which general Words signify, is a sort
of Things; and each of them does that, by being a sign of an abstract Idea in the mind, to
which Idea, as Things existing are found to agree, so they come to be ranked under that
name; or, which is all one, be of that sort”.272
This understanding of the signification of general terms manifests Locke’s general
comprehension of the relationship between language, thought and world which was
common at his time and conceived to be maintained by Aristotle.273 Language signifies
thought, and thought refers to, or represents, the world. Words gain semantic content i n
virtue of their relationship to thought. This is manifest in Locke’s claim that words, if
taken by themselves, do not signify anything and do so only if they are related to ideas.274
There is no “natural connexion”275 between words and entities in the world. A
connection is only established by a conventional nexus between a name and an idea. Thus
words refer to entities in the world in virtue of these entities being referred to by thought:
“[...] this abstract Idea, being something in the Mind between the thing that exists, and the
Name that is given to it; [...]”.276 In this sense, words refer only indirectly to the world,
namely via thought. And this relationship is expressed by Locke when he explains the
reference or extension of a general term by the class of entities which the idea represents
that is signified by the word.
There has been a recent debate of what Locke means by the primary signification of a
                                                                                                                                                                       
reference or meaning, since they are not used as signs standing for ideas. Cp. 402, III.i.1f. But this is likewise
the case when people use words without a definite primary signification, i. e., roughly speaking, without
knowing their meaning. Cp. 407f, III.ii.7; 614, IV.viii.7.
271 414, III.iii.11f.
272 414, III.iii.12. Consequently, if parrots use words, Locke does not conceive them to have any reference or
extension, since they are not used as signs standing for ideas and can therefore not denote entities. Cp. 402,
III.i.1f. But this is likewise the case when people use words without a definite primary signification, i. e.,
roughly speaking, without knowing their meaning. Cp. 407f, III.ii.7; 614, IV.viii.7.
273 Cp. Ashworth (1984), 56 and 62.
274 405, III.ii.1.
275 405, III.ii.2; 408, III.ii.8.
276 386, II.xxxii.8.
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term. Clearly, he identifies an idea as the primary siginification of a general term. But
what does this mean? Traditionally, Locke is conceived to assert a theory of meaning i n
the sense that he determines the extension of a word as the idea being signified by the
term.277 Several commentators have however attempted to revise this view, proposing
different alternatives. To come to grips with the issue, I begin with E. J. Ashworth.
Ashworth makes two important points by highlighting aspects of Locke’s main thesis i n
connection with a medieval discussion. As she argues, in saying that ideas, and not
entities in the world, are the primary signification of words, Locke takes sides in a
medieval discussion of how to determine the relationship between language, thought,
and world, i. e. an adequate order of priority amongst words like categorematic terms,
abstract ideas, and classes of entities.278 Locke’s contention that words primarily signify
ideas is simply the claim that words denote entities in the world only by means of ideas.279
This manifests in his argument that words, if taken by themselves, signify nothing, i. e.
that words do not refer to anything if they are not related to ideas,280 and that the
extension of a term is the class of entities being represented by the idea that is signified by
the word.281 Ashworth’s second major point is likewise correct that Locke does not assert
that words denote ideas and not entities in the world. Locke is rather in line with the
medieval standard view that entities are the extension of terms irrespective of whether
they primarily signify ideas or entities.282 This becomes evident in Locke’s claim that
words signify ideas only in order to denote entities: “[...] our Words signifie nothing but
our Ideas, yet being designed by them to signifie Things [...]”.283
Ashworth however sees an even stronger affinity between Locke’s account and the
medieval topic with the result that Locke’s main thesis does not concern meaning.
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‘Primary signification’, she claims, adds up to the medieval concept ‘significatio’ which is
the central concept of the mentioned medieval discussion. Accordingly, she takes Locke’s
primary signification of a word to be what the term makes known.284 In this sense, she
says, a word can make known either concepts or entities in the world (or both). She thus
distinguishes Locke’s primary signification from the reference and the meaning of terms,
i. e. from their extension and intension. Moreover, on the backdrop of her conception of
meaning as what is given in a definition or translation,285 she turns to Locke’s
explanations on definition and identifies the meaning of a general term with a “series of
simple ideas”.286 The result is that not Locke’s main thesis, but his explanation of
definition is about meaning.287
Michael Losonsky convincingly destructs Ashworth’s argument in this respect.288 In a
nutshell, she conflates a theory of meaning with a theory of definition and reads the
medieval notion of significatio into Locke’s concept of signification.289 He rather
highlights Locke’s comments in connection with contemporary discussions relating to
communication and linguistic meaning.290 According to him, this shows that Locke’s
notion of ‘primary signification’ and his main thesis concern likewise linguisitc meaning.
Losonsky thus supports Kretzmann’s interpretation that Locke’s distinction between
immediate and mediate signification corresponds to the modern distinction between
intension and extension, i. e. between meaning and reference.291
In principle, I join Kretzmann as well. There are two contexts in which an idea qua
primary signification of a term is conceived as its meaning or intension. First, in Locke’s
explanation of definition an idea qua primary signification is depicted as a set of features
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comprising the meaning of a word: “For Definition being nothing but making another
understand by Words, what Idea, the term defined stands for, a definition is best made by
enumerating those simple Ideas that are combined in the signification of the term
Defined: [...]”.292 Of course, like in many other contexts, simple ideas are here understood
as properties; for Locke does certainly not intend to make the daring claim that in a
dictionary a general term is defined by a list of simple ideas qua intentional objects.
Second, in connection nominal essences an idea qua primary signification is also
comprehended as a set of features comprising the meaning of a term. As will shortly be
delineated, the nominal essence of a species is for Locke the set of properties determining
kind-membership. Locke thereby identifies a nominal essence with the abstract idea that
is signified by the term which denotes a species. Thus, in this context an abstract idea is
identified with its content. If one therefore understands the meaning or intension of a
term to be the kind of characterization which a speaker knows, if he or she knows its
meaning, and which a speaker uses to establish the reference of the word or respectively
that determines its extension, an idea qua primary signification is here the intension or
meaning of a general term.
However, in other contexts ideas qua primary significations are intentional objects or
intentional states respectively. In other words, ideas are linked to mental states as being
their content: “[...] Words in their primary or immediate Signification, stand for nothing,
but the Ideas in the Mind of him that uses them [...]”.293 This also manifests in Locke’s
comments on communication which are centred around the claim that a speaker can
only attempt to convey the primary signification he or she attaches to a word since other
people do not have direct access to the idea of the speaker.294 That is, the root of Locke’s
issue of communication is the “mental privacy” of the primary signification which a
speaker attaches to words when using them.295 Moreover, as we have seen, it is crucial for
Locke that ideas qua primary signification are intentional objects, i. e. the content of
mental representations, in order to explain the reference or extension of a general term. A
                                                
292 413, III.iii.10.
293 405, III.ii.2.
294 408, III.ii8; 409, III.iii2; 476f, III.ix.3ff.
295 Cp. Brandt and Klemme (1997), 170.
6. SPECIES AND ESSENCES
137
word denotes the class of entities being represented by the signified abstract idea. It is
therefore not unimportant that Lockean primary signification is not simply a set of
features, but the set of features that is included in a mental representation.296
From Locke’s perspective, there is of course no big difference between ideas qua sets of
features determining the reference of general terms and ideas qua intentional objects
determining the reference of words, since the features characterize the intentional objects.
One intentional object is distinct from other ones in virtue of the properties
characterizing it. In his comments on semantics, e. g. on communication, Locke can thus
easily move back and forth between the intentional object that is signified by a term to its
meaning. In this sense, one has to pay attention not to read modern distinctions too
readily into Locke where he does not attempt to make any.297 To conclude, Locke’s
comments include a theory of meaning in two important respects. The reference or
extension of a general terms is identified with the class of entities in the world that are
represented by the idea being signified the word; and the meaning or intension of a term
is said to be the set of properties being the content of the idea that is signified by the word.  
Locke’s comprehension of species is closely attached to his account of words. According to
him, a species is commonly understood as the class of entities which is signified by a
general term: “[for an entity] to be of any Species, and to have a right to the name of that
Species, is all one”.298 Given this grasp of ‘species’, Locke can directly deduce from his
view on the meaning of general terms that a species is the class of entities being
represented by the idea which is signified by the word.299 The topic of species therefore is
                                                
296 The here defended account clearly differs from the Landesman’s interpretation, since he rejects Kretzmann’s
reading. Cp. Landesman (1976), 24 and 34f. However, I am not sure about the root of the disagreement since I
am not clear about the ontological status which according to Landesman ideas have qua intentional objects:
“Ideas in the required sense are themselves outside the mind; they are not private mental entities; they are
intentional objects, things conceived and thought of”; “Ideas as immediate significations are things in so far as
they are conceived of. Things signified and things immediately signified are the same things.” Cp.
Landesman (1976), 34 and 33.
297 Having said that, one could agree with Lowe in so far that ideas qua primary significations do also serve
for Locke to express thought. Yet, I disagree with him that this is the sole or primary conception of primary
signification. Cp. Lowe (1995), 144-49.
298 414f, III.iii12. Cp. the footnote after the next one.
299 414, III.iii.12: “That then which general Words signify, is a sort of Things; and each of them does that, by
being a sign of an abstract Idea in the mind, to which Idea, as Things existing are found to agree, so they come
6. SPECIES AND ESSENCES
138
not only confined to bodies (and spirits), but relates to sorts of any kind of entities. Yet, as
his comments show, the issue of species especially arises with respect to bodies, since he
regards the topic to be only controversial there.300
Locke similarly determines the essence of a species. According to him, the essence of a
species is commonly understood as “[what] makes any thing to be of that Species”.301 In
other words, the essences of species are what determines kind membership. And since
species are classes of entities being signified by a name, Locke’s notion of essences implies
that essences are ascribed to entities only if they are denoted by a name. Given this
understanding of ‘essence’, Locke can again easily infer from his previous conclusion
(namely, that a species is the class of entities being represented by an idea which is
signified by a name) that the essence of the sort is the abstract idea.302 That is, Locke
derives from his comprehension of ‘species’, of the signification of general terms and of
‘essence’ that the essence of a species is the abstract idea being signified by the respective
term. To say that essences are abstract ideas, of course, is effectively an identification of
essences with the sets of features which are the content of ideas. For the possession of
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these sets determines whether an entity is represented by an idea, i. e. whether an entity is
member of the species represented by the idea.
 After having established this result in the chapter on general terms, Locke moves there
on to distinguish between two different meanings of ‘essence’. He calls essences
determining kind membership nominal essences and distinguishes them from so-called
real essences.303 We turn to the notion of real essence in the next chapter, but a
provisional understanding as to the real essences of bodies is helpful for what follows.
Locke maintains that people conceive the real essences of bodies in two different ways,
namely in an Aristotelian and in a corpuscularian one.304 Locke highlights the former
one in connection with the Aristotelian doctrine of forms and comprehends the latter
ones as sets of microphysical properties in terms of corpuscularian primary qualities. For
Locke, bodies do not possess Aristotelian real essences, but corpuscularian real essences.
Aristotelian real essences are even unintelligible according to him.305
b. The First Argument
We have seen, in the light of his theory of meaning Locke elucidates what he takes to be
our common notions of essences and species.306 Locke is interested in this because it has
tremendous impact on a theory of our classification of bodies. The immediate upshot is
that the abstract idea, i. e. nominal essence, determines which entities belong to the sort
being depicted by the idea. In the chapter on the names of substances, Locke can thus
easily decide whether bodies are sorted in species in virtue of nominal essences or real
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essences, given his presupposition of what is true for him past doubt, namely that ideas
do not include real essences - no matter what real essences precisely are. For, since Locke
believes that one can easily become aware of the fact that general terms signify an abstract
idea representing a sort of entities by properties not being real essences and since he
regards his analysis of ‘species’ and ‘essence’ as elucidating common notions, from his
perspective the argument consists in a simple analysis of how we talk about entities
belonging to species. Consequently, when Locke examines the question, whether real or
nominal essences determine the boundaries of species, his answer is clear-cut:
“§7. The next thing to be considered is, by which of those Essences it is, that
Substances are determined into Sorts, or Species; and that ’tis evident, is by the
nominal Essence. For ’tis that alone, that the name, which is the mark of the Sort,
signifies. ’Tis impossible therefore, that any thing should determine the Sorts of
Things, which we rank under general Names, but that Idea, which that Name is
design’d as a mark for; which is that, as has been shewn, which we call the
Nominal Essence. [...] And I desire any one but to reflect on his Thoughts, when he
hears or speaks any of those, or other Names of Substances, to know what sort of
Essences they stand for.”307
Locke supplements this main argument by further objections against the possibility that
real essences determine species. But given Locke’s straight forward view, these reasonings
can only be meant to make plain why real essences do really not specify sorts. His
arguments are of many kinds. One objection often raised is that bodies cannot be classified
into species in virtue of their real essences because we do not know them, i. e. since we do
not have ideas of them.308 This reasoning is effectively aquivalent to his main argument
where he presupposes that our ideas do not include real essences. And as long as one
grants Locke our ignorance of real essences, this reasoning applies whether one conceives
real essences in corpuscularian or Aristotelian terms. By contrast, other objections seem to
be directed rather against either corpuscularian or Aritsotelian real essences since in these
passages Locke depicts real essences in terms of corpuscularian internal constitutions or
Aristotelian forms.309  But since it is Locke’s main argument that establishes his view that
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bodies are sorted in virtue of nominal essences not being aquivalent to real essences, I
will not go into the details of his objections against the claim that bodies are sorted as to
Aristotelian or corpuscularian real essences. We will however reconstruct two objections
as to corpuscularian real essences in the next chapter when discussing Locke’s notion of
(corpuscularian) real essences.310
c. The Second Argument
After having established in the chapter on the names of substances that we sort bodies i n
virtue of nominal essences which are not real essences, Locke asks there whether
nominal essences are made by men or by nature. What does he mean by that? One
passage in the chapter on general terms suggests that to say nominal essences are made by
men simply means that nominal essences are made by men in virtue of being abstract
ideas which are generated by the mind of human beings.311 In this sense, a nominal
essence is obviously the “Workmanship of the Understanding”,312 given Locke’s theory of
essences and ideas. However, the more detailed explanations in the chapter on the names
of substances show that Locke has a far more complex thesis in mind. The issue is to
understand aright our everyday classification of bodies in the perspective of an ideal
scientific one.
The main thrust of the argument is to refute that there are “precise and u n m o v a b l e
Boundaries” classifying bodies in species, being “made by Nature, and established by Her
amongst Men.”313 Nominal essences, Locke insists, are not “exactly copied from precise
Boundaries set by Nature, whereby it distinguish’d all Substances into certain Species.”314
To speak simply of precise boundaries set by nature, may seem vague; but this is no lack of
clarity on Locke’s side, since he finds this position unintelligible, as his criticism of the
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Aristotelian theory of forms shows.315 The punchline of Locke’s dismissal of precise,
unmovable boundaries becomes plain, if one draws on Locke’s own positive account
where he spells out what he means by saying that nominal essences are made by men.
After having repeatedly argued for his view, Locke makes a stock-taking in §§36 and 37:
“§36. This then, in short, is the case: Nature makes many particular Things, which
do agree one with another, in many sensible Qualities, and probably too, in their
internal frame and Constitution: but ’tis not this real Essence that distinguishes
them into Species; ’tis Men, who, taking occasion from the Qualities they find
united in them, and wherein, they observe often several individuals to agree,
range them into Sorts, in order to their naming, for the convenience of
comprehensive signs; under which individuals, according to their conformity to
this or that abstract Idea, come to be ranked as under Ensigns: so that this is of the
Blue, that the Red Regiment; this is a Man, that a Drill: And in this, I think,
consists the whole business of Genus and Species.
§37. I do not deny, but Nature, in the constant production of particular Beings,
makes them not always new and various, but very much alike and of kin one to
another: But I think it is nevertheless true, that the boundaries of the Species,
whereby Men sort them, are made by Men; since the Essences of the Species,
distinguished by different Names, are, as has been proved, of Man’s making, and
seldon adequate to the internal Nature of the Things they are taken from. So that
we may truly say, such a manner of sorting of Things, is the Workmanship of
Men.”316
Locke outlines the following picture. Humans generate ideas of bodies in virtue of their
experience, i. e. they make ideas comprising a set of properties on the macrophysical level.
These ideas or nominal essences respectively distinguish bodies into species. True, Locke
concedes, there are similarities amongst bodies on the microphysical level: bodies “d o
agree with another [...] in their internal frame and Constitution”. Yet, he insists, we do not
sort bodies in virtue of these microphysical similarities, i. e. (corpuscularian) real
essences: “but ’tis not this real Essence that distinguishes them into Species”. Rather, it is
one’s collections of experienced sets of properties on the macrophysical stage, i. e. one’s
ordinary nominal essences, which determine species: “’tis Men, who, taking occasion
from the Qualities they find united in them, and wherein, they observe often several
individuals to agree, range them into Sorts”. This means, Locke maintains that species are
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not sorts classifying bodies in virtue of their (corpuscularian) real essences.
As we have just seen in connection with §36, Locke calls the kind of microphysical
similarities, which he speaks of in this context, the real essences of specimens. In §37
Locke insists again on his view. Importantly, he claims there that “the Essences of the
Species, whereby Men sort them (scil. substances), [...] are [...] seldom adequate to the
internal Nature of the Things they are taken from.”317 Given the nexus to §36, this means
on the face of it that our ordinary nominal essences do not sort bodies in accordance to
their real essences in the sense that they do not classify bodies in correspondence to their
microphysical similarities. Thus, here Locke has not in mind the kind of microphysical
resemblances which correspond to a nominal essence that comprises features of the
macrophysical level and that is shared by all members of a species. For microphysical
similarities are depicted as, first, underlying and, second, as differing from the
resemblances which exist among bodies on the macrophysical stage and which are
represented by our nominal essences. But if real essences do not comprise the
microphysical properties that correspond to nominal essences, what kind of
microphysical resemblances are they?
When debating in another passage whether nature sets unmovable boundaries, Locke
similarly points out that our ordinary species do not depict bodies by their resemblances
“which would best shew us their most material differences and agreements [on the
explanatory, microphysical stage]”.318 Apparently, Locke’s dismissal of the view that our
species are made by nature includes the assertion that ordinary species do not sort bodies
into classes which mirror their most substantial resemblances on the explanatory,
microphysical stage. Now, it seems to me hardly disputable that the “most material
differences and agreements” are the kind of microphysical similarities according to which
bodies are ideally to be classified in Locke’s eyes. Thus, taking all quoted passages together,
in the second argument (corpuscularian) real essences are conceived as the microphysical
similarities by which one would ideally depict and sort bodies into species and which do
not correspond to known resemblances on the macrophysical stage.
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In turn, in this perspective one has to read the claim that ideas are the workmanship of
the understanding and the denial that nominal essences reflect precise boundaries
amongst bodies which are set by their real essences. Locke makes two points. First,
nominal essences are made by men in the sense that speakers generate ideas in virtue of
their own experience of similarities existing among bodies on the macrophyiscal level.
Second, whether one conceives real essences in Aristotelian or corpuscularian terms,
nominal essences are not determined by nature in the sense that our species represent a
classification of bodies in accordance to their unknown real essences, i. e. i n
correspondence to the resemblances existing on the explanatory stage in virtue of which
bodies are ideally to be sorted. Arguing that our classification scheme is made by us and
not by nature, Locke maintains that the scheme does not reflect one which can be said to
be present in nature in any stronger sense than simply that on the macrophysical stage the
similiarities exist among bodies by which bodies are depicted and classified by the scheme.
In other words: there is no reason to assume that the scheme expresses an underlying
order in nature which is established by unknown real essences. Instead, as the first
contention tells us, the scheme simply represents the sorting of bodies which corresponds
to the ideas a speaker has acquired. These two claims are raised independently of the
question whether real essences are corpuscularian or Aristotelian ones. When refuting
the essences-are-made-by-nature thesis, Locke especially attacks Aristotelian theory, but
not exclusively.319 The difference between spelling out the thesis in corpuscularian and i n
Aristotelian terms is only that the latter position is less comprehensible due to the
unintelligible notion of Aristotelian forms.
So far to the reconstruction of Locke’s position. But what are Locke’s arguments for
holding it? There are two chief reasonings. First, there is Locke’s own positive account of
how nominal essences are made in the light of one’s experience of bodies. Second, there is
a principal objection against the alternative view that nominal essences are copies from
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precise boundaries. Locke’s strongest argument certainly is his own account of the
formation of nominal essences. But in his debate these explanations stand in the rhetoric
shadow of his principal objection, since Locke expounds his own account of nominal
essences in his discussion of the objection. The reason for this is, it seems to me, that for
Locke the objection obviously manifests the falsity of the alternative view. I now spell out
the two reasonings which are both present throughout the discussion whether nominal
essences are made by nature or by man.320
First argument. The exposition of Locke’s position of course has already alluded to his
own positive account. In addition, we are in fact familiar with the details of Locke’s theory
of the genesis of nominal essences, since it is effectively aquivalent to his theory of the
formation of ideas because of the identification of nominal essences with abstract ideas.
As we have seen in the first chapter, speakers form an idea of bodies by copying a set of
properties which they have repeatedly found to coexist in bodies. In this sense, an idea is
depicted as borrowing its content and union from nature, namely from an experienced set
of coexisting properties.321 It follows that nominal essences are the workmanship of the
understanding: nominal essences are sets of properties determined by the selection
humans choose. And for this reason nominal essences are in no stronger sense made by
nature than that they correspond to sets of properties found in nature.
Second argument. Locke’s principal objection against the alternative view is based on the
observation that our general terms are not used by all speakers to signify the same species
or ideas respectively: nominal essences cannot be made by nature, Locke argues, because if
they were made by nature, this would mean that a general term would be used by every
speaker for the same species or idea, but this is simply not true. Locke exemplifies this as
to ‘man’. Controversies which entities are properly called a human being show that
people use ‘man’ differently.322
In addition to pointing out the fact of non-equivocal use of names, Locke explains why
people do not use the same word with the same signification. Since subjects acquire ideas
or nominal essences in virtue of their own experience, this experience varies from
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speaker to speaker, for what reason they do not use the same word to stand for the same
idea. For instance, ‘gold’ signifies bodies having a specific yellow colour for children,
whereas ‘gold’ stands for bodies having a specific yellow colour, weight and fusibility for
other people.323 On the other hand, if one takes into account what Locke says in a different
context, there is also a certain degree of conformity between the ideas being designated by
the same term by various speakers since subjects intend to use the words with the
meaning other speakers do due to the need of being understood.324 Thus, there is both
conformity as well as variation amongst the ideas of subjects which they signify by the
same words as Locke’s example of gold demonstrates. And the variation between ideas
being signified by the same term establishes for Locke that nominal essences cannot be
made by nature, but by humans, i. e. that speakers generate nominal essences in virtue of
their own experience of coexisting properties on the macrophysical level.325
In fact, Locke has a third argument at hand. In other parts of his comments, Locke points
out that Aristotelians have to make intelligible what it means that there are precise real
essences by which nature is supposed to distinguish bodies into species.326 Given this
criticism of Aristotelian theory, one might expect Locke to raise a similar objection i n
connection with the issue whether nominal essences are made by nature or by men. That
is, Locke could have demanded an explanation of how one has to understand precisely
that nature distinguishes bodies in species by nominal essences reflecting boundaries set
by real essences. However, Locke seems not willing to discuss the issue in this way. For,
when he raises his principal objection, he consciously concedes - hypothetically - the
possibility that there might be precise boundaries as the if-clause indicates: “Since the
Composition of those complex Ideas, are, in several Men, very different: and therefore,
that these Boundaries of Species, are as Men, and not as Nature makes them, if at least
there are in Nature any such prefixed Bounds.”327 That is, the diversity of ideas being
called by the same name shows that there are no species which sort bodies in accordance
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to some prefixed bounds, even if they existed. Thus, in this context Locke apparently
intends to refute the alternative view not by questioning its intelligibility, but by referring
to facts demonstrating the falsity of the theory. Yet, this shows, Locke has a third
substantial argument in peto, namely to point out that it has not yet been highlighted
convincingly how nature can distinguish bodies into species by unknown real essences.
d. The Overarching Issue
It has become apparent that the topic of the two leading issues of species is a theory of
classification, namely which features serve as criteria to determine kind membership and
how these criteria are established. Locke argues, firstly, that we usually sort bodies i n
species by nominal essences and not by unknown real essences and, secondly, that
nominal essences are made by us in virtue of our experience of coexisting properties and
not by nature in accordance to unknown real essences.
Furthermore, in connection with the second argument the sorting of bodies as to
(corpuscularian) real essences is conceived as the end of classification. Correspondingly,
the kind of species Locke discusses are species which do not represent an ideal scientific
scheme. This is the reason why in his debate classifications are on par whether they are
made by the laymen or by scientists: the schemes are alike if conceived in the ideal,
scientific perspective. In this sense, there were for Locke only “ordinary” species at his
time. The second argument assesses our ordinary species and essences in the perspective
of an ideal classification.
This shows that the essence distinction expresses the opposition between the sets of
properties as to which bodies are ordinarily classified and the sets as to which bodies are
ideally sorted. On the one hand, an ideal scientific classification of bodies as to their
microphysical similarities is in Lockean terms a sorting according to their
(corpuscularian) real essences or internal constitutions respectively. On the other hand,
our usual notions of bodies represent a classification scheme that sorts bodies as to
nominal essences comprising features on the macrophysical level. But to say that is not to
claim that the opposing roles of real and nominal essences in classification are of a
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conceptual kind. This of course is not the case, since (ideal) nominal essences comprise
real essences. Yet, in the debate, nominal essences are always understood as not
comprising real essences and real essences are conceived as consisting of the
microphysical similarities as to which bodies are ideally sorted. Thus, as a matter of fact,
real and nominal essences fulfill these roles.
On the backdrop of this reading of the second argument, the essence distinction
apparently serves the same purpose when used in the first argument. There, Locke argues
in one passage that it must be the nominal essence with respect to which we sort bodies,
simply because, on the one hand, we are ignorant of their real essences whereas, on the
other hand, we do know their nominal essences because they make up the content of our
ideas: “Nor indeed can we  rank, and sort Things, and consequently (which is the end of
sorting) denominate them by their real Essences, because we know them not.”328 In the
light of the second argument, the quote implies on the face of it that the goal or purpose
of scientific classification is expressed by saying that bodies are sorted as to their
(corpuscularian) real essences, i. e. as to their similarities among their internal
constitutions.329 This means, real and nominal essences perform here the same roles,
namely to characterize ordinary species respectively ideal scientific sorts.
Summing up, in the comments on the names of bodies the essence distinction is
effectively understood as expressing the contrast between ordinary species and ideal
scientific sorts. This in turn has implications for the topic of the comments. Firstly,
Locke’s way of debating the issue what determines our ordinary species as to the question
whether sorts are determined by real or by nominal essences means that he assesses
whether ordinary species are identical or aquivalent to ideal sorts or not. He insists, they
are not. Secondly, the second argument aims at excluding the possibility that ordinary
species are ideal scientific ones even if they are not determined in the light of real
essences. This is indicated by the role of the essence distinction and by the order of Locke’s
reasoning to discuss whether nominal essences are determined by humans or by nature
after having settled the first question. He intends to exclude the possibility that
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Aristotelians accept that our ordinary species are sorted by nominal essences different
from their real essences, but reaffirm that the species are still determined by the real
essences by arguing that nominal essences are regulated by the unknown real essences. In
the light of the essence distinction, Locke therefore insists that ordinary species are not
aquivalent or identical to ideal ones when arguing that species are man-made.
Consequently, the overarching topic of the comments on names of bodies is to contrast
the classification scheme entailed in our everyday concepts with an ideal scientific one.
The claim is: our common species do not classify bodies into the same sorts as one would
ideally do from the scientific perspective, since resemblances on the macrophysical level
are superficial and do not generally correspond to microphyiscal similarities.
The comments on names of bodies thus re-establishes what Locke has contended in his
explanations on archetypes. As has been pointed out in the first chapter,330 to depict bodies
by their real essences, is to grasp and classify them from the ideal scientific viewpoint. In
the perspective of science, our ordinary nominal essences are only a remedy for the time
being, namely as long as real essences are unknown.331 From the scientific viewpoint,
nominal essences serve only as proviso for real essences, since the scientific end of
classification is to sort and to grasp bodies in terms of their real essences. This goal of
scientific classification will be further delineated in the following chapter where Locke’s
notion of real essences will be determined.
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7. Real Essences
The notion of real essences is present in large parts of the Essay, which often relate to
bodies in particular, namely in his accounts of archetypes, species, knowledge, and the
imperfection and abuses of names. A correct grasp of the notion is essential for a precise
understanding of what Locke contends as to bodies. Controversies about the details are
still going on,332 but the concept is typically determined by elucidating the real essences of
bodies (and of any other kind of entities) in terms of Locke’s defining portrayal, namely
that the real essence of the member of a species is that on which the species’s nominal
essence and other coexisting properties depend. The nowadays orthodox view on real
essences, established by Woolhouse,333 reads the depend-on relationship as an explanatory
one: the real essence of a specimen is what explains the nominal essence and other
coexisting properties. The topic of real essences is thus conceived to be the explanation of
properties. This means more specifically in the case of bodies that the real essence of a
specimen is thought to consist of the microphysical structure corresponding to the
features making up the nominal essence of the sort. Spelling out Woolhouse’s formula
differently as to some of Locke’s comments, several commentators complement this
reading by taking there the real essence of a body to be the set of all the microphysical
properties the body has.334
By contrast, I will argue that the prevailing line of interpretation cannot coherently be
squared with the characterizations which real essences of bodies receive in Locke’s
various arguments. His theories of species, archetypes and knowledge afford a different
notion of real essences as commonly ascribed to him. Locke’s definition of real essences
should instead be understood in the light of his major claims and in particular on the
backdrop of his theory of archetypes. In turn, the leading theme of real essences is not the
explanation of properties serving in our everyday classification of bodies, but the
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epistemic project of an ideal scientific comprehension of bodies as specimens of sorts, a
comprehension which underlies our everyday understanding and classification. It thus
becomes plain that the notion of real essences serves Locke as the conceptual nexus to
link different threads of his most substantial comments on bodies. Correspondingly, real
essences emerge in the centre of a network of contentions which virtually are all
elements of his assessment of the extent of human knowledge.
I intend to show first in 7.1 that the role, which real essences play in the various parts of
Locke’s theory of bodies, suggests a different understanding of ‘real essence’ in general and
of the real essences of bodies in particular. The argument proceeds as follows. First,
Woolhouse’s approach to comprehend the definition of the real essences of bodies will be
critized and modified; I will then point out that the defining portrayal alone does not
sufficiently specify what real essences are; and, subsequently, the notion of real essence, its
specification as to bodies, and the implications for the topic of real essences will be
highlighted on the backdrop of Locke’s other explanations, e. g. his account of archetypes.
In other words, to conceive the defining portrayal of real essences in the light of Locke’s
further comments on them leads to a different understanding of what the issue of real
essences is. In 7.2, this claim will be underpined in two ways. First, the analysis of two
passages shows that there Locke consciously characterizes real essences as proposed.
Secondly, a careful interpretation of Locke’s comments reveals that they do not support
competing views on the real essences of bodies in contrast to what is usually thought. The
advanced reading will moreover be confirmed in the next chapter, since the discussion of
the fifth abuse of language makes plain that the proposed comprehension of real essences
is present there as well.
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7.1 The Real Essences of Bodies
a. ‘Real Essence’ and the Depend-on Relationship
Locke’s dominant portrayal of real essences depicts the real essence of a specimen as what
both the nominal essence of the sort and coexisting properties depend on , a portrayal
which is present in his definition of ‘real essence’ as well as throughout the Essay.335
Locke also uses alternative wordings, e. g. a real essence is what these features flow from.
Locke does not precisely elucidate the depend-on relationship. Consequently, there is a
need to interpret Locke’s definition in the light of his further comments what is the
deeper reason for the ongoing debate of what real essences are. Besides the passages
discussed in 7.2, there are additional comments which commonly serve as textual
evidence to establish the orthdox line of interpretation. But they are not conclusive, as I
will argue now.
Commonly, the depend-on relationship is explained in the light of Locke’s comparison
between the real essence of natural substances and the mechanical set-up of artifical
substances. Features of the macrophysical level, Locke says, depend on the real essence of
a natural substance just as the outer appearances of a clock, e. g. the moving of the hour
hand, depend on the inward contrivances of a clock, i. e. its springs and wheels.336 The
backdrop of this analogy is Locke’s grasp of both types of entities as machines.337 Artifical
substances are machines being designed and constructed by human beings, natural
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substances are bodies being produced by nature.338 For Woolhouse, the analogy imparts
that the real essence of a natural substance causes and explains features of the
macrophysical level just as the so-called inward contrivances of a clock, i. e. its springs
and wheels, cause and explain the so-called outer appearances of the clock, e. g. the
moving of the hour hand.339 In this sense, Woolhouse and other commentators
comprehend the depend-on relationship as an explanatory relationship and a real essence
as the causal basis of a nominal essence. They regard the real essences of bodies (being
conceived of as natural substances, not as artificial substances) as the sets of properties that
on the microphysical stage correspond to the features which a nominal essence consists
of. In this sense, a real essence is understood as the causal basis of a nominal essence,
namely as the set of microphysical properties in terms of which the features on the
macrophysical level are identified and explained.340 Properties are thus conceived as
depending on a real essence in the sense of being reducible to the real essence.
However, it is doubtful whether Locke really wants to convey this kind of depend-on
relationship with his analogy. First of all, one cannot simply equate the relationship
holding between the internal constitutions of natural substances and their nominal
essences with the relationship holding between internal contrivances of artefacts and
their outer appearances, since Locke emphasizes fundamental differences between
artificial and natural substances. For whereas there is hardly any difficulty to come to grips
with a classification of artefacts since one depicts artefacts by known features of their
internal contrivances known to us, there are contraversies in the case of natural
substances since one is ignorant of their internal constitutions.341 In other words, to
classify artefacts as to their internal contrivances is not problematic according to Locke
since they consist of macrophysical features being epistemically accessible to us, whereas
the sorting of natural substances as to their internal constitutions leads to difficulties since
they consist of microphysical features which we do not know. This shows, Locke is clearly
aware of the fact that the internal contrivances of artificial and natural substances differ i n
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kind, namely that the internal contrivances of artefacts comprise macrophysical features
whereas the real essences of natural substances consist of microphysical features. When
Locke elucidates the depend-on relationship as to the real essences of natural substances
in terms of a comparison to artificial substances, one can therefore not simply equate the
former case with the latter one. This means, it is not evident how the analogy is exactly to
be understood, since it is not clear which aspect is meant to be the one being common to
both cases.
More importantly, the common line of interpretation is even less convincing because the
analogy would not hold if it had to be understood in the suggested way. In the case of
natural substances, we have seen, the explanatory relationship is taken to relate to sets of
properties which are causally interrelated in the sense of being reducible to each other.
Macrophysical properties like colours are identified with microphysical features. But i n
the case of artefacts the explanatory relationship holds between sets of properties which
are causally interrelated in a temporal way, one being the effect of the other. Outer
appearances like the moving of the hour hand and the striking of the clock are causally
explained as effects of the internal construction of the clock but are not reduced to features
of the mechanical set-up.
In addition, the prevailing comprehension of the depend-on relationship cannot apply to
all types of species. Pace Woolhouse,342 Mackie has rightly pointed out343 that Locke
introduces the essence distinction not only with respect to the species of natural
substances, but as to every sort. But contrary to species of bodies, the real essences of
specimens of other sorts are identical with their nominal essences. For example, both the
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real essence and the nominal essence of triangles is space being enclosed by three straight
lines. And consequently, being in line with his identification of nominal and real essence
and his characterization of real essences in terms of the depend-on relationship, Locke
regards the non-defining features of triangles as depending on their real essence, namely
on the properties defining them as triangles.344 But, crucially, the depend-on relationship
cannot meant here to be a causal one, since the defining properties of triangles cannot
intelligibly be said in the relevant sense to be the cause of their other mathematical
properties. One does not identify the triangle’s property that the sum of its three angles is
equal to two right ones with its feature of being a space which is enclosed by three straight
lines. There is no property reduction in the case of triangles which is analogous to the
identification of being yellow with a specific microphysical structure. This means, the
ascription of the depend-on relationship in cases like triangles refutes the prevailing view
that the real essences of bodies are defined as the properties with which nominal essences
are identifiable.
The last objection makes furthermore plain that one has to elucidate the depend-on
relationship in a way which fits all types of species. But in which way? The key to Locke’s
comprehension of real essences lies in his tendency to associate the depend-on
relationship with necessary connections. Necessary connections, we will see,345 come into
play in the context of deductive, demonstrative knowledge, namely that perception of
(the holding of) a necessary connection leads to the recognition of a fact, e. g. that
specimens of a sort have a property. According to the primary usage of ‘necessary
connection’, a necessary connection holds between two ideas.346 For instance, there is a
necessary connection between the idea of the sum of the angles of a triangle and the idea
of being equal to two right angles.347 That is, grasping the necessary connection between
the two just mentioned ideas results in knowing that the sum of the angles of a triangle is
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equal to two right angles. The grasp of a necessary connection turns thus out to be the
comprehension of a proof, as Locke himself maintains.348
Necessary connections therefore relate to an entity’s possession of its properties. This
becomes apparent in those passages as well where Locke speaks of necessary connections
holding between entities and their properties and understands them as aquivalent to
necessary connections holding between the idea of entities and their properties: the
necessary connection indicates that the entities possess the features.349 Now, crucially, i n
the same context features depending on a real essence are said to have a necessary
connection with the real essence or with primary qualities respectively as well. That is,
the depend-on relationship between a real essence and other properties of a specimen
corresponds to a necessary connection between (the idea of) the real essence and (the ideas
of) the properties. This means, the recognition of a feature depending on a real essence
therefore leads to demonstrative knowledge that entities having the real essence possess
the property. This close nexus between the two relationships manifests in Locke’s
interchangeable use of ‘dependence’, ‘connection’ and similar terms.350 Locke apparently
understands the depend-on relationship as roughly aquivalent to the necessary-
connection relationship. To be precise, the depend-on relationship is more specific than a
necessary connection, since it is confined to relationships concerning real essences.
Having said that, I suggest to comprehend the depend-on relationship in a way that
applies to species of all kinds of entities and that is understood in the light of both the link
of depend-on relationships to necessary connections and the analogy to artefacts; namely,
in terms of an explanatory relationship relating to the possession of properties. Features
of an entity depend on its real essence in the sense that the entity’s possession of these
features is explained by the entity’s possession of its real essence: the entity has the
features in virtue of its real essence. And explaining the possession of features consists i n
making plain why having the real essence entails the possession of the features.
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This conception of real essences implies for the real essences of natural substances that
they are not defined  as the microphysical properties with which features of the
macrophysical level are identified. Of course, properties being defined as the set of
features which explain the possession of the features making up everyday nominal
essences are also the kind of features with which properties of the macrophysical level are
to be identified. But this is only an additional aspect of the real essences of natural
substances, not their defining feature, according to this line of interpretation.
But even given this modified comprehension of the depend-on relationship, one cannot
read Locke’s standard portrayal as truly being a definition of ‘real essence’ since the
depend-on relationship does not  sufficiently characterize real essences. As noted above,
only in the case of bodies real essences are not identical with nominal essences. Of course,
if one gets to know the microphysical properties of bodies, one could generate ideas
depicting classes of bodies whose nominal essences are the real essences of their
specimens. The point however is that there is the possibility of nominal essences being
not equal with real essences solely in the case of bodies. But why? What determines that
the nominal essences of our everyday species of bodies afford real essences being different
from them while the nominal essences of all other species are equal with their real
essences? This difference between the real essences of bodies and of other entities is
neither based on nor accountable by the depend-on relationship, namely that real essences
are the kind of properties in terms of which one explains the possession of the nominal
essence and other coexisting features. This becomes evident in two ways.
First, there are other types of entities whose defining features, or nominal essences, Locke
regards as depending on other properties without calling the latter the real essence of the
entities. Take for example entities like secondary qualities. Locke conceives secondary
qualities as features being identical with microphysical structures and which, in principle,
could determine and explain a multiplicity of features on the macrophysical level, just as
the microphysical figure of a body determines both, for instance, the visual idea of a cube
and the tactile idea of a cube. Thus, such a microphysical structure could be regarded as
the “microphysical real essence” of a secondary quality which determines not only the
secondary quality but also further, coexisting properties on the macrophysical stage. The
case of secondary qualities seem to be perfectly analogous to the one of bodies. But why
7. REAL ESSENCES
158
does Locke not conceive the nominal essences of secondary qualities to depend on real
essences consisting of primary, microphysical qualities?
Second, given the interpretation of ‘real essence’ in question, one could conceive the
everyday nominal essences of bodies as being also their real essences, since according to
Locke the nominal essences are sets of properties on which other coexisting features
depend. The backdrop of this objection is Locke’s contention that there are necessary
connections between features on the macrophysical level as well. For instance,
impenetrability is said to be necessarily connected with solidity, and Locke claims that a
body struck by another one will move.351 This means, some features of the macrophysical
level could serve as real essences in the sense that other properties depend on them. But
why does Locke not conceive nominal essences (of bodies), which comprise these features,
as being also real essences? In other words, why is for Locke in the context of essences the
possession of properties of the macrophysical level not to be explained in terms of the
possession of properties of the macrophysical level, but only in microphysical terms?
To conclude, when Locke portrays real essences in terms of their relationship with
nominal essences, he must have an additional depiction in mind that specifies which
nominal essences afford real essences being different from them and which nominal
essences are also their real essences. ‘Nominal essence’ and ‘to depend on’ do not add up
to ‘real essence’. Nominal essences are determined by the content of an abstract idea; what
determines real essences?
There are even more problems to read Locke’s standard formula as a proper definition of
real essences. Locke speaks only in connection with bodies that real essences are that on
which nominal essences depend. With respect to other entities, Locke simply says that the
real essence is equal to the nominal essence and that properties other than the nominal
essence depend on the real essence. That is, their real essences is not said to depend on
their nominal essences. Of course, one can intelligibly maintain that the nominal essence
of these sorts depend on their real essences in the sense that the nominal essences qua
real essence explain why their specimens possess the properties comprising the nominal
essence. But this is not how Locke puts it, i. e. in this context he does not speak of
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dependence. And since the nominal essences of ideal sorts of bodies are also identical
with their real essences, Locke’s choice of words indicates that his formula is tailor-made
for our everyday sorts of bodies whose real essences are not equal to their nominal
essences.
b. ‘Real Essence’ in the Light of Locke’s Major Arguments
Having said all that, Locke’s “definition” of real essences appears in a different light. As
Locke declares, he introduces the distinction between real and nominal essences to clarify
the common notion of essences. Thus, according to Locke, there has been a conception of
essences combining features which he wants to keep seperate. His punchline is to
demonstrate that nominal and not real essences determine species and kind membership.
Locke’s distinction between real and nominal essences therefore serves to make plain
that, in principle, nominal essences do not have the characteristics of real essences, as it is
commonly conceived. But, as just argued, Locke’s formula for real essences does not
determine whether the specimen of a sort have a real essence different from their
nominal essence or whether they coincide. Locke’s grasp of real essences is surely linked
to the depend-on relationship, but it cannot be the whole story. The description of real
essences as what nominal essences depend on thus seems, strictly speaking, not only to
apply solely to everyday species of bodies, but apparently also operates with a presumed
notion of real essences (which in Locke’s eyes is in some sense part of a widespread
conception of essences.) Thus: what does this presumed comprehension of real essences
consist in?
It seems to me, Locke’s depiction of real essences as archetypes entails the answer. A n
archetype is a conception of the properties which a body serving as a standard for an idea
has and which are ideally included in the idea. The archetype of an idea comprises the
features which one conceives as comprising a perfect or adequate idea of the standard. A n
archetype is what one intends an idea to represent, as Locke puts it. In the case of bodies,
he determines the archetype of an idea as the real essence which one conceives the idea’s
standard to possess. Real essences are therefore ascribed to bodies as being the properties as
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to which one intends to represent them by an ideal idea. Of course, Locke’s conception of
archetypes does not only apply to bodies serving as standards, but relates effectively to all
bodies insofar as they are represented by abstract ideas as members of species. According to
Locke, all bodies are ideally to be depicted by real essences insofar as they are grasped as
specimens of sorts of natural substances. (A body, e. g. a human being, does not have to be
depicted as a natural substance, e. g. as a human being, but can also be portrayed as a
mixed mode, e. g. a musician, whose real essence coincides with its nominal essence.)
Thus one’s conception of the real essences of bodies specifies as to which features bodies
are ideally to be depicted by ideas (portraying bodies as natural substances).
Consequently, pointed likewise out in the first chapter,352 Locke regards our everyday
ideas of bodies as provisio for adequate ideas portraying bodies by real essences. When we
examine bodies to form an idea of them, Locke maintains, only those properties of the
macrophysical level are taken into the idea which one believes to correspond to the real
essences of the bodies. Only those features of the macrophysical stage are included into an
idea which are conceived as depending on the real essence of the examined body. In this
sense, ideas of bodies are called partial representations of their archetypes: the ideas depict
the entities they represent not by their real essences, but only by features serving as
substitutions for their real essences.
Matters become a bit more complicated because speakers vary in their conception of the
archetypes of ideas of bodies. Aristotelians intend to portray bodies by Aristotelian real
essences and corpuscularians by corpuscularian real essences. But the deeper reason for
the differences in archetypes is a divergent view on what the real essences of bodies are.
For Locke conceives the Aristotelian and the corpuscularian view as expressing two
different opinions on what the real essences of bodies are.353 This shows, on the one hand,
that one’s conception of the real essences of bodies specifies as to which features bodies are
ideally to be depicted by an idea. Yet, on the other hand, it becomes plain as well that for
Locke Aristotelians and corpuscularians share a common epistemic project despite their
divergent views on real essences, namely to grasp bodies as members of species by their
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real essences. Speakers vary only in their conception of what the real essences of bodies
are and consequently also in their conception of the archetypes of ideas of bodies. But they
all intend to depict bodies in terms of their real essences.
The theory of archetypes thus implies that sorts of natural substances and their specimens
are understood on the backdrop of the epistemic project to represent bodies ideally by
their real essences. This grasp of bodies goes beyond the depiction of our everyday ideas
and provides a framework for the genesis of ideas, species and (everyday) nominal
essences respectively. For example, corpuscularians like Locke regard our common species
as provisional classifications which are ideally to be substituted by a scheme sorting bodies
in accordance with their microphysical similarities.354 This means, the comprehension of
bodies in terms of real essences is an integral part of our grasp of bodies as members of
(our everyday) species.
Crucially, if ideas are intended to represent bodies as to their real essences, there are -
logically speaking - firstly real essences and secondly ideas and nominal essences. That is,
from the viewpoint of our intentions to represent bodies as members of species, natural
substances are primarily characterized by or identified with their real essence. The logical
priority of the depiction of bodies possessing real essences plays an important role i n
Locke’s comments on archetypes. As indicated, if we are ignorant of real essences, one
includes properties in an idea of bodies which are taken to depend on the real essences of
the bodies that serve as samples in the formation of the idea. In this sense every property
of the macrophysical stage, which depends on the real essence of the standard, is said to
have “the same right” to be included in an idea.355 Correspondingly, it would be
irrational, Locke maintains, to include the form or bulk of a parcel of gold in an idea of
gold because it would be unreasonable to suppose that bulk and form depend on the
parcel’s real essence.356 That is, for corpuscularians like Locke, it would be unreasonable to
assume that the microphysical structures corresponding to macrophysical bulk and form
are part of the microphysical similarities existing amongst bodies. This would indeed be
irrational, since our everyday experience shows already on the macrophysical level that
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parcels of chemical substances vary too much in their bulk and form (and thus also in the
corresponding microphysical structure) for being classified as to these properties. And an
appeal to our everyday experience of bodies is justified for Locke, since according to h im
one makes ideas of bodies in the light of such experience. But if properties on the
macrophysical level are to be taken into an idea only if they depend on the real essence of
the standard, a speaker must first have a conception of real essences before he
subsequently forms ideas, i. e. before he generates nominal essences. In this sense, one’s
conception of real essences is logically prior to one’s conception of nominal essences.
Likewise, the comprehension of bodies as possessing real essences is logically prior to our
ascription of (common) nominal essences to bodies. Nominal essences are established i n
the light of one’s ascription of real essences to bodies.
The logical priority of real essences embodies Locke’s view that one conceives bodies as
members of species and as having nominal essences on the backdrop of our
comprehension of bodies as possessing real essences and of our intention to represent
bodies ideally as to their real essences. And part and parcel of this comprehension is the
doctrine that we generate abstract ideas of similarites existing on the macrophysical level
as a substitution for a depiction of bodies as to their real essences on which the observed
similarities depend. This means, one cannot separate our grasp of bodies in terms of
nominal essences from both our grasp of bodies in terms of real essences and the depend-
on relationship holding between nominal and real essence. But if common nominal
essences are grasped as depending on real essences in the first place, Locke’s formula of
real essences as that on what everyday nominal essences depend simply expresses his
belief that common nominal essences comprise features which depend on real essences i n
order to serve as a substitution for nominal essences being equal to real essences.
Therefore, the variance between common nominal essences and real essences is rooted i n
both our principal grasp of bodies in terms of real essences and in our ignorance of real
essences. The inequality between the nominal essences of our everyday sorts and the real
essences of their specimens is partly due to our ignorance of real essences and partly to the
conception of our epistemic project to comprehend bodies as specimens of sorts by
features which do not coincide with the nominal essences of our everyday species.
Locke’s portrayal of the real essences of bodies as depending on (our everyday) nominal
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essences now appears to be part and parcel of his view on our intentions to depict bodies
as specimens of sorts. Locke’s formula for real essences is thus not a proper definition of
‘real essence’, but rather illuminates the notion in the specific context of our common
species of bodies. The reason for this is that his interests lie in the topic of natural
substances. Another reason could be his belief that the reader is already familiar with a
conception of real essences that is present in the common notion of the so-called essences
of species. I therefore conclude that Locke does not satisfactorily explain his concept of real
essences. But the comments on archetypes indicate on the other hand that he
comprehends the real essence of a body as the set of features in terms of which the body is
conceived and identified with respect to one’s basic epistemic intentions to grasp the body
as the member of a sort.
Importantly, the account of the archetypes of other ideas suggests that the just developed
understanding of real essences is not only confined to bodies, but represents Locke’s
general comprehension of real essences. For, if one reads ‘real essence’ in this way, the
theory of archetypes makes intelligible why the real essences of entities other than bodies
coincide with their nominal essences. According to Locke, ideas other than those of bodies
do depict entities as one intends to. The ideas are perfect or adequate representations of
their archetypes. The adequateness of the ideas is explained by the type of conception
which their archetypes have. For instance, a simple idea necessarily is adequate because it
is intended to represent the type of power that causes the simple idea or mental
representation in perception.357 And an idea of mixed modes or of relations is necessarily
adequate because it is intended to represent the sort of entity which is characterized by the
idea.358 This means, we intend to represent archetypes that are characterized by properties
known to us, i. e. by properties of which we have ideas. Thus, all the ideas that are not
portraying natural substances are necessarily adequate simply because the relationship
between the ideas and their archetypes guarantees that the ideas represent the archetypes
as one intends, namely by the sets of features which are included in the ideas. In short, the
ideas are adequate because we intend to represent archetypes known to us. This means, if
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one understands here real essences in accordance to their role they play in the comments
on the archetypes of ideas of natural substances, the real essences of entities other than of
bodies are equal to their nominal essences because one’s ideas depict the entities by the
features with which the entities are identified by our epistemic intentions to represent the
entities as specimens of their sort. Locke’s theory of archetypes thus makes plain why real
essences do not coincide with the nominal essences of our common species of natural
substances and why real essences are necessarily equal to nominal essences in the case of
all other sorts.
On first thought, there seems to be an obvious objection against this line of interpretation.
Locke speaks of inadequate ideas of mixed modes (or of relations) as well. An idea of
mixed modes is inadequate if a speaker intends to generate an idea being equal to the one
which another speaker has and if the first one fails to do so. More precisely, the first
speaker intends to use a name with the same signification as another person does, but
does not succeed. First of all, an idea which is inadequate in this way is not inadequate i n
the other, previously discussed sense. More importantly, the inadequateness does not
really relate to the intentions of the speaker which kind of entities the idea is intended to
depict. It rather relates to the objective to use the same name for the same idea. Locke sees
this when he concedes: “And on this account, our Ideas of mixed Modes  are the most
liable to be faulty of any other; but this refers more to proper Speaking, than knowing
right.”359
Locke effectively reiterates this position when asserting that ideas of mixed modes are
false in the sense that they do not conform to the ideas which other people signify by the
same name. More importantly, Locke’s account indicates as well that this kind of
falsehood does not apply to ideas of mixed modes exclusively, but also to simple ideas and
ideas of substances, even though less frequently.360 This correspondingly implies that all
types of abstract ideas are inadequate in this second sense even though this is explicitly
ascribed as to ideas of mixed modes only. One should therefore distinguish between two
types of inadequacy. The first one relates to what a speaker intends to represent ideally
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with an idea, the second one relates to the idea a person intends to signify ideally with a
name. And the existence of the latter inadequacy does not refute the advanced reading of
the former one in connection with real essences. It rather shows that the issue of
archetypes and (in-) adequacy cannot simply be equated with the topic of real essences
being equal or different to nominal essences.
It therefore seems to me that Locke’s theory of archetypes indicates that he comprehends
the real essence of an entity as the set of features in terms of which the entity is conceived
and identified with respect to one’s basic epistemic intentions to grasp the entity as the
member of a sort. This is apparently Locke’s core conception of real essences since: it
applies to the specimens of all kinds of sorts, elucidates the relationship between real and
nominal essences, is logically prior to the notion of nominal essences, and expresses a
fundamental assumption of Locke’s view on our epistemic venture to classify bodies i n
species.
This general notion of real essences is easily specified as to sorts of entities not being
natural substances since their archetypes guarantee that the real essences of their
specimens coincide with their nominal essences. But in the case of bodies one cannot
spell out the notion as straight forwardly. Yet, the reconstruction developed so far allows
to specify the real essences of bodies in two ways. First, real essences consist of features
explaining the possession of properties on the macrophysical stage. Second. Locke speaks
of two different kinds of real essences. As argued, this means that according to h im
speakers vary in their conception of what the real essences of bodies consist in. This
implies, speakers must share a common idea of the features by which they want to grasp
bodies ideally. In the light of the reconstruction given so far, one naturally looks to the
theory of archetypes to find the answer.
In connection with the comments on archetypes, ideas of natural substances are said to be
made in order to represent a class of bodies which has been experienced regularly. That is,
one intends to sort bodies by features which one has recurrently found to go together i n
nature, i. e. by features being shared by various bodies. Given the principal character of
this conception, it applies to resemblances on both the macrophysical and the explanatory
stage. Ideas thus ideally portray bodies by their similarities on the explanatory level, since
real essences consist of features on which properties of the macrophysical level depend.
7. REAL ESSENCES
166
And this account holds whether one believes in Aristotelian real essences or i n
corpuscularian ones. The real essence of a specimen of a sort of bodies is therefore
conceived as comprising of explanatory basic features which the body shares with other
ones. Thus, for Locke, the real essence of a body consists of microphysical similarities
which it has in common with various other bodies.
Crucially, this understanding of real essences does not appear isolated in connection with
archetypes. Rather, the previous chapter showed that Locke characterizes corpuscularian
real essences in the context of species in the same way, namely as comprising
microphysical similarities as to which one would ideally sort bodies. Likewise, as will be
delineated in the third part, the same comprehension of real essences is at work in the
theory of knowledge where ideal knowledge of bodies is understood in terms of real
essences. Ideas representing bodies as to their real essences are said to be a prerequisite for
acquiring a comprehensive, scientific understanding of bodies and their properties.361
Real essences are understood as the sets of properties which allow systematic deductive
knowledge of bodies.362 Thus, real essences are portrayed again as the sets of features as to
which bodies are ideally classified and grasped from a scientific, explanatory viewpoint.
Moreover, in this context ideal ideas of bodies are clearly conceived again as depicting
natural substances by corpuscularian real essences which indicate microphysical
resemblances amongst bodies.
We see, there is a portrayal of the real essences of bodies which runs through Locke’s
comments on archetypes, species, and knowledge. The real essence of a natural substance
comprises microphysical properties in terms of which bodies are ideally comprehended
and sorted. A real essence is conceived as the set of explanatory features which a natural
substance shares with other ones, i. e. a real essence stands for the microphysical
similarities which a body has with respect to other ones. This grasp of bodies in terms of
their real essences is one’s primary conception of bodies as being specimens of sorts. This
is why Locke takes properties of the macrophysical level to make up our ideas or nominal
essences only as a substitution for ideas and nominal essences which represent
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respectively comprise the real essences of bodies. More specifically, as Locke’s account of
archetypes, species, and knowledge demonstrates, real essences are microphysical features
which prima facie do not correspond to known macrophysical resemblances. This
understanding of corpuscularian real essences is present in Locke’s most substantial
arguments on bodies, namely in connection with archetypes, species, and knowledge.
Having said that, Locke apparently defines real essences in the light of the third model.
When introducing ‘real essence’, Locke maintains that we talk of essences in the sense of
essentia “when we speak of the Essence of particular things, without giving them any
Name.”363 The important bit is that Locke refers to a common usage of the concept of real
essences when general terms are not involved. That is, we ascribe real essences to bodies
in a context where we do not use a general term. This means, since Locke discusses our
everyday use of names, he claims that we ascribe a real essence to bodies when we do not
regard them as members of species being characterzied by our everyday nominal essences.
As we have seen, the theory of archetypes affords an ascription of real essences to bodies
without regarding them as members of a particular species. A use of ‘real essence’ of this
kind is involved in one’s reference to the real essence of a standard in order to decide
which features are to be taken into an idea of the standard. And in this context real
essences cannot be understood in the light of the two prevailing models, but i n
accordance to the third one. This approach to read Locke’s defining portrayal of real
essences will be reconfirmed and further developed in the next chapter in connection
with the fifth abuse of words.364
c. A Third Model for the Real Essences of Bodies
The advanced characterization of real essences contradicts the prevailing interpretations
of the corpuscularian real essences of bodies. To come to grips with this, I will first
introduce the two dominant models for real essences in the light of Locke’s formula for
real essences, point then out their differences as to the new characterization and spell
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subsequently out this third, alternative view which has already been largely unfolded.
The three models of real essences differ most obviously as to the set of microphysical
properties which the models each determine for a corpuscularian real essence to
comprise.
Although there is a variety of proposed interpretations how to comprehend Locke’s
notion of the real essences of bodies, these views can be expressed in terms of two models.
According to one model, a real essence is a microphysical structure which on the
microphysical level corresponds to a sort’s nominal essence. A real essence in this sense is
a sub-set of microphysical properties which a class of natural substances has in c o m m o n
since they share the nominal essence to which the real essence corresponds. This means, a
real essence is specific for a species like its nominal essence. And only features of the
macrophysical stage which correspond to this set of microphysical properties are
conceived as depending on this set, i. e. on the real essence. Thus, one determines first the
real essence as the set of microphysical properties corresponding to the features of the
nominal essence and determines then the set of properties depending on this real essence
as the set of properties on the macrophysical level which correspond to the real essence.
For example, if the nominal essence of gold comprises being yellow and having a
particular sound, the real essence is the microphysical structure corresponding to these
two features and the set of properties depending on the real essence consists of all the
features which are likewise determined by this microphysical structure, e. g. the fusibility
of gold.
According to the second model, a real essence is the set of all the microphysical properties
a particular body has. This means, a real essence in this sense is specific for each particular
body and without being specific for the body in virtue of being the specimen of a
particular sort. Whether one regards a body with respect to its being gold or metal, it has
the same real essence, namely the set of all its microphysical properties. And since a real
essence comprises all microphysical features, all properties of the macrophysical level are
conceived as depending on the real essence.
Mackie and Woolhouse, for example, identify a real essence with a microphysical
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structure according to the first model.365 Ayers and Phemister distinguish between two
conceptions of real essences, each of them referring to one of the two models.366 By
contrast, for Guyer the real essence of body is a microphysical structure, whereas he
understands Locke’s notion of the real or internal constitution of bodies to denote the set
of all the microphysical properties a body has.367 But although Ayers and Guyer interpret
Locke’s account also in terms of the second model, they take a real essence to be primarily
a microphysical structure.368 In sum, commentators usually understand the real essence
of a body to be (primarily) a microphysical structure or set of microphyiscal properties
which specimens of a sort have in common and which corresponds to the properties of
the nominal essence. Some commentators read in addition several passages to be
conversant about real essences being the set of all the microphysical properties a body has.
A comparison now shows that the two models do not coincide with the characterization
of real essences which are present at least in many of Locke’s comments on bodies. W e
start with the first model. As we have seen, real essences are conceived as microphysical
similarities which prima facie do not correspond to known macrophysical resemblances.
This implies, the real essence of a specimen is not the set of microphysical features
corresponding to the sort’s nominal essence. For, to say that real essences are
microphysical similarities not corresponding to known macrophysical similarities, simply
means that real essences do not correspond to everyday nominal essences, i. e. nominal
essences which reflect our experience of similarities on the macrophysical level. Thus, i n
the discussed passages, real essences are not understood as microphysical structures
corresponding to nominal essences.
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Locke’s theory of the genesis of ideas shows as well that real essences are there not
conceived in the light of the first model. As delineated above, for Locke every property
may be taken into an idea which depends on the real essence of a body being examined
and serving as the standard of the idea. Conversely, it is irrational for Locke to include
properties which one cannot reasonably assume to depend on the real essence. In other
words, features are included in an idea only if they are regarded to depend on the real
essences of the examined bodies. Thus, a speaker has first a conception of the real essences
of bodies and generates then the nominal essences of species. This implies, the examiner
makes use of a conception of real essences which is logically prior to the notion of the
nominal essence of a species. The decision which feature can be taken into an idea, i. e.
which feature can make up the nominal essence of a species, is based on the depend-on
relationship between the property and the real essence of the body. This however
contradicts the first model according to which the logical relationship between real and
nominal essence is the other way around, namely that the real essence is understood to be
the set of microphysical properties corresponding to a nominal essence. A real essence
which is specified in relation to a nominal essence cannot determine before hand which
property may make up the nominal essence. This becomes more evident if one takes into
account that according to the first model a real essence is specified as to a particular
nominal essence, whereas in his comments on the genesis of ideas the real essence of the
standard is not related to any particular nominal essence since there the real essence is
portrayed to determine as to every idea which properties may be taken into an idea.
The second model cannot be at work in the discussed comments as well. As has been
argued, in Locke’s comments on archetypes, species, and knowledge, real essences are
conceived as microphysical similarities according to which one would ideally sort bodies.
This implies, in these contexts real essences cannot consist of all the microphysical
properties a body has. For, on the one hand, these microphysical similarities are regarded
as being shared by various bodies in nature whereas, on the other hand, bodies are not
identical as to all the microphysical features they have, as it is obvious from our everyday
experience of their differences on the macrophysical level. The appeal to everyday
experience is justified here since Locke’s own view on everyday species shows that their
members are conceived as not being identical with respect to their macrophysical figure.
7. REAL ESSENCES
171
Living substances are sorted in virtue of the similarities of their shape,369 whereas
chemical substances are not sorted as to their form and bulk at all.370 Only some structural
features of the macrophysical form are at best included into an idea of bodies.
Consequently, if at all, bodies are ideally sorted and represented by only some features of
their microphysical form.
There is an additional reason why the second model is not present in the theory of
archetypes. If the real essence of a body comprised all its microphysical features, every
macrophysical property would be conceived as depending on the real essence of a body
and thus as being elligible to be included in an idea. This however contradicts Locke’s
assertion that features depending on the real essence of a body should be included in an
idea, whereas for properties not depending on the real essence it were irrational to
include them.
Locke’s portrayal of real essences in his theory of archetypes, species, and knowledge
cannot be understood in the light of one of the two models. On the other hand, Locke’s
comments suggest a different understanding of corpuscularian real essences. There, the
real essence of a body comprises the microphysical similarities according to which it
would be classified and characterized in an ideal scientific account. With respect to real
essences thus understood, our everyday species are judged to be classifications not
representing the relevant resemblances amongst bodies on the microphysical level. Our
everyday sorting is provisional. And as to real essences thus understood, one conceives
features on the macrophysical level as depending or not depending on real essences and
therefore includes the features in an idea or not. According to this third model, properties
of the macrophysical level depend on the real essence of a body if they correspond to the
microphysical similarities according to which the body would be depicted and classified
from an ideal scientific viewpoint. Crucially, Locke’s contention that bodies would be
sorted in classes different from our everyday species, if one classified them as to their
microphysical similarities, or real essences respectively, implies: specimens of an
everyday sort do not necessarily share the same real essence, namely the set of
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microphysical properties according to which one would ideally sort them. In other words,
the real essences of the members of a sort differ prima facie. The real essence is a
microphysical structure being prima facie specific for a particular specimen of a sort. A
real essence is a sub-set of microphysical features which a body has and which might differ
from the real essences which other members of the same sort have. The real essence of a
particular body is a sub-set of all its properties, since not all microphysical features serve as
similarities according to which one ideally classifies the body. And the real essence is
prima facie specific for the body, in the sense that it might  be different from the real
essences of (some of) the other specimens of the same sort. Of course, if one knew real
essences, one could form ideas of species whose nominal essences were identical with the
real essences of their specimens.
The talk of prima-facie specific real essences should not be misunderstood as implying
that bodies have real essences being virtually individual to them. Quite the contrary,
since the real essence of a body comprises the microphysical features according to which
one would classify it in an ideal scheme, this means in general that numerous bodies
share the same real essence. If one knows real essences, one can “grasp at a time whole
Sheaves”371 of bodies. This goes along with Locke’s major contention that an abstract idea
is only introduced when similarities have repeatedly been experienced.372 Moreover, this
conception fits in his general framework that one chief purpose of general terms is the
grasp and communication of universal propositions that have an application common
enough for practical ends.373
Thus, pace Phemister,374 there are in general no species consisting of only one member,
since a species is a class being signified by a general term and represented by an abstract
idea which reflects repeatedly experienced similarities in nature.375 Only few entities,
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namely Locke’s monsters, which he loves so much to talk about,376 are so diversant from
the rest that they might be classified each in a separate class or, simply, in a more general
one, e. g. mammals. The possibility of monsters does not contradict the proposed reading
of real essences, because the purpose of Locke’s account of real essences is to point out the
difference between a classification scheme in terms of everyday nominal essences and one
about real essences. In other words, the essence distinction is designed for a classification
theory dealing with ordinary chemical stuffs and biological species, not with mutants.
More importantly than the issue of monsters is that the given explanation of the real
essences of bodies leaves open as to which microphysical features one would sort them if
one got to know the microphysical properties of bodies. To say one would classify bodies
as to their similarities, as Ayers rightly points out, does not specify which similarities are
the relevant similarities with respect to which one would sort bodies.377 What determines
which microphysical features comprise the real essence of a body being conceived as the
member of a sort?
Reading Locke’s account of real essences as coherent as possible, the decision which
similarities are conceived as classificatory relevant should be understood as arbitrary i n
the sense that it depends on the choice and epistemic interests of the subject. This position
is inherent in the rejection of (Aristotelian) real essences being made by nature and the
assertion that nominal essences are man-made. Locke illustrates many times that species
and kind memberships are partly a matter of our own decisions, e. g. frozen water might
be called either ice or hardened water.378 This conception of classification apparently
applies to the microphysical stage as well, since Locke rejects the idea of sorts being
established by real essences made by nature.379
Now I will turn to more substantial problems connected with Locke’s notion of real
essences. The essence distinction is introduced for every general term. This means, the
members of species have real essences whether the sorts are more or less abstract, e. g.
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gold or metal. This contention is substantial for Locke, since it indicates that there is
nothing special about the essences of the species of natural substances. Not only the
species of bodies have nominal and real essences, but every class of entities being signified
by a general term.380 Given this approach, the same conception of real essences has to
apply to both the least general species and the more general ones. Locke calls the former
‘lowest species’ and the latter ‘genera’. Importantly, there is a crucial difference between
Locke’s comprehension of lowest species and of genera. The nominal essence of a lowest
species comprises all the features which have been found to go together in the standards
when forming the idea.381 This implies that an ideal lowest species is characterized by all
the microphysical properties one conceives as being relevant for classification. By contrast,
a genera is introduced to encompass various existing sub-classes for which reason the
genera’s nominal essence comprises features being shared by all sub-classes, i. e. one
neglects on purpose other features which are included in the nominal essences of the sub-
classes. For example, metal is defined by features shared by gold and silver and thus by
neglecting several properties being specific for gold or silver.382 This understanding of
sorts implies that the same body can be conceived as both a member of lowest species and
of genera. And depending on which sort one conceives the body to be a specimen of, one
ascribes to him a different real essence.
Given Locke’s conception of lowest species, the real essence of a body qua member of a
lowest species comprises all the microphysical similarities one regards as classificatory
relevant. For example, if gold is understood as the sort of bodies being yellow and having
a metalic shine, the real essence of a specimen consists of all the microphysical properties
as to which the specimen would ideally be sorted as the member of a lowest species in an
ideal classification scheme. This conception of the real essences of members of lowest
species is clear-cut within the mentioned arbitrariness.
By contrast, given Locke’s conception of genera, the real essence of a body qua specimen of
a genera consists only of a sub-set of the microphysical similarities one regards as
classificatory relevant. In this case, the question however arises which type of
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microphysical similarities the real essence of a specimen comprises. For example, suppose
the nominal essence of metal comprises three features of the macrophyiscal stage, e. g.
having a metalic shine, being magnetic, and being heavier than water. In this case the real
essence of bodies qua metal certainly comprises the microphysical similarities
corresponding to the nominal essence. Yet, there might be further microphysical
similarities existing amongst specimens of metal which do not correspond to one’s
nominal essence. Does the real essence of a piece of metal consist of these further
similarities as well? On the backdrop of the thesis that species are man-made, one should
assume that the answer depends on the epistemic intentions of the subject, i. e. on its
grasp of bodies as metals. If ‘metal’ were introduced to catch all the similarities existing
amongst bodies having the three properties and other features coexisting with these three
properties, one would conceive their real essences as comprising all microphysical
similarities which coexist with the microphysical similarities corresponding to the
nominal essence. But if ‘metal’ were introduced to catch only the microphysical
similarities corresponding to the three properties, one would conceive real essences as
comprising only the microphysical similarities corresponding to the nominal essence.
Which answer is the right one Locke does not tell us. After all, Locke might have an
unclarified conception of real essences as to the genera of natural substances, since he
virtually never discusses them. His paradigm are lowest species throughout his
arguments.
As we have seen, Locke’s notion of real essences is indeterminate in the sense that it
partly involves “arbitrary” or personal decisions by the individual speaker to specify
which features are conceived as classificatory relevant on the microphysical stage. On the
one hand, this is certainly a bit dubious. Yet, on the other hand, given the success story of
chemical classification as to lowest species - Locke’s preferred example -, his conception of
real essences is not unintelligible on first thought, i. e. his appeal to a notion of “relevant”
similarities without exactly defining what ‘relevant’ means. Moreover, Locke is not
confined to define “in advance” which properties comprise exactly the real essence of a
body to get his arguments off the ground. He only needs to assume that there are
similarities on the microphysical level and that one would sort bodies with respect to
them to establish that our everyday species are not sorted by these similarities and that
7. REAL ESSENCES
176
they are the workmanship of the understanding. But it seems to me that in this respect
Locke has a rather naive view on this matter, since he does not discuss or even allude to
the problem. Apparently, he simply takes it for granted that there are distinctive
differences amongst the microphysical properties in virtue of which one can easily classify
bodies in sorts on this level. In this context, I may quote Ayers’s interpretation of the
following passage:
“[...] if the formal Constitution of this shining, heavy, ductil Thing (from whence
all these its Properties flow) lay open to our Senses, as the formal Constitution, or
Essence of a Triangle does, the signification of the word Gold, might as easily be
ascertained, as that of Triangle.”383
According to Ayers, this passage asserts that in the case of microphysical knowledge:
“[...] we could then fix and agree on a nominal essence consisting of a relatively few
mechanical properties, as in the classification of machines with observable working
parts, or indeed of geometrical figures: there would not be the same room for
confusion as there now is, when we have to select defining properties from an
indefinitely large number of powers.”384
I agree with Ayers, but would add that here the proposed interpretation is manifest: Locke
uses ‘formal Constitution‘ to denote the set of microphysical properties which would best
classify a piece of gold. Most commentators share the view that for Locke bodies are
ideally classified as to microphysical similarities, but they do not take his notion of real
essence to denote them.385
We have conceded that Locke’s conception of real essences does not precisely determine
which properties the real essence of a specimen comprises and that his distinction
between lowest species and genera needs further clarification. On first thought, from
today’s perspective these aspects might appear so deficient that they cast doubt on, or at
least represent prima-facie objections against, the proposed interpretation. The opposite
seems to be true, however. Locke’s account of real essences apparently appeals to a general
intuition amongst some of contemporary natural philosophers. This can be seen by
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Boyle’s attitude towards classification. On the one hand, he makes plain that classification
is a matter of human based notions.386 On the other hand, he contends that “there is a
vast multitude of portions of matter endowed with store enough of differing qualities to
deserve distinct appellations”.387 That is: it is us who sort bodies, but, ideally, we have to
do it in the right way because bodies “deserve” an appropriate, distinct classification. The
same thought is entailed in Marie Boas’s account of Boyle:
“[Boyle] had already pointed out that salt of tartar, potash, and vegetable alkalis
generally were all the same salt, without insisting that all salts were the same; and
similarly he had pointed out that all animal alkalis, spirit of hartshorn, spirit of
urine, spirit of soot were identical with spirit of sal ammoniac.
Boyle in fact interested himself very early in the problem of chemical classification
because it played a part in his attempt to confute the whole theory of chemical
elements and principles. He attacked on every occasion both those who over-
generalized and tried to assign all chemical substances to a very few classes, and
those who tried to separate substances into too many classes by insisting that they
must be classed according to their origin.”388
In short: Boyle argued that bodies have to be “adequately” classified. In this light, Locke
apparently picks up Boyle’s idea in terms of his conception of real essences. And as already
became clear, Locke incorporates this idea in a highly systematic way which links many
substantial topics of his philosophy of language and knowledge, namely his accounts of
archetypes, species, imperfection, abuses, and knowledge.
A final remark to Locke’s conception of real essences. If one takes all comments into
account, Locke’s (usage of his) notion of real essences turns out to be slightly incoherent,
however. According to Locke, the ascription of real essences to bodies is a supposition
although we have good reasons to believe that bodies do have unknown, microphysical
properties on which the experienced features depend. For instance, the assumption of
microphysical properties allows to highlight the change of features which bodies have on
the macrophysical stage.389 But after all, Locke insists, this conviction is only a
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conjecture.390 His reason for this position is of course his understanding of knowledge. As
long as we do not have ideas of the presumed properties, we are strictly speaking ignorant
whether bodies possess the features or not. On the other hand, Locke is evidently
convinced that there are unknown properties explaining the possession of the features on
the macrophysical level. This manifests in his claim that our everyday nominal essences
cannot be the real essences of bodies because they cannot explain the possession of
features what, however, genuine real essences can:
“But such a complex Idea cannot be the real Essence of any Substance: for then the
Properties we discover in that Body, would depend on that complex Idea and be
deducible from it, and their necessary connexion with it be known; as all Properties
of a Triangle depend on, and as far as they are discoverable, are deducible from the
complex Idea of three Lines, including a Space.”391
But there is not only the possibility that Locke is mistaken and that there truly is no
additional level of explanatory properties. Locke’s conception of real essences is moreover
based on his contention that there are resemblances amongst bodies on this level. To
depict ideally bodies by their similarities existing on an explanatory basic stage, is for Locke
the common epistemic project which Aristotelians, the laymen and corpuscularians share
despite their differences. But since the supposition of an explanatory stage and of
resemblances existing on this level is only an assumption, it is logically possible for Locke
that bodies do not possess properties and similarities on an explanatory stage which is
more basic than the macrophysical level. Consequently, if there were no similarities on
an explanatory more basic stage, resemblances on the macrophysical stage would be the
real essences of bodies since the core conception of ideas of bodies is the representing of
bodies by regularly experienced sets of properties. However, real essences comprising
features of the macrophysical level apparently contradict Locke’s formula that real
essences of bodies consist of features of the explanatory level on which the nominal
essence of the sort depends.
This tension in Locke’s account is not unimportant, since the thrust of his ascription of
real essences to bodies is to conceive bodies in terms of explanatory features being
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different from the macrophysical stage. It shows that the defining portrayal of real
essences works only on the supposition that there truly are explanatory more basic
similarities which explain properties on the macrophysical level. And the reasoning
moreover establishes that, if Locke’s theory is pressed, the most fundamental epistemic
project turns out to be the depiction of natural substances by the similarities they have.
7.2 Further Textual Evidence
The point I have intended to establish so far is that in many of his substantial arguments
Locke makes use of a notion of real essence as reconstructed - whether this is in line with
characterizations in other parts of his comments or not. But there might be passages i n
which Locke uses a different notion of real essences. Perhaps, Locke’s comprehension of
real essences is ambiguous or simply confused?
In what follows the advanced interpretation will further be confirmed by two passages
showing that real essences are consciously understood here in the proposed way.
Subsequently, the most prominent textual evidence is renounced that usually is thought
to establish one of the two prevailing models. The conclusion is that the advanced
understanding of real essences is more or less uniformly present in Locke’s explanations.
This claim will be further warranted by the next chapter whose discussion on the fifth
abuse of words yields the third model to be present there as well.
d. The Experience of Chemists
When arguing in III.vi that one sorts substances as to their nominal and not to their real
essences, Locke refers in §8 to the practical experiences of chemists. Expecting to find the
same properties when examining different members of the same sort, e. g. of sulphur,
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chemists discover on the contrary that specimens often differ. The features in which
members vary are said to depend on their respective internal constitution. And Locke
concludes from this that bodies are not commonly classified as to their real essences: for,
“if Things were distinguished into Species, according to their real Essences, it would be as
impossible to find different Properties in any two individual Substances of the same
Species, as it is to find different Properties in two Circles, or two equilateral Triangles”.392
How are here real essences conceived?
“§8. [...] But if Things were distinguished into Species, according to their real
Essences, it would be as impossible to find different Properties in any two
individual Substances of the same Species, as it is to find different Properties in two
Circles, or two equilateral Triangles.”393
First of all, Locke speaks of real essences in the corpuscularian sense, since he relates them
to internal constitutions. Furthermore, the internal constitutions in question do not
comprise all the microphysical properties a chemical substance has. For, if they did, this
would mean that the particular microphysical properties corresponding to the
macrophysical bulk and figure of a body were part of its internal constitution. But Locke
cannot conceive here internal constitutions as comprising these microphysical features,
since any two members of a sort would then obviously have different internal
constitutions and no chemist could reasonably expect that specimens are alike as to the
properties depending on their internal constitutions. Thus, in this context an internal
constitution does not consist of all the microphysical properties a body has. Importantly,
this suggests strongly that real essences are not conceived as comprising all the properties
a body has as well. For, if Locke understood real essences in the light of the first model,
Locke would not need to refer to the frustrated expectations of chemists, to conclude that
bodies are not distinguished into species as to their real essences. Locke would only need
to point to evidently existing variations amongst chemical substances, e. g. to their bulk
and form, to be able to argue: “But if Things were distinguished into Species, according to
their real Essences, it would be as impossible to find different Properties in any two
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individual Substances of the same Species, as it is to find different Properties in two
Circles, or two equilateral Triangles”. The two occurences of ‘real essence’ cannot
therefore be read as denoting the particular set of all the microphysical properties a body
has. This is confirmed by Locke’s understanding of real essences which is present in his
analogy as to mathematical objects. The real essence of equilateral triangles or of circles, i.
e. their nominal essence, does not determine all their mathematical properties, e. g. their
size.
Decisively, a real essence is equally not understood as a microphysical structure which
corresponds to the nominal essence of a species. This is indicated by Locke’s argument,
namely to establish that bodies are not classified as to their real essences by pointing out
that members of the same sort vary in their properties which depend on their internal
constitutions. Locke’s reasoning implies that in this context internal constitutions are
comprehended as consisting of microphysical features which in fact differ from specimen
to specimen. The properties in which parcels of sulphur vary are properties which depend
on the internal constitutions of the bodies. Thus, referring to experience, i. e. the scientific
practice of chemists, Locke claims that members of the same sort often have different
internal constitutions. In other words, an internal constitution is grasped as a sub-set of
all the microphysical properties a member of a species has and as being prima facie specific
for the specimen. On this backdrop, the real essences of specimens are apparently depicted
as prima facie specific as well. This shows up when Locke addresses that members of the
same sort could not display different properties, if they were sorted in accordance with
their real essences. Evidently, Locke regards here the features in which specimens vary as
depending on their real essences. For, if the properties were not conceived as depending
on their real essences, he could not reasonably claim that specimens would not differ if
they were sorted as to their real essences. In other words: if these properties did not
depend on the real essences of bodies, the sorting of bodies as to their real essences would
not guarantee that members of a species do not vary any longer as to these properties.
This implies that a real essence is prima facie specific for a specimen. For, if specimens
vary in the properties depending on their real essences, they must have different real
essences.
This suggests the third model, on the one hand, and contradicts the first model, on the
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other hand. Real essences are not grasped in terms of the first model because if the real
essences of specimens were the microphysical properties corresponding to the nominal
essence of the sort, every member would have the same real essence and they would be
alike as to the properties on the macrophysical level which depend on this common real
essence. To put it in different terms, the set of properties which is said to depend on the
real essences of specimens exceeds here the set of properties which is determined on the
macrophysical level by the set of microphysical features corresponding to the nominal
essence of the sort.
Summing up, ‘real essence’ and ‘internal constitution’ are used aquivalently, namely to
denote microphysical structures being prima facie specific for the members of a species.
Consequently, the point of Locke’s reasoning is to establish that bodies are commonly not
classified as to their real essences since they display different features which depend on
their real essences. Members of a species which vary as to the properties depending on
their real essences are not sorted as to their real essences, since specimens would
otherwise share the same real essence and would display the same features depending on
this real essence:
“§8. [...] But if Things were distinguished into Species, according to their real
Essences, it would be as impossible to find different Properties in any two
individual Substances of the same Species, as it is to find different Properties in two
Circles, or two equilateral Triangles.”394
More generally speaking, Locke maintains that bodies of the same sort might differ i n
their real essences because some of them might reveal mutually excluding chemical
properties. Thus, there is one nominal essence with which each specimen agrees, but
there are in principle many real essences in which specimens differ. This is the point of
Locke’s comparison of bodies with circles and triangles. Contrary to sorts of mathematical
objects, bodies of the same species do not necessarily have the same real essence. Of
course, if one knew the real essences of bodies, one could form ideas of species whose
nominal essences were identical with the real essences of their members as it is the case
with sorts of mathematical objects. The punchline of Locke’s argument therefore is that
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members of the same species of bodies have prima facie specific real essences. In Lockean
terms, bodies are not sorted “according to precise, distinct, real Essences”.395  Thus, given
the backdrop of the advanced interpretation, Locke’s disclaimer that bodies have precise
real essences expresses the contention that real essences are prima facie specific.
We have seen, Locke’s argument in §8 gets off the ground only, if real essences (and
internal constitutions) are consciously understood in terms of the proposed third model.
Moreover, on this backdrop, the beginning of §9 clearly characterizes real essences as the
sets of properties in accordance to which one would ideally sort bodies: “§9. Nor indeed
can we rank, and sort Things, and consequently (which is the end of sorting) denominate
them by their real Essences, because we know them not.”396
e. Human-like Creatures
There is another passage entailing similar results in connection with biological
individuals. Locke describes here human-like creatures differing in their outer
appearance and then asks which of them should be understood as being of the human
species. His answer is the expected one: classifying biological individuals as humans
depends on the idea one has. If one’s idea portrayed human beings as having reason and
language, all bodies having reason and language would rightly be called man, whereas
substances would not be conceived as humans if they had either no reason or no language
even if they have, for example, a human-like shape. Locke subsequently points out that
one could not decide with reference to the real essences of the human-like creatures
which of them are to be classified as human beings, since our idea of man does not
include any features of the real essences of these bodies. And he similarly claims that one
could not classify the creatures in virtue of specific differences amongst their internal
constitutions because our idea of man does not include any features of these internal
constitutions. The point evidently is: only if we knew real essences or internal
constitutions, one could take them into our idea of man and thus classify creatures as
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humans in virtue of their real essences or respectively in the light of the differences
between their internal constitutions. Moreover, Locke maintains, differences between
internal constitutions can only be said to be specific differences in relation to ideas
including these internal constitutions. Thus, being in line with his notion of properties
being essential for the members of a species, an internal constitution is conceived as being
specific for bodies only if the bodies are members of the sort in virtue of possessing the
internal constitution, i. e. if the internal constitution is the nominal essence of the
species. Locke therefore emphasizes that it is unintelligible to ask which differences
amongst the internal constitutions of the human-like creatures are specific as long as we
have no ideas which include internal constitutions.
In this discussion, Locke makes the concession that the differences between the creatures
on the macrophysical level gives us reason to assume that their are differences between
their internal constitutions as well. But, he insists, we cannot sort bodies as to any specific
differences amongst their internal constitutions if they are not included in our ideas.
Which notions of real essences and internal constitutions are here at work?
“§22. [...] only we have Reason to think, that where the Faculties, or outward Frame
so much differs, the internal Constitution is not exactly the same.”397
First of all, since Locke speaks of internal constitutions, real essences are here understood
as corpuscularian real essences. Furthermore, Locke apparently wants to argue that
creatures are not classified as men in virtue of the differences between their internal
constitutions because they are not part of our idea of man although it is true that there
certainly are differences amongst their internal constitutions. Importantly, Locke’s
wording indicates that commonly one only presumes - although quite reasonably - that
creatures, which vary obviously on the macrophysical level, do have internal
constitutions which differ to some degree: “only we have Reason to think, that where the
Faculties, or outward Frame so much differs, the internal Constitution is not exactly the
same”. Apparently, the difference between biological individuals having reason and
language and biological individuals lacking reason and language is that big for Locke that
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for him it is well justified to suppose that their internal constitutions have to vary to
some extent as well.
Now, this implies, internal constitutions are not comprehended here as consisting of all
the microphysical properties a body has. For, if internal constitutions were understood i n
terms of the first model, there would be no question whether it is reasonable to assume
that internal constitutions of these creatures differ. If a real essence comprised all the
microphysical features a body has, bodies would have to have different internal
constitutions if they varied in features on the macrophysical level. It would be impossible
to doubt whether a creature possessing reason had an internal constitution different from
that of a creature not possessing reason.
Similarly, internal constitutions are likewise not grasped as microphysical structures
corresponding to the nominal essence of a species. To get the opposite interpretation off
the ground that internal constitutions are microphysical properties corresponding to a
nominal essence, one would have to read Locke as conceiving the human-like creatures
to be members of species, e. g. as changelings or drills, when referring to their internal
constitutions. For example, when talking of the internal constitutions of creatures having
reason and language, one would have to take Locke to regard the creatures to be of a
species having the nominal essence of possessing reason and language. However, if
internal constitutions were to be comprehended in this way, namely in the light of the
first model, Locke could hardly claim that it were only reasonable to assume that the
mentioned creatures have different internal constitutions. For, if the creatures were
regarded to have nominal essences consisting of their properties on the macrophysical
level, it would not only be highly probable that the creatures have different internal
constitutions, but they would have to have different ones. If some internal constitutions
corresponded to different nominal essences, there would have to be differences amongst
the internal constitutions. In other words, if an internal constitution were the
microphysical structure which corresponds to a nominal essence, Locke should rather
have said: specimens of the same sort share necessarily the same internal constitution,
whereas specimens of different sorts possess necessarily different internal constitutions.
 The objections against both models shows that Locke speaks of internal constitutions
which do not comprise all the microphysical features a body has and which do not
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necessarily correspond to the nominal essence of a species. Importantly, Locke’s
contentions entail that internal constitutions need not to correspond to the properties of a
nominal essence. For, if it is possible for Locke that creatures have the same internal
constitution, although they differ in properties mutually excluding each other, e. g. to
possess and to lack reason, the internal constitution cannot correspond to both sets of
properties characterizing the two types of creatures.
By contrast, Locke’s explanations become intelligible if one conceives of nominal essences
as representing similarities on the macrophysical level and only as approximating
microphysical similarities. This means, in this context an internal constitution is grasped
in the light of the third model as the microphysical similarities according to which one
would ideally sort the body, while maintaining the possibility that the members of both
sorts have the same internal constitution. On this backdrop, Locke can reasonably claim
that big differences on the macrophysical level between two species are good indications
that the members of both sorts differ in their real internal constitutions, i. e. that one
would ideally sort specimens of both sorts as to different sets of microphysical properties.
On the face of it, in the quoted passage Locke makes use of a notion of internal
constitutions which does not correspond to the two traditional models, but to the
proposed one. And given Locke’s usage of ‘real essence’ in this context, the passage
suggests likewise on the face of it that real essences are conceived in the way as internal
constitutions are, namely to be in accordance with the third model.
f. Alleged Textual Evidence for the Two Prevailing Models
So far I have argued that many of Locke’s substantial arguments on the real essences of
bodies afford and suggest a notion of real essences along the lines of the developed third
model and that Locke consciously uses this notion in two passages. The next chapter will
add another passage. Moreover, the developed interpretation of ‘real essence’ can easily be
squared with Locke’s usage of the concept in many other parts of his comments. To
underpin further the proposed interpretation, I will therefore discuss prominent passages
which are usually read to demonstrate one of the two prevailing models. But what ever
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the comments indicate, given both the textual evidence just presented and Locke’s use of
‘real essence’ in connection with species, archetypes, and knowledge, other passages could
only establish that Locke is ambiguous or terribly confused as to his conception of
(corpuscularian) real essences. For to refute the alternative interpretation one would have
to say more than simply to insist on the traditional textual evidence for the orthdox view.
I begin with the second model which takes a corpuscularian real essence to be the set of all
the microphysical properties a body has.398 Some commentators399 interpret Locke’s
official introduction of ‘real essence’ as characterizing real essences in this way by arguing
that Locke means the set of all microphysical properties a body has when explaining its
real essence as the essentia or being of the body:
“First, Essence may be taken for the very being of any thing, whereby it is, what it is.
And thus the real internal, but generally in Substances, unknown Constitution of
Things, whereon their discoverable Qualities depend, may be called their Essence.
This is the proper signification of the Word, as is evident from the formation of it;
Essentia, in its primary notation signifying properly Being. And in this sense it is
still used, when we speak of the Essence of particular things, without giving them
any Name.”400
Many advocats of the line of interpretation in question apparently take their reading for
granted for the following reason.401 Locke speaks of real essences as to bodies when they
are not conceived as specimens, namely “when we speak of the Essence of particular
things, without giving them any Name.” However, we have seen above that this fits
perfectly with the third model as well, especially in connection with Lockean
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archetypes.402 Similarly, it is also not obvious that ‘essentia’ and ‘being’ are to be
understood in the light of the second model. To talk of the essentia or being of a body is
simply too abstract than that it is evident what Locke means. More importantly, there are
two objections against this reading.
First objection. Locke’s use of ‘essentia’ in other contexts suggests a different reading.
Shortly after the definition, Locke speaks of the essentia of a triangle.403 The essentia of
triangles is their real essence or nominal essence respectively, i. e. a space being enclosed
by three lines. But contrary to the second model, the real essence of triangles cannot
naturally be conceived as an aquivalent to the set of all the microphysical features a body
has. For this set determines all the body’s other properties, i. e. fatures on the
macrophysical level, whereas Locke’s real essence of triangles does not determine all their
(mathematical) properties, e. g. the size of the triangle. A particular triangle is conceived
to possess many other properties which are not solely determined by its real essence. For
example, a triangle might have a rect angle. But this property does not depend on the
triangle’s bare triangularity. Likewise, the property expressed by the proposition of
Pythagoras depends not only on bare triangularity, but on rectangularity as well. Thus the
essentia (or real essence) of triangles, as Locke understands it, is not analogous to the set of
all the microphysical properties a body has. Thus, if one does not want to ascribe
confusion to Locke, this passage indicates that he does not comprehend the essentia or
real essence of a body as comprising all its microphysical properties.
Second objection. In the defining portrayal of ‘real essence’, Locke explains the essentia of
a body as “the very being of any thing, whereby it is, what it is”.404 Crucially, Locke’s usage
of this expression in other passages suggests that ‘essentia’ should not be read in the light
of the second model:
”First, That there are certain precise Essences, according to which Nature makes all
particular Things, and by which they are distinguished into Species. That every
Thing has a real Constitution, whereby it i what it is, and on which its sensible
Qualities depend, is past doubt: But I think it has been proved, that this makes not
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the distinction of Species, as we rank them; nor the boundaries of their names.”405
On the face of it, in the last quoted sentence Locke speaks in persona propria, since he
refers to something what “is past doubt”. But this real constitution can hardly comprise
all the microphysical properties a body has, because according to Locke’s position one
would not even envisage to classify bodies as to a set of microphysical features of this
kind. The reason is simple. For Locke, ideas depict bodies in virtue of recurrently
experienced similarities. Thus, one would not even attempt to sort bodies into species
which are characterized by microphysical properties that are specific for only one body.
And since the internal constitution is depicted as that “whereby it is, what is”, this
suggests that in the defining protrayal Locke does not characterize the real essence of a
body as comprising all the microphysical properties the body has.
Since a discussion of Aristotelian real essences is the wider context of the citation, one
might claim that Locke really refers to Aristotelian real essences when qualifying real
essences as essentia, namely as that whereby a specimen is what it is. According to the
Aristotelian doctrine, a real essence comprises properties which are shared by each
member of a sort and which thus determine only features on the macrophysical stage
being common to every specimen. This implies crucially that Aristotelian real essences
are not (aquivalent to) the set of all the microphysical properties a body has. For if the
Aristotelian real essence of a body were analogous to the set of all the microphysical
properties the body has, the Aristotelian real essence would not only determine properties
on the macrophysical level which the body shares with other specimens of its sort, but
likewise all its other features just as the set of all the microphysical properties does.
Hence, ‘whereby it is, what it is’ does not characterize here the real essences of bodies as
that on which all their properties of the macrophysical stage depend. This suggests in turn
that ‘essentia’ should likewise not be understood in the light of the second model.
Summing up both objections, there are passages in which Locke apparently does not
conceive the essentia of an entity as a set of properties which is (analogous to) the set of all
the microphysical properties a body has. Locke calls the real essence of a triangle its
essentia, but the real essence of a triangle does not determine all its other mathematical
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properties. Locke characterizes the Aristotelian real essence of a body as that ‘whereby it is,
what it is’, but the Aristotelian real essence does not determine all the body’s features.
This usage of ‘essentia’ and ‘whereby it is, what it is’ contradicts the common view that
Locke defines real essences as the second model depicts them. Even worse, I do not see
any other passage which on the face of it could serve as textual evidence for the second
model. On the other hand, to do justice to this line of reading, it should be added that
other alleged textual evidence has been put forward which, however, has above been
interpreted differently, namely as incompatible with the second model and in favor with
the third one.
By contrast, there are two passages supporting the first model on the face of it. These
comments have in particular been advanced as textual evidence for the orthodox reading
according to which a real essence is the microphysical structure corresponding to the
nominal essence of a species and being common to all members of the sort. However, I
will argue, given both the presence of the third model in many of Locke’s most
substantial arguments and the two passages where Locke consciously portrays real
essences as being prima-facie specific, one should read the two comment differently.
There is no need to certify confusion or ambiguity on Locke’s side if one highlights one
occurrence of ‘real essence’ and one occurrence of ‘internal constitution’ on the backdrop
of the third model, i. e. in the light of his other comments. In one famous passage, the
real essence of a body is explained as
“that real constitution of any Thing, which is the foundation of all those Properties,
that are combined in, and are constantly found to coexist with the nominal
essence”.406
Does Locke here not depict the real essence of a body as the microphysical structure
corresponding to the nominal essence of a species which determines the nominal essence
and other properties on the macrophysical level?407 I do not deny that the real essences of
bodies are here depicted in this way. But to read Locke as expounding a coherent position,
one should take the quoted comment as not being a comprehensive characterization of
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the real essences of bodies. For the third model conceives likewise the real essences of
specimens to determine both the nominal essence of the sort and other properties
coexisting with the nominal essence. The decisive difference between the first and the
third model is, however, that according to the latter the real essence of a specimen
determines prima facie  also other features which do not always go along with the
nominal essence. This additional characteristic is not mentioned in the quoted passage,
yet it is clearly present or implied by many of his other comments on species, archetypes,
or knowledge - as we have seen. Locke does not point out or emphasize the prima-facie
specificity of real essences in all contexts, e. g. in the quoted passage, as he does in such
where it becomes relevant for the argument. In fact, there are many passages which are i n
this sense neutral to both, or even to all three, readings.
In the Stillingfleet correspondence, by contrast, Locke clearly appeals to real essences i n
terms of the first model:
“[...] it is certain that the real essence of all the individuals, comprehended under
the specific name man, in your use of it, would be just the same, [...]; because the
real essence on which that unaltered complex idea, i. e. those properties depend,
must necessarily be concluded to be the same.”408
“[...] it is impossible but the real constitution on which that unaltered complex idea,
or nominal essence, [of a species] depends, must be the same: i. e. in other words,
where we find all the same properties, we have reason to conclude there is the
same real, internal constitution, from which those properties flow.”409
No doubt, Locke declares that specimens of the same sort have the same internal
constitution, i. e., as Locke’s repreated equation of internal constitutions and real essences
makes plain,410 specimens of the same sort have the same real essence. Does this refute
the whole argument now? Hardly. Does this passage shows that Locke is hopelessly
confused or that he secretly changed his position in the face of Stillingfleet’s criticism?
Not necessarily.
To assess the significance of Locke’s assertions in his reply to Stillingfleet, one has to keep
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in mind that Locke does not need to refer to real essences being prima-facie specific to
refute Stillingfleet’s objections. There are two topics at issue, at least from Locke’s
perspective. The first one is Stillingfleet’s insistance that kind-membership is determined
by real essences and not merely by Lockean nominal essences.411 Stillingfleet’s starting
point is that there must be a real essence that underlies the similarities of a species, which
are included in its nominal essence. Locke grants this last claim, and in granting it he
introduces the notion of real essence as quoted above. Locke rejoins however not only
that there certainly is an underlying resemblance which accounts for the observed
similarities on the macrophysical stage, but that this real essence cannot determine our
species because we do not know them. In this context, all what Locke needs is one’s
ignorance of explanatory basic features to reject Stillingfleet’s contention. Locke’s
argument holds whether real essences are precise or prima-facie specific.
The second aspect of the controversy relates to the question whether species are made by
nature or by men.412 This becomes plain in the light of their respective contentions.
Stillingfleet argues for real essences that are in some sense not made by man, but by God
(and which therefore determine kind-membership independently from any man-made
nominal essences). In Locke’s terms of the Essay, as we have seen in the foregoing chapter,
Stillingfleet claims that species are made by nature, not by man. Consequently, Locke re-
insists both that nominal essences are collections of experienced similarities amongst
bodies and that it is unintelligible for him to conceive of real essences that exist in nature
in Stillingfleet’s strong sense. Correspondingly, Locke concedes only that there are real
essences matching man-made nominal essences. Again, Locke does need for his
refutation that real essences are prima-facie specific.  
The reconstruction of the debate made plain that, from Locke’s standpoint, he and
Stillingfleet agree in a common notion of real essence, but not on further
characterizations of real essences. Both understand a real essence as comprising the
features on which the nominal essence of a species depends. For Locke, this conception of
real essences is both: one which is accepted by Stillingfleet and which allows him to refute
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Stillingfleet. Given Stillingfleet’s orthodox view of real essences, he would hardly have
granted real essences being prima-facie specific. But to have a common ground is a
presupposition to convince another person. In the light of what has been shown above, I
therefore read Locke’s portrayal of real essences in terms of the first model as a tactical
concession to win the argument against Stillingfleet on issues which are not confined to
the supposition that real essences are prima-facie specific.
Another possibility is of course to take Locke as being confused. In this case, however, he
has to be really deeply confused. A direct comparison between a passage of the Essay and
of the correspondence illustrates this well:
“[...] it is certain that the real essence of all the individuals, comprehended under
the specific name man, in your use of it, would be just the same, [...]; because the
real essence on which that unaltered complex idea, i. e. those properties depend,
must necessarily be concluded to be the same.”413
“§20. That which, I think, very much disposes Men to substitute their names for
the real Essences of Species, is the supposition before mentioned, that Nature
works regularly in the Production of Things, and sets Boundaries to each of those
Species, by giving exactly the same real internal Constitution to each individual,
which we rank under one general name. Whereas any one who observes their
different Qualities can hardly doubt, that many of the Individuals, called by the
same name, are, in their internal Constitution, as different one from another, as
several of those which are ranked under different specifick Names. This
supposition, however  that the same precise internal Constitution goes always with
the same specifick name, makes Men forward to take those  names for the
Representatives of those real Essences, though indeed they signify nothing but the
complex Ideas they have in their Minds when they use them.”414
I will come back to the last quoted passage in the next chapter and analyse it in detail. But
the contradiction to the preceding citation is apparent. On the one hand, members of the
same sort are said to have the same real essence, or internal constitution respectively,
namely that “the real essence of all the individuals, comprehended under the specific
name man [...] must necessarily be concluded to be the same.” On the other hand,
experience is said to show that members of the same sort do not have the same internal
constitution, or real essence respectively, namely that “any one who observes their
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different Qualities can hardly doubt, that many of the Individuals, called by the same
name, are, in their internal Constitution, as different one from another, as several of
those which are ranked under different specifick Names.”
In any case, whether Locke makes a tactical concession or whether he is confused when
replying to Stillingfleet, the two occurrences of ‘real essence’ and ‘internal constitution’
respectively can scarcely establish that Locke has no clear conception of the kind of
corpuscularian real essences which he proposes as an alternative to Aristotelian real
essences. For, as we have seen above in connection with Locke’s account of the experience
of chemists and as will be reconfirmed in the next chapter,415 Locke consciously contrasts
Aristotelian real essences as being precise with his corpuscularian real essences as not
being precise. That is, the former ones are depicted as being necessarily common to all
members of a species in contrast to the latter ones as being prima facie specific for
specimens. Moreover, the discussed passages on chemists and human-like creatures
cannot be read coherently unless one understands a real essence and an internal
constitution respectively to be a microphysical structure in the advanced sense. In
addition, as delineated in 7.1, one does not find arbitrarily this conception of real essences
in these two passages; rather, it is present in Locke’s arguments on bodies throughout the
Essay. And having established that, one naturally reads passages on this background
where Locke consciously refers to real essences as real essences belonging to a particular
body, namely to a particular member of a sort. These comments do not demonstrate that
Locke conceives real essences as the third model depicts them. Yet, given the advanced
interpretation, he seems to account for the prima-facie specificality of real essences when
he speaks of them by referring to them as real essences belonging to a particular specimen
of a sort. For instance, Locke says that “[t]he particular parcel of Matter which makes the
Ring I have on my Finger, is forwardly, by most Men, supposed to have a real Essence.”416
Thus, even though Locke differently uses his terminology in his reply to Stillingfleet and
although he might be even confused there, his conception of real essences as depicted by
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the third model is dominant, consciously put forward, and crucial for many of his
arguments on bodies. Given the connection to Boyle, Locke seems to spell out Boyle’s
intuition of classifying bodies “as they deserve” in terms of his conception of real
essences.
196
8. Imperfection and Abuses
Locke puts his comments on the imperfections and abuses of words in the perspective of
his epistemological programme to determine the scope of human knowledge. The theory
is intended to disclose substantial hindrances for the progress of knowledge and to
propose remedies to advance knowledge.417 The importance which Locke attaches to his
comments manifests in his separate discussion of words in an autonomous book which
according to him evolved in the course of writing the Essay, apparently due to the
findings of the imperfections and abuses.418 Not unimportant for our topic, apparently,
this is particularly emphasized in the context of names of bodies, namely as to the
Aristotelians and their doctrines.419 For Locke, the account unmasks scientific debates and
philosophical arguments as being based on the abuses and imperfection of names of
bodies. And he intends to pave the way for the progress of knowledge by disenchanting
these false theories and fruitless debates, i. e. “[to remove] some of the rubbish that lies i n
the way of knowledge”.420 He thereby distinguishes between different causes of the
obstructions of knowledge, namely between abuses as avoidable shortcomings and
imperfections as natural or hardly evitable deficiencies of language. On this backdrop,
Locke then proposes an ideal to use words in scientific discourse to advance human
knowledge.
Yet, despite Locke’s own pronouncement, his discussion of imperfections and abuses is
generally underrated in the literature. There is hardly any systematic account of them. By
contrast, I will argue that a detailed analysis of the various issues where the theory applies
substantiates the prominence which Locke gives to his discussion. As we will see, Locke’s
account of how imperfections and abuses obstruct human knowledge of bodies and of
what one can do about it raises substantial claims as to our scientific grasp of bodies.
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In section 8.1, I will begin with Locke’s analysis of what the imperfection and abuses of
names of bodies consist in. Then, the obstructions of knowledge will be delineated
together with the remedies Locke proposes. The account of the fifth abuse will however
remain very general in 8.1, since it will separately be highlighted in 8.2 due to the
extensiveness of the discussion. The deeper reason is that the advanced interpretation
notably diverges from traditional readings, since Locke’s comments are again understood
in terms of the model of real essences which has been developed in the previous chapter.
8.1 Imperfection and Abuses
a. What the Imperfection and Abuses of Names of Bodies Consist in
Imperfections and abuses arise when speakers deviate from Locke’s ideal of using words
in thought and communication, namely to use words with a clear and unmistakable
signification. This means for the imperfection of names of bodies that the words are
ambiguous when used in the corpuscularian way and meaningless when used in the
Aristotelian way. In both cases, Locke advances a double characterization of the root of the
imperfection. Names of bodies are imperfect either if their signification are not the real
essences of bodies, or if words are referred to unknown or only partially known
standards.421 Both portrayals boil down to mean the same, since the real essences of bodies
serve as the standards of names of bodies. If names signify bodies by their real essences,
the standards of the names are known because the standards are the real essences and real
essences are known if names signify real essences. And if the standards are known, names
signify bodies by their real essences because one intends to signify ideally real essences by
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one’s names. Locke’s two causes of the imperfection of names of bodies turn thus out to
be aquivalent. But why is our ignorance of standards, or real essences respectively, the
source for the imperfection of the names of bodies? I will first turn to the corpuscularian
use only and later to the Aristotelian use in connection with abuses. This, at first sight,
unusual ordering is necessary, however, since Locke does not use his notions of
imperfection and abuse fully coherently in connection with bodies so that the borderline
between imperfection and abuses blurs.
According to Locke, speakers, who intend to depict corpuscularian archetypes by their
ideas, use the same terms to signify similar, but different ideas of bodies to the effect that
the terms are used ambiguously, i. e. differently amongst people. Locke’s example is
‘gold’.422 Whereas a child’s idea of gold includes only the colour of a particular type of
yellow, other people include more properties in their ideas, e. g. the property of possessing
a metallic shine. As a consequence, in the former case ‘gold’ denotes also tails of peacocks
besides golden rings, but not in the latter one. And, depending on their experience,
chemists add even more features to their idea so that ‘gold’ signifies again different classes
of bodies. Locke’s point is that this kind of imperfection has to evolve if people are
ignorant of real essences. For, if one does not know real essences, it is ligitimate for
everybody to include in one’s ideas every set of properties which one finds to coexist on
the macrophysical level in the bodies serving as standards when one makes the ideas. The
deeper reason for the ligitimaty is that every set of coexisting features may serve as a
substitute for the unknown real essences of the standards of our ideas if one is ignorant of
their real essences. As Locke puts it, every set of properties has the same right to be
included in an idea. Names of bodies therefore are ambiguous because everyone can
justify one’s use of terms by the ideas one has made in the light of one’s experience of
one’s standards and their properties. Likewise, noone can establish a uniform
signification for names of bodies because nobody has the right to reject the ideas of other
people by insisting on one’s own idea as the only true standard for the term everybody
uses.423 In this sense, our ignorance of real essences is the cause of the imperfection: due
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to our ignorance, real essences cannot serve as a uniform standard in the light of which
speakers could adjust their ideas and names. Instead, speakers have their own standards
and ideas which determine the signification of their names.
Like imperfections, abuses exist when speakers use words without a clear and
unmistakable signification in thought or communication. Locke distinguishes between
six types of abuses of which five are significant for names of bodies. All of these five
abuses are notably associated with the technical terms employed by the Aristotelians or by
other “Sects of Philosophy and Religion”:424 if one introduces new terms or uses familiar
terms which do not signify a clear and distinct idea (first abuse);425 if one use words
inconsistantly, see below (second abuse); if one employs common words contrary to their
common use or introduces new terms with ambiguous signification (third abuse), e. g. the
Cartesian notion of body; or if one understands one’s terms to denote existing entities
though they do not, e. g. ‘substantial Forms’ (fourth abuse); if one refers words to entities
in the world, namely real essences, which they do not or even cannot denote, see 8.2 (fifth
abuse).
On this backdrop, the difference between abuses and imperfections becomes obvious.
Whereas the imperfection of names of bodies is based on our ignorance of real essences
which for Locke is an undisputable, given matter of fact and in this sense unavoidable, an
abuse is evitable if speakers would simply take care about their use of words, namely if
one makes sure that one’s words stand each for an unmistakingble, clear and distinct idea.
And speakers have to use imperfect terms, namely words which have inevitably an
unequivocal meaning, simply because they have to use a common language i n
communication.426 If people want to refer to species of bodies even when they are
ignorant of their real essences, they have to use imperfect names. This is the punchline
that imperfections arise inevitably: they are rooted in the very nature of language, namely
to use common signs to express thoughts in communication, e. g. thoughts relating to
species of bodies. By contrast, an abuse is an use of words which is avoidable i n
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communication and with the result that terms have no unmistakable, distinct meaning:
“§1. BESIDES the Imperfection that is naturally in Language, and the obscurity and
confusion that is so hard to be avoided in the Use of Words, there are several
wilful Faults and Neglects, which Men are guilty of, in this way of
Communication, whereby they render these signs less clear and distinct in thei
signification, than naturally they need to be.”427
To understand the distinction between imperfections and abuses in the suggested way is
in line with what has been said so far in connection with names of bodies (and what
Locke contends as to the imperfections and abuses concerning other types of words).
However, Locke’s account of the imperfection as to the corpuscularian use of names of
bodies substantially undermines this picture. Names of bodies are said to be imperfect
when they are referred to (unknown) Aristotelian real essences because they become
meaningless and cannot be rectified in the light of (known) Aristotelian real essences.
That is, speakers do not use their words to signify unmistakingbly clear and distinct ideas.
Thus, on the face of it, this account is parallel to the one of the corpuscularian use, as I
will now delineate first.
With respect to Aristotelian real essences, the argument consists of two steps.428 First,
Locke explains the uncertainty of the meaning of words by the inability of speakers to
identify members of species that results from their ignorance of the Aristotelian real
essences.429 Locke makes here use of an argument which he develops more in detail at
other places.430 It runs as follows. Given the Aristotelian comprehension of names and
ideas, speakers refer them to real essences being shared by every specimen. Only those
bodies are conceived as members of a species which have its real essence. Thus, it is the
real essence and not the nominal essence which according to this use of words sets the
boundary of a sort. But if the real essence determined which body belongs to a species and
if the real essence is unknown, no specimen could be identified. Therefore, general terms
being used in this way, truly signify nothing, neither an idea nor a species. In this
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perspective, one has to read Locke’s analysis that a word being thus used “must be very
uncertain in its application”: our ignorance of real essences implies that one has no
criteria to apply names of bodies so that their application has to be uncertain. One has to
read likewise the second step of the argument where Locke concludes from what he just
said that the signification of names of bodies can never be established by rectifying them
in the light of their standards or real essences respectively: if one does not even know
how to apply the names of bodies, it is simply impossible that one can adjust their
signification by referring them to (unknown) Aristotelian real essences. In a nutshell: we
cannot adjust the meaning of our terms, if they do not have one.
In both cases, i. e. in the corpuscularian and the Aristotelian one, we have seen, Locke
determines as the root of the imperfection our ignorance of real essences in the sense that
their lack of knowledge does not enable speakers to rectify names in the light of the real
essences by which they intend to portray bodies ideally. The common line of both
arguments is: that people intend to depict ideally bodies by their real essences, that
speakers are ignorant of real essences, and that speakers vary in their use of words since
they cannot adjust their use in the light of the (unknown) real essences of bodies. Locke
takes this as an obvious fact being displayed in everyday communication, e. g. between
children and adults, and in scientific discussions, e. g. which substance is truly gold and
which creatures are truly humans.431
However, to conceive the imperfection of the Aristotelian use as analoguous to the one of
the corpuscularian use is only to follow Locke’s official setting; namely, that, on the one
hand, there is the distinction between imperfections and abuses, and that, on the other
hand, there are the different kinds of imperfections and abuses. But a closer look reveals
that the fifth abuse is identical with the Aristotelian use of names of bodies. In both cases,
one refers words to species of entities characterized by (unknown) Aristotelian real
essences. Curiosly, this implies, the imperfection relating to the Aristotelian use is an
imperfection relating to an abuse. Thus, there is a tension in Locke’s account since
imperfections are officially contrasted as being “inevitable” with abuses as being
“avoidable”. Of course, one may say: once one supposes the fifth abuse, the imperfection
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occurs inevitably. But this way of putting it can hardly cover up the fact that this is
contrary to the point which Locke intends to make with his two notions, namely to
introduce a clear-cut distinction. Thus, as a matter of fact, his characterization of
imperfections as inevitable in contrast to abuses as avoidable is in harmony with the
imperfection of names of bodies as to the corpuscularian use (and with the imperfections
concerning other words), but not with the imperfection as to the Aristotelian use. To be
more precise, since the Aristotelian use is identical with the fifth abuse, the Aristotelian
use is as avoidable and dispensible as Locke portrays the fifth abuse. And according to
Locke, the Aristotelian use should be substituted for the corpuscularian one.
b. The Obstructions of Knowledge and Locke’s Remedies
In which way do the imperfection and abuses of names of bodies obstruct communication
or thought and, as a consequence, knowledge? What kind of remedies does Locke
propose? In this context Locke distinguishes between two cases, namely between the civil
or common use of words and the philosophical one.432 The former is the usage of words
in everyday’s conduct, the latter the one in scientific discourse. That is, Locke
distinguishes between different contexts in which words are used. Importantly, for Locke
the imperfection seriously hamper only scientific discourse, but not everyday conduct.433
Locke probably beliefs as to the common use that the difference between the ideas of
speakers do either not become relevant or are too obvious to cause (serious) confusion
and misunderstanding. And he could explain this by his view that speakers have the
general inclination to adjust the signification of their names as to the ideas of other
people in order to be understood in communication.434 That is, due to our efforts to use
common names as other speakers do, the usage of names does not vary too much to
destruct everyday conduct.
Quite the contrary, the philosophical use. Imperfections here introduce ambiguities
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leading to fruitless discussions which are in fact only about the meaning of words, e. g.
whether a bat is a bird and whether bodies not being malleable are gold.435 Locke does not
become tired to emphasize the hindrance for the progress of knowledge which is caused
by misunderstandings due to unclarified ambiguities.436  
Similarly, abuses. Locke’s focus is clearly on the philosophical use as his examples show
which chiefly relate to technical terms of the Aristotelians or of other “Sects of Philosophy
and Religion”.437 His criticism aims primarily at the Aristotelians which according to h im
obscure knowledge by a theory of species and essences that is merely based on an abuse of
words. Locke recurrently critizes the technical terms of Aristotelian theory as
unintelligible and meaningless, e. g. ‘form’, ‘species’ and ‘essence’.438 He seems to regard
these notions as crude conceptions evolving in the aftermath of the fifth abuse, since he
conceives the Aristotelian understanding of real essences, i. e. the doctrine of forms, as
comprising additional extravagant assumptions and thus as unnecessarily topping the
fifth abuse.439 Below, in 8.2, we will give a full account of the types of false knowledge
claims which are raised by the Aristotelians in connection with the fifth abuse.
Of course, other abuses like the ambiguous or inconsistant use of terms occur in the
common use and hamper everyday communication to some degree. But Locke does not
claim that the abuses make common conduct unintelligible as they do with regard to
scientific discourse. This is again best exemplified by the fifth abuse, i. e. the referring of
names of bodies to species characterized by unknown real essences. According to him, the
fifth abuse is not only practised by Aristotelians, but also by laymen.440 However, Locke’s
analysis implies that the abuse does not really become relevant in the civil use of the
laymen. The reason is obvious. As Locke repeatedly points out, since words are effectively
meaningless when abused in this way, speakers could not identify any specimens if they
really applied their words as they intend to do. For instance, one could not identify a ring
of gold or a piece of fish in the jewellery shop respectively on the market, if one referred
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‘gold’ and ‘fish’ to unknown real essences. Communication would be impossible, if the
fifth abuse were truly practised in everyday conduct. We will come back to this below.441
The fifth abuse is therefore effectively confined to scientific debates, e. g. what is the true
definition or real essence of humans.442
But besides the fifth abuse there is another substantial source of obstruction in the
scientific realm of bodies which is chiefly based on the second abuse, i. e. the inconsistant
use of terms. This is the topic of maxims. In his discussion of maxims, Locke attacks the
Aristotelian belief that the so-called maxims can serve as basic principles from which all
other truths are to be deduced.443 Maxims are very general and intuitively known
propositions, e. g. ‘Whatsoever is, is’, which can supposingly serve as axioms to prove
other propositions. Contradicting allegations raised against him, Locke agrees with the
Aristotelians that knowledge of maxims is genuine knowledge, since they are
propositions being intuitively known. Yet, he points out, maxims do not help to enhance
knowledge in the sense that they serve as a foundation of our knowledge.444 For the kind
of propositions which maxims are supposed to prove are grasped independently of the
maxims because the propositions are intuitively known as well, e. g. ‘White is white’.445
Quite the contrary, Locke contends, instead of advancing knowledge, the belief in maxims
rather hinders the progress of knowledge. For maxims can easily be mistaken to establish
contradictory propositions in the course of an abuse of words, namely of using the same
term for different ideas. Locke illustrates this as to ‘man’. Children whose idea of man
include the feature of having a white skin can demonstrate that ‘black people are not
humans’ is not true. However, people whose ideas incorporate only a human-like shape
can reason that the proposition is true. Similarly, the latter speakers can likewise conclude
that changelings are humans, whereas changelings are not humans for those subjects
whose ideas include rationality and speech as well. And so on. From the modern
perspective, this seems to be rather uninteresting. But Locke has disputes of his time i n
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mind, e. g. whether certain creatures are humans and can therefore be baptized, which
were relevant at his time.446
In addition, Locke’s criticism of Aristotelian maxims applies to Descartes’s notion of
body.447 Given Descartes’s idea of body that bodies are bare extension, Locke exhibits, one
can conclude with the maxim ‘Whatsoever is, is’ that there cannot be a vacuum.
However, if ‘body’ signifies an entity comprising not only extension but solidity as well,
one can establish with the maxim ‘The same thing cannot be, and not be’ that there might
be a vacuum. But the two contradictory claims have only the word ‘body’ in common, i. e.
a term which signifies a different idea in each case. And contradictory claims, Locke
complains, lead to confusion which hinder us to grasp things correctly.
In fact, the Cartesian example is more complex than it first appears because the third and
fourth abuse are involved as well. First, as Locke’s example of the third abuse shows, the
Cartesian idea of body does not comply with the everyday one although this is suggested
by signifying the Cartesian idea by the common term ‘body’.448 Second, the fourth abuse is
present because Cartesians imply that their notion of body refers to existent entities,
namely the ones which we commonly call body, although we do not know whether
Cartesian body exists in the world, since this idea has not been acquired from
experience.449 That is, Cartesians suppose their idea to depict the kind of entities to which
one usually refers as body although the idea does not portray the entities in the way we
commonly grasp them as bodies. Thus, the name that signifies the idea, i. e. ‘body’, is
taken to denote our everyday bodies. This means that, contrary to the Cartesian doctrine,
the name ‘body’ is not referred to the Cartesian idea of body, but stands for entities which
are not depicted by the idea - when Cartesians relate ‘body’ to our common bodies. In this
sense, Locke accuses Cartesians to take words to stand for (commonly known) entities but
not for (their offical) ideas:
“But because Men mistake generally, thinking that where the same Terms are
preserved, the Propositions are about the same things, though the Ideas they stand
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for are in truth different. Therefore these Maxims are made use of to support those,
which in sound and appearance are contradictory Propositions; as is clear in the
Demonstrations above-mentioned about a Vacuum.  So that whilst Men take
Words for Things, as usually they do, these Maximes may and do commonly serve
to prove contradictory Propositions.”450
To “take Words for Things”, is the reason why Cartesians wrongly believe that their
propositions and ideas have to apply to the entities to which one usually refers ‘body’ i n
everyday conduct. But since everyday bodies are differently conceived as being bodies than
the Cartesian idea suggests, the common notion of body allows the possibility of a
vacuum in contrast to the Cartesian idea. The Cartesian confusion to believe that their
conception of bodies is in line with our grasp of the entities commonly understood as
bodies leads to the kind of confusion and error in scientific debates and learning Locke
persistantly complains about.451 Locke’s intriguing analysis of the Cartesian doctrine of
bodies and the impossibility of the vacuum well illustrates why he attaches that much
importance to our “ill use” or abuse of words throughout the Essay.
On the backdrop of this account, Locke proposes remedies of the imperfections and
abuses. He does this in the light of his ideal that words should have a unmistakable, clear
and distinct signification. This means that words like names of bodies have to signify for
all speakers the same clear and distinct idea in communication. But since this is difficult
to achieve, as the imperfection of the corpuscularian use well exemplifies, it follows that
one has to make sure that other speakers grasp the ideas which are signified by one’s
names. Only in this way one can prevent confusion and fruitless debates which are caused
by terms that are differently understood by speakers. In other words, to avoid the
obstructions of knowledge by imperfections and abuses, one has to use only words with
an unequivocal meaning whose signification one can properly convey to other people.
For this reason Locke points out that  one should make plain one’s ideas, which are
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signified by names of bodies, by partly showing the most distinctive properties to other
speakers, e. g. the colour being specific for specimens, and partly by defining their other
features.452 Consequently, Locke demands the composition of a natural history, i. e. a
dictionary settling the signification for names of bodies.453
At first thought, this seems to much of a good thing. Do we have to carry a dictionary
with us when buying fish or jewellery in order to ensure that we really get what we want?
However, Locke’s concern is here again the philosophical use, not the common one. On
the other hand, having said that, the demand of a canonical scientific vocabulary might
not sound very revolutionary for a modern reader. Locke’s backdrop however is not
today’s interconnected scientific community with established nomenclature. The
situation of his time is instead represented by the publications of the Royal Society.
Experimental findings of both the laymen and scientists were there reported in an effort
to make them known.454 Not surprisingly therefore, at Locke’s time, the scientific
classificatory vocabular was hardly standardized, difficult to survey and thus from his
perspective incurably ambiguous. On this backdrop, Locke proposes natural history as a
remedy, namely an encyclopaedia compiling the scattered experimental results of
scientists in a conceptually unequivocal way. Locke is thereby realistic enough to see that
one cannot reform language at the conference table.455 The proposal of a natural history is
thus not leveled at practices of a contemporary scientific community, but serves as an
ideal which at his time philosophically conscious researchers should aim at when ever
possible in their private research and in discourse with other scientists.456 At most, Locke
aims at establishing a uniform terminology for scientists organized in the Royal Society,
since the Society was initially committed to corporate experiments.457  
Locke’s demand of a natural history is proposed as a remedy for both the imperfection and
the abuses of names of bodies. But one can conceive the proposition as aiming at the
imperfection of the corpuscularian use in order to make the use of names as uniform as
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possible. For, after all, in the case of abuses the only possible true remedy is the
abandonment of them, the respective vocabulary, and the related theories of species,
essences, maxims, etc. The kind of obstructions caused by the Aristotelian use or by other
abuses can be best avoided by simply abandoning them. In this sense, one can conceive
the development of a nomenclature as a “positive” measure and the abandonment of
abuses as “negative” measures to enhance human knowledge of bodies.
We have seen, Locke’s criticism as to the imperfection and abuses of names of bodies is
primarily leveled at contemporary language use in scientific contexts, namely the kind of
scientific vocabularies which existed at Locke’s time.458 Moreover, Locke makes the
important point that the ambiguity of names of bodies is primarily due to a natural
deficiency, or imperfection, which is inherent in our use of these terms and which can
only be overcome with an ideal scientific-classificatory vocabulary. His argument is
thereby not trivial, but linked to Locke’s theory of archetypes and real essences. The
upshot is that names of bodies “naturally” obstruct the progress of knowledge because
speakers put them in the perspective of their epistemic project to depict bodies by
similarities on the explanatory stage (and, ideally, by their real essences). By contrast,
abuses are generally conceived as being avoidable and as the result of a rather careless use
of words.
But this official setting is substantial undermined by the fifth abuse, as has been
maintained above. Locke depicts the fifth abuse also as the imperfection of the
Aristotelian use. More importantly, as I will argue next, the fifth abuse is caused by a
“natural fallacy” and is thus similar to the imperfection of the corpuscularian use. And
the seemingly clear-cut distinction between imperfections and abuses blurrs furthermore
if one takes into account that other abuses of names of bodies, e. g. the introduction of
unintelligible technical terms by the Aristotelians, are understood to flow from the fifth
abuse.
The analysis which has been so far developed has not yet discussed the fifth abuse i n
detail. What is still missing, is a precise account of the obstructions caused by the abuse
and of the fifth abuse itself. Both issues will be reconstructed hand in hand, since his
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examples for the fifth abuse are crucial to understand his explanations.
8.2 The Fifth Abuse in Detail
As already indicated, the fifth abuse exists when one refers words to entities in the world,
which they do not or even cannot denote.459 This effectively means that one abuses words
when one refers names to species of bodies which are conceived as being characterized by
a real essence (and not by a common nominal essence). To be precise, this kind of
referring names to real essences is an abuse only because the speakers are ignorant of real
essences, i. e. because the names do not signify an idea of the real essence which the
subjects presume. Names being thus used are in fact meaningless, since they do not stand
for any idea. One cannot identify any specimen, Locke argues, since one does not have an
idea including a nominal essence which comprises the properties determining and
specifying kind membership. But if this is so, one might wonder how it is possible for
people to believe that their names do have a signification. How is it possible that speakers
abuse words in a way in which words truly become meaningless? The question is not
unimportant, since an analysis reveals that the fifth abuse leads to substantial false
knowledge claims and to misconceptions of species of bodies and their essences. The
answer to both issues lies in the reconstruction of the details, namely of Locke’s examples
when explaining the fifth abuse. The contexts with which Locke illustrates the fifth abuse
will first be reconstructed, since the roots of the fifth abuse have to be analysed i n
connection with Locke’s examples. On the other hand, in the light of the latter
interpretation, I will argue that the fifth abuse is present in another prominent context as
well.
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c. Contexts in which the Fifth Abuse Occurs
Locke first illustrates the abuse as to one’s understanding of the meaning of universal
propositions about the attribution of properties to species. His example is, as so often,
‘gold’.460 If one claims ‘Gold is malleable’, everyday speakers usually do not understand
the proposition as saying: what I call gold, i. e. what is characterized by my idea or
nominal essence of gold, is malleable. Instead, they interpret the sentence to express: what
has the real essence of gold is malleable, thereby meaning that malleableness depends on
the real essence of gold. ‘Gold’ is thus not referred to an idea or nominal essence, but is
supposed or intended to stand for a real essence. However, since one does not know real
essences - and in particular not unintelligible real essences defining our common species -
one’s general terms are referred to entities which by no means they can signify.
Locke moreover exemplifies the abuse with respect to the discussion of the Aristotelians
which is the true definition of a species, e. g. ‘man’.461 If one believes that one’s own
definition of ‘man’ truly captures the real essence of man, whereas alternative definitions
are conceived as failing to do so, ‘man’ is understood to have a meaning which
universally applies to all these so-called definitions, namely to stand in each case for the
alleged real essence of man which the proponents of each definition believe to have
discovered. But since advocats of definitions of species are ignorant of the supposed real
essences of species, they refer their general terms like ‘man’ to entities which they cannot
signify.
Locke mentions a third context where everyday speakers in general and Aristotelians i n
particular abuse names of bodies in this way. Locke draws a comparison with mixed
modes. With respect to names of mixed modes, one conceives correctly that the
modification of the idea signified by a word implies a change of the species being signified
by the word. The reason is that one alters the nominal essence and thus the set of
properties which entities must have to count as a specimen if one includes or excludes
properties in an idea. But in the case of bodies one usually does not regard the addition of
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further properties to an idea as an alteration of the idea. Rather, speakers usually conceive
the modification as making the idea more perfect. If one adds fixedness to one’s idea of
gold, one regards the idea to represent more accurately the species which is generally
called gold and which is characterized by a real essence. The name ‘gold’ is again abused to
refer to a species that is allegedly defined by a supposed real essence of gold. One assumes
that ‘gold’ stands for a species defined by a real essence and that fixedness depends on this
real essence so that the new, enriched idea is thought to depict more adequately the
alleged species gold which is presumably characterized by the so-called “real essence of
gold”. The believe that members of a sort have the same real essence warrants in the eyes
of the abuser that further features, which some specimens possess, are likewise shared by
all other specimens. For this reason an idea is regarded to portray the same sort more
accurately if properties are added. However, Locke insists, since one changes the nominal
essence by the addition of further properties, the idea does not represent the same species
anymore, but rather a different one. Yet, abusers refer their names of bodies to entities
which they do not signify.
As Locke rightly insists in a similar context,462 this kind of misconception of one’s ideas
and words is an abuse of words, and not of ideas. For it is the role words play in the eye of
the abuser: names signify species characterized by alleged real essences which warrants for
the abuser to substitute the name of a species for the real essence of a species, i. e. to regard
a word to stand for a sort characterized by a real essence.463 This is the reason why for the
abuser the alteration of an idea does not imply a corresponding change of the species
denoted by the name. The word ‘gold’ is left unchanged and is regarded to refer constantly
to a species characterized by a real essence, whereby the idea is modified. For the same
reason Aristotelians believe to be able to substitute a prevailing definition of ‘man’ by a
“better” one. And a universal proposition is likewise presumed to relate to a species
defined by a real essence, since the general term is again conceived to signify the real
essence of a species. It is therefore natural for Locke to relate the misconception of species
to our understanding of the meaning of names.
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d. The Roots of the Fifth Abuse
Locke does not only explain how speakers abuse their words in this way, but also why
they do it. As we have seen, Locke contends that the archetypes of our ideas of bodies are
real essences. In other words, one intends to depict classes of bodies ideally in accordance
to the real essences of one’s standards.464 On the other hand, we do not know real
essences. Now, to remove this imperfection and to achieve one’s original intention, one
conceives words as standing for real essences of species being signified by one’s general
terms.465 This, of course, does not remove the imperfection, but only adds an abuse of
words to our ignorance of real essences. Speakers therefore regard their words as standing
for species being characterzied by a real essence due to their original intention to depict
bodies by their real essences, i. e. to denote species of bodies possessing the same real
essence.
But besides this explicitly given explanation, there are two additional aspects present i n
Locke’s comments which elucidate why people abuse words in this way. Crucially, they
involve Locke’s conception of real essences in terms of the third model. This becomes
evident in his discussion of modifying ideas by adding further features where he explains
the abuse by the speaker’s belief that the members of a sort have the same internal
constitution. But, Locke points out, it is rather evident that contrary to the assumption of
the abuser members of our everyday species do not have the same internal constitution:
“§20. That which, I think, very much disposes Men to substitute their names for
the real Essences of Species, is the supposition before mentioned, that Nature
works regularly in the Production of Things, and sets Boundaries to each of those
Species, by giving exactly the same real internal Constitution to each individual,
which we rank under one general name. Whereas any one who observes their
different Qualities can hardly doubt, that many of the Individuals, called by the
same name, are, in their internal Constitution, as different one from another, as
several of those which are ranked under different specifick Names. This
supposition, however  that the same precise internal Constitution goes always with
the same specifick name, makes Men forward to take those  names for the
Representatives of those real Essences, though indeed they signify nothing but the
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complex Ideas they have in their Minds when they use them.”466
According to Locke, our everyday experience of the differences amongst the properties of
members of the same species shows us that they do not have the same real internal
constitution. In other words, specimens have prima facie specific internal constitutions, i.
e. their internal constitutions are not necessarily identical. Moreover, Locke apparently
expresses the assumption that specimens do have the same internal constitution by
qualifying them as precise. Importantly, as the context shows, Locke refers here to real
essences, i. e. he uses interchangeably ‘real essence’ and ‘internal constitution’. For the
preceding paragraph, to which this argument is explicitly related, concerns real essences
with respect to names of bodies, and the last sentence of the quote discusses real essences
as well. Locke’s explanations would become incoherent, if one read a difference into his
use of the two concepts, since ‘those real essences’ refers directly to ‘precise internal
constitution’. This means, Locke delineates the real essences of the members of a species
as being prima facie different to contradict the assumption of the abusers that real essences
are precise. No doubt, Locke speaks of real essences as being not precise in the same sense
as in the passage on chemists discovering that members of the same sort have different
chemical properties, namely that specimens have real essences on which different sets of
features depend.467 The third model is again at work.
The context moreover demonstrates that Locke could hardly have understood real
essences in the light of one of the two prevailing models.468 The first model does not
apply. For, if the real essences of specimens were microphysical structures corresponding
to the sort’s nominal essence, it would be impossible that members of the same species
could vary in their real essences, as Locke here maintains. And the second model cannot
apply either for the following reason. If the real essence of a specimen comprised all its
explanatory (i. e. microphysical) properties, specimens would obviously vary as to their
real essences since they obviously differ in some of their properties on the macrophysical
stage, e. g. specimens vary in size. But a laymen or Aristotelian cannot reasonably
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contend, or Locke cannot reasonably have taken them to believe, that specimens of the
same sort are identical with respect to all their explanatory features, e. g. as to the
(microphysical) properties corresponding to their macrophysical size.
Crucially, if real essences are understood as prima facie specific, Locke contends here that
the abuser believes that real essences are precise because of the similarities existing on the
macrophysical stage. Thus, Locke explains the wrong assumption of abusers that members
of a common sort have the same real essence by a fallacy: one’s experience of
resemblances on the macrophysical level in the light of which one classifies bodies i n
species leads to the supposition that bodies of the same species have the same real essence,
i. e. that the members of a sort have similarities on the microphyiscal stage according to
which one would sort them if one knew the microphysical features of bodies.
On this backdrop, it is easier to see that the preceding paragraph on the modification of
ideas entails another root for the fifth abuse. It will also become plain that the third model
is there present as well:
“For by this tacit reference [...] we are fain to substitute the name for the thing.”469
Locke points out that ‘gold’ does not have any signification at all if one refers it to an
unknown real essence of a species, since one does not have an idea of this real essence.
Decisively, Locke adds another condition. Since we do not have an idea of this real
essence, ‘gold’ “can signify nothing at all, when the Body it self is away.” If one takes Locke
seriously, he implicitly maintains: if a particular body is present, one is able to refer to the
real essence of a species, namely to the body’s real essence as the real essence of a species.
What kind of conception of real essence is at work here?
The second model cannot reasonably apply, since Locke speaks of the general term ‘gold’
which is related to the real essence. For, if the real essence comprised all the microphysical
features of a particular body, the species being characterized by this real essence would
have only one member, namely that body, since all other bodies in the world certainly
vary from that particular body, e. g. in size. And Locke does not make use of the first
model either for the following reason. If the real essence he speaks of were ascribed to the
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particular body as what corresponds to a nominal essence, this would imply that the
particular body is member of a sort characterized by a nominal essence. But, if this were
so, Locke would effectively claim in the quote that real essences can be ascribed to
specimens of a sort, being characterized by a nominal essence, only when they are present.
However, such a contention is hardly conceivable in the light of Locke’s comments on
real essences and species elsewhere in the Essay, since he evidently gives there the
impression that real essences can be ascribed to members (of a sort depicted by a nominal
essence) whether a speaker can refer to them demonstratively or not. A different
understanding of real essences must therefore apply here. Given the connection with the
subsequent paragraph, Locke should speak of non-precise, i. e. of prima facie specific, real
essences. Given this result, what does his assertion exactly mean?
Locke argues against the common opinion that the addition of further properties to an
idea is a perfection of the idea. He does this by rejecting one’s referring to real essences of
species. At the end of the paragraph, he justifies this dismissal by our ignorance of real
essences, yet conceding that this kind of reference is possible with respect to the real
essence of a particular body. He thus maintains that the word ‘gold’ has a signification if
referred to the real essence of a body being present. In other words, Locke speaks of a
species called gold which is characterized by a real essence, namely by the real essence of a
particular body being present. The punchline of Locke’s insistence that a body has to be
present seems to be that a speaker has to be able to refer demonstratively to its real
essence, since only in this way he can individuate or specify an unknown real essence,
namely by referring to it as the real essence of that body. Locke therefore acknowledges the
possibility to refer to a real essence which characterizes a species while maintaining that
one does not have an idea of it. Given Locke’s view of the subsequent paragraph that
members of the same species do not have the same real essence, it becomes evident that
referring demonstratively to a real essence is referring to a prima facie specific real
essence. Locke thus concedes the possibility to refer demonstratively (with a general term)
to a species being characterized by a real essence.
 This kind of real essence characterizing a sort should not to be confused with the precise
real essences of species which the laymen and Aristotelians presume. Their real essences
are real essences being ascribed to common species, i. e. sorts being characterized by an
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(everyday) idea or nominal essence. By contrast, the real essence of a species Locke
mentions is the real essence of a species which is not characterized by an idea or nominal
essence, but solely by the unknown real essence of a particular body. In this case, no
everyday species, i. e. sorts being signified by our common terms, are misconceived as
being characterized by a real essence.
But why are Locke’s sorts, that are characterized by the real essence of a particular body,
species which are not denoted by our common names of bodies? From his perspective,
the reason is obvious. According to Locke, general terms are introduced for the purpose
that one can speak of entities to other people even if they are not acquainted with them.470
But if a sort were characterized as to the unknown real essence of a particular body, one
could hardly convey such a species to another speaker if the body were away. The
introduction of names would be fruitless. This is the reason why our everyday terms do
not stand for species being depicted by the real essences of a particular body to which one
commonly refers demonstratively.
It now becomes plain that for Locke there is a third root for the fifth abuse: laymen and
Aristotelians confuse the two ways in which, according to Locke, one can refer to species.
This is indicated when he insists on a difference between “Gold in name” and “a parcel of
the Body it self, v. g. a piece of Leaf-Gold laid before us”.471 For, on the backdrop of the
subsequent assertion that an abuser substitutes names for the real essences of species,
Locke seems to maintain here: there is a substantial difference between employing the
conception of a real essence being specific for a species as to our common species signified
by our names and employing this conception as to a particular member of a common
species. Given what has been said before, this means: the conception of real essences being
specific for everyday species is unintelligible whereas the conception of real essences being
specific for species being individuated by the real essence of a particular body lying in front
of us is intelligible because one can refer demonstratively to the real essence of a
particular body.
In turn, this sheds light on the abuse of words in the context of the alleged perfection of
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ideas. When adding another property to their idea of gold, laymen and Aristotelians refer
to the real essence of a particular member of their everyday species gold as if that real
essence were a real essence specific for that everyday species. That is, abuser refer
demonstratively to the real essence of a particular body as to the real essence of a species,
but not in the way Locke would allow: the abuser does not refer demonstratively to the
real essence of a particular body as the real essence of a species which is individuated by
this real essence, but as the real essence which supposingly characterizes the common
species of which the particular body is a member, e. g. gold. To rephrase the quote:
although it is usually thought to be the same, it is a fundamental difference whether real
essences are discussed with reference to our everyday species or to individual members of
such a species - even though one commonly treats the real essence of a particular member
of a sort to be the (precise) real essence of the species. From Locke’s view, laymen and
Aristoteleans pick out arbitrarily one specimen and refer to its prima facie specific real
essence as a real essence being shared by all other members. However, if one contends, as
Locke does, that real essences prima facie vary, one cannot arbitrarily pick out the real
essence of a particular member and treat that specific real essence as a real essence being
shared by all specimens.
For instance, the situation is as follows. One has an idea of gold and discovers in a
particular piece of gold, i. e. a particular substance having the nominal essence as entailed
in one’s idea, another property which goes together with the properties of the nominal
essence. The speaker then refers (demonstratively) to the real essence of that particular
body as if it were a (precise) real essence characterizing the species the subject had
represented by his or her idea of gold. This belief justifies the speaker to regard the
inclusion of the further property as a perfection, since he or she conceives all these
properties to depend on the presumed real essence which is supposingly shared by all
members of the species he or she had always called gold. And since all members are
assumed to have the same real essence, the speaker may conclude that they also have the
new property he or she had discovered to depend on the real essence of that particular
specimen. For the speaker, only another property is added to the features of the nominal
essence or respectively idea which he or she had before. Thus, to include the newly
discovered feature is for the speaker to come closer to an adequate idea of the alleged
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species, namely to have an idea comprising more properties depending on the presumed
real essence than there were inlcuded in the previous idea.
This treatment of the real essence of a particular member as if it were the (precise) real
essence of its species is explicitly said to be at work when a speaker believes to make more
perfect his ideas. But it seems to me that from Locke‘s viewpoint this confusion is lurking
in the background when names of bodies are abused in other contexts as well. For the
confusion lends plausibility to the abuse from the abuser‘s perspective in the sense that
the in fact incomprehensible reference to the alleged real essence of a species is
confounded with the intelligible reference to the real essence of a particular member of a
sort.
Not unimportantly for the advanced interpretation, the same conception of the
relationship between names, species and real essences is entailed at another place in the
Essay as well. In the chapter on the names of substances Locke criticizes the Aristotelian
notion of substantial forms on five grounds. The fourth objection implies our ignorance
of Aristotelian real essences and the conclusion that one cannot therefore have classified
bodies in the light of their assumed real essences. The fifth objection discusses whether
bodies are commonly sorted in species in accordance to the alleged real essences of species
on the basis of indirect knowledge of the real essences.472  Locke imagines the possibility to
know all the properties which (would) depend on the supposed real essence of a species. If
it were possible to acquire knowledge of all these properties, one could, theoretically
speaking, identify specimens in virtue of their possession of all the features which depend
on the presumed real essence of the sort. In this way one could determine a species and its
members without knowing their Aristotelian real essence. Locke, however, rejects this
scenario due to the impossibility for us to know all properties - which (would) depend on
such a real essence -, if one does not know the real essence. For, according to him, one has
to know a real essence in the first place to be able to deduce and to know all the features
depending on a real essence. Thus there is no chance to classify bodies in species as to
their alleged real essences by sorting them by the set of properties depending on these real
essences, if one does not know them. And since Locke has already concluded our
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ignorance of Aristotelian real essences from the first three objections, his fifth argument
is intended to shut for ever the door for the Aristotelian attempt to sort bodies as to their
real essences.
Now, Locke remarks in the last two sentences of his fifth objection that this argument,
exemplified again by ‘gold’, is only intelligible if ‘gold’ is understood to refer to a particular
body, namely to a particular member of the species gold. This implies, one cannot
understand the key notion used in his argument, i. e. ‘the real essence of gold’, as being
particularly Aristotelian. For, if Locke’s conception of the real essence of gold were
Aristotelian in this context, all members of the species gold would (have to) have the
same real essence and Locke’s insistance would therefore be superfluous that his
argument works only if one relates it to a particular specimen. Given an Aristotelian
understanding of species and essences, there would be no need to refer to a particular
body. One could refer to many specimens at once, since they would be taken to have the
same real essence. Locke’s insistance implies that his argument does not operate with an
Aristotelian notion of real essence, but with one according to which a real essence is i n
some sense specific for a body.
The specificity excludes for the same reason also the possibility to interpret Locke’s key
term in the light of the first model for real essences. For, if the real essence of gold, which
here Locke speaks of, corresponded to a nominal essence, his reference to a particular
substance would become pointless, since all members of a species would have the same
real essence. Moreover, the second model cannot apply either. Locke discusses species
being characterized by a real essence and being determined by properties depending on
this real essence. If the real essence comprised all the microphysical features a particular
body has, Locke would let Aristotelians discuss species having in fact only one member.
But since Locke critizes here the Aristotelian theory of species relating to our everyday
concepts, he could not reasonably take Aristotelians to believe that these sorts consist of
only one member. Thus, to highlight Locke’s fifth objection, one needs an understanding
of real essences different from the Aristotelian one and the comprehensions commonly
ascribed to him.
Furthermore, in the last sentence Locke explicitly denies that in his argument ‘gold’ is
used in its ordinary meaning, i. e. to signify an idea. Thus, if one takes Locke seriously,
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this means that the sort gold he speaks of in this context is not a class of bodies being
characterized by a set of properties on the macrophyiscal stage. One rather has to
understand the species gold in a different way, namely in one which affords the reference
to a particular body. On this backdrop, his argument then suggests that ‘gold’ denotes a
species conceived of being characterized by a real essence, since he discusses the possibility
of determining a species being defined by a real essence. More precisely, gold has to be
understood as a species whose members have the same real essence which the particular
specimen has to which one has to refer ‘gold’ to get the argument off the ground
according to Locke:
“By the Word Gold here, I must be understood to design a particular piece of
Matter; v.g. the last Guinea that was coin’d. For if it should stand here in its
ordinary signification for that complex Idea, which I, or any one else calls Gold; i. e.
for the nominal Essence of Gold, it would be Jargon: [...].”473
This line of interpretation fits with the fact that the fifth objection does not make use of
any specific features of Aristotelian real essences. Locke does not argue against this
conception by pointing out absurdities. He rather assumes the possibility of it being true
for the sake of the argument and shows then that our species cannot possibly be based on
them - not even indirectly. His argument operates solely on our ignorance of these real
essences and with the contention that one has first to know real essences in order to
deduce the set of features depending on them. This suggests that Locke makes use only of
notions, e. g. ‘gold’, ‘real essence’ and ‘real essence of gold’, which are intelligible to him.
This means, Locke insists that his talk of the real essence of a species being called gold and
of gold as a species being characterized by a real essence is only comprehensible with
reference to the real essence of a particular body. One can intelligibly refer to a species
being defined by an unknown real essence only if the species is portrayed by the real
essence which a particular body has - because one can then refer (demonstratively) to such
a real essence without knowing it.
Locke claims in two passages, I argued, that one can refer to a sort being characterized by
an unknown real essence, if the species is defined by the real essence of a particular body.
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In this sense, names of bodies can be used not only to denote our everyday species
characterized by the nominal essences of our ideas, but also to signify species which are
characterized by the real essence a particular body has. Yet, although this second
conception of species and general terms are in line with the role real essences play i n
substantial parts of Locke’s comments, as will be indicated next, it is not systematically
developed and presented in his accounts of words. The reason is that, as a matter of fact,
the introduction of names for species of the latter kind is pointless. Only if a name
signifies an idea, communication about the represented species is effectively possible. This
is the reason why our everyday species are sorts of the first type. To distinguish therefore
the second use of names from the first one, is rather unusual and difficult to convey, as
Locke complains at the end of his fifth objection: “so hard is it, to shew the various
meaning and imperfection of Words, when we have nothing else but Words to do it
by.”474  
Locke’s talk of unknown real essences to which we can refer (demonstratively) is not
strange to his position. First of all, the reference to unknown properties that are solely
functionally depicted is familiar to Locke’s theory since according to him one rightly refers
to the unknown substratum of bodies which also is functionally defined, namely as what
explains the union of an experienced set of properties.475 More important, an intelligible
comprehension of unknown real essences of bodies to which speakers can refer is
indispensable for Locke’s account, since it is presupposed by his theory of the formation of
ideas. As argued,476 the genesis of an idea of bodies affords a conception of real essences
being logically prior to the one of nominal essences. Properties of the macrophysical stage
are justified as depending on the real essence of the examined standard before they are
united into one idea. If one does not regard a certain feature of the examined body as
depending on its real essence, one does not include it in an idea representing the body.
This means, if we decide which features of the macrophysical level are to be taken into an
idea, we refer to the unknown real essence of the standard that we examine. Locke’s
sporadic talk of being able to refer demonstratively with one’s names to the unknown real
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essence of a particular body and thus to denote a species depicted by this real essence
therefore not only mirrows his conception of real essences being prima facie specific, but
also that they are involved in the formation process of our ideas.
This nexus to other comments implies that one has to take Locke’s core conception of real
essences into account, if one asks “Well, which microphysical features does the real
essence of that substance in front of me comprise?”. The body’s real essence is, one replies,
the set of microphysical properties according to which it would be sorted in an ideal
classification scheme - a vague answer, but precise enough for Locke to make his various
points.
Moreover, given this line of interpretation, one naturally reads Locke’s definition of real
essences in the same light. There, Locke points out that we speak of real essences only i n
relation to particular entities and without using names: “And in this sense, it [scil.
‘essentia’] is still used, when we speak of the Essence of particular things, without giving
them any Name.”477 On the background what has been said before, Locke apparently
contends here that we usually speak of real essences only in relation to particular bodies
when we do not employ general terms, i. e. names for species.478 But, as the foregoing
discussion of the two passages has revealed, Locke maintains as well that one could use
general terms to denote species defined by the real essence of a particular body.
Summing up, Locke’s comments entail three aspects explaining how speakers come to
abuse their names of bodies and refer them to real essences of which they have no idea so
that the terms become  effectively meaningless. Firstly, due to the similarities bodies
display on the macrophysical level, one tends to take these classes to be species of bodies
which are likewise similar with respect to their explanatory basic properties. That is, one
assumes the members of a sort to share a common, but unknown real essence. This real
essence is presumably specific for all specimens of a sort and distinguishes the species
from all other sorts. Secondly, since we intend to represent bodies ideally in terms of their
real essences, speakers tend to assume that they do so, even if truly they do not have ideas
of the real essences of bodies. Taking the first and the second belief together, one usually
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supposes according to Locke that the members of a species, which one signifies by a name,
share the same real essence and that therefore one’s everyday species classify bodies i n
accordance to their real essences. As a consequence, one abuses names of bodies by taking
them not to stand for one’s ideas of bodies, but for species being characterized by the
presumed, unknown real essence. One thereby confuses, thirdly, two ways in which one
can intelligibly refer to bodies as members of species, namely by grasping a body as the
specimen of a sort depicted by an idea and by conceiving a body as the member of a sort
characterized by the real essence of that particular body. This is the cocktail of reasons why
speakers abuse names of bodies by referring them to unknown real essences.
Once the abuse is established, speakers believe to be able to discuss which set of features is
the true real essence of a species, conceive the joining of further properties to an idea as
making the ideas more complete or perfect, and interpret universal propositions as
ascriptions of properties to species being characterized by presumed real essences, e. g.
‘Gold is malleable’ is understood to express that bodies possessing the real essence of gold
are malleable. Importantly, this conception of names, species and universal propositions
leads to abusing words in this way in another context as well. As will be delineated in the
next part, on the backdrop of the advanced interpretation the fifth abuse apparently is also
present in Locke’s analysis of the typical belief that all members of a species have
properties in common, which are not included in the nominal essence, but which were
found in several specimens.479 Given for example that gold is not defined as being
malleable, the observation of some specimens being malleable usually makes people to
contend that all gold is malleable since they presume that all members of a sort possess
the same real essence and thus the same set of properties depending on this alleged real
essence.
According to Locke, this is the understanding the layman has of species of bodies, of the
signification of their names and of universal propositions conversant about bodies.
Aristotelians go even further in their confused conception of species and bodies with
their theory of forms and their debates what is the true definition of a sort.480 In this
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sense, the fifth abuse is the source of a false comprehension of the species and essences of
bodies and of fruitless debates which both hinder the progress of knowledge. Locke’s
language critic thus adds up to a thoroughly dismissal of the Aristotelian conception of
what an intelligible science of bodies consists in. It likewise becomes evident in which
way a correct comprehension of language advances knowledge. For, if one recognizes that
words signify ideas, one needs only to becomes aware that one’s ideas do not inlcude the
supposed real essences of species to realize one’s abuse and the false knowledge claims
connected to it what subsequently opens the path to true knowledge. The following
chapter assesses what according to Locke this knowledge as part and parcel of a
comprehensible science of bodies consists in.
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Part III
K N O WLEDGE OF BODIES
Introduction
The fourth book of the Essay on knowledge and probability is the natural climax of the
overall argument to “enquire into the Original, Certainty, and Extent of humane
Knowledge; together, with the Grounds and Degrees of Belief, Opinion, and Assent”.481 In
the case of bodies, Locke’s assessment is thereby advanced almost entirely in connection
with knowledge. The account readily falls into two parts. First, there is the general
depiction of knowledge with a definition and subdivision of knowledge in different
degrees and realms. Second, on this backdrop, Locke takes stock of contemporary
knowledge, evaluating human knowledge and proposing means to enhance it. Locke’s
analysis thus attempts to establish an appropriate conception of a contemporary science of
bodies. The results are disillusioning, however: human knowledge is “very short and
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scanty” and we are able to achieve “very little general Knowledge”.482
The root of this predicament is Locke’s conception of knowledge which he conceives as
straight forward and hardly controversial. Locke first presents a definition of knowledge
and subsequently introduces a variety of subdivisions of knowledge to assess human
knowledge. Moreover, when discussing bodies, Locke ingenuously applies the general
conception of knowledge to the effect that a conception of an ideal science of bodies
manifests in his account of contemporary knowledge and the means to enhance it. This
ideal thus forms the backdrop of Locke’s idea of a contemporary science of bodies. And
this ideal is likewise Locke’s viewpoint, I will argue, from which he judges contemporary
knowledge as little and the prospects of progress as bleak.
On the basis of his notion of knowledge, Locke also refutes the Aristotelian conception of
means founding and enhancing human knowledge. Given the interpretation of the
preceding part, this analysis completes Locke’s rejection of an Aristotelian idea of a science
of bodies. The controversy with the Aristotelians also looms in the background of his
own account as to real essences. Importantly, I contend, the developed interpretation of
Locke’s discussion of real essences is crucial to understand why this debate is present i n
the argument on knowledge. In this context, the issue of real essences is what a
contemporary science of bodies should consist in: how experimental findings are to be
understood and which means are appropriate to advance knowledge. It thus becomes
plain why and in which sense Locke puts so much weight on the analysis of language as
to his overall account in the context of bodies.483
The first chapter of this part reconstructs Locke’s conception of knowledge, namely his
definition of knowledge and its devision into three degrees. On the contrary to the
orthodox line of interpretation, I will argue that Locke’s definition of knowledge applies
uniformly and coherently to all degrees, i. e. not only to intuitive and demonstrative
knowledge, but also to sensitive knowledge. There is no obvious flaw in his reasoning,
which Locke fails to recognize, and he is not injudicious to apprehend the modern
criticism which already figured in his correspondence with Stillingfleet. A careful
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reconstruction of Locke’s comments on the background of his views on language shows
instead what he believes to be conspicuous, namely that the advanced definition fits with
his account of sensitive knowledge. A corresponding assessment of Locke’s conception of
degrees of knowledge will moreover evolve as part and parcel of the debate. The account
thus shows how Locke highlights knowledge and its degrees in terms of its certainty.
To understand anew Locke’s conception of knowledge, does not however have a genuine
impact on the analysis of his argument on contemporary knowledge (chapter ten). As we
will see, Locke’s account is primarily based on a philosophical analysis of what knowledge
and language consist in. Given this type of reasoning, it represents an extremely powerful
argument for the favoured conception that also questions the principal legitimacy of the
discussed, alternative theories. It will particularly be pointed out that one cannot fully
apprehend the analysis, if one does not relate it to Locke’s conception of real essences as
being prima-facie specific and as being not precise as the Aristotelians claim. Pickung up
the thread of the two foregoing parts, the focus is moreover on Locke’s idea of an ideal
science of bodies. Crucially, I will argue for a re-interpretation of the nature of Lockean
demonstrative knowledge of bodies and thus of his conception of an ideal science of
bodies. Contradicting the prevailing view, the interpretation attempts to show that
Locke’s ideal is not a deductive science which only affords microphysical knowledge of
the figure of bodies, but is an axiomatic, empirical theory which rather presupposes a
comprehensive grasp of matter. This point is crucial, since it re-positions Locke in the
history of philosophy. In rough and ready terms, Locke is farer away from Descartes’s
rationalism and closer to Hume’s empiricism than is usually thought.
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9. Knowledge and its Degrees
Locke’s characterization of knowledge and its degrees is fundamental for his latter account
of the scope and nature of human knowledge. From Locke’s perspective, his general
portrayal, or notion, of knowledge is innocuous and fits to all degrees of knowledge,
namely to intuitive, demonstrative and sensitive knowledge. He does not really argue for
his concept of knowledge, but simply asserts it after having pointed out that the mind
discourses on entities solely via ideas.484 Apparently, Locke assumes everyone will agree
with this general definition of what knowledge is, once one becomes aware that entities
and their properties have always to be represented in thought to be known. From his
standpoint, the prominent and, perhaps, controversial claims are still to come in the
subsequent chapters. However, Locke’s official definition of knowledge is usually taken to
be highly problematic since it is conceived to be tailor-made only for intuitive and
demonstrative knowledge, but not to cohere with his account of sensitive knowledge.
There is supposingly a gap between the generic conception and the more specific accounts
of knowledge what I will call the “orthodox view”. Locke however consciously reasserts
in the face of such criticism that there really is no deviation from his notion of knowledge
in the case of sensitive knowledge.485 Given this and the prevailing view that there truly
is a contradiction, Locke simply seems not to understand. This is probably one reason why
commentators less favorable to Locke enjoy bashing him in this context.486
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Opposing the orthodox view, I will argue that a careful analysis of Locke’s definition i n
connection with his further comments shows what he thought to be conspicuous for
everyone, namely that his general notion applies to sensitive knowledge as well. On the
contrary to what is usually maintained, it becomes evident in Locke’s explanations on
truth that his definition naturally evolves from his contentions on ideas and words
which form the backdrop of his argument. In addition, further clarification is needed of
what the three degrees of knowledge consist in. By assessing what Locke means by
“degrees” of knowledge, it will become plain what kind of feature distinguishes the three
types of knowledge. This account will further deepen our understanding of Locke’s
general conception of knowledge in terms of its certainty and why sensitive knowledge
does not differ in kind from intuitive and demonstrative knowledge.
A careful reconstruction of Locke’s comments shows both that on the face of it the
proposed understanding of his definition of ‘knowledge’ is here manifest and that a
decisive flaw of comprehending Locke is the source of the orthodox view. I will therefore
develop first a straight forward reading of the relevant passages and subsequently reject
the three most prominent lines of interpretation by debating the crucial passages on
which the controversy hinges. I will then turn to Locke’s account of the three degrees of
knowledge. Since both issues are interconnected, the discussion of the second topic
effectively provides the interpretation of passages which are the final bits to establish the
advanced reading of Locke’s concept of knowledge.
a. Locke’s Definition of Knowledge and the Orthodox View
According to Locke, knowledge is “nothing but the perception of the connexion and
agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas”.487 The key to
understand aright this assertion is to highlight properly what the (dis-) agreement of ideas
consists in. To come to grips with this, one first has to become aware that for Locke the
objects of knowledge are states of affairs which obtain, namely facts. This manifests in the
exemplifications immediately following the definition which display that the perception
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of the agreement or disagreement of ideas implies knowledge of the holding of a state of
affairs. Importantly, Locke’s examples also indicate that the states of affairs do not concern
ideas and whether they agree or disagree, but the entities which are represented by ideas
whose agreement or disagreement is perceived:
“For when we know that White is not Black, what do we else but perceive, that
these two Ideas do not agree? When we possess our selves with the utmost security
of the Demonstration, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right
ones, What do we more but perceive, that Equality to two right ones, does not
necessarily agree to, and is inseparable from the three Angles of a Triangle?”488
Thus, two ideas evidently serve here to represent a state of affairs which is known when
one perceives the (dis-) agreement between the ideas. Ideas are the constituents of
thought, i. e. of cognitive content. And ideas are not conceived as the elements of a
particular kind of intentional or cognitive state, as Locke’s explanations suggest, since
there is, for instance, no special reference to sense perceptions. Correspondingly, in this
context one should understand ‘perception’ in a very general sense, namely to denote the
awareness or recognition that ideas (dis-) agree. More precisely, for Locke the perception of
the (dis-) agreement of two ideas is the correct recognition of a (dis-) agreement which is
really there. This becomes plain when Locke insists that knowledge is not merely the
supposition, but the perception of the (dis-) agreement of ideas: “Where this Perception is,
there is Knowledge, and where it is not, there, though we may fancy, guess or believe, yet
we always come short of Knowledge”489 This difference is crucial for Locke, since it
underlies his distinction between knowledge and probability. Knowledge is the
recognition of a fact, probability is only the belief that a state of affairs obtains.490
‘Perception’ thus is a success concept in the sense that it implies that one truly perceives
what one believes to perceive. This makes plain that the objects of knowledge are not just
states of affairs, but facts, i. e. states of affairs which truly obtain and which one does not
only believe to hold.
On this backdrop, one can fully apprehend Locke’s contention that knowledge has to be
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conversant about ideas, since ideas are the only objects about which the mind
immediately discourses:
“§1. Since the Mind, in all its Thoughts and Reasonings, hath no other immediate
Object but its own Ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident, that
our Knowledge is only conversant about them.”491
On the face of it, Locke reasserts his well-known claim that thought is not directly
concerned with entities but only indirectly via representations of them. This is the whole
point of ideas as contra distinguished from the entities they represent: if one wants to
grasp entities, one has to mentally represent them, i. e. one has to conceive them in terms
of ideas.492 Thus, given what has been reconstructed so far, Locke’s contention apparently
means that knowledge (of facts) is possible only in so far as facts are represented i n
thought. One should therefore not misunderstand Locke’s remark that one can think of
facts only by representing them via ideas as the claim that knowledge has to be about facts
concerning ideas.493
Generally speaking, advocats of the orthodox view take this into account and maintain
that ideas, whose (dis-) agreement is perceived, represent a fact and that this fact is
therefore the object of knowledge. Moreover, they likewise understand Lockean
perception as awareness of facts. However, commentators conceive Locke’s definition of
knowledge as highlighting the reasons in which knowledge is grounded and whose
perception leads to knowledge of facts.494 Locke’s portrayal of knowledge is reconstructed
as delineating a necessary and sufficient condition for knowing facts: one knows a fact if
and only if one recognizes conclusive reasons showing that the fact obtains. Knowledge of
a fact consists in the recognition of why the state of affairs obtains. In this sense, Locke’s
portrayal of knowledge is understood to elucidate knowledge as being grounded in the
awareness that the two ideas (dis-) agree which represent the fact. More precisely, ideas are
regarded as adding up to concepts and the (dis-) agreement of two ideas as the relationship
that one concept does (not) include or, more generally, entail the other. Correspondingly,
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one usually understands Locke to define knowledge as the awareness of the holding of a
conceptual (-like) relationship between two ideas.495 For instance, to perceive that the idea
of gold agrees with the idea of yellow, is to be aware that ‘gold’ entails ‘yellow’. To
perceive that the idea of black does not agree with the idea of white, is to recognize that
‘black’ does not entail ‘white’. In linguistic terms, Lockean knowledge is taken to consist
in the awareness that the subject term does (not) entail the predicate.
The orthodox line of interpretation thus takes the (dis-) agreement relationship as a
“relation between ideas”, i. e. as a relationship holding between the two ideas
representing the fact which is known.496 This however implies obviously that Lockean
sensitive knowledge cannot fulfill this definition of knowledge, since perceptual
knowledge does not consist in the awareness of conceptual-like relationships. To be
precise, one can distinguish between two aspects of the criticism. First, there is the logical
problem that every account of perceptual knowledge cannot intelligibly claim that such
knowledge consists in the recognition of relations between ideas, since it is grounded i n
sensations and not in conceptual relationships. Second, Locke’s own account of sensitive
knowledge as being achieved by veridical sensations does not tie in with his official
definition of knowledge because of this logical contradiction.497 Both aspects make up the
orthodox view. On the contrary, I will argue that Locke highlights knowledge of a fact as
being nothing else but the genuine recognition of the holding of a state of affairs which is
represented in our minds by ideas. This means, the perception of the (dis-) agreement of
ideas is the cognition of a fact, namely that the state of affairs holds which is represented
by the ideas. We can already see that the difference of the two readings hinges on what for
Locke the (dis-) agreement of ideas consists in. Is the (dis-) agreement of ideas, the reason
which a fact is grounded in and whose cognition leads to knowledge that the state of
affairs truly holds? Or does the (dis-) agreement of ideas mean that the state of affairs
obtains, which is mentally represented by the ideas, so that the recognition of the (dis-)
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agreement of ideas is the cognition of a fact?
b. Knowledge and Truth
The account of Locke’s conception of knowledge given so far can be deepened by his
account of propositions and their truth. This theory sheds light on both how ideas
represent facts and the relationship of two ideas agreeing or disagreeing. As already
indicated in chapter six,498 words and ideas have both in common to be signs and to refer
as such to entities. But whereas ideas refer directly to entities by representing them, words
stand only indirectly for these entities by signifying directly only ideas and thus denoting
only indirectly the entities which are represented by these ideas. In this sense, words
possess, if taken by themselves, no cognitive or semantic content. Locke’s passages on the
truth of mental and verbal propositions display that there is a corresponding relationship
between language and thought as to states of affairs.499 Locke calls a proposition the
joining or separating of signs, which are either ideas or words. Mental propositions
concern ideas, verbal propositions words. For example, the separating of the idea of iron
with the idea of green is a mental proposition, whereas ‘Peaches are round’ is a verbal
proposition joining ‘peaches’ and ‘round’. And being in line with his theory of meaning
as to linguistic signs like general terms, the content of a verbal proposition is understood
as being determined by the content of the mental proposition which corresponds to the
former. Thought is again the carrier of content, language can only refer to it.
Furthermore, in the light of Locke’s examples500 and on the background that an abstract
idea represents merely a class of entities, the point as to propositions evidently is that they
express states of affairs. And since for Locke propositions are the bearers of truth, a true
proposition is evidently conceived as expressing a state of affairs which obtains. In
connection with his notion of truth, the analogies between words and ideas as well as
between verbal and mental propositions will now help to understand how the joining
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and separating of ideas represent states of affairs.
For Locke a proposition is true only if its signs are joined or separated as the signified
entities agree or disagree whereas a proposition is false if the joining or separation of its
signs does not correspond to the agreement or disagreement of the signified entities. This
becomes plain when Locke defines truth:
“§2. Truth then seems to me, in the proper import of the Word, to signify nothing
but the joining or separating of Signs, as the Things signified by them, do agree or
disagree one with another. The joining or separating of signs here meant is what by
another name, we call Proposition. So that Truth properly belongs only to
Propositions: whereof there are two sorts, viz. Mental and Verbal; as there are sorts
of Signs commonly made use of, viz. Ideas and Words.”501
On the face of it, Locke first expounds a general formula which he spells subesequently
out in two ways, namely in terms of ideas and in terms of words. This implies, in this
context ‘things’ denotes entities in a very general sense: on the one hand, entities being
signified by ideas, and, on the other hand, ideas being signified by words.502 Accordingly,
with respect to ideas, a mental proposition is true only if two ideas are joined or separated
as the entities represented by them agree or respectively disagree. And the truth value of
verbal propositions, by contrast, involves two levels, namely the relationship of words to
ideas and of ideas to the entities they represent. The first level implies that a verbal
proposition stands for a corresponding mental proposition, e. g. ‘Iron is not green’ refers
to the separating of the idea of iron and the idea of green. The second relationship implies
that the mental proposition corresponding to the verbal proposition stands for the state of
affairs which is expressed by the joining or separating of the ideas of the mental
proposition. Importantly, irrespective of whether propositions are mental or verbal, the
analysis of their truth boils down to the claim that the signs constituting them are
separated or joined in accordance to the (dis-) agreement of the entities being represented
by ideas.
Moreover, the correspondence between the joining or separating of ideas and the joining
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or separating of words means that an affirmation refers to the joining of ideas whereas a
negation refers to the separating of ideas: “[...] Verbal Propositions, which are Words  the
signs of our Ideas put together or separated in affirmative or negative Sentences”.503 A n
affirmation therefore is true only if the joining of two ideas, which are signified by the
words of the affirmation, corresponds to an agreement of the entities which are
represented by these ideas; and a negation is true only if the separation of two ideas,
which are signified by the words of the negation, corresponds to a disagreement of the
entities which are represented by these ideas. Otherwise, verbal propositions are false.
Crucially, this notion of truth and falsehood implies that the separating and joining of
signs express a state of affairs which does not necessarily hold. Whether a represented
state of affairs obtains or not, depends on whether the joining and separating corresponds
to the disgreement respectively agreement of the represented entities. In this sense, Locke
introduces his notion of proposition in his definition of truth: “The joining or separating
of signs here meant is what by another name, we call Proposition.” A proposition is the
joining or separating of signs, and this proposition stands for a state of affairs which can
hold, because for Locke propositions can be both true or false.
This account of the truth of propositions is helpful to highlight what Locke means by the
joining or separating of ideas. His examples show that his paradigm are simple
predications or subject-predicate assertions expressing a state of affairs.504 The match
between the joining or separating of words and the joining or separating of ideas thus
indicates that the latter relationship is comparable to the grammatical relationship of
predications which holds between subject term and predicate. This means, two ideas and
their relationship of being joined or separated represent a state of affairs analogous to the
way a state of affairs is expressed by an affirmation respectively negation.
This is confirmed by the relationship between ideas, being joined or separated, and
entities, agreeing or disagreeing. This relationship indicates that the joining or separating
of ideas corresponds to two ways in which two entities can be conceived as being
interrelated to make up a state of affairs. For example, the relationship of joining the idea
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of gold and the idea of yellow represents the relationship between gold and yellow, that
holds, if gold agrees to yellow, namely if gold is yellow. Similarly, the relationship of
separating the idea of black and the idea of white represents the relationship between
black and white, that holds, if black disagrees with white, namely if black is not white.
That is, the relationships of agreement and disgreement between two entities are
represented on the linguistic level by the grammatical relationship between subject term
and predicate as it is expressed in a true affirmation respectively negation. In turn, one
has to understand correspondingly the relationship of two ideas being joined or separated
as a “mental predication”, namely to represent two entities as being related to each other
in the same way as the predication of an affirmation or negation represents these entities
as being interrelated.505 Given Locke’s way of ideas, it is natural for him to say that states
of affairs are represented in the mind by the joining or separating of ideas.
As we have just seen, two ideas and their relationship of being joined or separated
represent a state of affairs analogous to the way a state of affairs is expressed by an
affirmation respectively negation. To be more precise, as Locke’s theory of the so-called
particles indicates, the joining and separating of two ideas is linguistically expressed by the
coppula ‘to be’ or respectively by the coppula plus the negation sign in the case of simple
predications, e. g. ‘Gold is (not) yellow’.506 This clearly shows that a mental proposition
represents a state of affairs not only by its ideas, but also by the joining or separating of
these signs. An idea or word stands solely for an aspect of a state of affairs, namely for an
entity. Without being joined or separated, ideas cannot represent a state of affairs. For
Locke, only the joining or separating of ideas relate ideas so to each other that they express
a state of affairs. In this sense, one has to understand the joining or separating of ideas as a
constitutive element of the mental representation of a state of affairs. This becomes
obvious by the fact that the joining or separating of two ideas determines which state of
affairs is represented by two ideas; for example, whether the idea of horses and the idea of
animals express that horses are animals, horses are not animals, animals are horses, or
that animals are not horses. Again, to speak of the joining and separating of ideas is a
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natural and innocuous way for Locke to express in terms of ideas how states of affairs are
mentally represented.
On this background, the (dis-) agreement of two ideas becomes evident. As we have seen,
the punchline of Locke’s formula for truth is that a proposition is true only if the signs
making up the propositions are joined or separated in accordance to the agreement or
disagreement of the entities to which the signs refer. This means: the joining and
separating of signs represent states of affairs which can hold, and the (dis-) agreement of
the signified entities is a state of affairs which does  obtain, namely a fact. Thus, when
Locke says that the ideas of a mental proposition (dis-) agree as the entities they represent
(dis-) agree, i. e. as the ‘things’ (dis-) agree, the (dis-) agreement of the ideas manifests a
fact. This usage of Locke’s notion of the (dis-) agreement of two ideas in the context of
truth strongly suggests an analoguous use in connection with his definition of
knowledge. Locke’s conception of knowledge as the perception of the (dis-) agreement of
ideas means: knowledge is the cognition of the holding of a fact, namely the holding of a
state of affairs which is represented by the joining or separating of ideas.
Crucially, this notion of the (dis-) agreement of ideas is present in Locke’s comments on
truth at several places. First, as we have seen above, this understanding of the (dis-)
agreement of ideas is part and parcel of his general definition of truth at the opening of
his discussion: “§2. Truth then seems to me, in the proper import of the Word, to signify
nothing but the joining or separating of Signs, as the Things signified by them, do agree o r
disagree one with another. ”507 This means as to verbal propositions: in true affirmations
and negations words are joined respectively separated as the ‘things’ agree respectively
disagree which these words signify, i. e. as the ideas agree respectively disagree which are
signified by the words. And since true mental propositions are here explained as joining
or separating two ideas as the ‘things’ they signify agree or disagree, the (dis-) agreement o f
ideas manifests the obtaining of the state of affairs which is represented by the ideas.
Therefore, in connection with verbal propositions, the point of saying that ideas (dis-)
agree is to assert that the state of affairs truly holds  which is merely represented by the
joining or separating of the ideas. Second, the same depiction of truth is apparently
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present in another passage where Locke comes back to his portrayal of truth after a short
excursion into a related matter:
“§5. But to return to the consideration of Truth. We must, I say, observe two sorts
of Propositions, that we are capable of making.
First, Mental, wherein the Ideas in our Understandings are without the use of
Words put together, or separated by the Mind, perceiving, or judging of their
Agreement, or Disagreement.
Secondly, Verbal Propositions, which are Words the signs of our Ideas put together
or separated in affirmative or negative Sentences” .508 By which way of affirming or
denying, these Signs, made by Sounds, are as it were put together or separated one
from another. So that Proposition consists in joining, or separating Signs, and
Truth consists in the putting together, or separating these Signs, according as the
Things, which they stand for, agree or disgree.”509
Evidently, Locke discusses truth by first distinguishing mental and verbal porpositions to
advance then a characterization of truth which concerns both types of propositions.
Accordingly, one has to read ‘Things’ as denoting ideas in the first case and entities being
represented by ideas in the second case.510 Locke therefore re-states his definition of truth
given at the begining of the chapter. This means as to verbal propositions: in true
affirmations and negations words are joined respectively separated as the ‘things’ agree
respectively disagree which these words signify, i. e. as the ideas agree respectively
disagree which are signified by the words. Again, the (dis-) agreement of two ideas
manifests a fact.
Third, this conception of the (dis-) agreement of ideas is likewise present when Locke
highlights only verbal propositions as being true: “But Truth of Words  is something
more, and that is the affirming or denying of Words one of another, as the Ideas they
stand for agree or disagree: [...]”.511  That is, in true affirmations and negations words are
joined respectively separated as the ideas they signify agree respectively disagree. Or even
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shorter, fourth: “Truth is the marking down in Words, the agreement or disagreement of
Ideas as it is.”512 This way of putting it is for Locke more handy than the more elaborate
version which highlights the truth of verbal propositions in connection with the truth of
mental propositions, namely as consisting in: the joining or separating of words which
signify ideas that agree or respectively disagree in accordance to the agreement or
respectively disagreement of the entities they represent. In turn: defining the truth of
verbal propositions simply as the (dis-) agreement of ideas implies that the (dis-)
agreement of ideas expresses the holding of the state of affairs which the proposition
means.
True, the definition of knowledge relates to mental, not to verbal propositions. But since,
as  we have just seen, the notion of the (dis-) agreement of ideas is used by Locke to
indicate that a state of affairs obtains, it is, conceptually speaking, only a short step for
Locke to talk simply of the (dis-) agreement of ideas to express the holding of states of
affairs which are represented by mental propositions. To speak of the (dis-) agreements of
ideas in this sense just abbreviates again the longer formula which is employed in the
definition of truth to express the obtaining of a state of affairs being represented by a
mental proposition: in the case of true mental propositions, ideas are joined or separated
in correspondence to the agreement or disagreement of the entities which they represent.
To sum up, in the light of Locke’s usage of the notion of (dis-) agreement in connection
with verbal propositions, it is most natural to understand him likewise as to mental
propositions in the context of knowledge.
Having established that, one passage is naturally understood as Locke treating the the (dis-
) agreement of ideas as aquivalent to the (dis-) agreement of the entities they represent:
“When Ideas are so put together, or separated in the Mind, as they [scil. as the ideas], or
the Things they stand for do agree, or not, that is, as I may call it, mental Truth.”513 I will
come back to this quote, since Lorenz Krüger reads it differently to underpin his
interpretation. But given what has been said before, the (dis-) agreement of ideas is here
understood to be aquivalent with the (dis-) agreement of the signified entities, namely to
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express that the state of affairs holds (that is represented by the ideas). Thus, in the quote,
the truth of a mental proposition is described in two ways: to consist in the joining or
separating of ideas in accordance to their (dis-) agreement, or respectively in the joining or
separating of ideas in accordance to the (dis-) agreement of the entities represented by the
ideas.
To conclude, in the light of Locke’s definition of truth and of his usage of the notion of
(dis-) agreement in the context of verbal propositions, the agreement or disagreement of
ideas means on the face of it that the state of affairs obtains which is represented by the
joining or separating of the ideas. The (dis-) agreement of ideas means the holding of a
state of affairs that is represented by the joining or separating of ideas. By contrast, the
joining or separating of ideas leaves open whether the expressed state of affairs truly
obtains or not. Consequently, when Locke maintains that one joins or separates ideas and
then judges, perceives, supposes or believes the (dis-) agreement of ideas, he asserts that
one judges, perceives, supposes or believes that the state of affairs holds which is
represented by the joining or separating of the ideas.514 It seems to me, Locke’s
explanations clearly establish that in the context of knowledge the (dis-) agreement of
ideas expresses the holding of the state of affairs represented by the ideas.
We can now easily assess what Locke means when asserting that knowledge is the
perception of the (dis-) agreement of two ideas. Locke elucidates knowledge as the
awareness that ideas are joined or separated as the signified entities agree or disagree. In
other words, knowledge is the cognition of the obtaining of a state of affairs which is
represented by the joining or separating of two ideas. As we have seen above, one might
perceive or only consider the (dis-) agreement of ideas, i. e. one can merely suppose the
holding of the state of affairs being represented by the joining or separating of these ideas.
The (dis-) agreement of two ideas itself therefore means that the joined or separated ideas
represent a fact, but it does not entail that one knows the fact, i. e. that one is aware that
the represented state of affairs obtains. Only the perception of the (dis-) agreement is
knowledge of the fact. To sum up: in Locke’s knowledge formula the (dis-) agreement of
ideas expresses the holding of a represented state of affairs, whereas the perception of the
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(dis-) agreement is the cognition of the obtaining of the state of affairs.
If one moreover takes Locke’s point into account that knowledge of facts can only be via
ideas, Locke assesses knowledge as the awareness that our mental representation of a state
of affairs is the mental representation of a fact: one is aware that ideas are truly joined or
separated in accordance to the agreement or disagreement of the entities represented by
these ideas. If one knows that a state of affairs obtains, one recognizes that one’s mental
representation of this state of affairs stands for a fact. One cannot grasp a fact without
mentally representing it, but one can recognize that one’s mental representation of a state
of affairs is the representation of a state of affairs that holds.
Having said that, a question naturally emerges. If knowledge is the cognition of a fact,
how do we become aware of the fact? That is, how do we come to recognize that in the
case of knowledge our representation of a state of affairs is a representation of a fact? I will
come back to this issue below in connection with the three degrees of knowledge which
will deepen the so far given account of Lockean knowledge. Alternative readings of the
(dis-) agreement of ideas will however be discussed first.
c. Rival Interpretations
Setting aside the here developed reading, the common ground of virtually all proposed
interpretations of Locke’s conception of knowledge is the view that the (dis-) agreement of
two ideas is a conceptual, or at least conceptual-like, relationship holding between the
ideas. Importantly, to get this reading off the ground, one cannot take Locke’s definition of
knowledge - as I do - as an explanation that re-states in terms of ideas what it means that
one knows a fact. For, given the “conceptual reading” of the (dis-) agreement relationship,
namely of concepts (not) entailing one another, Lockean knowledge would be knowledge
of conceptual relationships, if the (dis-) agreement of two ideas were conceived as the
object of knowledge. And one cannot interpret (dis-) agreements of ideas as the objects of
knowledge in this sense because this would openly contradict Locke’s exemplifications:
Locke does not discuss our knowledge of facts expressed by, for example, ‘‘Gold’ entails
‘yellow’’, but facts expressed by sentences like ‘Gold is yellow’.
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Thus, to spell out the common approach of interpreting Locke coherently, Locke’s
analysis of knowledge as the perception of the (dis-) agreement of ideas has to be
understood as elucidating as in what knowledge is grounded: to know that a state of
affairs obtains, is grounded in the perception that the concepts expressing this state of
affairs stand in the relationship of entailment.515 Knowledge of facts, Locke is effectively
understood to claim, is based on or involves the recognition of the holding of conceptual
(-like) relationhips. This condition for knowledge does not directly relate to the fact being
the object of knowledge, but to the reasons which one has to be aware of for knowing that
the fact obtains.
This reading is usually justified by Locke’s understanding of intuitive and demonstrative
knowledge where knowledge is depicted as being based on conceptual or conceptual-like
relationships, what will be discussed below.516 This interpretation implies however that
perceptual knowledge would obviously not fit with his definition, since it is not
grounded in conceptual relationships. Even worse, since Locke’s own account of
perceptual knowledge clearly suggests that for him perceptual knowledge is achieved by
and grounded in veridical sensations, Locke would be hopelessly confused.517 And since
he rejects criticism along these lines, he moreover appears to be stubborn or does simply
not understand. I therefore believe that, in the light of the above reconstruction of an
alternative interpretation, the orthodox view is simply not tenable. But to see this more
clear, it might be helpful to discuss how proponents of the common line of interpretation
have reacted to the prima facie unpleasant result of their reading that sensitive
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knowledge is in fact no knowledge on Locke’s own, official account. Three ways will be
discussed in the following.
First. One possible move is to emphasize utterances where, on first thought, Locke
appears to raise doubts whether sensitive knowledge should and can be truly called
knowledge.518 Thus, if Locke consciously declined the knowledge status of sensitive
knowledge, he could be viewed to exclude doubtful, sensitive knowledge as a true realm
of knowledge, since it is not based on the recognition of conceptual relationships but on
potentially erroneous sensations. However, if Locke really declined the epistemological
status of sensitive knowledge as knowledge in connection with skepticism, he would be
deeply confused since he also insists towards Stillingfleet that sensitive knowledge is
decent knowledge that lives up to his official notion of knowledge.519 Generally speaking,
I do not go into detail to refute this view since other commentators, e. g. Ayers, have
already done so convincingly.520 An outline of the rejection seems therefore appropiate.
We will see that Locke does not decline the epistemic status of sensitive knowledge, for
which reason there is no basis to read him as confining his general analysis only to
knowledge being grounded in the perception of conceptual relationships.
Take for example the most prominent passage.521 In his discussion whether so-called
sensitive knowledge is knowledge Locke concedes at the beginning that sensitive
knowledge does not have the same degree of certainty as intuitive and demonstrative
knowledge. But at the end of the same  sentence Locke restricts his contention as to
general truths; and he then moves on to discuss whether there is knowledge of
“particular truths” about entities existing in the outer world which can be known by the
senses. Decisively, these claims do not contradict for him his subsequent anti-skeptical
argument. For he concludes at the end of the argument that there are three realms,
namely intuitive, demonstrative and sensitive knowledge. Whether Locke’s anti-
skeptical reasoning convinces us or not, he unequivocally contends that his refutation of
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skepticism establishes sensitive knowledge as true knowledge.522 Thus, whatever Locke’s
theory of the different degrees of knowledge asserts about the difference between sensitive
knowledge and intuitive and demonstrative knowledge, he does not believe that it
opposes his anti-skeptical analysis of sensitive knowledge and his conclusion that
sensitive knowledge really is decent knowledge. And we will see below that the doctrine
of the three degrees of knowledge does indeed not imply that Locke is deeply confused as
to sensitive knowledge, i. e. not virtually contradicting himself in the very same sentence
in connection with skepticism.523
Second. Most advocats of the orthodox line of interpretation concede that sensitive
knowledge is true knowledge for Locke, but insist that sensitive knowledge does not
fulfill the official definition. Locke is understood to claim that sensations show the
perception of a (conceptual-like) relationship between an idea given in sensation and the
idea of existence. Commentators therefore critizise Locke for grounding unintelligibly
sensitive knowledge in relations between ideas.524 However, as just pointed out, in the
face of such criticism Locke clearly re-asserts to have expounded a coherent view. One
should therefore, if possible, attempt to read him differently, namely without ascribing to
him persistent injudiciousness.
Third. Having said that, a third variation of the orthodox view becomes attractive,
namely one which ascribes to Locke a coherent position while still contending that the
account of sensitive knowledge does not fit with his definition of knowledge. According
to Lorenz Krüger, Locke has two notions of truth, an idea-theoretic and a correspondence-
theoretic one. Given this approach, as will be delineated, the former notion naturally
applies to intuitive and demonstrative knowledge and the latter one to sensitive
knowledge.525 Thus, in the light of these two notions of truth, one can explain why,
                                                
522 This reading is confirmed by other passages where sensitive knowledge is likewise called knowledge in
connection with skepticism. Cp. 630-34, IV.xi1-7.
523 Cp. 9d.
524 Cp. Alexander (1985), 282f; Ayers (1991), I, 103 and 126; Jenkins (1983), 196ff; Lowe (1995), 174; Specht
(1989), 129f.
525 Cp. Krüger (1973), 144f. Krüger acknowledges that Locke’s definition of knowledge corresponds to the
assumed idea-theoretic notion of truth. Mattern, by contrast, accepts Krüger’s interpretation of two different
notions of truth, but argues on this basis that one has to distinguish between two corresponding notions of the
(dis-) agreement of ideas, i. e. between two distinct notions of knowledge. Cp. Mattern (1978).
9. KNOWLEDGE AND ITS DEGREES
245
allegedly, sensitive knowledge does not fit the official notion of knowledge. This line of
interpretation is also the most challenging one with respect to the one here proposed,
since it is build on a different reading of passages crucial for both reconstructions.
Pace Krüger I do however not understand Locke’s explanations to entail two notions of
truth, an idea-theoretic and a correspondence-theoretic one. A closer analysis of Krüger’s
main textual evidence reveals that it does not suggest his interpretation if read in context.
Krüger maintains526 that Locke defines truth as a correspondence-theoretic notion when
he declares:
“§2. Truth then seems to me, in the proper import of the Word, to signify nothing
but the joining or separating of Signs, as the Things signified by them, do agree or
disagree one with another.”527
What does Krüger mean by ‘correspondence-theoretic’? He does not want to go into
detail,528 but for him a naive conception of a correspondence theory of truth includes at
least that a proposition somehow corresponds to real, existent entities, i. e. to entities
existing in the outer world.529 This implies for his interpretation of Locke’s definition that
he must read ‘things’ to refer to entities existing in the outer world when Locke speaks of
the things being denoted by signs. And indeed Krüger does so.530 He likewise interprets
Locke as asserting a correspondence-theoretic notion of truth in connection with verbal
propositions when Locke maintains: “So that Proposition consists in joining, or
separating Signs, and Truth consists in the putting together, or separating these Signs,
according as the Things, which they stand for, agree or disgree.”531  However, I argued
above that the context of both passages discloses that ‘things’ denotes not only entities
represented by ideas, but also ideas, since this depiction of truth concerns not only verbal,
but also mental propositions.
There is another passage cited by Krüger which seems more promising. Here he
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understands again ‘things’ to denote entities existing in the outer world, and consequently
reads this passage in the sense of Locke asserting two notions of truth: “When Ideas are so
put together, or separated in the Mind, as they, or the Things they stand for do agree, or
not, that is, as I may call it, mental Truth.”532 According to Krüger,533 Locke maintains:
two ideas agree or disagree either if they agree or disagree (as in the case of intuitive and
demonstrative knowledge) or if the signified existent entities agree or disagree (as in the
case of sensitive knowledge). This means, ‘things’ and ‘ideas’ are understood to stand for
two alternative ways to conceive the (dis-) agreement of ideas. More precisely, for Krüger,
the correspondence-theoretic conception of truth asserts that the truth of (some)
propositions is grounded in the outer world, namely when ideas (dis-) agree in accordance
to existent entities; whereas the idea-theoretic notion depicts the truth of (other)
propositions as being grounded in relations holding amongst ideas, namely when ideas
(dis-) agree with respect to themselves.534 As Krüger rightly sees, one import of this
reading is that Locke first officially introduces a general, correspondence-theoretic notion
of truth and then smuggles in a second, idea-theoretic one.535
Krüger therefore follows the usual path in the sense that he highlights Locke’s
explanations as specifying the reasons in which truth (and knowledge) is grounded.536 If
this approach is presumed, Krüger’s interpretation of the last quotation is not
unreasonable, since Locke often uses ‘things’ to denote entities existing in the world. And,
if this second step is granted, he correctly concludes that Locke has two notions of truth:
some propositions are grounded in the world, whereas the other ones are grounded i n
relations between ideas.537
Two objections. First, in the light of the suggested interpretation of Locke’s foregoing
definitions of truth, one naturally understands this passage as has been explained above:
the (dis-) agreement of ideas is here conceived as being aquivalent to the (dis-) agreement
of the signified entities, namely to express that the state of affairs holds (that is
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represented by the ideas). That is, in the quote, the truth of a mental proposition is
described in two ways: to consist in the joining or separating of ideas in accordance with
their (dis-) agreement, or respectively to consist in the joining or separating of ideas i n
accordance with the (dis-) agreement of the entities represented by the ideas. The (dis-)
agreement of two ideas is taken to express the (dis-) agreement of the entities they signify.
Second, Locke uses ‘things’ also to refer to entities which can exist in the world, e. g.
triangles. According to him, triangles exist in the world only if they are perfectly
instantiated. And since he does not believe that this is actually possible, he refers to
triangles as ‘things’ which can exist.538 In this sense, Locke also refers to the members of
sorts as ‘things’ irrespective of whether they actually exist or not, e. g. of circles.539 In fact,
this is a very natural way of speaking of entities and their properties. Triangles are entities
which have certain features irrespective of whether they truly exist. Similarly, to say that
a proposition about triangles (not) possessing the property X is true only if the two ideas
are joined or separated as the things they stand for (dis-) agree, simply means that the
proposition is true only if triangles have (not) the feature X. That is, one naturally talks of
triangles as being entities having properties, even if one is convinced that, strictly
speaking, there are no triangles instantiated in the world. In short, Locke’s usage of
‘things’ establishes neither reading, since it sometimes denotes existing entities and
sometimes entities which can exist. But in the light of the above interpretation ‘things’
should be understood to refer to entities for which it is semantically possible to exist.540  
Moreover, it seems to me that the wider context of the quoted passages supports the here
developed interpretation as well.541 To see this, one has to recognize that, on Krüger’s
reading, Lockean sensitive knowledge naturally fits to the correspondence-theoretic
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notion whereas intuitive and demonstrative knowledge is tailor-made for an idea-
theoretic conception because it is about existent entities. The correspondence-theoretic
notion applies to sensitive knowledge because sensitive knowledge is grounded in the
world. Likewise, the idea-theoretic notion relates to intuitive and demonstrative
knowledge, since they are grounded in relations between ideas. Given Krüger’s approach,
one is almost forced to accept these correlations. But these correlations show that, if
Krüger were right, Locke would discuss truth in a way very untypical for his approach
elsewhere in the Essay. If Locke introduced the general topic of truth with a
correspondence-theoretic notion, that were specific for propositions being grounded i n
sensitive knowledge, as Krüger maintains, Locke would have in mind propositions of
only a finite number of entities that exist in the outer world, e. g. ‘This piece of gold is
yellow’, since perceptual knowledge concerns for Locke only a finite number of entities.542
However, when discussing truth, Locke’s paradigms are not propositions about
particulars, but intuitively or demonstratively known universal propositions, e. g. ‘White
is not black’ or ‘All men are animals’. This indicates that Locke does not introduce a
general definition of truth which effectively applies only to truths known by the senses.
Furthermore, since Locke consciously distinguishes between intuitively and
demonstratively known universal  propositions and perceptually known propositions
about particulars existing in the world, it would be unusual for him if he opened the
discussion with the latter propositions and then moved on to the former ones without
loosing a word.543  
Furthermore, if Krüger were right, Locke would present a deeply incoherent account. As
Krüger concedes, the idea-theoretic notion is present in Locke’s definition of
knowledge.544 But since Locke insists that this definition also pertains to sensitive
knowledge of existence, Locke’s fundamental conception that known propositions are
true would imply that his definition of knowledge entails an idea-theoretic notion of
truth also for propositions being knowable by sensations. This sort of implication holds
correspondingly for Locke’s alleged official correspondence-theoretic conception of truth
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as well. That is, Locke’s supposingly official definition of truth implies a correspondence-
theoretic notion of knowledge as to inuitive and demonstrative knowledge. Thus, if
Krüger’s reading were correct, Locke would give two official portrayals of knowledge and
truth which oppose each other. In the chapter on truth, Locke would introduce a notion
of truth (and knowledge) that contradicts and competes with the previously advanced
notion of knowledge (and truth) in the chapter on knowledge. The official notion of truth
would not work with universal knowledge, whereas the official notion of knowledge
would not work with sensitive knowledge. This however contradicts Locke’s obvious
intention to propose (official) notions of truth and knowledge that apply to all kinds of
propositions. Locke did not believe to operate with two different and divergent notions of
knowledge and truth.
By comparison, according to the here developed interpretation, in the last quoted
sentence Locke does not maintain two different ways in which the (dis-) agreement of
ideas has to be highlighted. Rather, he re-asserts his formula in two different ways, one
time in terms of the (dis-) agreement of ideas and the other time in terms of the (dis-)
agreement of the entities which are represented by ideas: “When Ideas are so put together,
or separated in the Mind, as they, or the Things they stand for do agree, or not, that is, as I
may call it, mental Truth.”545 In my words: a mental proposition is true only if ideas are
joined or separated in accordance with these ideas, i. e. in accordance with the (dis-)
agreement of the entities being represented by these ideas. Like in Locke’s general
definition of truth, ‘things’ is here read as denoting entities which could, but need not
exist. Locke’s example immediately preceding the citation illustrates this well:
“When a Man has in his Mind the Idea of two Lines, viz. the Side and Diagonal of
a Square, whereof the Diagonal is an Inch long, he may have the Idea also of the
division of that Line, into certain number of equal parts, v.g. into Five, Ten, an
Hundred, a Thousand, or any other Number, and may have the Idea of that Inch
Line, being divisible or not divisible, into such equal parts, as a certain number of
them will be equal to the Side-line. Now whenever he perceives, believes, or
supposes such a kind of Divisibility to agree or disagree to his Idea of that Line, he,
as it were, joins or separates those two Ideas, viz. the Idea of that Line, and the Idea
of that kind of Divisibility, and so makes a mental Proposition, which is true or
false, according as such a kind of Divisibility, a Divisibility into such aliquot parts,
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does really agree to that Line, or no.”546
The (dis-) agreement of two ideas corresponds to a fact that is represented by the (joining
or separating of) ideas, e. g. certain mathematical objects (do not) have a certain
mathematical feature. Thus, for Locke there is no need to have two notions of truth, since
his notion does neither apply exclusively to ideas nor exclusively to existing things. His
notion relates only to states of affairs represented by ideas which are joined or separated. It
is left open whether these states of affairs are manifest in the world, i. e. relate to existing
entities, or not. For instance, a true proposition about triangles relates to all possibly
existing triangles. This is the reason why for Locke the question arises whether truth and
knowledge is about reality.547 His conception of knowledge and truth alone does not
guarantee that knowledge and truth are about real entities existing in the outer world.
Locke’s way of speaking that the truth of a mental proposition consists in the (dis-)
agreement of ideas or respectively in the (dis-) agreement of entities simply means that
the state of affairs holds which is expressed by the joining or separating of the ideas
making up the proposition.
d. The Three Degrees of Knowledge
I will now turn to Locke’s theory of the three degrees of knowledge which will deepen the
so far developed reading. By distinguishing different “degrees of knowledge”, Locke
classifies knowledge in three types, namely in intuitive, demonstrative and sensitive
knowledge. I will first shed light on these types of knowledge and subsequently come back
to what Locke means by different “degrees”, i. e. as to which feature the three sorts of
knowledge vary.
Locke’s defining characterizations of intuitive and demonstrative knowledge are
interconnected. Demonstrative knowledge is the perception of the (dis-) agreement of two
ideas by intervening ideas.548 As Locke puts it in other passages, in the case of
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demonstrative knowledge, there is a connection or dependence between the two ideas
whose (dis-) agreement is perceived.549 This nexus of two ideas is also depicted as a chain
of ideas. The recognition of the holding of a chain of ideas leads to demonstrative
knowledge, namely to the perception that the two ideas (dis-) agree which are connected
by this chain. In this sense, the perception of the (dis-) agreement of two ideas is
understood to be achieved by the cognition of a chain of ideas that shows the (dis-)
agreement of the two ideas:
“Those intervening Ideas, which serve to shew their Agreement of anytwo others,
are called Proofs; and where the Agreement or Disagreement is by this means
plainly and clearly perceived, it is called Demonstration, it being shewn to the
Understanding, and the Mind made see that it is so.”550
Locke exemplifies a demonstration by the chain of ideas that makes up a proof i n
Eucledeian mathematics, e. g. a succession of comparisons of angles and lines of
geometrical figures.551 Moreover, the perception or recognition of this chain of ideas
consists in a series of immediate perceptions of which each represents a link. Each
immediate perception is of the (dis-) agreement of two neighbouring ideas making up the
chain. Immediate perceptions of the (dis-) agreement of two ideas therefore serve as the
basic or elementary components of a demonstration. And since intuitive knowledge
consists in the immediate perception of the (dis-) agreement of two ideas, a
demonstration, i. e. the grasp of a chain of ideas, is a series of steps which are intuitively
known.552
Importantly, Locke differentiates, as just quoted, between the perception of the (dis-)
agreement of two ideas and the perception of a chain of ideas leading to the former
perception. A proof is said to show the (dis-) agreement of two ideas. Similarly, a proof
makes the mind “to perceive the Agreement or Repugnancy between two Ideas that need
Proofs and the Use of Reason to shew it”.553 “Perception” is depicted as to be “produced by
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Demonstration”.554 Crucially, this means, a demonstration is depicted as a truth yielding,
cognitive process. For Locke, the recognition of the holding of a connection, or chain,
between two ideas leads to the perception of their (dis-) agreement, i. e. to demonstrative
knowledge. He does not identify the perception of the (dis-) agreement of ideas which
represents demonstrative knowledge with the demonstration itself, i. e. with the
succession of immediate perceptions. This implies, intuitive and demonstrative
knowledge are distinguished by the kind of cognitive process by which one achieves these
types of knowledge. Intuitive knowledge is immediate  perception, demonstrative
knowledge is mediated perception. The difference lies in the way of attaining knowledge,
i. e. of obtaining perceptions of the (dis-) agreement of ideas.
Having said that, the question arises what an immediate and what an mediated
perception is. As we have seen, demonstrative knowledge is highlighted is terms of
intuitive knowledge. Demonstrative knowledge is achieved by the perception of a chain
of ideas, namely by a series of immediate perceptions of the (dis-) agreement between
ideas of a chain. Inquiring into mediated perceptions passes on the question as to
immediate perceptions.
Locke’s characterization of mediated perceptions implies moreover for intuitive
knowledge that an immediate perception of the (dis-) agreement of two ideas does not
involve the perception of the (dis-) agreement of these ideas in relation to other ideas. A n
immediate perception concerns only the two ideas whose (dis-) agreement is perceived.
This manifests in Locke’s depiction of intuitive knowledge as knowledge not affording
proofs.555 There are no further perceptions of (dis-) agreements of ideas needed. And since
the (dis-) agreement of two ideas stands for a fact, immediate perception does not involve
the recognition of other facts (besides the one which is immediately perceived.) Thus,
given our previous interpretation of Locke’s notion of knowledge, intuitive knowledge is
the cognition of the holding of a state of affairs that does not require to become aware of
other facts. In turn, mediated perception of the (dis-) agreement of two ideas is mediated
by the recognition of other facts, namely facts which correspond to each step of the
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demonstration.
The question is however still unanswered what an immediate perception of a fact consists
in. Locke’s position can be highlighted by the types of propositions which can intuitively
be known, and by his explanations why one can intuitively know them. By and large,
Locke distinguishes intuitively known propositions into propositions which relate: to the
identity of two ideas, to the diversity of two ideas, and to the inclusion of two ideas. For
instance, ‘Black is not white’ corresponds to the diversity of the idea of black and the idea
of white, ‘Red is red’ corresponds to the identity of the idea of red, and ‘Gold is yellow’ or
‘Horses are animals’ correspond to the inclusion of the idea of yellow by the idea of gold
or respectively to the inclusion of the idea of horses by the idea of animals. But why do we
know these kinds of propositions immediately? Locke advances an answer in connection
with his argument on maxims, for instance, as to propositions on identity:
“§4. For, First, the immediate perception of the agreement or disagreement of
Identity, being founded in the Mind’s having distinct Ideas, this affords us as many
self-evident Propositions, as we have distinct Ideas. Every one that has any
Knowledge at all, has, as the Foundation of it, various and distinct Ideas: And it is
the first act of the Mind, (without which it can never be capable of any Knowledge,)
to know every one of its Ideas by it self, and distinguish it from others. Every one
finds in himself, that he knows the Ideas he has; And that when more than one are
there, he knows them distinctly and unconfusedly one from another. Which
always being so, (it being impossible but that he should perceive what he
perceives,) he can never be in doubt when any Idea is in his Mind, that it is there,
and is that Idea it is; and that two distinct Ideas, when they are in his Mind, are
there, and are not one and the same Idea.”556
Locke’s issue is that “the immediate perception of the agreement or disagreement of
Identity [is] founded in the Mind’s having distinct Ideas”. Part of his explanation is that a
necessary condition for knowledge is one’s grasp of the content of ideas and to distinguish
ideas as being different ideas.557 The backdrop is of course that propositions are the objects
of knowledge and that ideas are their constituents. In this context, the insistance on ideas
being distinct simply means that they have a definite or determined content. Locke
justifies this claim by referring to common experience: “Every one finds in himself, that
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he knows the Ideas he has; And that when more than one are there, he knows them
distinctly and unconfusedly one from another.” Having established the claim, he then
concludes that one therefore cannot doubt which ideas one has and what their content is.
Importantly, Locke does not assert that one is always aware of the ideas one has. He rather
says that one fully grasps one’s ideas, if one indeed fully recognizes them. This is indicated
by his remark that “it being impossible but that he should perceive what he perceives”
and, as quoted below, by his reference to propositions being considered by the mind with
attention. Thus, Locke’s fundamental contention is that thought is perspicuous i n
principle, namely when one is appropriately aware of the content of one’s consciousness.
This means, as the cited passage continues, in the case of intuitive knowledge to
understand a proposition entails or leads to the immediate awareness of the holding of
the state of affairs that is represented by (the joining or separating of) the ideas:
“So that all such Affirmations, and Negations, are made without any possibility of
doubt, uncertainty, or hestitation, and must necessarily assented to, as soon as
understood; that is, as soon we have, in our Minds, determined Ideas, which the
Terms in the Proposition stand for. And therefore where-ever the mind with
attention considers any proposition, so as to perceive the two Ideas, signified by the
terms and affirmed or denyed one of the other, to be the same or different; it is
presently and infallibly certain of the truth of such a proposition [...]”.558
Locke proposes the same account also in connection with other types of intuitively
known propositions, e. g. relating to the diversity of two ideas. To know intuitively that
blue is not red, is to become aware that blue is not red in the light of our understanding of
both the idea of blue and the idea of red.559 To be more precisely, since two ideas have to
be joined or separated to represent a state of affairs: the considering or conceiving of black
not being white leads in the light of our comprehension of black and white to our
recognition that the separating of the two ideas represents a fact, i. e. that the represented
state of affairs obtains. And, obviously, this analysis applies to the inclusion of ideas as
well.
Summing up, to know intuitively the holding of a state of affairs, is to become aware that
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the state of affairs holds simply by grasping or comprehending the state of affairs. That is,
the truth of a maxim, or of any other intuitively knowledgable proposition, is known
when one understands it. This is the reason for Locke why one immediately perceives the
(dis-) agreement of two ideas in the case of intuitive knowledge. In the case of intuitive
knowledge, one immediately  perceives the holding of a state of affairs because it is o n e
cognitive act to grasp what the state of affairs consists in and that it holds, and because this
grasp is “the first act of the Mind”,560 i. e. no other cognitive act is prerequisite to perform
one’s grasping.
Locke’s reference to the identity, diversity and inclusion of ideas can easily be
misunderstood in two different ways as portraying intuitive knowledge as consisting i n
the grasp of conceptual (-like) relationships. First, as has already been pointed out above,
one should not confuse intuitive knowledge of ‘Gold is yellow’ with knowledge of ‘‘Gold’
entails ‘yellow’’. Locke has the former states of affairs in mind, not the latter ones.
Intuitive knowledge is not knowledge of conceptual relationships. Second and more
important, to elucidate intuitive knowledge of a fact as consisting in a grasp of a
conceptual-like relationship holding between two ideas, would exclude intuitive
knowledge of facts which are not represented by ideas between which a conceptual-like
relationship holds. For example, according to Locke the immediate recognition of one’s
own existence does not consist in the perception that ‘I’ includes ‘exist’; what would
indeed be a very daring claim. Instead, one is simply aware of one’s own existence. This
self-awareness is entailed or accompanied by (our consciousness of) mental states: “In
every Act of Sensation, Reasoning, or Thinking, we are conscious to our selves of our
Being; and, in this Matter, come not short of the highest degree of Certainty.”561
The point about intuitive knowledge therefore is that one immediately perceives a fact
when considering or conceiving a state of affairs. And one should consequently read
Locke’s explanations about the identity, diversity or inclusion of ideas as highlighting
why intuitive knowledge of certain kinds of facts is possible, namely of the identity or
diversity of entities, of the ascription of properties, or of kind membership: if facts are
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represented by propositions that join or separate two ideas which are identical, diverse or
partly identical, one comes to know the facts simply by comprehending them. In the same
light, one has to interpret Locke’s justification of why one intuitively knows one’s own
existence. He highlights the reason why one perceives this fact immediately, i. e. why one
recognizes this fact solely by considering this state of affairs and without referring to other
facts: the “omnipresence” of the self-awareness of our own existence is the reason why
one immediately knows that one exists when envisaging it.
As we have seen, no further consideration is needed for intuitive knowledge besides
understanding (the content of) a proposition. Accordingly, Locke proposes an analoguous
understanding of demonstrative knowledge. Demonstrative knowledge is achieved by a
proof, i. e. by a succession of cognitions of facts that makes perspicuous the holding of the
state of affairs in question. In other words, a demonstration establishes the truth of a
proposition by providing a list of propositions whose truth are known by understanding
them and which show, when considered all together, that the state of affairs holds being
expressed by the proposition in question. Correspondingly, demonstrative knowledge is
not the cognition of a conceptual-like relationship as explained above. First,
demonstrative knowledge is concerned with sentences like ‘The angles of triangles are
equal to two right angles’, but not with ‘‘Angles of triangle’ entails ‘being equal to two
right angles’’. Second, demonstrative knowledge is also not (necessarily) achieved by
insights in the holding of conceptual-like relationships, since Locke’s demonstration of
the existence of God involves the claim that oneself exists. Thus, in general, a
demonstration is not a proof consisting of various premisses which correspond to
conceptual-like relationships obtaining between two ideas making up the chain. By
contrast, when Locke refers to the (dis-) agreement of ideas as being grounded or as
corresponding to conceptual-like relationships, he speaks of “relations” holding between
ideas. And this is the reason why knowledge of existence is opposed to other realms of
knowledge relating to relations between ideas.562 (One should not however conflate this
distinction with the opposition between sensitive knowledge and non-sensitive
knowledge. For knowledge of existence comprises intuitive knowledge of one’s own
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existence and demonstrative knowledge of God’s existence as well.) But many
commentators highlight the definition of knowledge as perception of the (not) obtaining
of a relation between two ideas; that is, the (dis-) agreement relationship is understood as
a relation between two ideas.563 Locke, however, clearly distinguishes between knowledge
of relations between ideas and knowledge of existence!
In the light of the deep connections between intuitive and demonstrative knowledge,
sensitive knowledge seems a little bit out of place - at first sight. Sensitive knowledge is
said to be the perception of the (dis-) agreement of ideas which is achieved by the senses.
Sensitive knowledge therefore is neither an immediate perception nor a perception being
the outcome of a mathematical-type demonstration. Moreover, sensitive knowledge is
not about general propositions, but about particular truths concerning the existence of
entities in the world (which are neither oneself nor God). Of course, sensations yield for
Locke not only knowledge that entities exists, but also that they have properties, e. g. that
my golden ring is malleable.
The aim of Locke’s reasoning on sensitive knowledge is to establish that one can indeed
attain it. This becomes manifest in the chapters on the degrees of knowledge and on
knowledge of the existence of entities (which are neither oneself nor God), namely in his
argument that one has knowledge of existence when one receives an idea by the senses. In
the latter chapter, he concedes that, if taken by itself, an idea does not entail that the
represented entities truly exist. The reason is that ideas can be generated in a way which
does not warrant the existence of the depicted entities, e. g. when representations are
memories or part of a dream. Locke however insists that one does have knowledge of
existence when ideas are delivered by the senses. According to Locke, one is aware i n
sensation that the object of the sensation is the true cause of the sensation, namely that an
entity existing in the outer world causes the sensation.564 For Locke, this awareness is not
established by reason, but is naturally given in  sensation if we appropriately become
aware of our perceptions and can thus exclude that they are not, for instance, part of a
dream. Locke does concede that philosophical skepticism is coherent and possible as to the
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outer world. One can doubt whether sensations, which we commonly regard to acquire i n
ideal circumstances, really yield the truth of their content. But Locke contends that one
can become aware in proper perceptions that one indeed is in causal interaction with the
object of sensation. This awareness of the causal interaction guarantees for him the truth
of sensations. And since he maintains a causal theory of perception, namely that i n
proper sensations the object of perception is its cause.
In addition, Locke mentions four “concurrent reasons” which in the case of proper
sensations can show as well that we do have proper sensations yielding truth and that
they are not part of a dream.565 They all aim at demonstrating that, when we are awake,
dreams are for us distinguishable from decent sensations so that we know that we are not
dreaming when we are not dreaming. The icing of the account is Locke’s claim that to
doubt the epistemic status of proper sensations is to undermine our notion or
understanding of knowledge on which basis one can query only in the first place what
knowledge is.566 The reason is that for Locke proper sensations are the paradigm for
knowledge and the successful exhibition of our faculty of knowledge; this can be seen
from the fact that intuitive knowledge is compared to visual perception in best, i. e. truth
conveying, circumstances.567 Thus, according to him, to question whether sensations
under ideal conditions are cases of knowledge is to dissolve what we mean by knowledge.
Yet, for him, these further considerations seem to serve only to hammer additional nails
in the skeptic’s coffin. The core argument is his analysis of proper sensations as entailing
our awareness that they really are decent sensations.
On this complex backdrop, Locke refutes the skeptic who raises doubts whether one has
sensitive knowledge by the appeal to the possibility that all our ideas are part of a dream.
One does know that sensations are not part of a dream, Locke rejoins, since an idea of an
entity that is given in sensation is distinguishable from an idea of the entity that is part of
a dream. And since Locke regards the skeptic to challenge sensitive knowledge only i n
this way, he concludes that sensitive knowledge is decent knowledge despite the noise of
                                                
565 632ff, IV.xi.4-7.
566 Cp. Ayers (1991), I, 155-59.
567 531, IV.ii.1.
9. KNOWLEDGE AND ITS DEGREES
259
the skeptic.568 Thus, for him, sensations show the (dis-) agreement of two ideas, i. e. the
holding of a state of affairs which is represented by two ideas being joined or separated.
For instance, under ideal conditions the sensation of a tree proves that there is a tree,
namely that the idea of that tree agrees to the idea of existence.
In the light of Locke’s conception of intuitive, demonstrative and sensitive knowledge,
one can assess which feature distinguishes them in three degrees of knowledge. Locke
speaks of different degrees in various ways, namely as to: the evidence of knowledge, the
clearness of knowledge and the certainty of knowledge.569 Locke apparently intends to
raise the same, or at least roughly aquivalent, claim(s) when using these different
expressions. But what do they mean?
The answer lies in Locke’s explanations on the three sorts of knowledge which are
couched in similar terms. For Locke, the evidence of demonstrative knowledge is less
bright and clear than the one of intuitive knowledge because one does not immediately
perceive the (dis-) agreement of ideas, i. e. the obtaining of a fact. As we have seen, the
reason for the perception being non-instantly is that one first has to comprehend a proof,
namely to grasp a chain of ideas. Moreover, the comprehension of a proof requires skill
according to Locke, since, for instance, long deductions can easily cause mistakes.570 On
this background, I read Locke’s assertions that in demonstrative knowledge evidence is
not that bright and clear and that the truth of propositions is doubtful before one has
comprehended a proof:571 in demonstrative knowledge it is rather difficult to grasp facts
which support a fact and to achieve thus certainty that the fact holds. In Locke’s own
words:
“§4. This Knowledge by intervening Proofs, though it be certain, yet the evidence of
it is not altogether so clear and bright, nor the assent so ready, as in intuitive
Knowledge. For though in Demonstration, the Mind does at last perceive the
Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas it considers; yet ’tis not without pains and
attention: There must be more than one transient view to find it. A steddy
application and pursuit is required to this Discovery: And there must be a
Progression by steps and degrees, before the Mind can in this arrive at Certainty,
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and come to perceive the Agreement or Repugnancy between two Ideas that need
Proofs and the Use of Reason to shew it.
§5. Another difference between intuitive and demonstrative Knowledge, is, that
though in the latter all doubt be removed, when by the Intervention of the
intermediate Ideas, the Agreement or Disagreement is perceived; Yet before the
Demonstration there was a doubt, [...]”.572
Correspondingly, I interpret Locke’s contention that in intuitive knowledge the assent to
propositions is irresistable and that there are no doubts as to the truth of such
propositions:573 in the case of intuitive knowledge one cannot do but recognize with
certainty the truth of propositions, since one instantly grasps the (dis-) agreement of ideas
when one considers the proposition because one’s understanding of the proposition
entails knowledge of its truth. Similarly, the uncertainty or doubtfulness of sensitive
knowledge relates to the difficulty to identify sensations as being proper perceptions:574
the refutation of the skeptic leads to the recognition or, perhaps better, to the self-
assurance that one’s sensations truly convey sensitive knowledge.
In short, knowledge differs in degree as to the difficulty of grasping the evidence showing
that a state of affairs holds575 and not, for instance, as to the “degrees of assurance with
which a knowledge claim is made”.576 These distinctions in difficulty are due to
differences in the type of cognitive process producing knowledge. As Locke puts it: “The
different clearness of our Knowledge seems to me to lie in the different way of Perception,
the Mind has of the Agreement, or Disagreement of any of its Ideas.”577 And, similarly,
Locke says: “in each of which [scil. in each of the three degrees], there are different degrees
and ways of Evidence and Certainty.”578 Our difficulty to grasp the evidence conveying
knowledge implies a corresponding difficulty to attain knowledge since the grasp of the
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evidence leads to the recognition of facts. There is no obstacle to grasp a proposition
which can be known intuitively: intuitive knowledge is the brightest, clearest, and
undoubtful as well as irresistable.579 There are some difficulties to understand a proof
showing the (dis-) agreement of ideas: demonstrative knowledge is less clear and certain,
and is doubtful.580 To become aware that one’s sensation is a decent sensation is even a
higher hurdle, since one might have to remove the philosophical doubt whether a given
mental representation is truly attained by the senses and is not part of a dream: sensitive
knowledge is the most doubtful one, its evidence is less clear and certain.581 The three
degrees of knowledge can be expressed in two or respectively four ways: as degrees of the
certainty or doubtfulness of knowledge in the sense of the questionability of whether the
proposition is true before one has knowledge of its truth; and as the degree of the
clearness or evidence of knowledge in the sense of the difficulty to grasp the evidence
conveying knowledge. Obviously, the certainty, or doubtfulness, of whether a proposition
is true and the evidence, or clearness, of the facts grounding a truth correspond each
other.582  
It thus becomes plain that Locke uses two different notions of certainty. When contrasting
knowledge and probability, knowledge is unequivocally called certain whereas probability
is not.583 This is a clear-cut, all-or-nothing distinction. By comparison, in the context of
the three sorts of knowledge certainty is a question of degree, spanning from intuitive to
sensitive knowledge. Yet, in both contexts, certainty relates to one’s grasp of reasons
conveying the cognition of a fact. To have simply a probable opinion, is not to have
certainty that the presumed fact truly obtains, since one has not grasped reasons
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conveying knowledge; whereas to have knowledge, is to have certainty that the fact truly
obtains. And the attainment of this certainty differs in degrees as to its difficulty, since the
difficulty varies of grasping reasons conveying knowledge.
One should therefore not mistake Locke’s use of ‘certainty’ and ‘degrees’ and conclude
that there is a range of knowledge and probability for him which spans from intuitive
knowledge to mere, unfounded conjectures. For even though Locke speaks of “degrees”,
he does not mean that some knowledge is more genuine knowledge than other
knowledge. This is indicated when he calls the three degrees also three sorts of
knowledge.584
e. Knowledge and its Degrees
The account of the three degrees of knowledge thus deepens our understanding of Locke’s
general conception of knowledge. As argued before, knowledge is the cognition of the
holding of a state of affairs that is mentally represented by ideas being joined or separated.
‘Perception’, is here understood as a success concept. To perceive the (dis-) agreement of
ideas is the awareness of a state of affairs that truly obtains. We have now seen in addition
that this perception is conceived as the outcome of a truth yielding cognitive process.
Knowledge, the perception of the (dis-) agreement of two ideas, is achieved by either
intuition, or demonstration, or sensation. Locke actually delineates this innocuously
when maintaining:
“[...] That we can have no Knowledge farther, than we can have Perception of that
Agreement, or Disagreement: Which Perception being, 1. Either by Intuition, or the
immediate comparing any two Ideas; or, 2. By Reason, examining the Agreement,
or Disagreement of two Ideas, by the Intervention of some others: Or, 3. By
Sensation, perceiving the Existence of particular Things.”585
In addition, this reconstruction coheres with Locke’s account of habitual knowledge.
Contrary to so-called actual knowledge, which we have discussed so far only, habitual
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knowledge does not consist in the actual perception of the (dis-) agreement of two ideas.586
Habitual knowledge is rather the result of becoming aware of reasons which show that
once one recognized reasons which showed the (dis-) agreement of ideas, i. e. the holding
of a fact. In this sense, habitual knowledge is knowledge being grounded in reasons which
only indirectly show that ideas (dis-) agree. Roughly speaking, for example, if one (truly)
remembers that in the past one knew the proof for a particular proposition, one
habitually knows the proposition.587 In this case, veridical remembering is the truth
yielding process which leads to knowledge. In fact, veridical remembrance is involved i n
demonstrations as well, since one can know only one step at a time and thus has to
consider all steps at once at the end of a proof, as Locke indicates.588 Similarly, Locke
concedes, one likewise speaks of propositions which can be intuitively known as being
habitually known. To know habitually in this sense, is to have the disposition of
immediate actual knowledge, namely to perceive immediately the (dis-) agreement of
ideas as soon as one considers or reflects on the proposition.589
Locke justifies this comprehension of knowledge as comprising habitual knowledge by
pointing out that otherwise an absurd or uncommon understanding of knowledge would
be the consequence. A person would know at most only one fact, since subjects can
actually perceive only one  (dis-) agreement of ideas at the same time.590 The account of
habitual knowledge thus confirms that Locke’s conception of knowledge distinguishes
between the perception of the reasons showing that a fact obtains and the perception of
the holding of the fact. Locke however focuses on actual knowledge, on intuitive,
demonstrative, sensitive knowledge.
One should finally note that according to Locke knowledge of a fact does not include or
entail knowledge that one truly knows the fact. This is manifest in his claim that we can
mistakingly believe to have grasped a proof and to have achieved demonstrative
knowledge.591 For, if one can mistake an alleged proof for a correct one, Locke can hardly
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maintain as well that one knows to have knowledge, if one has knowledge. The reason is
simple. If one could somehow distinguish between knowing and mistakingly knowing,
one would not wrongly believe anymore to know something, since one could easily check
whether one really knows it. But if one cannot distinguish between genuinely and
allegedly knowing, one cannot know in the case of knowledge that one really knows
something. Given Locke’s contention that one can be mistaken, he can hardly believe that
in the case of knowledge one knows unmistakingly that one knows a fact. This makes
plain, Locke claims only that knowledge of a fact implies grasping of reasons showing the
holding of the fact. Given Locke’s way of ideas, his definition of knowledge turns rather
out to be as innocuous as Locke thinks it is: knowledge consists in the recognition that a
state of affairs obtains; and this recognition is the outcome of a cognitive process which is
either an intuition, or demonstration, or sensation that consists in the awareness of
reasons showing the holding of that state of affairs.
265
10. Scope and Advancement of Knowledge
After having assessed contemporary knowledge of bodies, Locke sums up his results as to
its extent by declaring that our knowledge is “very short and scanty”, namely that we have
“very little general Knowledge”.592 Locke’s rather general programmatic statements in the
introductive part of the Essay also relate to the knowledge of bodies where insight in the
nature of contemporary knowledge is said to make plain which inquiries are intelligible
and worth to be investigated and which are not.593 This means, Locke takes his
disenchanting results of his analysis to pave the way for an intelligible conception of a
science of bodies.
I will examine in which sense for Locke contemporary knowledge of bodies is “very short
and scanty” and how this pertains to the advancement of knowledge. As will be
delineated, Locke specifies knowledge in two ways, namely quantitatively and
qualitatively. He thus effectively assesses and judges contemporary knowledge of bodies
in the perspective of an ideally scientific account, indirectly developing a conception of an
ideal science of bodies. I want to emphasize that not only virtually all bits of the account
relate to an ideal theory of bodies, but more importantly, that his final judgement does so
as well, namely that knowledge is “very short and scanty”. The upshot is that one does
not know much of importance compared to what one ideally should know and that
which one knows is in fact trivial. In the same perspective one has to read Locke’s
proposal of so-called remedies, i. e. general means, to enhance knowledge. The aim of
Locke’s assessment thus turns out to establish first that from an ideal epistemological
perspective contemporary knowledge of bodies has limited value to develop then an
appropiate conception of a contemporary science of bodies to enlarge human knowledge.
Moreover, as will be contended, Locke’s claim that the real essences of bodies are pr ima
facie specific form the backdrop of why his chief issues are problematic for him. One has
to take into account his views on real essences to understand comprehensively why for
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him contemporary knowledge of bodies has scarcely any epistemic value and why this
insight paves the way for an appropriate conception to enhance knowledge. But most
importantly, an unorthodox reading of the nature of Locke’s ideal science of bodies will be
advanced. Locke does not hold on to a Cartesian or rationalistic idea that conceives an
ideal science as an a priori account which, roughly speaking, deduces properties from the
microphysical figure of bodies, but rather develops a genuine empiristic conception.
The first two sections discuss Locke’s assessment of the scope of human knowledge of
bodies. The first one reconstructs the extent of knowledge which quantitatively
determines the extent of contemporary knowledge. The second one determines Locke’s
account with respect to his other issues where he qualitatively assesses human
knowledge, namely to which degree it is “real” and “instructive”. Not unimportantly
with respect to Locke’s own view on remedies, in this context he rejects the Aristotelian
conception of maxims, i. e. propositions conceived as being essential for the advancement
of knowledge. Subsequently, the nature of Locke’s conception of an ideal science of bodies
will be reconstructed on the background of the foregoing accounts. This will then be
contrasted with Locke’s proposal of remedies which amounts to a conception of a
contemporary science of bodies. Finally, Locke’s view on the prospects of such a science of
bodies will be highlighted. This outlook is not advanced in a separate chapter or
discussion, but is present in many contexts. A sharp contrast will emerge between what
Locke takes as an ideal comprehension of bodies and the kind of knowledge he believes
humans can ever attain - if God is not so kind as to reveal it to us one day.
a. The Extent of Human Knowledge of Bodies
Locke discusses the extent of knowledge in terms of his distinction of knowledge in four
realms: identity and diversity, coexistence of properties, relations, and real existence.594
With respect to bodies, the analysis focuses on coexistence and we will therefore discuss
this realm first.
The coexistence of properties pertains exclusively to bodies since coexisting properties are
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understood to be physical features of bodies which go constantly together with the
features included in the idea of a species. For example, given that gold is defined as the
kind of substances being yellow and soluble in aqua regia, the proposition ‘Gold is fixed’
expresses that the feature of fixedness coexists with the defining properties of gold.
Everything what is gold, is fixed. Locke maintains that we have knowledge of coexisting
properties, namely scanty intuitive knowledge. One can distinguish between two kinds of
knowledge. First, there is knowledge of the coexistence of primary qualities. Locke
mentions few instances, for instance: to have figure entails the possession of extension, to
pass on or receive motion by impulse supposes solidity, and to be both solid and in space
implies the filling of space.595 Second, we have intuitive knowledge of the repugnancy of
secondary qualities: secondary qualities being determined features of the same
determinable properties do not coexist, since the possession of one of them excludes the
possession of the others. Take, for example, colours. If gold is defined by being yellow, one
(intuitively) knows that gold does not have another colour in addition.
Thus, for Locke there is hardly any intuitive knowledge of the repugnancy or coexistence
of primary and secondary qualities. Locke is certainly right with this judgement, given the
small number of propositions in comparison to what one should ideally know. On the
other hand, the mentioned knowledge of coexisting primary qualities amounts to not less
than knowledge of fundamental laws: to have figure entails the possession of extension,
being capable of passing on or receiving motion by impulse supposes to be solid, and
being both solid and in space implies the filling of space.596
Yet, even though we have only scanty intuitive knowledge of coexisting properties,
maybe we have demonstrative knowledge? According to Locke, however, there is no
demonstrative knowledge of coexistent qualities. This is in effect not surprising, since
intuitively known propositions are the basis for demonstrations. But Locke further
specifies the reasons for our ignorance.
Locke’s paradigm for demonstrative knowledge of coexisting properties is knowledge of
the coexistence of a secondary quality, i. e. the ascription of a feature to specimens of a sort
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which is not defined by this secondary quality. This becomes plain when Locke illustrates
our ignorance:
“Thus though we see the yellow Colour, ad upon trial find the Weight,
Malleableness, Fusibility, and Fixedness, that are united in a piece of Gold; yet
because no one of these Ideas has any evident dependence, or necessary connexion
with the other, we cannot certainly know, that where any four of these are, the fifth
will be there also [...].”597
Given Locke’s general conception of demonstrative knowledge, our lack of it means that
one does not perceive a necessary connection holding between the respective properties.
The reason for our general ignorance of the coexistence of secondary qualities consists i n
our ignorance of a necessary connection holding between the set of properties defining
the sort and the secondary quality in question. Thus, the question arises what kind of
necessary connection is preeminent for demonstrative knowledge of the coexistence of
secondary qualities.
Knowledge of such a necessary connection, Locke contends, comprises of two parts. First,
one has to grasp the defining features of the sort in terms of microphysical primary
qualities, i. e. one has to know the properties which on the explanatory stage correspond
to the defining features of the macrophysical stage.598 This is a necessary condition, Locke
argues. For, since secondary qualities depend on microphysical primary qualities, one has
to understand the defining properties in terms of microphysical primary qualities in order
to conceive that a secondary quality depends on this set of defining features. Thus, if one
does not know the defining features in terms of microphysical primary qualities, one
cannot know whether a secondary quality depends on, or respectively is determined by,
the defining set. This means in turn, knowledge of a necessary connection between a
(secondary) quality and the defining features entails knowledge of the defining properties
in terms of primary qualities.
Second, one has to comprehend the necessary connection between a secondary quality and
the microphysical primary qualities on which it depends.599 Locke conceives this
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necessary connection to be the causal relationship holding between the microphysical
primary qualities, which correspond to a secondary quality, and the idea of the secondary
quality. This manifests in his claim that one has “to discover [a] connexion  betwixt these
[microphysical] primary qualities of Bodies, and the sensations that are produced in us by
them [to] be able to establish certain and undoubted Rules of the Consequence or Co-
existence of any secondary Qualities”.600 This likewise becomes plain when Locke admits
that in this context he presumes the corpuscularian hypothesis to highlight the matter.601
This means, to know that a secondary quality depends on its corresponding microphysical
primary qualities is to grasp that the latter causes an idea of the former. The backdrop of
this claim is Locke’s definition of qualities. Secondary qualities are understood as the
properties causing a specific idea (of a reducible, non-real quality), i. e. a secondary quality
is grasped in virtue of the idea that it causes. The idea apparently is: to know that a
secondary quality truly depends on a certain set of microphysical primary qualities, one
has to grasp that the idea of the secondary quality is genuinely caused by this set of
features.
Locke’s understanding of demonstrative knowledge of the coexistence of secondary
qualities thus comprises two parts: the comprehension of the defining features of a sort
and of the secondary quality in terms of microphysical primary qualities, and the grasp of
the causal relationship holding between the secondary quality (conceived i n
microphyiscal terms). The point is of course that the second part shows which
microphysical properties cause one’s idea of a secondary quality, i. e. which microphysical
features are to be identified as the secondary quality, whereas the first part imparts that
these microphysical properties are features of the microphysical structure that is identical
with the defining properties of the species. Evidently, knowledge of these two parts is
sufficient for Locke to attain demonstrative knowledge of coexisting properties. To be
precise, the so far advanced reconstruction applies only when species are defined i n
microphysical terms. If a sort is defined by secondary qualities, one has to grasp the causal
relationships between these features and their ideas as well in order to know with which
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microphysical primary qualities one has to identify the secondary qualities.
Moreover, strictly speaking, this depiction works only for sensible qualities, and has to be
supplemented by an analogous condition for non-sensible secondary qualities. For
instance, knowledge of the coexistence of the defining properties of wax with the
secondary quality of being able to be melted by the sun presupposes knowledge of the
causal relationship between the sun’s capacity to melt wax and the wax’s quality to be
melted by the sun, since the wax’s secondary quality to be melted by the sun is defined i n
relation to the sun’s power to melt wax. That is, there is a third aspect, namely the grasp of
the causal relationship in explanatory terms which holds between a secondary quality and
the feature of another body in terms of which the secondary quality is understood. On first
thought, however, Locke does not seem to acknowledge this consequence for knowledge
of coexisting non-sensible secondary qualities:
“§16. But as to the Powers of Substances to change the sensible Qualities of other
Bodies, which make a great part of our Enquiries about them, and is no
inconsiderable branch of our Knowledge; I doubt, as to these, whether our
Knowledge reaches much farther that our Experience; or whether we can come to
the discovery of most of these Powers, and be certain that they are in any Subject by
the connexion with any of those Ideas, which to us makes its Essence. Because the
Active and Passive Powers of Bodies, and their ways of operating, consisting in a
texture and motion of Parts, which we cannot by any means come to discover: ’Tis
but in very few Cases, we can be able to perceive their dependence on, or
repugnance to any of those Ideas, which make our complex one of that sort of
Things.”602
The point is that Locke does not explain the difficulty and bleak prospects of discovering
coexisting non-sensible secondary qualities by the difficulty to acquire a causal
understanding of sense perception, as he does in the case of sensible qualities.603 He rather
points to the hurdle of grasping microphysical properties and processes. And he likewise
maintains the possibility of attaining knowledge of non-sensible dispositional properties
if one knows the internal constitutions of bodies.604 This implies, according to Locke, one
can have knowledge of coexisting non-sensible qualities even though one does not grasp
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microphysical processes. Below, I will come back to this claim when further clarifying the
nature of necessary connections.605 The important bit is that Locke can maintain these
contentions only if he conceives here non-sensible dispositions from a microphysical
perspective. If pressed, he has to concede that knowledge of coexisting non-sensible
secondary qualities involves necessary connections partly relating to sense perceptions, if
the properties are grasped by the change of sensible qualities in bodies.
In this perspective, one has also to read the last sentence of the quote where Locke asserts
that we have knowledge of the coexistence or repugnance of non-sensible dispositions.606
Given that Locke can hardly claim that reflection on our everyday ideas reveals the
coexistence of this kind of properties, he must mean the repugnance of features. For
instance, the defining power of gold to be soluble in aqua regia implies knowledge that
gold is not non-soluble in aqua regia Epistemologically speaking, this kind of knowledge
is of course not much worth and it is not very much compared to the countless
unknown, coexisting secondary qualities whose high number Locke emphasizes.607 To
make sense of Locke, one has to understand in this way his contention that there are a
few cases of knowing the coexistence or repugnance of non-sensible dispositions.
Implicitly, the discussion of non-sensible secondary qualities has already depicted Locke’s
model of necessary connections as to coexisting microphysical primary qualities. For him,
demonstrative knowledge of the operations of bodies in microphysical terms involves a
necessary connection solely holding between microphysical primary qualities. In this
passage, Locke’s position is again manifest that he conceives the attainment of this kind of
knowledge as more probable than the comprehending of sense perception and of the
coexistence of sensible qualities:
“§13. That the size, figure, and motion of one Body should cause a change in the
size, figure, and motion of another Body, is not beyond our Conception; the
separation of the Parts of one Body, upon the intrusion of another; and the change
                                                
605 Cp. 10c.
606 As Goodin has recently pointed out, the topic of non-sensible qualities is usually neglected. Cp. Goodin
(1992), 60. But even her very detailed account of the issue, with which I agree, overlooks this, at first sight,
highly interesting claim of Locke that we possess knowledge of the coexistence or repugnance of this kind of
properties.
607 381. II.xxxi.8.
10. SCOPE AND ADVANCEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE
272
from rest to motion, upon impulse; these, and the like, seem to us have some
connexion one with another. And if we knew these primary Qualities of Bodies, we
might have reason to hope, we might be able to know a great deal more of these
Operations of them upon another: But our Minds not being able to discover any
connexion betwixt these primary qualities of Bodies, and the sensations that are
produced in us by them, we can never be able to establish certain and undoubted
Rules of the Consequence or Co-existence of any secondary Qualities, though we
could discover the size, figure, or motion of those invisible Parts, which
immediately produce them.”608
It becomes plain that in the case of bodies necessary connections are conceived as causal
relationships. Given Locke’s view of what demonstrative knowledge of coexisting
properties consists in and his analysis of the scope of human knowledge as to these causal
relationships, the argument on demonstrative knowledge of coexisting properties runs
straight forward. This lack of demonstrative knowledge is expressed by Locke’s assessment
of contemporary knowledge of bodies as not being a science.609 Below, we will see that two
models has been proposed how to understand these causal relationships and the necessity
of the necessary connections. I will argue for a different reading.
Aristotelians, as Locke conceives them, would present an alternative analysis, however.
According to them, the possession of Aristotelian real essences justifies conclusions about
the coexistence of properties. Aristotelians would contend that the real essence of a species
of bodies, which is presumed to be common to all members, determines a set of features
being shared by all specimens and not being (usually) contained in one’s idea of the sort.
Aristotelian real essences are thus conceived to justify the inclusion of properties (in
one’s idea of a sort) which one has discovered in a few specimens and thereby regard the
idea to be a more complete depiction of the species.610 As we have seen in connection
with the fifth abuse of words,611 Locke’s response is to insist that the real essences of
bodies are not precise, but prima facie specific, i. e. the specimens of a sort do not
(necessarily) possess the same real essence.
Of course, from Locke’s standpoint, he could refute the Aristotelian position also by
                                                
608 545, IV.iii.13.
609 560, IV.iii.29.
610 Cp. 8c.
611 Cp. 8d.
10. SCOPE AND ADVANCEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE
273
pointing out his conception of knowledge and claiming that a correct analysis of what
knowledge of the coexistence of properties consists in reveals that the Aristotelian
reasoning for the coexistence of properties is flawed and does not lead to the perception of
the agreement of ideas. But this line of argument would seriously be undermined if
Aristotelians could substantiate their view on real essences, since they could then call into
question Locke’s analysis of what knowledge of coexisting properties consists in. The
reason is: Aristotelians believe that similarities on the explanatory level correspond to
known similarities on the macrophysical stage, and they take this presumed
correspondence to warrant the conclusion that all members of a sort possess a certain
property even though one has experienced only some specimens to have the feature.
Thus, according to the Aristotelians, one can know coexisting properties without
knowledge of causal relationships and features in explanatory terms. As has been
indicated, Locke objects against this view that microphysical resemblances need not, and
in many cases do not, reflect macrophysical similarities.612 Locke’s account of real essences
therefore paves the way for the claim that knowledge of coexisting properties affords
knowledge of properties and causal relationships in terms of microphysical primary
qualities.
The dispute over real essences is likewise the backdrop of Locke’s extensive and separate
discussion of our knowledge of coexisting properties in terms of the certainty and truth of
universal propositions.613 Locke alludes here to his analysis that, at his time, a name of
bodies does not denote a species defined by an unknown (Aristotelian) real essence, but by
a known nominal essence or respectively by the abstract idea signified by the term.614 If
words signified species characterized by unknown real essences, he argues, one would not
only be ignorant of coexistent properties, but even of features defining a species. For one
could not identify members of the sort, if kindship were defined by an unknown real
essence. That is, if Aristotelians were right, one would not know any property which
specimens have. This refutation of the Aristotelian conception of species and real
essences secures on the one hand both that we can identify specimens and that we have
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knowledge of features, namely of the properties which define sorts. On the other hand,
however, the argument also establishes that we have hardly any knowledge of coexisting
properties since one cannot conclude that all members of a sort have a certain property if
the feature is discovered in some specimens.
The topic of real essences in this context is evidently manifest when Locke refutes the
Aristotelian conception of species. But it is likewise present, even though less obviously,
when he moves then on to insist lengthy for the rest of the chapter that knowledge of
coexisting properties affords knowledge of necessary connections.615 For the controversy
on real essences makes plain: why in this context Locke repeatedly rejects the view that a
feature can be known to be a coexistent property if it has been displayed by some
specimens; and why he insists that knowledge of a feature truly going together constantly
with the defining properties of a species affords knowledge that there really is a necessary
connection. The backdrop of Locke’s argument that only the perception of necessary
connections yields knowledge of the coexistence of a property is again his contention that
specimens can have and probably do have different real essences. For if the Aristotelian
assumption of precise real essences were true, claims on coexistent properties could
instead be justified even if one is ignorant of real essences, microphysical primary
qualities and causal relationships.
In this context, the issue of real essences manifest in another way as well. Locke regards an
explicit discussion of universal propositions (of coexistence) as necessary because people
often raise knowledge claims in the course of their mistaking the meaning of universal
propositions. The root of the misconception is that they do not understand names of
bodies to stand for ideas, but for Aristotelian real essences.616 Locke apparently alludes
here to his analysis of the fifth abuse where he delineates different types of false
knowledge claims and puts forward an account of why speakers are mistaken about the
signification of their names of bodies.617 Summing up, to grasp adequately Locke’s
argument on coexistence, one has to see its connections to his contention on real essences
being not precise.
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To return to the other three realms of knowledge, propositions of the first realm concerns
the identity or diversity of entities, e. g. ‘Gold is gold’ and ‘White is not black’. Below, I
will come back to our knowledge of these statements which effectively are set aside by
Locke in his analysis of the extent of knowledge.618 The third realm of relations does
however not pertain to bodies. Strictly speaking, as Locke himself concedes, relations
comprise not only what Locke explicitly calls relations, but also identiy, diversity and
coexisting properties, since they all are states of affairs which are represented by, or
correspond to, relations holding amongst ideas. Returning to the specific sense of
relations which applies only to the third realm, Locke’s paradigms for relations are
triangles and their properties. Relations in this sense are simply defined as being relations
in the general sense which are neither identities, nor diversities and nor coexistences of
properties. And for Locke bodies do not possess any relations of this latter kind, but only
relations in the sense of identities, diversities, and coexistences, since bodies qua bodies
are understood as entities possessing only physical properties.
Finally, knowledge of real existence. In the chapter on the extent of knowledge, Locke is
not very much concerned with knowledge of existence, e. g. ‘There is a tree’. But in the
later chapter on knowledge of existant entities (except for oneself and God) Locke
highlights knowledge of the existence of bodies in terms of sensitive knowledge. Present
sensations yield sensitive knowledge of existing natural substances,619 and (reliable)
memories of past sensations establish knowledge that the depicted bodies had existed
beforehand.620 Thus, what Locke calls “experimental knowledge” in connection with
bodies in contrast to “universal knowledge”, is knowledge of the (past) existence of
particulars and of their qualities, e. g. ‘This piece of gold is fixed’, which largely comprises
remembered sensitive knowledge that depends on the individual and “collective”
memory of a subject respectively of society.621 Moreover, since sensitive knowledge is
about particular specimens, one has knowledge of the possession of properties solely with
respect to particular specimens, for instance, that this piece of gold in front of me is
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soluble in aqua regia. This means, other specimens might not possess this feature as well,
e. g. one discovers another lump of gold to be not soluble in aqua regia.
This reasoning would of course be undermined again, if one assumes an Aristotelian
conception of real essences, since it justifies the Aristotelians to conclude that all
specimens have a certain feature if it was discovered in some members of a sort. Locke’s
argument on real essences and them being, in my words, prima facie specific thus
purports correspondingly to his analysis of experimental and sensitive knowledge.
As we have seen, Locke maintains, there is only scanty intuitive and no demonstrative
knowledge of coexisting properties. That is, we have hardly any universal knowledge of
the possession of properties which are not defining a species. But we have sensitive
knowledge of the existence of bodies and of their possession of properties not defining
their species. That is, we do have plenty of knowledge, but it relates only to particular
specimens. Due to our ignorance of real essences and causal relationships, one knows the
possession of properties solely by the senses and only of particular specimens. As Locke
puts it, we have no scientific, but only experimental knowledge of bodies.622
 In addition to the assessment of knowledge as to the four realms, Locke also determines
its extent as to kinds of bodies and properties which contemporary knowledge is about.
First, in his account of the so-called ‘causes of ignorance’ he points to the limits of our
sensual capacities to acquire ideas of properties, namely of secondary qualities.623
Appealing to the existence of other spirits like angels having - of course - better discerning
faculties than we have, Locke argues that one is ignorant of many sorts of properties
which bodies possess. This ignorance is of a principle kind, since it is impossible for us to
have ideas of features which do not affect our senses. Our sensual apparatus simply
restraints the reception of ideas of secondary qualities. Thus, our knowledge of secondary
qualities is fundamentally restricted because it reaches only as far as we can have ideas of
qualities.
Second, in his account of the inadequacy of ideas, Locke makes plain that there is an
incomprehensible high number of secondary qualities all of which we do not even come
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close to know.624 Third, Locke also emphasizes that we do not know the bodies existing
somewhere in the universe.625 Finally and most importantly, he points out the ignorance
of microphyiscal bodies and properties.626 This latter lack of knowledge is of course
manifest in his analysis of the extent of knowledge, since it shows that the condition for
demonstrative knowledge is not fulfilled.
Locke’s accounts of the extent of knowledge as to the four realms and as to different types
of bodies and properties clearly makes plain the limitation of knowledge as to its quantity.
On this backdrop, Locke then assesses its “epistemic value”, namely to which extent it is
real, instructive knowledge.
b. Real, Instructive Knowledge
It becomes manifests in various chapters that Locke is primarily, or even exclusively,
interested in real, instructive knowledge.627 In fact, as will now be delineated, Locke’s
verdict of contemporary knowledge being “very short and scanty” refers to this kind of
knowledge. Why is this so? and what is real, instructive knowledge?
The issue of the reality of knowledge is for Locke rather a pseudo problem. If knowledge is
the perception of the (dis-) agreement of ideas, as Locke rhetorically questions his own
depiction of knowledge, how do we know that it is real?628 If knowledge is based on ideas
and their connections, how can knowledge appropiately be about reality and does not
concern only fantastical entities, e. g. that centaurs are not a harpy?629 The point to note
here is, as will be highlighted in what follows, that the reality of knowledge is understood
in contrast to knowledge relating to fantastical ideas. The debate relates to knowledge
about all kinds of entities, but as a matter of fact it focuses on substances, or respectively
on bodies, since only ideas of them can genuinely be fantastical.630 This apparently is the
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reason why Locke introduces the issue with respect to ideas of substances.
According to Locke’s account, knowledge is real, only if the ideas are real which make up
a (mental) proposition.631 This means for Locke, I maintain: knowledge is real, only if the
ideas depict entities having the kind of relationship to reality that one intends the ideas to
have when forming them. This is indicated by Locke’s comparison of knowledge about
fantastical entities with clear, sensation-like perceptions of entities as we have in dreams:
in both cases our knowledge claims do not refer to entities in the appropriate way in order
to be real knowledge.632 I will not at length argue for this general understanding of
Lockean real knowledge, but it applies in any case to bodies, since Locke clearly maintains
that our knowledge of bodies is real only if our ideas of bodies are real, namely that they
are copies of bodies existing in nature.633 As Locke emphasizes, real knowledge of bodies is
about a type of entities which once existed in the past and possibly exist again now or will
in the future.634 This means, we do have real knowledge of bodies, e. g. that gold is a
metal and that gold is yellow, given that gold is defined as being yellow and by properties
by which metal is defined as well.
At this point, Locke’s distinction between trifling and instructive knowledge comes into
play. The just mentioned kind of knowledge is trifling, since we know the respective
propositions to be true simply in virtue of the fact that one idea includes the other one, e.
g. the idea of gold contains the idea of yellow. One knows a trifling verbal proposition to
be true solely by understanding the subject term and the predicate and realizing that the
former includes the latter. By contrast, Locke calls knowledge instructive if, by and large, it
is not trifling. More precisely, instructive knowledge is neither trifling nor about
identities or diversities, nor about existence. On the face of it, Locke does not regard, for
instance, knowledge of the following facts as instructive: that gold is gold, that gold is not
silver, and that this piece of gold is fixed. This comprehension of instructive knowledge
corresponds to Locke’s contention that one hardly has any instructive knowledge of
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bodies, a claim which otherwise would evidently be contradicted by one’s (intuitive)
knowledge of identities and diversities. As his examples indicate, instructive knowledge
rather comprises (universal) knowledge of coexisting properties and relations.
Given Locke’s assessment of contemporary knowledge as to bodies, it becomes plain that
the judgement of it being “very short and scanty” relates only to real, instructive
knowledge. For one’s universal knowledge of bodies virtually consists only i n
propositions which are already entailed by one’s ideas of bodies. For example, if gold is
defined as a yellow metal one knows that: gold is yellow, gold is a metal, gold is gold, gold
is not silver, gold is not water etc. Evidently, this kind of knowledge is hardly worth
mentioning it since it does not represent an advancement of knowledge which has any
epistemic value. This is the reason why Locke virtually disregards it in his assessment of
the extent of knowledge.635 Thus, Locke’s principal contention that contemporary
knowledge of bodies is very short and scanty does not mean that there is hardly any kind
of knowledge, but that there is hardly any knowledge of coexistence which is real and
instructive. On the other hand, the kind of knowledge we do have according to him is not
neglectable despite his strong rhetoric. After all, fundamental physical laws are deduced i n
connection with Locke’s ordinary notion of body: to have figure entails the possession of
extension, to pass on or receive motion by impulse supposes solidity, and to be both solid
and in space implies the filling of space.636
In the light of what has been argued above, Locke’s analysis of the extent of real,
instructive knowledge of bodies depends heavily on his argument on real essences. For, if
the Aristotelians were right, experimental knowledge could establish real, instructive
knowledge of bodies. For instance, one’s experience of pieces of gold being fixed would
show that in general all gold is fixed. Without having established his views on real
essences, Locke’s reasoning would be exposed to Aristotelian attacks questioning his
conception of instructive knowledge by insisting on a different account of what real
essences are.
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c. The Axiomatic Character of an Ideal Science of Bodies
Given the line of interpretation developed in previous chapters,637 Locke’s comments
clearly imply that in an ideal science bodies are defined and understood in terms of real
essences. Importantly, this depiction of real essences is manifest in two ways in Locke’s
account of knowledge as well. First, Locke justifies the possibility of attaining
demonstrative knowledge in ethics638 and explains our inability to achieve demonstrative
knowledge of bodies639 by the fact that in ethics the nominal essences of entities are also
their real essences, respectively, that the nominal essences of bodies are not their real
essences. Thus, there is a close nexus between the defining of species in terms of their real
essences and achieving demonstrative knowledge.640  On this backdrop, one naturally
reads other passages, that depict the grasp of bodies in terms of real essences, as asserting
an ideal for comprehending bodies in a scientific account,641 namely that real essences
comprise the microphysical properties of bodies in terms of which an ideal science
classifies and depicts them.
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638 643, IV.xii.7f: “This, I think, I may say, that if other Ideas, that are the real, as well as nominal Essences
of their Species, were pursued in the way familiar to Mathematicians, they would carry our Thoughts
farther, and with greater evidence and clearness, than possibly we are apt to imagine.“
§8. This gave me the confidence to advance that Conjecture, which I suggest, Chp. 3. viz. That Morality i s
capable of Demonstration, as well as Mathematics. For the Ideas that Ethicks are conversant about, being a l l
real Essences, and such as, I imagine, have a discoverable connexion and agreement one with another; [...]”. Cp.
560, IV.iii.30; 565, IV.iv.7. Locke links here demonstrative knowledge to adequate ideas, i. e. to ideas
portraying entities by their real essences.
639 644, IV.xii.9: “[...] We advance not here [scil. in our knowledge of substances, or of bodies respectively], as in
the other (where our abstract Ideas are real as well as nominal Essences) by contemplating our Ideas, [...] Here
we are to take a quite contrary Course, the want of Ideas of their real Essences sends us from own Thoughts, to
the Things themselves, as they exist.” Cp. 588, IV.vi.12.
640 Woolhouse draws the conclusion from these passages that knowledge of real essences is prerequisite for a
priori knowledge. Cp. Woolhouse (1981), 144. In fact, he is of course referring to demonstrative knowledge,
since according to Locke we have plenty of trifling a priori knowledge and few instructive a priori knowledge
of bodies. But this claim seems to me too strong, since it is possible on Locke’s position that we have
demonstrative knowledge even if one is ignorant of real essences. Imagine, we discover that the idea of
extension entails another idea. One could then demonstrate that figure entails this further property (of which
this other idea is), given Locke’s contention that figure presupposes extension.
641 In two passages, Locke links the possibility of having a science of bodies and scientific demonstrations with
grasping bodies in terms of real essences. Cp. 644ff, IV.xii.9ff; 647, IV.xii.12.
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Second, Locke conceives scientific research of coexistent properties as terminating in the
attainment of adequate ideas, i. e. of ideas representing bodies by their real essences.642 In
other words, in an ideal classification or science, bodies are grouped together in species
each of which is characterized by a real essence that is specific for the sort. Again, real
essences comprise the properties in virtue of which a body is ideally grasped from a
scientific viewpoint. And since ideas depict bodies by patterns having regularly been
experienced, a real essence is understood to comprise features by which a body is ideally
classified with respect to its similarities that it shares with other bodies on the explanatory
stage. To be precise, in the light of Locke’s comprehension of real essences in terms of
primary qualities, the real essence of a body comprises the kind of explanatory features i n
terms of which one understands the body from a perception-neutral perspective.643
Locke’s account of knowledge therefore re-establishes what has been extensively argued i n
the context of archetypes, species, and essences.
Other commentators have also maintained that bodies are depicted and sorted by their
real essences in an ideal account.644 However, these interpretors neither draw the
consequences for Locke’s notion of real essences nor have they recognized the
contradiction between this depiction of real essences and the concept of real essences
which they ascribe to Locke as his official conception of real essences.
Importantly, an ideal account depicts bodies not only by their real essences, but   enables to
demonstrate, or respectively to deduct, the possession of properties. As delineated above,
demonstrative knowledge is highlighted as the grasp of causal relationships holding
between the defining properties of a species and an idea of a secondary quality, or
alternatively, between the defining features and a microphysical property. This means, if
bodies are defined by real essences, necessary connections between real essences and (the
ideas of) properties of the micro- and macrophysical stage consist for Locke in causal
relationships between real essences and (the ideas of) the features. That is, if one comes to
                                                
642 648, IV.xii.14. In another passage, there is a nexus between scientific knowledge and adequate or
respectively perfect ideas. Cp. 556f, IV.iii.26.
643 Cp. 3c and5b.
644 Cp. Ayers (1970), 39; Mackie (1975), 100. Yolton concedes that Locke’s views entail that, in my words, an
ideal science of bodies depicts them by real essences, but insists that Locke himself is not able to see this. Cp.
Yolton (1970), 33.
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know of these causal relationships one has demonstrative knowledge of the coexistence
of qualities with real essences. As delineated in the context of real essences,645 these
necessary connections correspond to the depend-on relationships holding between the
real essences of bodies and their other features. Both relationships manifest the
possession of coexisting properties. Given Locke’s focus on knowledge of secondary
qualities, an ideal science especially displays via demonstrations that the secondary
qualities of bodies depend on, coexist or respectively are connected with their real essences
in terms of which they are classified in species. This science of bodies would therefore be a
deductive theory of bodies.
The question however is what is the precise nature of necessary connections as well as of
their causal and deductive character. The dominant view is that, in some contexts, Locke
operates with a quasi-geometrical model of necessary connections.646 Locke is taken to
believe that microphysical knowledge of real essences enables us, in principle, to deduce
properties in the same way as one can in mathematics. To be precise, as Ayers contends,
the difference between geometry and physics is that in physics the defining property of
body to push other bodies out of its way is added to its geometrical figure.647 This means,
Locke claims that knowledge of real essences leads to quasi-geometrical, a priori
knowledge. In this sense, Locke is called to be a ‘pure mechanist’.648
Commentators usually agree that this model applies at least to certain physical properties
and their necessary connections to real essences, and most of them accept this model for
all properties.649 By comparison, Wilson agrees that this is Locke’s official position, but
insists that Locke’s comments on superaddition reveal that in important cases causal
relationships are also conceived as “God-forged”, e. g. in the case of gravitational forces
and the interaction between mind and body. According to her, Locke contradicts himself
                                                
645 Cp. 7a.
646 Cp. Ayers (1991), I, 102; Ayers (1991), II, 147; Krüger (1973), 243-46; Mackie (1975), 100-103; Wilson (1979),
143 and 147; Wilson (1982), 249; Woolhouse (1971), 19, 25, and 136.
647 Ayers (1991), II, 147.
648 Cp. Ayers (1991), II, 147 and 153; Mackie (1975), 102.
649 Cp. Ayers (1991), I, 102; Ayers (1991), II, 147; Krüger (1973), 243-46; Mackie (1975), 100-103; Woolhouse
(1971), 19, 25, and 136.
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by maintaining two different models with respect to these physical relationships.650
McCann, by contrast, agrees with Wilson on Lockean superaddition, but disagrees with
her and Ayers that their textual evidence establishes that the quasi-geometrical model i n
also in place for gravitational forces and the causal relationship between mind and
body.651 He thus joins Wilson that in this latter context necessary connections add up to
God-forged correlations between real essences and their dispositions to cause gravitation
and thought.652 For instance, the necessary connections between real essences and
secondary qualities are God-forged causal relationships between real essences and ideas of
secondary qualities which God has simply ordained by law and which do not consist in an
ordinary physical relationship involving physical processes. There is nothing more to say
than that the causal relationship holds due to a devine act of correlating mind and
body.653 McCann attempts to reconcile this view with Locke’s notion of knowledge by
conceiving these God-forged correlations as necessary connections which one can grasp
with the help of God, namely when  God informs us that this and that correlation holds
by an act of devine revelation.654
Below, I will discuss the issue of superaddition. In particular, McCann’s own textual
evidence will be re-interpreted where he sees Locke to distinguish between physical and
mathematical demonstrations in a way that allows him to understand Locke as
coherently maintaining two distinct models, namely that the former are God-forged
connections and the latter conceptual ones.655 Since I will join and reinforce Ayers’s and
Yolton’s criticism against his and Wilson’s approach of understanding Lockean
superaddition, their reading of physical relationships as God-forged connections will not
further be discussed here. So let us turn to the disputed passages which are quoted by
Ayers and Wilson as displaying that Locke holds on to the quasi-geometrical model with
                                                
650 Wilson (1982), 248f.
651 McCann (1985), 256ff.
652 McCann (1994), 71-75. McCann however disagrees with Wilson that Locke takes the cohesion of corpuscles
to be God-forged as well. Cp.  McCann (1994), 68f; Wilson (1982), 248.
653 McCann (1985), 254f. Cp. Wilson’s denial that she wants to ascribe occasionalism to Locke. Cp. Wilson
(1982), 249.
654 McCann (1985), 259; McCann (1994), 72.
655 I refer here to 559, IV.iii.29. Cp. McCann (1985), 258. Cp. 10e.
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respect to secondary qualities. This line of interpretation is indeed tempting, but I will
argue that this model is just the special case of a more general one.
To come to grips, one has first to emphasize that Locke conceives necessary connections to
be physical, causal relationships. We have seen this above in the context of the extent of
knowledge, but in this sense Locke also speaks of necessary connections when drawing
analogies between mathematical and physical knowledge. A deduction of properties is
said to afford ideas of “how those [sensible] Qualities flowed from [real Constitutions]”656
and the internal constitution, or real essence, of a body is depicted as “the cause”657 of the
secondary qualities by which the body is defined as the member of a species. If necessary
connections between physical properties were therefore understood to be on par with
necessary connections between mathematical properties, namely to be conceptual-like
relationships, Locke would maintain that the discovery of causal relationships is done by
discerning conceptual relationships. As just indicated, according to Ayers, quasi-
geometrical physical relationships are obtained by adding the defining property of body to
push other bodies out of its way to its geometrical figure.658 That is, reflection on the
figure of bodies in conjunction with their specific capacity to push other bodies out of
their way is supposed to lead to insights into their causal interactions.
By comparison, I contend, Locke believes that insight into causal interactions leads to a
conceptual understanding of bodies, their constitutions and interactions which
subsequently enables one to find proofs and to attain thus demonstrative knowledge of
coexisting properties. That is, an acquired empirical comprehension of bodies leads to a
conceptual understanding that allows in a second step to deduce properties in a
mathematical style. And a thorough grasp of bodies, their microphysical properties and
causal operations is the basis for a comprehensive axiomatic theory of bodies. As we will
see, for Locke a partial understanding of the causal powers of bodies allows already some
deductions. In this sense, I contend, an ideal science of bodies is for Locke an empirical,
comprehensive, true axiomatic account. Thus, contradicting the orthodox view, a grasp of
only the real essences of bodies, but not of their causal interaction as well, does not enable
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one to discover conceptual-like relationships of (all) their properties.
I will first discuss the controversial passages and come then back to the view I ascribe to
Locke. The point I first want to make is that the less important passages rather support the
here proposed view than the prevailing one. Take, for instance, the following reasoning:
“But such a complex Idea [scil. an everyday nominal essence] cannot be the real
Essence of any Substance: for then the Properties we discover in that Body, would
depend on that complex Idea and be deducible from it, and their necessary
connexion with it be known; as all Properties of a Triangle depend on, and as far as
they are discoverable, are deducible from the complex Idea of three Lines, including
a Space.”659
Locke’s argument against the claim that our common nominal essences are real essences
implies only the contention that the deduction of properties from a real essence implies
knowledge of necessary connections. The passage does not entail that the comparison
between the deduction of physical properties and the deduction of mathematical
properties implies that the physical features are deduced by discerning conceptual-like
relationships only on the basis of knowledge of the real essences of bodies. Instead, Locke’s
comments on the conditions for demonstrative knowledge of coexisting non-sensible
secondary qualities apparently support the here advanced interpretation:  
“§11. Had we such Ideas of Substances, as to know what real Constitutions produce
those sensible Qualities we find in them, and how those Qualities flowed from
thence, we could, by the specifick Ideas of their real Essences in our Minds, more
certainly find out their Properties, and discover what Qualities they had, or had
not, than we know by our Senses: and to know the Properties of Gold, it would be
no more necessary, that Gold should exist, and that we should make Experiments
upon it, than it is necessary for the knowing the Properties of a Triangle, that a
Triangle should exist in Matter, the Idea in our Minds would serve for the one as
well as the other.”660
The punchline is: when Locke insists that a deduction of properties is said to afford ideas
of “how those [sensible] Qualities flowed from [real Constitutions]”,661 he already
presupposes our attainment of knowledge of sense perception, namely of “how those
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[sensible] Qualities flowed from [real Constitutions]” or respectively of how bodies operate
on our senses. This lends credibility to the here proposed reading: in general,
demonstrative knowledge of necessary connections affords, is based on, and consists i n
microphysical knowledge of bodies and their causal interaction. Consider, moreover, the
next passage:
“§16. But as to the Powers of Substances to change the sensible Qualities of other
Bodies, which make a great part of our Enquiries about them, and is no
inconsiderable branch of our Knowledge; I doubt, as to these, whether our
Knowledge reaches much farther than our Experience; or whether we can come to
the discovery of most of these Powers, and be certain that they are in any Subject by
the connexion with any of those Ideas, which to us makes its Essence. Because the
Active and Passive Powers of Bodies, and their ways of operating, consisting in a
texture and motion of Parts, which we cannot by any means come to discover: ’Tis
but in very few Cases, we can be able to perceive their dependence on, or
repugnance to any of those Ideas, which make our complex one of that sort of
Things.”662
Here Locke links the attainment of demonstrative knowledge of coexisting qualities with
the discovery of “the Active and Passive Powers of Bodies, and their ways of operating” i n
terms of the “texture and motion of Parts, which we cannot by any means come to
discover.” In other words, Locke speaks of the necessity to come to know of physical facts,
but not of conceptual relationships holding between ideas. And, decisively, these facts do
not concern only real essences, but their causal interaction as well. On the other hand,
turning now to the most important passage on this issue, there seems to be strong support
for the quasi-geometrical model when Locke declares:    
“I doubt not but if we could discover the Figure, Size, Texture, and Motion of the
minute Constituent parts of any two Bodies, we should know without Trial several
of their Operations one upon another, as we do now the Properties of a Square, or a
Triangle. Did we know the Mechanical affections of the Particles of Rhubarb,
Hemlock, Opium, and a Man, as a Watchmaker does those of a Watch, whereby it
performs its Operations, and of a File which by rubbing on them will alter the
Figure of any of the Wheels, we should be able to tell before Hand, that Rhubarb
will purge, Hemlock kill, and Opium make a Man sleep; as well as a Watch-maker
can, that a little piece of Paper laid on the Balance, will keep the Watch from going,
till it be removed; or that some small part of it, being rubb’d by a File, the Machin
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would quite lose its Motion, and the Watch go no more. The dissolving of Silver in
aqua fortis, and Gold in aqua Regia, and not vice versa, would be then, perhaps, no
more difficult to know, than it is to a Smith to understand, why the turning of one
Key will open a Lock, and not the turning of another.”663
Given that Locke does not mean God-forged connections, the operations Locke speaks
here of are physical processes and causal relationships in the ordinary sense. This means,
Locke’s necessary connections between the properties of bodies are again conceived as
consisting in physical processes or causal relationships respectively. Now, the crucial
question of interpretation relates to Locke’s two comparisons, namely between knowledge
of coexistent secondary qualities, on the one hand, and on the other hand, knowledge
which a watch-maker or a smith has and respectively knowledge in mathematics. Locke
seems to assert that knowledge of the microphysical configuration of bodies is sufficient to
discover how bodies interact and thus which properties coexist with their real essences,
just as we are able to deduce mathematical properties from the real essence of a triangle or
just as we know that a key turns a lock if one knows that the shape of the  key fits the lock.
To come to grips with the passage, one has first to distinguish between two important
claims Locke raises here. First, knowledge of the internal constitutions of two bodies
entails knowledge of how they interact. Second, deduction of the latter kind of knowledge
is like the knowledge a smith or watch-maker has. The key to understand aright both
contentions lies in Locke’s assertion that knowledge of the internal constitution of two
bodies enables one to deduce several of their operations one upon another. That is, Locke
does not contend that knowledge of real essences is the basis for deducing all features
coexisting with the real essences. Moreover, in this sense one naturally reads Locke also as
to our macrophysical knowledge of the causal powers of bodies. For instance, to say that a
key has the capacity to turn a lock, implies that the key is turned with enough force to
move the corresponding part of the lock if the key is turned. Thus, to know in advance
for each degree of force, or impulse respectively, whether the key will turn, one has to
understand how impulse works. In other words, knowledge of causal interaction always
involves an understanding of impulse whether on the micro. or macrophysical stage.
Even if a key is turned with enough force, it passes on impulse to the corresponding parts
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of the lock. Similarly, how can a watch-maker know for every stone beforehand whether
the stone will stop or be crumbled by the famous clock of Strasbourg if it is placed between
the wheels of its mechanical set-up? To know that, one would have to understand not
only impulse, but the coherence of matter as well. But Locke points out that we are
ignorant of both. We do not even have a conception of how impulse operates and what
coherence consists in. These considerations rather make one doubt how Locke can
maintain in the first place that a watch-maker and a smith have knowledge of this kind of
macrophysical capacities of bodies. Yet, Locke clearly asserts this.
First of all, it seems to me, Locke is not aware of the predicament for otherwise he would
have said more and would not have simply drawn the analogy. He apparently believes
and appeals to the intuition that one can have this kind of a priori macrophysical
knowledge. And this intuition can be squared with his official notion of knowledge, I will
now argue. The point is to understand the macrophysical knowledge claims
appropriately.  Take, for instance, a mill stone. Our conception of a mill stone may be that
it is part of a certain mechanism and that it thus has the power to grind corn. If this is so,
one a priori knows that mill stones grind corn. It is a conceptual truth. Crucially, Locke’s
comments show that something similar applies to our concept of body, impulse, and the
coherence of bodies:
“§13. That the size, figure, and motion of one Body should cause a change in the
size, figure, and motion of another Body, is not beyond our Conception; the
separation of the Parts of one Body, upon the intrusion of another; and the change
from rest to motion, upon impulse; these, and the like, seem to us have some
connexion one with another. And if we knew these primary Qualities of Bodies, we
might have reason to hope, we might be able to know a great deal more of these
Operations of them upon another: But our Minds not being able to discover any
connexion betwixt these primary qualities of Bodies, and the sensations that are
produced in us by them, we can never be able to establish certain and undoubted
Rules of the Consequence or Co-existence of any secondary Qualities, though we
could discover the size, figure, or motion of those invisible Parts, which
immediately produce them.”664
Locke contends that we conceive some  connections between the relevant properties i n
causal interaction. That is, we have some understanding of causal processes, namely of
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“the separation of the Parts of one Body, upon the intrusion of another”, of “the change
from rest to motion, upon impulse” and that “the size, figure, and motion of one Body
should cause a change in the size, figure, and motion of another Body”. In short,
according to Locke one has a deficient, but notwithstanding basic grasp of mechanical
interaction.
Of course, this elementary understanding is for Locke acquired by experience. And only
further experience of microphysical properties can enhance this comprehension of the
causal relationships. Importantly, this claim differs from Locke’s contentions that figure
entails extension, that receiving or passing on of motion by impulse supposes solidity,
and that being solid and in space implies the filling of space.665 In the light of Locke’s
notion of knowledge, he clearly takes these propositions for conceptual truths. The reason
is that our experience of causality which is entailed in our concepts implies these
conceptual truths. But this is not the case regarding the details of mechanical interactions.
Accordingly, we cannot deduce coexisting properties from the defining features of body or
of our species of bodies.
Moreover, this limited, but fundamental comprehension of causality has somehow to be
cashed out. I thus interpret Locke to maintain that our everyday grasp of the mechanical,
causal capacities of bodies is derived from our everyday experience of these interactions. If
this is so, there must be some conceptual truths regarding bodies and their interactions, e.
g. that a key with an appropriate shape and being turned with an adequate force opens a
lock. This kind of knowledge of the causal powers of bodies has to be part of our
understanding of them, otherwise we would not know what it means that, for instance,
they can push each other out of their way under appropriate circumstances! This
comprehension of impulse, coherence, intrusion, and the like is rather sketchy. But it
entails knowledge of the behaviour of bodies in the easy cases. Correspondingly,
knowledge of internal constitutions leads to a priori knowledge of several of the
operations of bodies.
According to this reading, in the context of bodies Locke’s necessary connections are causal
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connections. And the kind of necessity of the connection is causal or physical necessity, i.
e. the necessity of natural law. Consequently, one acquires knowledge of these necessary
connections by attaining knowledge of causal relationships.
An ideal science of bodies thus is an axiomatic, empirical account of bodies, their
properties, and caual interactions. This axiomatic theory has to be true and
comprehensive since it is depicted as enabling us to find proofs regarding all coexisting
properties. In other words, such an axiomatic, empirical theory is an ideal scientific
account of bodies. This axiomatic character is manifest when Locke contends that
knowledge of the real essences of bodies and of their operations would make experiments
superfluous since one then could deduce properties as in mathematics.666
“§11. Had we such Ideas of Substances, as to know what real Constitutions produce
those sensible Qualities we find in them, and how those Qualities flowed from
thence, we could, by the specifick Ideas of their real Essences in our Minds, more
certainly find out their Properties, and discover what Qualities they had, or had
not, than we know by our Senses: and to know the Properties of Gold, it would be
no more necessary, that Gold should exist, and that we should make Experiments
upon it, than it is necessary for the knowing the Properties of a Triangle, that a
Triangle should exist in Matter, the Idea in our Minds would serve for the one as
well as the other.”667
Furthermore, Locke also points out that a full grasp of secondary qualities and of all the
circumstances conditioning the possession of them amounts to nothing less than a
comprehensive understanding of matter, namely of “all the Effects of Matter, under its
divers modifications of Bulk, Figure, Cohesion of Parts, Motion, and Rest”.668 And since
necessary connections qua causal interactions involve impulse and, in some cases at least,
the coherence of corpuscles, Locke contends in a similar passage that a thorough grasp of
the coexistence of features affords knowledge of “the coherence and continuity of the parts
of Matter” and “the original Rules and Communication of Motion”.669 It seems to me,
Locke is clearly aware of the implications of his conception of knowledge regarding
bodies.
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But we are far from having such an ideal understanding because we know neither the
microphysical properties of macrophysical bodies nor the microphysical properties of
microphysical bodies, e. g. of minute bodies that are part of the causal interaction between
our senses and macrophysical bodies and the causal relationships between bodies.670 In
other words, due to our lack of microphysical knowledge, i. e. knowledge of minute
bodies transmitting motion from body to body, of the coherence of corpuscles, and of
secondary qualities in terms of microphysical primary qualities, we are ignorant of
coexisting properties since we do not conceive the necessary connections holding between
a feature and the defining properties of a species.
On this backdrop, Locke is apparently aware of the cardinal problem which the axiomatic
character imposes on a science of bodies, namely the question of its material adequacy. In
fact, this is the issue of Locke’s discussion of the reality of knowledge. As has been
delineated above,671 knowledge of bodies is real, if our ideas are copies of bodies existing
in the world. Real knowledge of bodies is only about entities which once existed and for
which it is therefore possible to exist (again) in nature. Given this conception of real
knowledge, it naturally applies to all aspects which a theory of bodies comprises, e. g.
causal relationships. In this sense, Locke’s account of the reality of knowledge addresses
the question of the material adequacy of an ideal, axiomatic theory of bodies.
However, Locke is not fully aware of the significant problem in virtue of which criteria
one knows that a theory truly is materially adequate. As I will indicate at the end of the
chapter, I believe the root of this is Locke’s pessimistic outlook on achieving significant
progress of knowledge. Let it be as it may, Locke has a rather naive view on how we can
recognize that we truly have ideal ideas of microphysical properties and of causal
interactions. He apparently comprehends our acquisition of ideal ideas in terms of ideas
being conveyed by microscopes and thereby conceives microscopes simply as a “technical
extension” of our natural epistemic faculties, i. e. of our senses, since he speaks of
“microscopical eyes” perceiving microphysical structures.672 And given furthermore that
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sensations under ideal conditions serve for him as the paradigm for knowledge,673
knowledge of microphysical features and of causal interactions appears to be undramatic,
namely as being achieved by technically enhanced sensations under appropriate
conditions of perceptions. Locke therefore substantantially underestimates the problem
when we know that our grasp of bodies is comprehensive, e. g., in modern terms, which
elementary particles are really the most basic ones. To put it in another perspective, Locke
does not really tell us when experimental research comes to an end and when the
development of an axiomatic ideal account of our results and the search for
demonstrations begin.
This kind of naivity ties in with Locke’s conception of simple ideas. As Krüger has
pointed out,674 one fundamental problem of simple ideas is that Locke conceives them as
the elementary compounds of cognitive content which one cannot further differentiate.
This, however, is simply not true. One can always go on to distinguish between two
colours. At least in the case of our everyday range of colours, one can always draw finer
distinctions. Locke apparently attempts to solve this problem by introducing the so-called
simple modes, e. g. shades of colours, but unsucceessfully.
The upshot is a partial re-positioning of Locke’s place in the history of philosophy. In
rough and ready terms, Locke’s conception of an ideal account of bodies is substantially
farer away from Descartes’s rationalism and closer to Hume’s empiricism than is usually
thought. The problem with Locke’s conception is not that it has a Cartesian,
mathematical-like a priori character, but that Locke is rather naive on the question of its
material adequacy.
A final remark as to the scope of such an ideal account of bodies. As we have seen, ideas
of bodies genuinely serve the epistemic purpose to sort and depict bodies by similarities
being regularly displayed in nature. This means for Locke, of course, that classification
concerns, in principle, all the (secondary) qualities which bodies possess.675  And it
likewise naturally relates to all bodies irrespective of where they exist, on Earth or
elsewhere in the universe, and irrespective of whether they are of a macro- or
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microphysical size.676  
d. Remedies to Advance Contemporary Knowledge of Bodies
On the backdrop of Locke’s view of an ideal science of bodies, his analysis as to the extent
of contemporary real, instructive knowledge becomes even more disillusioning. One does
not only have hardly any instructive, real knowledge, but one is also miles away from an
ideal science of bodies, since one is ignorant of microphysical properties, namely of real
essences, matter, and causal connections. Not surprisingly therefore, Locke proposes
remedies to advance contemporary knowledge which adds up to a conception of a
contemporary science of bodies that takes into account prevailing ignorance.
Given the attested ignorance of microphysical properties, Locke develops, consequently, a
conception of a contemporary science in the light of his general claim that: ideas of bodies
stand in the perspective of the epistemic project to depict bodies by their similarities on
the macrophysical level as a substitution for a portrayal by their microphysical
resemblances. More specifically, Locke concludes in the chapter on the improvement of
knowledge that one has to conduct experiments to discover similarities and gather their
results systematically. The scientific community, so to speak, should compile their
observations in a so-called natural history of bodies.677 This process is likewise depicted as
making our ideas of bodies more perfect, complete or adequate, i. e. one forms ideas
which include larger sets of properties.678 For example, if experiments reveal that various
parcels of gold share further properties being not contained in the idea of gold, one would
have to generate an idea which also includes the new, found features. In this sense, the
former idea is enlarged and it depicts its specimens more adequately or perfect, namely by
more properties they share. And if some parcels of gold display a quality which other ones
do not, one would have to differentiate the old idea into two ideas portraying two similar,
but different sorts of substances. For instance, one idea represents gold that is fixed,
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whereas another one depicts gold that is not fixed. Progress of knowledge therefore
consists in the genesis of ideas portraying classes of bodies by as many features as possible,
which they recurrently share. This leads to the specification of ideas and differentiation of
species.
Locke also suggests the development of a nomenclature, i. e. a well defined and generally
used set of names of species. In other words, Locke appeals here to his ideal for
communication and demands that scientists use their words with the same, uniform, and
generally known signification. This becomes plain in his account of the imperfections of
words where this use is proposed as a measurement to achieve an unequivocal vocabular
in natural philosophy to avoid confusion that arises because speakers signify different
ideas with the same name.679 Locke is thereby aware of the fact that one can hardly install
a well defined and generally used vocabulary at the conference table. Yet, he insists, this
ideal remains to be realized as far as possible by scientists and in their communication.
Summing up, Locke suggests the development of a nomenclature classifying bodies i n
species as specific as experiments reveal.
What about other means to enhance knowledge?680 In discussing, mathematics and a
future science of ethics, Locke proposes to advance knowledge by finding new
demonstrations, i. e. chains of intermediate ideas linking two ideas making up a
proposition.681 This “method of demonstration”, however, is not recommended for
bodies. The reason becomes obvious in the light of Locke’s account of the prospects of
enhancing human knowledge of bodies, as delineated below:682 According to him, there is
virtually no hope to achieve demonstrative knowledge. Given these bleak prospects,
there is no place for methods to gain knowledge by discovering demonstrations. The
method of demonstration thus applies only to an ideal or nearly ideal science of bodies
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which is out of reach on Locke’s account.
However, besides his two official ways to advance human knowledge, namely natural
history and demonstrations, there are also hints that the use of hypotheses can serve as a
third method. Laurens Laudan has opened a debate with his claim that Locke, allegedly,
recognizes the importance of employing hypotheses in discovering new truths.683 Laudan
is right that in some passages Locke does claim that hypotheses can enlarge our
understanding. For instance, Locke does maintain that hypotheses “are at least great helps
to the memory and often direct us to new discoveries”.684  But if one reads the quote i n
context, its message is less ambituous as it first seems:
“§13. Not that we may not, to explain any Phœnomena of Nature, make use of any
probable Hypothesis whatsoever: Hypotheses, if they are well made, are at least
great helps to the memory and often direct us to new discoveries. But my Meaning
is, that we should not take up any one too hastily, (which the Mind, that would
always penetrate into the Causes of Things, and have Principles to rest on, is very
apt to do,) till we have very well examined Particulars, and made several
Experiments, in that thing which we would explain by our Hypothesis, and see
whether it will agree to them all; [...] And at least, we take care, that the Name of
Principles deceive us not, nor impose on us, by making us receive that for an
unquestionable Truth, which is really, at best, but a very doubtful conjecture, such
as are most (I had almost said all) of the Hypotheses in natural Philosophy.”685
What is Locke’s position? First, since Locke speaks of the human mind as “[penetrating]
into the Causes of Things”, he really refers to explanatory theories and not merely to
empirical generalizations, e. g. gold is fixed. Second, Locke clearly distinguishes here
between useful hypotheses and mere conjectures. Third, according to him, there are only
very few useful hypotheses. Since Locke is explicitly favourable only to Boyle’s
corpuscularian theory and Newton’s principle of gravitation,686 he probably had these i n
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mind.687  Fourth and importantly, this whole passage is a concession, since in the
preceding paragraphs he criticizes people for raising false knowledge claims as to spirits
claims on the basis of not well founded hypotheses. And, more important, in the
subsequent paragraph Locke then mentions “ways to enlarge our Knowledge”  in natural
philosphy which do not include the use of hypotheses.688 Thus, Locke does concede that
hypotheses can enlarge knowledge, (if they are well founded on careful observation and
experiment,) but apparently neither very much and nor in a systematic way. In the light
of Locke’s account, there seems to be no ground for assuming that for him the use of
hypotheses is a genuine tool for discovery. I therefore believe, hypotheses can be useful
for Locke only in the sense that they give a general, though hypothetical, understanding
of bodies at hand, which promotes experiments and thus discoveries. Not more, but not
less either. This corresponds to Locke’s praise of Newton’s principle in the Conduct as
“the basis of natural philosophy”.689   
What about induction?  As we have seen, Locke’s natural history is based on
systematically collected results of carefully conducted experiments. The reconstruction of
Locke’s doctrine of real essences showed however that he emphasizes the gap between
knowledge and probability, natural history and hypothetical generalizations.690 The goal
of natural history is to compile experimental findings to make one’s ideas as adequate as
possible, i. e. to expound a nomenclature depicting species of bodies as precisely as
possible. We thus advance our knowledge by enlarging our conceptual understanding by
forming concepts which depict classes of bodies by as many properties as possible. And
Locke contrasts this kind of knowledge with alleged knowledge claims about coexisting
properties which are only warranted by experience. For instance, given that gold is not
defined by being soluble in aqua regia and given further that we do not have any proof
demonstrating the coexisting of this property with the defining features of gold: one
would still not know whether gold is soluble in aqua regia, even if experiments show that
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all known parcels of gold are soluble in aqua regia. Locke can justify this position in two
ways. First, one knows coexistence only if one perceives the agreement of the respective
ideas; experiments cannot produce knowledge in the required sense. Second, the
(nominal) essences of our ordinary species are made by men, not by nature for which
reason it is epistemically possible that there is a parcel of gold not possessing a certain
property which is not soluble in aqua regia.691
To sum up. pace other commentators, who rather downplay Locke’s remarks on
hypotheses, I therefore count natural history and, to some degree, the use of hypotheses as
Lockean methods of discovery.692 They are, so to speak, his “positive” means to enhance
knowledge. Other comments entail moreover a “negative” measurement, namely the
abandonment of the abuse of language.
In his chapter on maxims, Locke denounces the belief that maxims are steps to improve
knowledge. As previously delineated,693  maxims are very general, intuitively known
propositions having been regarded as principles to prove other propositions. Locke
concedes that our grasp of maxims is proper knowledge since they can be known
intuitively. Yet, he points out, maxims do not help to advance knowledge, since the kind
of propositions which they are supposed to prove are grasped independently of maxims.
The reason simply is that the propositions in question can likewise be known intuitively.
Quite the contrary, the belief in maxims rather confuses and leads to alleged knowledge
claims hindering the progress of knowledge. In this context, Locke discloses the Cartesian
conception of body as being based on an abuse of language and thus refuses the basis for a
Cartesian science of body.694
Not less importantly, throughout the Essay, Locke denounces repeatedly the Aristotelian
use of language and corresponding theories of bodies as the hindrances of the progress of
knowledge.695 Locke regards this abuse of language, I argued, as the source of a
fundamental misconception of what real essences and our common species of bodies
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are.696 According to him, one assumes members of an everyday sort to share a common,
but unknown real essence which comprises all microphysical resemblances that are
classificatorily relevant. This real essence is specific for all specimens of a sort and
distinguishes them from all other species. As a consequence, one abuses language by
taking names of bodies not to stand for the ideas one has, but for unknown real essences.
One thus beliefs to be able to discuss which set of features is the true real essence of a sort,
e. g. what the genuine real essence of human beings is. These speakers moreover conceive
the joining of further properties to an idea as making one’s ideas more complete or
perfect, i. e. as representing the alleged real-essence species by a larger set of properties. In
general, laymen have this understanding. But Aristotelians share this comprehension too
and go even further by developing a more specific, but unintelligible conception of species
and real essences, namely their theory of forms. To abandon the Aristotelian abuse of
language would therefore advance knowledge in the sense that it “[removes] some of the
Rubbish, that lies in the way to Knowledge”.697
Hence, to abandon the use of maxims and the abuses of language advances knowledge
because it leads to the abandonment of Aristotelian and Cartesian misconceptions of a
science of bodies.698 Correspondingly, Locke’s account of remedies is effectively the
suggestion of an alternative, corpuscularian conception of a science of bodies. Maxims are
replaced by experiments and observation, whose results are systematically compiled, as
means to enhance knowledge. A corpuscularian understanding of real essences, species,
and classification is substituted for an Aristotelian one. Locke’s analysis therefore adds up
to an assessment of which scientific programme current at his time is the appropiate one.
(Besides the Cartesian, Aristotelian, and Boylean accounts of bodies the alchemists
proposed another one; but Locke hardly ever referred to them,699 maybe because he
thought Boyle had already successfully dealt with them.) And we have seen, one
substantial issue underlying the debate is what a correct conception of real essences
consists in. For, if the Aristotelian idea that real essences are precise were true, not only
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Locke’s theory of species and classification would seriously be undermined, but also his
major contention on experimental knowledge that findings of new properties as to some
specimens do not justify the conclusion that all specimens possess the features.700
e. Prospects of Advancing Knowledge
The delineated scientific programme of course pertains only to the advancement of
contemporary knowledge. If one had microphysical knowledge of matter, real essences,
and causal interactions, one could enhance knowledge only by discovering
demonstrations establishing, for example, coexistent properties. But what are the
prospects of acquiring one day such an ideal comprehension of bodies? Locke is extremely
pessimistic. For besides his disillusioning stock-taking he moreover raises principal
concerns over achieving a comprehensive understanding of bodies and their properties.
This concerns five aspects of what needs to be known for an ideal science which differ i n
the difficulty of discovering them: real essences, matter, causal interactions amongst
bodies, all the circumstances causally determining a property, and the relationship
between bodies and the human mind.
First, Locke is pessimistic about our discovery of real essences since, apparently, it seems
to him too difficult to construct instruments aquivalent to “microscopical eyes”,701 i. e.
microscopes of a far higher resolution.702 But, according to him, we do have at least a
general corpuscularian conception of what real essences are, namely of real essences being
microphysical structures consisting of cohering corpuscles. Yet, even on the presumption
of the corpuscularian model for real essences, one does not have a comprehension of how
to highlight in principle a particular quality in terms of a specific “combination” of
microphysical primary qualities.703 That is, corpuscularian theory is not specific enough to
determine the corresponding microphysical features for a given quality.
Second, in the case of the substratum of bodies, we even lack an adequate conception. As
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has been indicated in the second chapter,704 Locke rejects all contemporary approaches to
explain the cohesion of corpuscles and the transmission of impulse. For him, one does
not have an idea of how to explain these mechanisms. Similarly, according to Locke one
does not have any idea of how to explain the phenomenon of gravitation.705 On the other
hand, this account implies that one does have a partial, though inadequate, conception of
matter, namely as a stuff consisting of cohering, solid, and mobile corpuscles whose
coherence, mobility and gravitational forces cannot be understood. As Locke puts it, “we
have no Idea of what it is, but only a confused obscure one of what it does”.706
Third, this latter ignorance is effectively paired with the former one as to how bodies
operate upon each other, since causal interaction amongst bodies involves impulse, if not
cohesion as well, and microphysical features which pass on and receive motion. Perhaps
not surprisingly, Locke maintains that it probably needs devine revelation to understand
this kind of causal relationships or respectively the powers of bodies to act upon each
other.707
Fourth, this ignorance is part and parcel of a deeper one. As Locke insists, a
comprehensive grasp of a property is virtually impossible because it includes knowledge
of all the relevant circumstances causally determining the possession of a property.708
Usually, Locke points out, one conceives a body and its properties as being isolated and
solely as to its own constitution; one does not take into account that other bodies
determine a body’s properties as well. But to conceive thoroughly the feature of being
alive, he insists, one has to understand not only the internal constitution, i. e. the
microphysical mechanism, of animals and plants but also causal factors or properties of
other bodies. For example, the sun has a great influence on life, since too much or not
enough sunlight destroys life on earth. Who knows, Locke asks, whether a distant star
does not condition life on earth? (This example relies of course on his assertion that one
is ignorant of distant bodies and their causal interactions to bodies with our planet, but
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the argument is generally related to the vastness of causal interactions among bodies and
our ignorance of them.) Thus, for Locke it is virtually impossible to achieve a
comprehensive understanding of properties, e. g. to be a living body, due to the
complexity of causal interactions.
 Finally, the discovery of the causal relationship between bodies and mind, e. g. sense
perception, is for Locke even more doubtful, since we do not have any conception of the
kind of relationship being involved. Since, as already pointed out, for Locke both
materialism and dualism is possible,709 it is reasonable to assume that for Locke one only
knows that there are correlations between bodies affecting our senses and the appearance
of sensations, but we are completely ignorant of what this causal relationship consists in.
However, several passages in which he expresses his pessimism about discovering the
answer to the mind-body problem have recently stirred up an intensive debate. Margaret
Wilson has opened the discussion by ascribing especially two claims to Locke.710 First,
thought cannot be explained by matter. Second, thought is rather supperadded to
operations by God. Wilson does not highlight the latter assertion, but vigorously denies
that she meant occasionalism.711 At any rate, according to her, Locke holds that
“mechanistic principles, or primary qualities, have limited explanatory power in Locke’s
considered view: the purposive action of an eternal thinking being is also required to
account for phenomena”.712 Thus, in some way or other, God has to play a role i n
explaining the relationship between thought and matter. Edwin McCann argues for the
same position, except that, in contrast to Wilson, he attempts to reconcile the thesis on
superaddition with Locke’s mechanism.713 McCann speaks of “God-forged connections”
between matter and thought, arbitrary laws ordained by God, which “salvage
mechanism”.714 In my eyes, Ayers and Yolton have convincingly shown the defects of
this approach to understand Locke.715 McCann has recently re-stated his position,
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however.716 It seems therefore to me appropriate to reconstruct carefully Locke’s account
by discussing the latest version of this line of interpretation. For instance, Locke argues:
“’Tis evident that the bulk, figure, and motion of several Bodies about us, produce
in us several Sensations, as of Colours, Sounds, Tastes, Smells, Pleasure and Pain,
etc. These mechanical Affections of Bodies, having no affinity at all with those
Ideas, they produce in us, (there being no conceivable connexion between any
impulse of any sort of Body, and any perception of a Colour, or Smell, which we
find in our Minds) we can have no distinct knowledge of such Operations beyond
our Experience; and can reason no otherwise about them, than as effects produced
by the appointment of an infinitely Wise Agent, which perfectly surpass our
Comprehensions. As the Ideas of sensible secondary Qualities, which we have in
our Minds, can, by us, be no way deduced from bodily Causes, nor any
correspondence or connexion be found between them and those primary Qualities
which (Experience shews us) produce them in us; so on the other side, the
Operation of our Minds upon our Bodies is as unconceivable. How any thought
should produce a motion in Body is as remote from the nature of our Ideas, as how
any Body should produce any Thought in the Mind. That it is so, if Experience did
not convince us, the Consideration of the Things themselves would never be able,
in the last, to discover to us. These, and the like, though they have a constant and
regular connexion, in the ordinary course of Things: yet that connexion to nothing
else, but the arbitrary Determination of that All-wise Agent, who has made them to
be, and to operate as they do, in a way wholly above our weak Understandings to
conceive.”717
Let us start with the less controversial statements. First, Locke depicts the relationship
between states of bodies and states of minds as a regular and even causal one, since
according to him experience shows us that they “operate” upon, or respectively
“produce”, each other. Second, the way of how consciousness and body operate on each
other is “unconceivable” for us. Third, this inconceivability is explained by (the content
of) the ideas one has. This latter point becomes plain in another passage which clearly
includes all three statements:
“What certainty of Knowledge can any one have that some perceptions, such as v.g.
pleasure and pain, should not be in some bodies themselves, after a certain manner
modified and moved, as well as that they should be in an immaterial Substance,
upon the Motion of the parts of Body: Body as far as we can conceive being able
only to strike and affect body; and Motion, according to the utmost reach of our
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Ideas, being able to produce nothing but Motion, so that when we allow it to
produce pleasure and pain, or the Idea of a Colour or Sound, we are fain to quit our
Reason, go beyond our Ideas, and attribute it wholly to the good Pleasure of our
Maker. For since we must allow he has annexed Effects to Motion, which we can no
way conceive Motion able to produce, what reason have we to conclude, that he
could not order them as well to be produced in a Subject we cannot conceive the
motion of Matter can any way operate upon?”718
Here, Locke justifies the possibility of both materialism and dualism by our lack of
comprehending interaction between body and thought. More importantly, this ignorance
is explained by our ideas, namely that according to our understanding of body and motion
we cannot conceive how bodies interact on minds by motion. McCann, however, does not
conclude from the passage that it is incomprehensible for us how  they causally interact,
but that they causally interact.719 But this stronger interpretation is clearly not warranted
by what Locke says. Quite the contrary, pointing out the inconceivability, does not mean
for Locke that there is no causal connection between thought and body, since he insists
instead that “we must allow he [scil. God] has annexed Effects to Motion, which we can no
way conceive Motion able to produce”. He thus simply re-asserts his previous claim that
we know this connection from experience. This is manifest in another passage as well:
“We are so far from knowing what figure, size, or motion of parts produce a yellow
Colour, a sweet Taste, or a sharp Sound, that we can by no means conceive how any
size, figure, or motion of any Particles, can possibly produce in us the Idea of any
Colour, Taste, or Sound whatsoever; there is no conceivable connexion betwixt the
one and the other.”720
Given Locke’s assertion in the other quoted comments that there is a causal connection,
he does not claim here that there is no connection because it is inconceivable, as McCann
reads this passage again, but that the connection is inconceivable.721 In the light of our
experience and ideas, Locke maintains, we do know that there is causal interaction, but
not what it consists in. Consequently, we have to understand Locke on this backdrop
when he speaks of “superaddition”:
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“We have the Ideas of Matter and Thinking, but possibly shall never be able to
know, whether any mere material Being thinks, or no; it being impossible for us, by
the contemplation of our own Ideas, without revelation, to discover, whether
Omnipotency has not given to some Systems of Matter fitly disposed, a power to
perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to Matter so disposed, a thinking
immaterial Substance: It being, in respect of our Notions, not much more remote
from our Comprehension to conceive, that GOD can, if he pleases, superadd to
Matter a Faculty of Thinking, than that he should superadd to it another Substance,
with a Faculty of Thinking; since we know not wherein Thinking consists, nor to
what sort of Substances the Almighty has been pleased to give that Power, which
cannot be in any created Being, but merely by the good pleasure and Bounty of the
Creator.”722
Given what has been reconstructed so far, one should not read into Locke’s talk of
superaddition a mysterious or magic conception of (causal) relationship between body and
thought and thus introduce incoherences into his account. As Ayers has already pointed
out, Locke speaks of superaddition in other, definitely harmless contexts as well.723 For
example, mechanical properties of bodies are said to be superadded to matter by God.724 It
is therefore natural to conclude, as Ayers does, that Locke does not raise any stronger
ontological claims than that God has the power to create the world in the way he pleases,
thus determining whether dualism or materialism is true.725 In all the so far quoted
passages, Locke refers to God only as the being who establishes an unknown, for us
inconceivable causal relationship. Consequently, the whole point of Locke’s argument is
an epistemological one: given our narrow understanding of the causal relationship
between thought and body, both materialism and dualism is epistemically conceivable for
us.
On this backdrop, one can naturally read Locke’s reference to God, e. g.: “yet that
connexion to nothing else, but the arbitrary Determination of that All-wise Agent, who
has made them to be, and to operate as they do, in a way wholly above our weak
Understandings to conceive.”726 That is: even though we do not understand how mind
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and body are causally interrelated, yet, one thing is for sure, the relationship is the one
which God wanted it to be. Yet, as McCann rightly insists, if Locke really discusses only an
epistemological issue, why does he refer to God in the first place?727 It seems to me the
deeper reason for Locke’s referring in this context to God’s power to create the world as he
likes it, is that the matter at issue is a physical one. For, by contrast, God could not have
ordained that the three angles of a triangle sum up to three right ones, since this would be
a contradiction in terms. But our notions of matter and consciousness genuinely denote
entities in the world whose constitution therefore depend on God’s will.
This consideration appears to be manifest in another comment on our subject matter.
Here Locke contrasts the inconceivability of triangles having not angles adding up to two
right angles with our inconceivability of how body and thought interact. The
mathematical state of affairs is inconceivable because one cannot conceive that the
holding of the connection (between the idea of triangles and the idea of possessing angles
being equal to two right ones) “depend[s] on any arbitrary Power, which of choice made it
thus, or could make it otherwise.”728 In other words, since not even God can establish a
connection, the possibility that it holds is inconceivable. But the physical fact of how body
and thought causally interact is inconceivable for us because “we cannot but ascribe [how
they interact] to the arbitrary Will and good Pleasure of the Wise Architect.”729 That is,
since God has chosen to create the world as he wanted, it is inconceivable for us (with our
ignorance of the subject matter) to determine the relationship without any further
knowledge.
But given the incomprehensibility of the causal relationship, it becomes virtually
impossible for Locke, in practical terms, to achieve knowledge of coexistent secondary
qualities, since it consists of knowledge of the causal relationship holding between the
microphysical primary qualities of bodies and our ideas of secondary qualities. We afford
devine revelation.
To some up, besides the disenchanting stock-taking of the extent of contemporary
knowledge of bodies, the outlook for advancement is gloomy. Locke seems to concede
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that a classification of bodies in accordance to their real essences might be possible one
day, but the attainment of real, instructive knowledge - not to speak of an axiomatic
theory - is out of reach due to the incomprehensibility of causal relationships. In the light
of these serious doubts about mankind developing an axiomatic theory, natural history
appears not only to be a provisional conception for a science of bodies, but also to be an
ever lasting one. On the other hand, since Locke expresses only reservations but neither
presents nor hints at an argument why one should not be able to attain ideas of matter
and real essences, or microphysical primary qualities respectively, he apparently does not
maintain that we are neceassirily ignorant.
Moreover, as already alluded to,730 there are for Locke further practical limitations to
compile an adequate natural history. Besides the difficulty of establishing a uniform
nomenclature,731 the scope of discovery is restricted. First, he contends that the number of
secondary qualities exceeds our cognitive capacity to know them all, since we cannot
experience all the various dispositions a body has to interact with other bodies. Second,
we do not achieve comprehensive knowledge even of those properties of which, i n
principle, we are capable to attain ideas as to our senses, since bodies and their features
might be out of reach for our faculties, e. g. bodies and their properties somewhere in the
universe. Thus, for Locke, any natural history will remain significantly incomplete even
in respect of classifying bodies as to their properties on the observable level, not to speak
of the microphysical stage.
This pessimistic outlook on the progress of knowledge in the perspective of an ideal
account of bodies might be one reason why Locke’s analysis does not discuss criteria
determining which ideas depict real essences and causal relationships in terms of primary
qualities. As argued above,732 Locke apparently has a rather naive view on how we can
recognize that we truly have ideal ideas of microphysical properties and of causal
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interactions.
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Conclusion
In the preceding chapters, we have assessed Locke’s account of bodies. Before picking up
the overarching theme of this work how the general programme of the Essay “to enquire
into the Original, Certainty, and Extent of humane Knowledge; together, with the
Grounds and Degrees of Belief, Opinion, and Assent”733 is spelled out with respect to
bodies, Locke’s train of thought will first be reconstructed as a whole on the basis of the
foregoing results.
We have seen, Locke motivates his account of ideas on the backdrop of his criticism of
knowledge based on innate ideas or propositions. The second book of the Essay thus
serves Locke to determine the content of ideas in the light of an alternative theory of their
genesis. This means in the case of bodies that the assessment adds up to an analysis of
one’s conceptual understanding of bodies. One part of this account comprises the
explanations of archetypes according to which ideas of bodies are made in the perspective
of a specific epistemic project. One intends to classify bodies in accordance to their
similarities which they possess on the explanatory, microphysical stage: ideas ideally
depict bodies by their real essences. Since, however, contemporary ideas do not portray
bodies by these resemblances, one generates ideas which instead sort bodies by their
similarities on the macrophysical level. But even though the account applies to all
contemporary ideas, whether they are made by laymen, philosophers, or scientists, this
classificatory ideal genuinely pertains only to the scientific context. Locke therefore
conceives an ideal scientific account of bodies as including a classification of bodies. In
Lockean terms, an ideal theory depicts bodies by real, abstract ideas classifying bodies by
their real essences into species.
To depict similarities means for Locke that an idea is made in the light of the recurrent
experience of the same set of properties which is posessed by various bodies. Ideas of
bodies thus serve as copies to portray and sort bodies existing in nature because they
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reflect experience and can therefore guarantee that the depicted entities really exist or at
least can exist. Correspondingly, Locke rejects throughout the Essay alleged ideas of bodies
which are not acquired by experience, namely the Cartesian notion of body and the
Aristotelian conception of species.
Locke’s theory of substratum likewise manifests this “empiristic” conception. Locke
conceives bodies as substances, or respectively, as possessing a substratum. A substratum
is what explains the “union of the properties” being included in an idea. This grasp of
bodies qua substances, i. e. the supposition that bodies have a substratum, is for Locke a
response of the mind to the regular experience of bodies possessing the same set of
properties. That the substratum, as has been argued, is what explains how properties are
interrelated which are contained in an idea. And due to Locke’s corpuscularian
comprehension of body, the substratum is identified with a stuff which bodies consist of.
In this sense, the confused idea of substratum, that is included in one’s ideas of bodies, is
for Locke the theory-neutral placeholder for the kind of stuff bodies are made of. This
means, an ideal grasp of bodies does not only depict them by their real essences, but by
their substratum as well. In Lockean terms, an ideal account sorts and portrays bodies by
adequate ideas, namely by ideas representing bodies by their real essences and substratum.
One can illustrate this in terms of Locke’s corpuscularian model for bodies. Bodies are
conceived as consisting of corpuscles, atoms, which are solid, cohere, and are capable to
move and interact by impulse. Explanatory features are thus identified with
microphysical properties, real essences with microphysical structures, and the substratum
of bodies with matter. And since the substratum highlights how the properties of bodies
are interrelated, a thorough comprehension of substratum adds up to a characterization of
matter that elucidates how corpuscles cohere, how impulse works, and how these features
relate to the solidity of corpuscles. Our confused idea of substratum therefore corresponds
to our impoverished understanding of body.
This account of the contemporary comprehension of bodies by comparison to an ideal
scientific one is decisively specified in the comments on resemblance and qualities. The
analysis of Locke’s notion of resemblance and his argument on qualities revealed that
ideal ideas portray bodies from a specific epistemological viewpoint. From this ideal
scientific perspective, bodies and their properties are described in terms of which they are
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conceived independently from the way they are mentally represented. They are grasped i n
terms in which one depicts bodies and their properties as causes of our mental
representations. As we have seen in connection with Boyle’s rejection of real qualities,
Locke calls the kind of properties, which are ascribed to bodies from this standpoint, as
being “real” and as “being in the things themselves”.
The comments on qualities and resemblance thus determine to which degree
contemporary ideas depict bodies from this epistemological perspective. Locke presents a
complex argument to establish that only few properties are real by which one grasps
bodies. On the one hand, a general mechanical conception of bodies is claimed to be the
only conceivable account of their properties and causal interaction with the result that i n
the course of this reasoning Boyle’s corpuscularian set of physical features are identified
with the mechanical features being real qualities. On the other hand, an Aristotelian
theory of sense perception and of the explanatory properties of bodies is rendered
implausible by empirical evidence. Locke thus attempts to show that contemporary ideas
portray bodies largely by non-real qualities and only partially by corpuscularian, real
qualities.
Importantly, due to Locke’s proximity to the corpuscularian hypothesis, he expounds this
argument in terms of the quality distinction and thus identifies real qualities with
primary qualities and non-real qualities with secondary qualities. Accordingly, a
characterization of bodies in terms of their microphysical primary qualities is conceived as
a description from the perception-neutral viewpoint. Thus, since real essences and
substratum are understood in relation to primary qualities, in an ideal theory bodies are
depicted in perception-neutral terms. Since ideas portraying bodies from this perspective
are called resemblances, this means in other words that an ideal theory represents bodies
by “adequate resemblances”.
In the light of this epistemological standpoint, one can also determine in which sense
properties are regarded here as explanatory. In general, these primary or real qualities are
explanatory in the sense in which properties are explanatory in a true and comprehensive
physical account of bodies, their features and causal interactions. Yet, given Locke’s
perception-neutral viewpoint, explanatory properties are additionally grapsed as the kind
of features in terms of which one depicts bodies and their properties when they are
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conceived independently from the way they are mentally represented, namely when they
are understood as causing ideas in sensation.
On this backdrop, Locke moves on to assess names of bodies in the third book. The core of
the argument is his general analysis that names of species denote a sort which is
represented by an abstract idea that is signified by a general term. Locke can thus identify
the nominal essence of a species with the set of properties being included in the abstract
idea signified by the name of the sort. In other words, it is the known abstract idea which
determines the boundary of a sort, not an unknown real essence as the Aristotelians
claim. In the case of bodies, Locke underscores this point by arguing that nominal essences
cannot be said in any intelligible sense that they somehow depend on unknown real
essences which exist in nature. There is no ontologically based devision of bodies that can
exist independently of the classification scheme entailed by our own names and ideas. As
Locke puts it, it is man, not nature, who sorts bodies in the light of their experience of
similarities existing amongst bodies and their features.
I have argued, the overarching issue of this account is not to refute the Aristotelian
theory of species, but to demonstrate that contemporary concepts do not amount to an
ideal classification scheme. Names sort bodies neither in virtue of their real essences, nor
in a way that is aquivalent to a classification in terms of real essences. Rather, experience
shows us that contemporary classifications differ from an ideal scientific scheme. This
view was confirmed by the interpretation of Locke’s notion of real essence. The real
essence of a body comprises the similarities in virtue of which a body qua member of a
species is ideally sorted. Locke thus picks up an idea of classification that is already present
in Boyle’s attempt to adequately sort bodies as to their similarities. Bodies, he says,
“deserve” a certain classification.734 Locke calls the set of features of a body, in virtue of
which it deserves to be sorted, the real essence of the body.
Locke’s semantic contentions are likewise the starting point of his account of the
imperfection and abuses of words. In the case of bodies, both one’s ignorance of real
essences and the classificatory purpose of our ideas come into play again. Since the real
essences of bodies are unknown, speakers are legitimated to generate ideas which can
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include any regularly experienced collection of properties as a substitute for adequate
ideas. Hence, there is no common standard for speakers to establish a uniform meaning
for their names of bodies. And Locke regards the resulting ambiguity of general terms as
the source of fruitless scientific debates really concerning the signification of names only:
“[t]he greatest part of the Questions and Controversies that perplex Mankind [depend] on
the doubtful and uncertain use of Words”.735
But whereas for Locke this so-called imperfection of words is an unavoidable consequence
of our ignorance of real essences, speakers often carelessly abuse words in addition.
According to Locke, abuses lead to misconceptions of what species, real essences, and
bodies are. Aristotelian ideas stand here in the centre of his critic. Locke reconstructs the
Aristotelian comprehension of species, universal propositions, and essences as the
consequence of an abuse of words which takes names of bodies to refer to species being
defined, not by known nominal essences, but by unknown real essences. As the analysis
of Locke’s notion of real essences displayed, Aristotelian real essences are conceived as
being precise, i. e. as being specific for a species and its members. Locke explains this abuse
by two factors. First, one has the tendency to remove the imperfection of names by
supposing that one’s ideas represent a species that is characterized by a real essence.
Second, resemblances obviously existing on the macrophysical level lead to the
assumption that there are corresponding similarities on the explanatory stage. This
second presumption justifies in the eye of the abuse to use names as if they denoted sorts
each one being defined by a real essence, even though this real essence is unknown.
Allegedly, known resemblances on the macrophysical level stand for unknown,
classificatorily fundamental similarities on the explanatory stage. This is the basis for their
understanding of species and essences and, as a consequence, of general terms and
universal propositions. Aristotelian theory and knowledge claims of bodies are rooted i n
confusion.
 Moreover, in the context of maxims, the Cartesian notion of body is disclosed as being the
result of an abuse of ‘body’ which conflates one’s ordinary notion with an artificial one.
According to Locke, Cartesians take their peculiar idea of bodies to be the one which is
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usually named by ‘body’ to the effect that they understand their idea to refer to existing
entities, namely to bodies known from experience. However, Locke points out, our
ordinary idea of body is not the Cartesian one, but the one he has specified. Locke thus
undermines the foundation of a Cartesian science of bodies.
Both Aristotelian and Cartesian ideas of a science of bodies are disclosed as being rooted i n
an unintelligible use of language. That is, Locke refutes these alternative conceptions of a
science of bodies on purely semantic grounds: “deep Learning, and heighth of
Speculation” consists in the “frivolous use of uncouth, affected, or unintelligible Terms”
and in “[v]ague and insignificant Forms of Speech, and Abuse of Language”.736 In this
sense, Locke attempts “[to remove] some of the Rubbish, that lies in the way to
Knowledge”.737
This argument is furthermore complemented by Locke’s recommendation of how to use
words properly in order to serve knowledge. Scientists should use their words
unequivocally and as standing for species defined by nominal essences. This is not only a
practical consideration, but has also a direct bearing on the content and purpose of a
science of bodies, since it relates to developing a natural history, namely to the gathering
of experimental results. The recommended use of words thus amounts to the core
conception of a contemporary science of bodies, i. e. to a dictionary that compiles
experimental findings in terms of a nomenclature. In the light of these results, it becomes
plain why Locke attaches so much importance to his account of words. For his language
critic paves the way for his idea of a science of bodies.
In the fourth book, Locke explicitly turns on knowledge. He first advances a general
definition which, if correctly understood, is a rather innocuous depiction. Knowledge is
the awareness of facts that is achieved by a truth yielding cognitive process. Locke thereby
distinguishes between three types of cognitive process that differ in the difficulty of
grasping the reasons conveying knowledge of a fact. In Lockean words, there are three
different degrees of knowledge which vary in their degree of certainty or evidence
respectively. In this sense, knowledge is said to be the perception of the (dis-) agreement of
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two ideas which is produced by either intuition, or demonstration, or sensation. One
immediate consequence of Locke’s understanding of these three types of knowledge is
that general knowledge is either intuitive or demonstrative whereas sensitive, or
empirical, knowledge is only about a finite number of entities. There only are opinion
and probability as to empirical universal propositions.
In this conception of knowledge, facts are the objects of knowledge. Ideas thereby serve as
constituents of mental representations of  the states of affairs that hold, since these states
of affairs are represented by the joining or separating of two ideas. An ideal scientific grasp
of bodies does therefore not simply consist in a set of ideal ideas. But the foregoing
analysis of ideas is an important, preparatory step. Locke’s assessment of human
knowledge thus spells out the implications of the preceding analysis of ideas as to
knowledge on the backdrop of his conception of knowledge.
Importantly, when assessing human knowledge of bodies, Locke ingenuously applies his
general account of knowledge with respect to the realm of bodies to the effect that a
conception of an ideal of a science of bodies sets the stage for his analysis. Locke
understands his conception of knowledge to imply that an ideal axiomatic theory enables
one to deduce the possession of properties in the light of causal connections. These causal
relationships hold between the real essence of a species and a further property or
respectively between the real essence and the idea of the property. Thus, if one had a
thorough grasp of the microphysical properties of bodies, namely a general understanding
of matter, one could deduce properties, just as one can do in mathematics.  I argued as to
the character of such a science of bodies that Locke is committed to a quasi-geometrical
model only in the sense that a comprehensive theory of bodies is an axiomatic,
mathematical-like account which allows for deductive, demonstrative knowledge. The
scope of this ideal account pertains in principle to all bodies irrespectively of whether they
are of macro- or microphysical size and irrespectively of whether they exist on Earth or
elsewhere in the universe. Correspondingly, the range of properties being deducible is
only limited by our possession of ideas of them.
Such an axiomatic theory leads to the kind of knowledge which in this context Locke calls
instructive and real. Real, instructive knowledge concerns a species of (possibly) existent
bodies and is not “trifling”, i. e. which does not concern the possession of properties
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defining the sort. This conception of knowledge of bodies being about (possibly) existing
entities touches the crucial issue of any axiomatic theory of nature, namely of how one
knows that a given account is truly the ideal one. However, Locke is apparently naive
about the problem. If one only had “microscopical eyes”, one could discern the
fundamental structure of matter and the operations of bodies.
This account of deductive knowledge of properties becomes further complicated by
additional considerations. According to Locke, a comprehensive grasp of a feature
involves knowledge of all the circumstances conditioning the possession of the property.
To pick up his example, if being alive were causally determined by distant stars, one
would have to know this condition for a thorough understanding of being alive. As
Locke indicates, a comprehensive grasp of bodies and their properties adds up to an
understanding of matter under all circumstances. In fact, this contention simply
corresponds to Locke’s conception of ideal knowledge as affording a thorough grasp of
matter and physical laws.
To return to Locke’s train of thought, after having expounded his general account of
knowledge, Locke quantitatively and qualitatively assesses contemporary knowledge on
the background of his preconception of what ideal knowledge of bodies consists in.
Thereby, he is genuinely interested only in our knowledge of universal propositions, e. g.
that gold is fixed, because they relate to a class of entities and can thus enlarge human
understanding as to many particulars at once. Given Locke’s conception of the three
degrees of knowledge, only intuitive and demonstrative knowledge concerns universal
propositions. The result is, as Locke can easily point out, that contemporary general
knowledge chiefly comprises facts that are grasped in the light of one idea including
another one, e. g. that gold is not silver or that gold is yellow. For general knowledge
comprises only few intuitively known universal propositions, e. g. that being uniformly
coloured in one way excludes the possession of another colour, and comprises no
demonstrative knowledge. In modern terms, knowledge by and large consists simply i n
conceptual analysis. In Locke’s words, we largely know trifling propositions, but hardly
any real, instructive ones. It is this viewpoint from which Locke judges knowledge of
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bodies as “very short and scanty”.738 The reason is simple: since one is ignorant of real
essences and causal relationships, one can attain instructive knowledge of only few facts.
On the other hand, according to Locke, one does intuitively know the coexistence of some
primary qualities. And, even though he seems to underestimate their significance, they
effectively represent knowledge of fundamental laws: to have figure entails the
possession of extension, being capable of passing on or receiving motion by impulse
supposes to be solid, and being both solid and in space implies the filling of space. In
principle, these propositions can serve as the starting point of the development of a
deductive science of bodies because they relate to the defining features of bodies qua
bodies. Moreover, I argued, one has knowledge entailed in one’s present conceptual
understanding of macrophysical bodies, e. g. that this key opens that lock or that
millstones grain corn.
In addition, one has sensitive, i. e. perceptual or experimental, knowledge of bodies. But,
as already indicated, sensitive knowledge only pertains to a finite number of bodies. For,
since we do not conceive any causal connections between, for instance, the defining
features of gold and the property of being fixed, experiments can only show that particular
bodies are fixed, but not that all gold is fixed. In this context, Locke is concerned with
language. The reason is that, on the one hand, language is regarded as an indispensable
means for thought and communication which is therefore relevant for knowledge and
that, on the other hand, the Aristotelian abuse of words leads to false knowledge claims i n
terms of universal propositions about coexisting properties. The point of Locke’s
discussion of the Aristotelian abuse in this context is, I argued, that large parts of Locke’s
argument on knowledge of bodies could be questioned if the Aristotelian (ab)use of words
led to knowledge. For, if the Aristotelian account of names, species, and precise essences
were true, this would open the possibility to bypass Locke’s analysis of knowledge and to
establish these far reaching knowledge claims which in truth are unwarranted according
to Locke’s position.
After having advanced this disenchanting stock-taking, Locke develops a conception for a
contemporary science of bodies. He suggests so-called remedies, means to advance the
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progress of knowledge. The proposed remedies add up to the development of a natural
history. Scientists are recommended to compile their experimental findings in terms of a
uniform, standardized nomenclature classifying bodies as precisely as possible with
respect to known similarities. However, Locke regards this measurement as an ideal
which cannot easily be established universally amongst scientists and which can therefore
be realized rather by individual scientists with respect to their own work. At any rate,
natural history is a conception of a contemporary, experimental science of bodies, since it
is not an axiomatic theory, but a collection of similarities on the macrophysical level. In
the light of Locke’s ideal, a natural history is only a provisional account of bodies.
Besides collecting and compiling data in a natural history, Locke also recommends the
employment of hypotheses. As has been suggested, hypotheses are probably conceived as
suggesting new experiments which lead to the discovery of new properties and
similarities. In this sense, hypotheses are means to enhance knowledge. Yet, Locke does
not give any prominence to them, even though he uses the corpuscularian hypothesis i n
his argument on qualities and resemblance, because he apparently thinks that only
natural history can genuinely advance human knowledge.
When assessing knowledge, Locke also comments on the prospects of a natural history to
achieve significant progress. According to him, they are bleak. For besides his
disillusioning stock-taking Locke also raises principal concerns over achieving a
comprehensive understanding of bodies and their properties. For him, it is doubtful
whether we will ever find out features of bodies that are part and parcel of an ideal grasp.
Locke doubts whether mankind will ever know: real essences, matter, causal interactions
amongst bodies, all the circumstances causally determining a property, and the causal
relationship between body and the human mind.
As has been pointed out, these five aspects of an ideal account of bodies differ as to the
inadequacy of our grasp of them and as to the difficulty of discovering them. With respect
to real essences, Locke is pessimistic about our discovery of these microphysical structures
since it seems to him too difficult to construct instruments aquivalent to “microscopical
eyes”, i. e. to microscopes of a far higher resolution than were invented at Locke’s time.
But we have at least a general corpuscularian conception of what real essences are,
namely of real essences being microphysical structures consisting of cohering corpuscles,
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even though this depiction is not specific enough to determine for a given quality the
corresponding microphysical feature. In the other cases, however, we even lack an
adequate conception of the features so that the outlook of exploring them is even more
gloomy. For instance, one has no convincing conception of what matter is, namely of
how corpuscules cohere and how impulse is transmitted. In this sense, knowledge of
matter is more inconceivable than knowledge of real essences. This ignorance of matter is
of course likewise present in one’s grasp of causal interactions, since they are understood
in terms of impulse and, partly at least, of cohering corpuscules. This moreover implies
that, due to its complexity, knowledge of all the circumstances causally determining a
certain property is even more difficult to achieve than a general comprehension of matter
and causal interactions, since it includes a comprehension of causal relationships all of
which one can hardly recognize. Finally, the discovery of the causal relationship between
body and mind, e. g. sense perception, is for Locke the most doubtful one, since we do not
even come close to having an idea of the kind of causal interaction being involved. Is
mind after all matter, or are they two numerically distinct kinds of substances? How do
they interact? Here, we lack a conception of the most general kind of how this
relationship is to be understood.
Corresponding to this gloomy outlook, Locke concedes that a classification of bodies i n
accordance to their real essences might be possible one day, but regards the attainment of
real, instructive knowledge - not to speak of an axiomatic theory - as being out of reach. In
the light of Locke’s serious doubts about mankind advancing an axiomatic theory, natural
history appears not only to be a provisional conception for a science of bodies, but also to
be an everlasting one: “This way of getting, and improving our Knowledge in Substances
only by Experience and History [...] makes me suspect that natural Philosophy is not
capable of being made a Science [scil. a mathematical-like, axiomatic theory].”739
So far to the course of Locke’s argument. We can now take on the question of what the
specific topic of Locke’s theory of bodies is. In the light of the developed interpretation,
one can naturally distinguish between four aspects comprising the account and
elucidating its character.
                                                
739 645, IV.xii.10.
CONCLUSION
319
First, Locke expounds a conception of an ideal science of bodies. This ideal account is
more than simply a true, comprehensive physical theory of body. First, bodies are sorted
as to their most significant resemblances. Second, bodies are understood in causal,
explanatory terms describing their properties in a perception-neutral way. Third, an
axiomatic theory assigns further properties to specimens of sorts in virtue of causal
relationships holding between (the ideas of) these features and the defining properties of
the species. Fourth, to enable the corporative search for proofs, the account is expressed i n
a generally accepted, unambiguous language, i. e. speakers use the same names to denote
the same ideas and species. Thus a Lockean ideal science of bodies includes four elements
in particular: a classificatory component, a perception-neutral viewpoint, an axiomatic
character, and a semantic aspect. One crucial upshot is a partial re-positioning of Locke’s
place in the history of philosophy. Since, in rough and ready terms, Locke’s conception of
an ideal account of bodies is substantially farer away from Descartes’s rationalism and
closer to Hume’s empiricism than is usually thought. The problem with Locke’s
conception is not that it has a Cartesian, mathematical-like a priori character, but that
Locke is rather naive on the question of its material adequacy.
Second, Locke’s theory of bodies assesses contemporary knowledge on the backdrop of his
ideal. Most of Locke’s chief contentions are negative accounts of the limited contemporary
grasp of bodies. First, there is virtually no knowledge of the explanatory, microphysical
properties. One does know the existence of matter, but has no adequate conception of its
properties. Similarly, one is ignorant of real essences and of causal relationships in terms
of microphysical features. Moreover, on the supposition of corpuscularian theory,
contemporary ideas depict bodies largely by non-real, secondary qualities and only by few
real, (macrophysical) primary qualities. That is, ideas of bodies hardly resemble their
properties. On the other hand, given corpuscularian theory, one’s knowledge of
macrophysical primary qualities amounts to knowledge of the concepts in terms of which
(some) microphysical properties are understood qua real qualities, i. e. one knows the
“conceptual type” of (some of) the explanatory basic features of bodies.
Second, this attested ignorance of microphysical features implies of course that one is not
even close of having an axiomatic theory. Contemporary knowledge is “very short and
scanty”, namely it comprises few intuitively known instructive propositions, and no
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deductive, demonstrative knowledge. Contemporary knowledge consists largely of
trifling propositions which simply spell out the content of ideas. Third, a positive account
of human knowledge is however advanced as well. Besides numerous trifling
propositions, one knows some very basic laws of nature. Fourth, there is no established,
standardized scientific vocabulary in terms of which scientists can compile their
experimental findings to a natural history. Fifth, given Locke’s comprehension of
knowledge, the prospects are bleak for him that one will ever achieve significant progress:
to discover real essences, the substratum of bodies, the causal relationships amongst
bodies, all the causal circumstances fully determining the possession of properties, and
the causal interaction between mind and body.
Third, Locke advances a conception of an experimental science of bodies. Given our
ignorance of causal relationships, only natural history can enhance knowledge of
similarities existing amongst bodies on the macrophysical level. Scientists are
recommended to compile corporatively their results of regularly experienced coexisting
properties. Ideally, they do so in terms of a uniform language to avoid confusions and to
promote corporation. The introduction of hypotheses is furthermore welcomed to guide
and to inspire scientists to conduct new experiments and thus gather new data, but this is
not conceived as being essential for the progress of knowledge. Instead, careful
observation and systematic collection of empirical facts are proposed.
Fourth, Locke complements the argument for his own conception of a science of bodies by
a thorough refutation of other contemporary accounts of bodies. These alternative ideas
of a science of bodies are based on confusion for the most part, namely on abuses of names
of bodies. First, the Cartesian notion of body dissolves in the face of language criticism just
as, second, Aristotelian knowledge claims as to universal propositions, species and their
essences. Third, in the light of Locke’s conception of knowledge, Aristotelian maxims are
moreover revealed as not founding a science of bodies. Finally, as alluded to, additional
objections are raised against the intelligibility of the Aristotelian theory of essences and
species as to its explanatory value. These latter reasonings however stand rather in the
shadow of Locke’s sweeping, semantic arguments.
In the light of this line of interpretation, the programme of Locke’s comments on bodies
emerge as amounting to a theory which: (1) specifies what a science of bodies ideally
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consists in, (2) assesses contemporary knowledge in this perspective, (3) advances an
experimental conception of a contemporary science of bodies that proposes means to
enhance contemporary knowledge, and (4) refutes alternative ideas of a science of bodies.
These are the chief issues of Locke’s discussion of bodies. In his comments on bodies, John
Locke therefore spells out the general programme of his epistemology to determine the
origin, certainty, and extent of human knolwedge in terms of a philosophical framework
for a science of bodies.
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